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Foreword
This book was prepared under the “Local Government Policy Partnership” Program,
which is a joint project of two donor organizations. The British Government’s
Department for International Development (DFID) and the Local Government
and Public Service Initiative (LGI) of the Open Society Institute, Budapest launched
this regional program jointly. The “Local Government Policy Partnership” (LGPP)
projects intend to contribute to policy development and innovation in these countries
(http://lgi.osi.hu/lgpp/).
LGPP hopes to develop expertise and to support professional cooperation among
local government specialists throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Parallel to this,
experiences from this region should be made available in Central and Eastern Europe,
and in Central Asia. The core partner countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. However, other countries have been invited to participate in these
regional projects, which would help direct information exchange and comparison of
policy efforts.
LGPP publications include policy studies and proposals discussed with government
officials and experts in the countries involved. Targeted beneficiaries of LGPP projects
are national government ministries, local government associations, research and training
institutions, and individual local authorities throughout the CEE region. LGPP
intends to publish three studies each year.
In the first year of LGPP operations, the following three policy areas were selected
for analysis: (i) education financing and management; (ii) regulation and competition
of local utility services, and (iii) public perception of local governments. The policy
studies were widely disseminated throught our region. They supported the policy
dialogue (e.g. on education  in Macedonia) and served as training materials (e.g. for
regulatory experts).
Topics for the second year of LGPP (2001/2002) were rather different by nature:
a) decentralization and regional development;
b) relationship between local government size, local democracy and local services
delivery;
c) local government and housing.
This volume touches the most critical issues of decentralization reforms: how
democratic institutions and procedures, public service efficiency and size of local
governments are interrelated. Evidence and lessons from countries with fragmented
local government structures (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) are compared
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with countries having traditionally large local authorities (Bulgaria, Poland). Beyond
these country reports, the comparative chapters in this book specify the conditions
and components of each basic policy option.
Kenneth Davey & Gábor Péteri
September, 2002
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Size of Local Government, Local Democracy
and Efficiency in Delivery of Local Services
—International Context and
Theoretical Framework
Pawel Swianiewicz
1. HOW TO MEASURE THE SIZE OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT?
There are at least two potential measures of the size of a local government: population
number and surface area. Both of these have some advantages when applied to
different public administration themes. Population number seems to be the most
popular and the most powerful indicator [King 1984]—this relates directly to those
consumers of locally provided services. Nevertheless, for some issues, such as network
infrastructure, the area to be covered is an almost equally important challenge for
local government. Simplifying matters, we may say that with some services, costs
are first and foremost a function of the number of beneficiaries (customers), while
with others costs are more dependent on the area being covered. In practice, both
factors have some significance. For example: in order to construct a rational school
network, local government not only has to take into account the number of students,
but also the distance from residential areas to the closest school, the social benefits of
maintaining small schools in remote rural settlements, the number of teachers to be
employed, etc.
For some local government activities we might agree that the key factor determining
cost efficiency is population density rather than simple measures of size, as mentioned
above. However, in this book, we will concentrate first and foremost on population
size, only making reference to surface area. There is a strong argument against expressing
the size of a municipality based on population density. Any social research is useful as
long as it results in reasonable policy implications. It is feasible (although sometimes
a political challenge) to re-draw a country’s administrative divisions, to increase or
to decrease the population or area surface size of local government units. Even so, it is
hard to imagine, unless under a dictatorship, that any country’s administrative reform
would have a short-term affect on population density within its existing units.
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2. FRAGMENTATION OR CONSOLIDATION—INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCES AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
What is the optimal size of a local government unit? For many years this has been one
of the most frequently discussed issues related to the organization of a state on a sub-
national level. Such discussions can already be found in works of the classic philosophers.
Plato, in his Republic and Laws, suggested that the ideal city should have a size sufficient
for delivery of all important functions but small enough to protect the unity of the
city. He came to the conclusion that the ideal number of citizens would be 7!, i.e.
5,0401. In the 19th century, the recommendation to organize society into localities
attracted the attention of utopians. Fourier (1829) suggested the organization into
falansters (communes) consisting of 1,620 or, even better, 2,000 persons (inhabitants).
 Turning to more contemporary discussions and solutions, it is striking how much
the size of local governments varies in practice throughout different European countries.
On one hand, we have England, the Nordic countries, and Holland with relatively large
municipalities. On the other hand, France is divided into almost 40 thousand, very
small, local government units. Table 1.1 briefly illustrates this variation.
Countries included in the analysis presented in following chapters of this book
represent a good spread in regards to the size of municipal governments. For instance,
Bulgaria and Poland belong to the group of countries with relatively large local govern-
ments. In contrast Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, after the recent fragmentation
processes, have very small units. This provides a good opportunity to observe a variation
of political, social and economic processes amongst a variety of territorial organization
settings.
Differences between countries may only be explained by history (tradition) and
inertia of the spatial organization to some extent. The territorial organization of some
states’ municipal government is, indeed, deeply rooted in historical tradition and any
change would probably be strongly resisted (France provides a classic example of such
a situation). Still, we can also indicate countries in which the size of municipal government
has only recently been re-shaped. For example, the history of the large British district
is just over 20 years old.2  Also, in Nordic countries amalgamation of small municipalities
been in place no longer than the last 20–40 years. The structural changes introduced
in European countries during the last 40 years have usually lead to enlargement of
local government units. L.J. Sharpe in his report (1995) treats enlargement as a synonym
to changes in territorial structures. The Sharpe generalization stresses the fact that
fragmentation trends in Central–East European countries during the beginning of
1990’s were very atypical. However, during 1980s and 1990s theoretical arguments
in favor of the creation of territorially fragmented systems have become increasingly
more pronounced in many analysis published in Western Europe as well.
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Table 1.1
Average Size of (Municipal) Local Governments in Selected European Countries
Country % of Municipalities Average Population Average Area
Below 1,000 Citizens [sq. Km]
England and Wales 0 123,000 533
Lithuania 0 66,000 1,166
Yugoslavia 0 49,500 487
Bulgaria 0 35,000 432
Sweden 0 29,500 1,595
Holland 0.2 20,500 60
Denmark 0 18,000 150
Poland 0 16,000 130
Macedonia 3 15,800 209
Slovenia 3 10,300 106
Albania 0 10,000 77
Finland 5 10,500 730
Norway 4 9,000 710
Croatia 3 8,800 104
Romania 2 7,600 81
Italy 24 6,500 38
Estonia 9 5,700 178
Spain 61 5,000 60
Ukraine NA 4,600 56
Latvia 32 4,300 115
Hungary 54 3,300 32
Slovakia 68 1,900 17
Czech Republic 80 1,700 13
France 77 1,300 15
NOTE: Countries analyzed in the following chapters of this book are highlighted in bold font, other
Central and Eastern Europe countries are marked in italics.
SOURCE: Newton, Karran (1985), Baldersheim et. al. (1996), The Size of Municipalities..., (1995),
Horváth (1999), Kandeva (2000).
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The issue of the size of local government units has many important practical con-
sequences. This goes beyond the typical results usually identified with territorial
organization. For example, Page and Goldsmith (1987) claim that the shape of territorial
organization, to large extent, will determine other characteristics of the local government
system, including the allocation of functions and the nature of the contact between
central and local governments.
Before we veer into deeper analysis of Central European countries, it is worthwhile
to review the most important arguments for and against small/large local governments.
Keating (1995) claims that the discussion on optimal size of local government
usually focuses on four dimensions:
• Economic efficiency—which scale may produce the most service at the least
cost;
• Democracy—what structures can best secure citizen control over government
and proper accountability;
• Distribution—which structures can achieve the most equitable distribution
of services and tax burdens;
• Development—which structures are best equipped to promote economic
growth?
It is the reform theory that provides the most essential arguments for territorial
consolidation. These arguments can be summarized under the following items:
• There is economy of scale in many local services. Marginal cost of service delivery
is lower if the total amount of produced services is larger;
• Small local governments produce costs related to spillovers (a.k.a. “free-riders”,
those using services in a municipality but who live and pay taxes elsewhere).
Many big cities and their suburbs, which have separate local governments,
provide a good example of just such a   phenomenon. Citizens living in suburbs
pay their taxes locally but they still benefit from many services delivered in
the center of the city. The “central municipality” carries the burden of providing
the services used by commuters. To some extent, this means that tax-payers
living in the center subsidize those who live outside city limits. The situation
is even more dramatic when the rich inhabit the suburbs and the majority
of those living in the center are relatively poor. Examples of spillover are also
encountered in Central European countries. In the Czech Republic, many cities
complain that surrounding municipalities are not willing to co-finance services
(such as schools or administrative services), which are delivered in the city
[Blazek, 1994]. During the beginning of 1990s, one frequent conflict in
Poland was over financing public transportation to the suburbs. This service
was delivered by a company owned by the “central city” but it was mostly
serving citizens from surrounding local governments [Swianiewicz, 1997].
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The spillover effect can never be eliminated (reduction of its negative impact
is usually one reason for central grants systems) but it can be reduced if local
government system is territorially consolidated. Obviously the extent of problems
related to spillovers also depends on how local services are financed. For example,
if tax on citizens’ income is one of major local revenues, the situation can be
quite different depending upon whether revenues are allocated according to
place of residence (as in Scandinavian countries and Poland) or according to
place of work (as in Bulgaria or the Ukraine). Central cities will no doubt benefit
most from taxes on commercial activity and on commercial properties, while
suburban municipalities will benefit more from tax on residential properties.
• Large local governments can provide more functions, which may lead to more public
interest and participation in local politics. Page and Goldsmith (1987) argue
that one of the most important reasons why Northern European countries are
responsible for more functions than local governments in their fragmented
Southern European counterparts, is the large size of their local governments.
This observation was confirmed by Bours (1993) who grouped European local
government systems into 4 clusters3: (A) large and responsible for numerous
functions (Scandinavia, Netherlands, the United Kingdom), (B) average size
and average scope of functions (Finland, Germany, Belgium), (C) small, with
an average scope of functions (France, Spain, Switzerland, Austria), (D) small,
with a narrow scope of functions (Italy, Portugal, Greece). This classification’s
correlation between size and scope of functions is very clear. The theory argues
that a broader list of functions stimulates citizens’ interest and participation as
well as helping to attract “better quality” candidates to local councils [Dahl,
Tufte, 1973]. Of course, this is also related to the fact that the power and prestige
associated with holding office in larger constituencies is greater [Goldsmith, Rose, 2000].
• Territorial consolidation provides more space for interest groups representing a pluralist
society. In this theory, interest groups as well as more developed party systems
are seen as a positive emanation of pluralist society. In big communities, it is
easier to avoid nepotisms or other forms of political clienteles. It helps citizens
influence local politics between the election periods. One potential danger is
related to the presence of dominant pressure groups. Such a danger is smaller
in large territorial units. Goldsmith and Rose (2000) also suggest that there is
better representation of various minority groups in larger local governments,
since bigger municipalities are usually more liberal and disadvantaged groups
are less likely to meet with negative prejudices preventing them from entering
the politics;
• Similarly, in large local governments, there is a greater possibility of a strong civil
society. In large communities, there is a greater chance that a dense network
of voluntary organizations will develop.
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• Large local governments enable promotion of local economic development. This
is the case because larger scale enables complex, coherent planning and also
makes it easier to finance expensive infrastructure investment projects, crucial
for promoting economic development;
• Proponents’ arguments about territorial fragmentation based on “community argu-
ments” are very often idealistic and vague. This line of argument tries to dispel
some of the counter-arguments used by proponents of territorial fragmentation.
It is argued that most people are more interested in getting good quality, cheap
services rather than participating in the everyday decision-making and formu-
lation of local policies. Further, to illustrate how vague the notion of “local
community” is,  Lyon (1987) enumerates 94 different definitions of this term.
The opposing arguments (in favor of territorial fragmentation) include both the
idea of localism [Jones, Stewart, 1983] and that of public choice.  Although branching
from very different theoretical assumptions, both theories come to very similar
conclusions—small is beautiful. The following arguments are those most frequently
used to support this position:
• Contact between councilors and citizens are much closer and politicians are more
accountable to their local communities when in small units. According to this
argument, “social trust is based on strong personal ties in small communities.
Decline of community and social trust resulting from increasing scale will be
reflected in declining political trust” [Denters, 2002]. This high trust issue
should subsequently be reflected in general positive attitudes towards the
elected officials in small units;
• In small units citizens can “vote with their feet” [Tiebout, 1956] i.e. choose
their preferred ratio of local taxes vs. services publicly delivered. According
to the classical Tiebout model, people migrate to local governments in which
the ratio of taxes verses services is closest to their personal preferences.
Territorial fragmentation decreases the costs of migration and increases the
chances of reducing the gap between implemented public policies and the
individual preferences of citizens;
• Small local communities are more homogenous and it is easier to implement
policies that meet the preferences of a large proportion of citizenry (to some extent,
this is a less radical formulation of the Tiebout argument).
• There is more incentive for citizen participation in small communities because a
single individual’s vote will “weigh more”. Denters (2002) provides an excellent
illustration: in Schiemonnikoog, the smallest Dutch municipality, one councilor
represents 111 citizens. While in Amsterdam, there is one councilor for almost
16,250 citizens. The rational of this argument is additionally strengthened
by the more socio-psychological argument that people are more likely to develop
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a stronger sense of community and local identification in smaller, more
homogenous settings. This, in turn, will heighten interest in local affairs
and stimulate political involvement.
• Small local governments are less bureaucratic. In some functions, economy of
scale is overshadowed by problems related to the co-ordination and management
of large units. Administrative function is a good example of this.
• Argument of economy of scale is irrelevant since it is possible to separate responsibility
for service from actual delivery. It is true that economy of scale is important in
many services. But many services may be contracted-out to the private sector
and, in such a situation, economy of scale depends on the size of the private
company. Possible solutions may be found in American and British privatization
of local services [Savas, 1987; Walsch, 1989] but also in the French model
[Lorrain, 1997], in which large public utility companies serve many munici-
palities, or in Germany [Reidenbach, 1997], where economy of scale is
frequently achieved by the creation of multi-sector companies providing
complex services in small towns;
• Fragmentation supports competition between local governments in attracting
capital to those places where it will be most productive;
• Fragmentation supports experimentation and innovation.4  If a given territory
has many small local governments, it is both easier to experiment with various
policies and to learn from neighboring territory’s experiences.
The collection of arguments presented above requires at least one critical comment.
As Sharpe (1995) notes, size arguments cannot be considered in the abstract. Quite
often, what is quoted as an argument for or against small scale local government, in
fact, is not related to the size itself, rather to the social nature of the community.
For example, it is true that most small local governments have less developed pressure
groups and/or weaker media systems. Yet, it is not because they are small, rather,
because they are rural. Only some of arguments quoted above can particularly be
related to the size itself.
3. ECONOMICS IN SEARCH OF THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT—KING’S ATTEMPT AT A SUMMARY MODEL
The economic analysis of optimal size for a local government is presented by King
(1984). It provides a good summary of most the arguments presented above. Limited
space available does not allow us to present the details of his model, but it is
worthwhile to highlight at least the most important elements. The model starts
with analysis of a basic situation in which:
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• all citizens have similar tastes and incomes;
• governments do not co-ordinate with each other
• citizens are geographically immobile
• the authorities that provide a public service, also produce that service
• only one service is entrusted to sub-central authorities
• the area is geographically homogenous
• the population density of the country is broadly uniform.
These assumptions are successively released in the model analysis. The model is
based on cost-benefit analysis methods.
The basic relationship between present value of gains and size of authorities is
presented in Figure 1.1. The curve OG1 represents gains from economy of scale
(production and managerial gains)—with optimal size at N1, while OG2 represents
gains due to internalization of externalities and approaching the optimal level of
service provision. The total gains are shown by the line OG (with an optimal size at
point N2).
Figure 1.1
The Present Value of Gains and Size of Local Government
The “top point” of the OG curve depends on numerous factors—first of all, it
differs depending  on the service but it also depends on the demand for the service.
If the demand increases, the optimal size decreases because the same quantity of
services may be provided within smaller territory, while reducing unit costs. This
change is illustrated in Figure 1.2, in which the original OG curve moves to OG’
and OG” with the increase of demand for the provided service.
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Figure 1.2
Impact of the Demand for Services and Variation of Citizens’ Preferences
on the Optimal Size of Local Government
The situation is more complicated if we release the initial assumption that citizens’
preferences are uniform. This is illustrated by line L (illustrating looses), which
slopes upwards with increase of population size, because the variation of individual
preferences in larger municipalities is greater and the gap between the final output
(actual provision) and citizens’ tastes has to be larger.
Relaxation of further basic assumptions from the model introduces more
complications:
• redistribution problems related to the geographical variation of the local tax
base—if local governments are small, then variation in their fiscal capacity
is greater. It leads to one of three consequences: (i) regional variation in the
level of service provision (which sometimes is unacceptable for various political
reasons); (ii) greater variation of local tax rates; (iii) complications in the
grant redistribution system. It often happens that optimal size is larger
than has been suggested in our earlier discussion because it helps to reduce
redistribution problems;
• reduction of territorial spillovers also increases the optimal size;
• administrative costs related, for example, to tax collection—this is another
factor leading to the increase of the optimal size (it helps to reduce adminis-
trative “unit costs” of tax collection);
• if services are not directly provided by the local government, rather they are
purchased on the market, the OG curve becomes much more flat. However,
this is not quite horizontal since small local governments may have problems
with efficient control of contracts and may find themselves in monopoly
provision situations more often than larger authorities.
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of Gains
Size of Local
Government
0
G’’
G’
G
L
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
14 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
With some simplification, we may say that the OG curve presents a summary
of theoretical expectations for the impact of size on unit costs of service provision,
while L line represents a summary of theoretical expectations for the impact of size
on democratic processes. The theory also expects that distribution and development
considerations will also push the optimal size in the direction of larger local
governments.
4. SOME EXAMPLES OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE IMPACT
OF SIZE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
There are many empirical analysis which try to expose the following questions:
1) How is size of local governments related to democracy? Is there any relationship
between size and citizens satisfaction as well as between size and ability (and
willingness) to participate in local public issues?
2) How does the size of local governments affect costs of local services’ delivery
and capacity for development?
Ad. 1.
In their classic analysis, Verba and Nie (1972) came to a conclusion which supports
reform theory arguments—that is, participation is positively correlated with the
size of local community. Newton (1982) and Nielsen (1981) formulated similar
conclusions in their studies in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Yet, another
classic book by Dahl and Tufte (1973) leads to opposite conclusions. Very interesting
analysis by Mouritzen (1991) suggests that, in Denmark, trust in local government
is low in big cities (over 100,000) and the optimal point is probably somewhere
between a population of 15 and 20 thousand.
In their recent comparative analysis of the United Kingdom and Norway,
Goldsmith and Rose (2000) found that, in both countries, local elections in larger
municipalities attract more candidates, this may be interpreted as a larger interest
in local politics. In Norway, large cities also have a more balanced social structure
for their councils (i.e. representation by a larger proportion of female councilors).
On the other hand, there is a strong (and continually increasing) negative correlation
between local government size and turnout in local elections in Norway. In the
United Kingdom, such a relationship has not been found. This is probably due to
the large size of local governments in the UK, where a local government with a
population of 50,000 is considered very small. For the nature of social links there is
not a huge difference between a population of 50,000 and 100,000, but there is a
significant qualitative difference between a community of 2,000 and 20,000.
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Rose (2002) provides a comparative analysis of the relationship between size of
local government and non-electoral participation in local politics in Denmark, the
Netherlands and Norway. He comes to the conclusion that size is an important
factor in explaining citizens local political activity. In small local governments,
contacting local politicians, contacting local administration and—to a lesser extent—
attending public meetings, are all usually much more frequent than they are in big
local governments. For other analyzed forms of participation (participation in action
groups and petitioning) the relationship is not so clear nor so straightforward. Analysis
shows a low participation in the smallest municipalities (especially those below
1,000–2,000 citizens) as well as some advantages of larger governments.
Denters (2002) provides clear examples (on the basis of analysis carry out in the
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom) that trust in local
politicians is significantly, and negatively, related to the size of local government.
In spite of theoretical arguments, which present different predictions in this respect,
Denters concludes that the civic trust or higher competence perspectives (which
provide an argument for better “democratic performance” in bigger municipalities)
are not supported by empirical findings.
Many interesting examples of this are provided by a recent Council of Europe
report [The Size..., 1995]. Analysis completed in Finland and Iceland did not lead
to any definite conclusions on the impact of size. In Norway, it was found that
there was larger voter turn-out during elections in small local governments but, on
the other hand, larger units seem to stimulate participation through protest actions
and general political communication seems to be more intensive. Also, in the
Netherlands, size has no clear effect. For example, on one hand, councilors are easier
available to citizens in smaller municipalities, but, on the other hand, in regards to
consultations on decisions, large municipalities were found to be more active.
However, these findings are questioned by Denters, De Jong and Thomassen (1991)
who all criticize Dutch amalgamation policy anyway, arguing that it leads to a
decrease in citizen satisfaction and participation in local public affairs. This is not
always immediately visible in the data because participation is usually positively
related to the level of education and low-educated citizens are frequently over-
represented in small municipalities. Yet, when impact of size by the education level
was controlled, the correlation became much stronger. Surprisingly, the same Dutch
research did not find a correlation between the size of local government and the gap
between policy preferences of citizens and local councilors.
In Sweden, some very interesting research tries to compare the situation before
and after amalgamation of local governments. It found that, after amalgamation, the
intensity of local political life and citizens orientation into local policy issues increased
but the personal acquaintance between residents with local politicians decreased.
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The Council of Europe report also notes also an interesting observation taken
from Central Europe. One of problems with local democracy in the Czech Republic
is that, in very small villages, it is often difficult to find enough citizens willing to
be members of the municipal bodies prescribed by the law.
Ad. 2.
In regards to costs of service delivery and its efficiency, various empirical analyses
lead to a variety of conclusions. It is generally accepted that the efficiency function
in relation to the size is U-shaped, with the lowest point representing the effect of
economy of scale. But location of this point is very different in various empirical
analyses. Newton (1992), Sharpe (1995), as well as King (1984) in his theoretical
analysis, all point out that optimal size may differ for various services. Therefore,
optimal size depends on the allocation of functions to local governments.
The Council of Europe survey on the subject [The Size...., 1995] provides
numerous examples of empirical analysis of the impact of size on the efficiency of
local services’ delivery. Still, there is a basic methodological problem with such
analysis. It is extremely difficult to measure the output of certain services and there
is certainly no objective method to measure the benefits arising from them. In
practice, many researchers adopt a simplified method measuring only the cost-side,
following a silent assumption that the level of service provision is invariant. However,
some analyses are worthy of mention. In the Netherlands, it has been found that
size of municipalities has considerable implications in regards to administrative
capabilities concerning certain services such as social security, public order and
safety. Yet, it has little importance in regards to others, such as public works. The
same Council of Europe survey reported results of analysis occurring in many
countries in which the question of the minimum size of municipal government has
been asked. In quite a few of the countries (Italy, Norway, Denmark) the conclusion
was that a population 5,000 is the minimal size for an efficient local government.
Analysis undertaken in the Netherlands and Sweden led to even larger population
threshold of about 8,000.
Most research agrees that larger size increases capacity of local administration to
promote economic development. However, this finding happens to be in question
as well. For example Denters, De Jong and Thomassen (1991), analyzing 30 Dutch
municipalities with less than 30,000 citizens, could find no evidence that bigger
municipalities are more successful in achieving their planning objectives. This fact,
together with other findings, led them to the conclusion that size of local government
is far less important for various dimensions of the quality of government than is generally
presumed.
The brief review presented in this section clearly shows that, although most the
empirical findings confirm theoretical arguments presented in the previous sections,
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there are considerable differences in the theoretical approaches and a considerable
variation of the empirical findings, which lead to far from univocal conclusions.
5. MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION AND FRAGMENTATION
IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE—BASIC FACTS
In the beginning of 1970s, we witnessed the process of territorial consolidation
throughout the whole of East–Central Europe. That change was, to large extent,
inspired by the reform theory arguments and the very strong and wide-spread belief
on the part of communist leaders in the economy of scale. Polish communes were
amalgamated in 1973 and their numbers were reduced from over 4,000 to about
2,400. In Hungary, the number of municipalities was reduced from 3,021 in 1962
to 1,364 in 1988. In the Czech Republic, the number of municipalities was similarly
reduced from 11,459 in 1950 to 4,104 in 1988. In Bulgaria, the number of munici-
palities was reduced from 2,178 in 1949 to 255 at the end of 1980s.
The beginning of 1990s was marked with territorial fragmentation in many of
these countries, a process which might be seen as a reaction to the forced amalgama-
tion of 70s. In Hungary, the number of municipalities sharply increased to 3,133
in 1992, while the increase in Czech Republic was almost 50% and number of
Slovak municipalities increased by over 20 percent. The process of fragmentation in
Poland was much less pronounced. Since 1988, the number of Polish municipalities
has increased by less than 5 percent. Also, in Bulgaria, Romania, as well as in former
Yugoslavia, the process of territorial fragmentation was almost non-existent. As a result,
presently  in Central and Eastern Europe we have examples of countries with many
small local governments (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the Ukraine, Latvia
or—to a lesser extent—Estonia). We also have examples of countries in which the
territorial system is highly consolidated (Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland).
There are several examples as well of countries which remain between these two
extremes (Macedonia, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania). This variation is illustrated
on Figure 1.3. In the Czech Republic almost 10%, and in Slovakia over 4%, of the
local governments are merely tiny villages consisting of less than 100 citizens. Muni-
cipalities with less than 500 citizens constitute almost 60% of all units in the Czech
Republic and in Slovakia the number is over 40%, while the same statistics are
about 15% in Hungary. In contrast, in Bulgaria and Poland, none of local govern-
ments have less than 1,000 citizens and only a very few have less than 2,000. Big
territorial units (over 10,000 citizens) constitute over 90% of all local government
in Lithuania and Yugoslavia, almost 2/3 of in Bulgaria, 1/3 in Poland but only less
than 5% in Latvia, Estonia or Hungary and just over 2% in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia.
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Figure 1.3
Distribution of Local Governments According to Their Population Size
Not surprisingly, in the countries with territorially fragmented systems—the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (and also in some other countries of the
region—such as the Ukraine, where the average size of a municipal government
unit is just over 4,600 citizens, yet in rural areas the average size of over 10,000 of
its local governments is just over 1,500 citizens) the issue of the size of municipal
government has became among the hottest issues discussed both by local politicians
and academics. It has been noted that small local governments (many of them with
less than 100 inhabitants) cannot provide important local services and they slow-
down the decentralization process [see for example: Szabo, 1991]. It has been also
mentioned that territorial fragmentation increases problems related to spillover
[Blazek, 1994]. The problems associated with small local government have frequently
been the focus of very numerous analyses [see for example: Horvath, 1995, who
focused his attention on service delivery issues, or Bucek, 1997, who discussed the
weakness of small local governments in promoting economic growth due to their
lack of capacity to undertake major infrastructure projects].
Contrary to the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, the issue of size of
municipal government has not been widely discussed in Poland nor have any pointed
changes been introduced. The issue has become important only locally, especially
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in communities consisting of a small town and several surrounding villages. In such
local governments, conflicts between urban and rural councilors were quite common.
The former were accused of preferring spending on “pavements and flowers in the
city”5  while the latter prefer development of water supply and roads in rural areas.
Not surprisingly, the division between town and village was the most frequent
reason for the modest increase in number of Polish municipalities during the 1990s.
This is despite the other rational arguments proving there was even an increase of
some service delivery costs after the split [Swianiewicz, 1996].
6. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
—WHICH THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS SEEM TO BE VALID?
Do theoretical arguments cited in the first section of this paper seem to be potentially
valid in Central and Eastern Europe? We hope that the analysis undertaken in our
LGPP project will help to answer this question. It may be best, however, to start by
formulating some initial comments and hypothesis.
It seems to me that most of the arguments used in Western literature are worthy
of consideration and we should keep them in mind when we prepare our analysis,
although there are some specific remarks that are very important.
There is no doubt that economy of scale may be important to many local services
provided in Central and Eastern Europe. One should also consider though that it is
the impact of a weak infrastructure which in some cases makes the benefits of larger
scale in rural areas questionable. For example, it is true that larger schools organized
for children from a few small villages can be not only cheaper but also may provide
better quality education. But for children from villages with very poor or non-
existent transportation connections attending the school may raise additional problems
which can overshadow the potential benefits. During a visit to the Ukraine, I was
told that if snow falls are heavy enough, many villages are almost completely cut-off
for most of the winter.
Similarly, we discuss the use of basic administrative services. Bulgaria definitely
has the largest local government units among those countries under analysis. But those
traveling to the municipal centers in mountain areas may find it very difficult. The
village of Srbnica, in the Rodopy mountains, is located in the Municipality of Velingrad.
The distance between the settlement units is well above 30 kilometers. There is only
one bus per day (and not every day of the week) providing transportation to Velingrad
and most citizens do not have their own cars. How can they use administrative
services in the municipal center? Such a situation puts a very large question mark
over the policy of territorial consolidation justified by the above mentioned theoretical
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argument. It also requires significant “decentralization within the municipality” to
allow the provision of basic administrative services down in individual villages.
But existing data clearly suggests [for Polish evidence see Swianiewicz, 1996,
but similar calculations were conducted in other countries as well] that there is an
economy of scale for administrative services in Central and Eastern Europe. Does it
mean that the arguments, for local and public choice within larger organizational
bureaucracies, are totally invalid? Not necessarily. It might very well happen that
benefits from cheaper administrative services in large local governments are partially
eaten-up by slower decision making processes and more frequent events of corruption
(indirect evidence from Poland suggests that danger of corruption is much larger in
big than in small local governments).
Arguments related to the catchment area and spillover effect remain valid but
should be slightly reformulated. In several Central and Eastern European countries,
some of the taxes providing local budget revenues are to be paid in one’s place of
work not in one’s place of residency (Bulgarian and Ukrainian local shares in Personal
Income Tax provide good examples).  In this case, the list of losers and gainers will
change. Under such a regulation, it is more likely that suburban municipalities will
loose and central cities will gain.
Other theoretical arguments, which require additional comment, concern better
organized pressure groups and more diversified forms of participation in large local govern-
ments. Can this argument, based on the experiences of Western democracies with relatively
long traditions of democratic and civic society, be translated into a realistic scenario
for Central and Eastern Europe where civic society is at a much earlier stage of
formation? This question certainly requires further reflection. It seems that, in Eastern
and Central Europe, development of local media (press, TV stations) is very important
for pluralist politics and this factor may work in favor of larger local governments.
The set of arguments related to closeness and openness of local authorities in small
units may be even more important in our region than in well-established Western
democracies. Lack of well-established democratic traditions and political culture
can make civic control over authorities difficult especially in big, more anonymous
communities.
It seems that incentive for citizens’ interest in local politics can be also provided
by the system of voting. The problem of rural local governments which consist of
several settlement units is proper representation of individual villages. In the
proportional system (like in Bulgaria) there is no guarantee that a council will not
be dominated by representatives from the largest village (town). In the ward majority
system (as in Polish municipalities below 20,000 citizens) more balanced territorial
representation may be secured. Reports presented in the following chapters will
provide us with opportunity to check whether this hypothesis is correct.
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The Tiebout concept of voting by feet is highly controversial anywhere, but it
has to be treated with special suspicion in countries in which spatial mobility is very
low. For example, in Poland, a low level of incentive to migrate as well as structural
shortage of housing flats, are seen as some of the most important problems in developing
a sound policy to cope with unemployment. Still, there is no doubt that the actual
ability to migrate, because of variation in local taxes, is quite small. We can treat the
Tiebout theory as an interesting point of reference or as an example of elegant model,
but certainly it would be unwise to try to apply it in our countries, word for word.
Last but not least, there is the public choice argument, suggesting that the
economy of scale effect should be achieved by private producers to which provision of local
services might be contracted. This raises the question: To what extent are the markets
in Central and Eastern Europe developed? Naturally, the situation may differ from
one country to another (as well as from one locality to another within each of the
countries), but one can definitely say that the types of policies, recommended by
the public choice theory, are still more difficult to implement in practice within
Central and Eastern Europe than in Northern America or Western Europe.
7. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
—WHAT DO WE KNOW FROM EXISTING EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS?
In 1997, mayors from the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia were asked their
opinion on both the general idea of amalgamation and on the impact of possible
amalgamation on different aspects of local communities’ governance6  [for more
details see Swianiewicz, 2000].
The first observation is that there are many missing values in the answers to
relevant questions in the LDI survey—i.e. many mayors do not have very clear
opinion on the issue. It might be interpreted in two ways: respondents either have
not thought about the issue or they considered the various arguments (leading to
different conclusions) and have difficulties deciding.  At first glance, the former hypothesis
is supported by the fact that, in general, when questioned about amalgamation,
Polish mayors have remained undecided much more often (19%) than their Czech
(7%) or Slovak (6%) colleagues. It may reflect the fact that, in Poland (opposite to
two other countries), territorial division on municipal level is not a hot issue. But
surprisingly enough, the situation appears differently when we consider opinions on
individual arguments for and against fragmentation. In this case, the proportion of
undecided Polish mayors is lower than in two other countries. The proportion of
missing values in Poland varies from 2.5% to 12.9%. In the Czech Republic, missing
values vary from 4.1% to 13.4%, with three other arguments with missing values
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of more than 10% ratio. In Slovakia, the ratio varies from 7.6% to 17.2%, with five (!)
other arguments with missing values of over 10%. This suggests that, while Czech
and (especially) Slovak mayors usually have a clear general opinion on the issues of
territorial consolidation (as we will see later, they are usually against it), their opinion
is quite often of a more ideological nature rather than based on analysis of rational
arguments.
In general, public choice and localism arguments for territorial fragmentation
are much more convincing to Central European mayors than reform theory arguments
for consolidation. Yet again, there are important differences between the countries
analyzed here.
This is well illustrated in Table 1.2. Overall opinion on consolidation is the
most negative in Slovakia. According to the mayors there, three of the strongest
arguments against amalgamation are: it would increase level of conflicts between
citizens, it would reduce support for local democracy and it would make contact
between residents and councilors more difficult. The top-most convincing argument
against consolidation is the fear of increased conflicts among citizens. It is also the
only argument stressed more in Poland than in the two other countries. Perhaps
Polish municipalities, which are usually much larger than Czech or Slovak, have
had the most frequent negative experiences related to that issue. Indeed, in recognized
cases of division, involving relatively big Polish local governments, the process usually
started with conflicts between villages or the town and surrounding villages
[Swianiewicz, 1995]. Also, conflicts between geographical areas are among the most
important dimensions of political debate in local councils, especially in rural areas,
where local politics is usually non-partisan.
On the other hand, arguments for consolidation that are usually the most
convincing are: better efficiency of service delivery, possible increase of local autonomy
and then (gaining slightly less support) that it would help to increase range of
services delivered locally and it would help to adapt services to local needs. The
score of the latter argument is surprising, since public choice theory uses this argument
to support territorial fragmentation. However, Poland is the only country in which
any of  the arguments for amalgamation proved to be, all in all, convincing for the
mayors (i.e. the average score, as seen in the Table 1.2, is larger than 0)7 .
Arguments evaluated by mayors during the survey may be divided in two groups:
those streaming from reform theory and those referring to arguments of localism or
public choice. The summary results for the two groups or, rather, their defined
arguments, are presented at the bottom of Table 1.2. Public choice arguments (for
fragmentation) are seen everywhere as more important. On the other hand, reform
theory arguments for consolidation are considered as largely valid only in Poland.
However, support for this is not very high in Poland either. Their average score in
favor of reform theory arguments is just over 0. At the same time, they see public
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choice arguments for fragmentation more sharply than their counterparts from the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Table 1.2
Opinions on Various Arguments for Merging Municipalities
in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia
Poland Czech Republic Slovakia
Overall opinion –0.85 –0.72 –1.24
Conditions for local democracy –0.61 –0.70 –0.78
Better efficiency of service delivery +0.16 –0.05 –0.11
Reduce conflicts between areas of municipality –1.27 –1.03 –1.06
Increase range of services delivered by local govt. +0.04 –0.05 –0.04
A just distribution of services among citizens –0.53 –0.56 –0.52
Stimulate contacts between citizens and councilors –0.82 –0.94 –0.82
Increase local autonomy +0.26 –0.08 –0.17
Help to adapt services to local needs +0.10 –0.13 –0.03
Increase solidarity among municipal residents –0.86 –0.64 –0.66
Increase political involvement of citizens –0.55 –0.38 –0.11
Reduce need for state grants +0.02 –0.22 –0.29
“Reform theory arguments”—together +0.04 –0.16 –0.22
“Public choice argument”—together –0.67 –0.62 –0.56
NOTE: The scale of answers was converted into –2—+2 scale, where –2 means—the argument is totally
unconvincing (consolidation would make the situation worse), 0—consolidation would have a
neutral effect, +2—the argument is convincing (consolidation would have a very positive impact).
Scores below 0 mean negative approach towards consolidation, scores above 0 mean positive approach.
The issue of impact of size on citizens perception of local governments and
willingness to participate was partially investigated in last year’s LGPP project
[Swianiewicz, 2001]. However, it was the relationship between local governments
and citizens (not the impact of size) which was the main focus of analysis and the
results quoted below should be treated as preliminary only. It has been discovered
that, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, size was the most
frequently referenced variable influencing the variation in citizens’ opinions. As
local and public choice theoreticians would expect, the smaller the administrative
unit then the more positive the citizens’ opinions on most aspects of local authorities’
activities. They feel better informed and they are more often better acquainted with
the local councilors. We will come back to these findings in the last chapter of this book.
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
24 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
It is hard to formulate very definite conclusions on the basis of the data collected
by the “Public perception…” LGPP project, however, it seems that citizens within
small administrative units, while enjoying many positive features of their local
governments, are at least partially aware that far-reaching decentralization of functions
on to very small authorities would be unrealistic or would lead to inefficiency of
service provision. Still, this conclusion would require further investigation with the
inclusion of economic—not only sociological—analysis.
8. THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The reports presented in the following chapters provide empirical analysis on the
issues previously discussed in regards to four8  Central and East European countries:
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. These analysis lead to general conclusions
and practical recommendations which are presented both in national reports and in
the summary chapter at the end of the book. The main focus is on the basic (the
lowest) level of local governments, however, wherever it is appropriate, references
are made to the situation within the upper tiers of government as well.
Each of national studies tries to answer following questions:
• What is the impact of the size of basic local government units on their
efficiency and effectiveness? Efficiency considerations include; scale economies
in service delivery, the costs of administration, as well as local economic
development policies. Effectiveness includes; issues of public trust and parti-
cipation in local public issues.
• What measures are taken in individual countries to compensate for territorial
fragmentation? These measures may include; municipal cooperation, joint
offices and differential assignment of functions. In amalgamated systems—
how is representation of village interests secured (especially through the election
system)?
These general issues are made operational in a list of more specific research
issues:
• Impact of the size of local governments on the level citizens’ satisfaction with
local government and preservation of community life. There are arguments,
including those formed in the year 2000 following the LGPP “public percep-
tion study” [Swianiewicz, 2001], that people in small local governments are
more willing to participate, trust local authorities more and are more satisfied
with the performance of local administration. However, this is not necessarily
true for the smallest groups and, anyway, it does not concern all dimensions
of citizens’ satisfaction;
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• Catchment area of services delivered by local governments. How often does
it happen that services delivered by one local government serve population
in the surrounding units as well? To what extent is this a problem for small
local governments in rural areas? How this situation is dealt with? For example:
is the service being delivered when a local government receives special
compensation from the state budget? Are there mechanisms of horizontal
compensation among local government budgets? Are there examples of
voluntary and compulsory co-operation of local governments (for example
in form of one-purpose associations)?
• In countries where one local government covers several settlement units—
what are examples of “decentralization within local government”? How are
the relationships between individual villages managed? Is there any form of
government in individual villages? If so, what are its powers and modes of
operation (in functional and financial terms)? What is the level of tension
(conflicts) between villages within one local government and what are
methods to manage these tensions?  What measures are, or should be taken,
to secure sufficient political representation of individual villages in the
amalgamated system?
• The impact of size on unit costs in service delivery. Is there any evidence of
the economy (or diseconomy) of scale in local services? In relation to which
services has this been noticed?
• Impact of territorial organization on the allocation of functions among tiers
of government. In some countries small size is a limit for the further decentra-
lization of many important functions. In result, these are delivered by central
government administration—is that the case in some East-Central European
countries?
• Impact of territorial organization on local economic development policies.
Is there any evidence that territorial fragmentation/consolidation makes
economic development policies less or more effective?
• what are the most important features of national debates on the issue of size
of local governments? Are those debates “a hot issue” on the political agenda
or are they treated as of secondary importance?
Although there is still much to be done, we hope that this book contributes to
filling some of the gaps in our knowledge and also provides input into important
policy discussions going on in several countries of the region.
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NOTES
1 The number of our citizens shall be 5,040—this will be a convenient number; and
these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment [Plato 360 B.C.E.
Laws, Book V., in translation of B.V. Jowett]. Plato was counting heads of households
only. So, taking into account the size of their families, he meant a city of about
25–30,000 inhabitants. Interestingly enough, this was a very similar size to identify
as optimal by empirical analysis in the Polish national chapter further on in this
book.
˛˛
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2 It is worth noting that the United Kingdom, very recently (last ten years) engaged
in discussion about creating a one-tier local government system, leading to even
larger units of local government.
3 Bours tried to also include Central and Eastern Europe countries in his classification.
However, since his data is out-dated and not very precise, we will skip that section
of his classification here.
4 However, it is interesting to note that the most well-known programme, which
focused on stimulation of innovations and experiments in local government, has
been introduced in Nordic countries where the territorial system is consolidated
rather than fragmented [Baldersheim, Stahlberg, 1994].
5 Direct quotation taken during an interview with one of village managers. [See:
Swianiewicz, 1995].
6 I refer to the Local Democracy and Innovation Project which was financed by
the Norwegian government and co-ordinated by Harald Baldersheim from the
University of Bergen. The question I refer to was formulated in the following way:
A merging of municipalities can have an impact in several ways. In the event your
municipality were to be combined with one or more neighbouring municipalities, do
you think it would lead to an improvement or worsening with respect to following matters:
... (individual items assessed by local mayors are presented in the Table 1.2).
7 A score over 0 means the mayors expected a positive impact from consolidation.
For details of the scaling system used see the note below Table 1.2.
8 Initially, it was assumed that this book would also include a chapter on the
Czech Republic but, eventually, it has not been possible to include the Czech
report. Nevertheless, some examples from the Czech Republic are called upon
in the introductory and summary chapters.
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1. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUES
REGARDING SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
1.1 Dual and Fragmented Settlement Systems
and Changing Urban-Rural Relationships
The most important factors that influenced the Hungarian settlement network were
the following: 1) geographical conditions—landscape, hidrography, collision line of
various regions, 2) special geopolitical location of the country, being at the cross point
between East and West. The features of the Hungarian settlement network are in between
the western and eastern type models. There is a special mixture of regions characterized by
small and large settlements. The settlement structure for the Hungarian Great Plains is
completely different from western style models for settlements because it consists of
relatively large settlements, agricultural towns and homesteads. [Tóth J., 1988]
The average size of a settlement (exempting cities) is 1,264 inhabitants. In the
Great Plain region, the average size of a settlement is 2,000 inhabitants. The most
common size of a settlement, in counties where small villages dominate the settlement
pattern, is between 500–700 inhabitants. Statistically, a total of 17.2% of the popu-
lation (1.7 million people) live in villages under 2,000 inhabitants while villages amount
to 75.8% of the total number of settlements. (In 1900 the first rate was 26.6% and in
1970 it had been 19.3%)
Between 1960 and 1990 a strong concentration process dominated the Hungarian
settlement network. The population in the big cities grew dynamically, while the pop-
ulation and rate of growth in the smaller settlements decreased rapidly. Signs of
deconcentration began to appear in 1990, when the population started growing again
in the smaller settlements. Further expansion of small settlements can be seen between
1990 and 2000. The splitting of many formerly amalgamated settlements has result-
ed 64 new—and rather small—villages.
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Figure 2.1
Differences in the Settlement Structure (2000)
a) Number of Settlements/km2 b) Average Population Number of Settlements
10–19 units 5,000–7,200 people
20–39 units 4,000–4,900 people
40–59 units 2,000–3,999 people
60–69 units 1,000–1,999 people
Due to legal decrees resulting in the formation of new townships during the 1990s,
the average size of the towns decreased from 26,000 to 20,000 inhabitants.
Table 2.1
Changing Size of Settlements Between 1990–2000
Settlement Settlements Population
Types
1990 1999 Changing 1990 1999 Changing
[%] [%]
Number [%] Number [%] Number [%] Number [%]
Under 499 965 31.4 1,032 33.0 6.9 269,458 2.6 283,365 2.8 5.2
500–999 709 23.1 687 21.9 –3.1 517,670 5.0 501,217 5.0 –3.2
1,000–1,999 647 21.1 655 20.9 1.2 927,841 9.0 942,726 9.4 1.6
2,000–4,999 479 15.6 483 15.4 0.8 1,421,419 13.7 1,448,999 14.4 1.9
5,000–9,999 130 4.2 138 4.4 6.2 886,272 8.6 959,069 9.5 8.2
10,000–49,999 120 3.9 115 3.7 –4.2 2,317,883 22.4 2,204,851 22.0 –4.9
50,000–99,999 12 0.4 12 0.4 0.0 785,278 7.6 749,687 7.5 –4.5
Over 100,000 9 0.3 9 0.3 0.0 3,229,021 31.2 2,953,310 29.4 –8.5
Total 3,071 100 3131 100 2.0 10,354,842 100 10,043,224 100 –3.0
SOURCE:  Central Statistical Office. Statistical Yearbooks 1990, 1999.
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To date, each settlement with a population above 10,000 has been declared a
township. Among settlements with a population under 10,000, a total of 75 of these
have also been declared towns.
1.2 The Features of Local Governmental Legislation
The legal framework of formation and operation of local governments has been laid
down in the Constitution,1  in the Act on Local Governments2  and the Act on Associ-
ations of Local Governments.3
1.2.1 Strong Local Autonomy in Relation to Local Communities
According to the law, a community of local citizens has the right to self-governance.
The state has given up some of its sovereignty and, today, it is not able to intervene in
division of territorial structure suitable to national interests if these interests are in
conflict with opinion of the local community in question. Any change in connection
with this autonomy (merge or split of settlements, establishing new settlements, etc.)
can be implemented only by initiation of local community.
Size was not even an issue when the Constitution and Act No. LXV on Local
Governments was accepted in 1990. These had given the right to every local community
to establish its own local government representative body. (Besides municipal LGs, the
governments of the capital and the counties are also considered local governments.)
According to the legislation, the most important challenge for local self-governing is
managing local public affairs in an independent and democratic way. The LG—with-
in the framework of Act No. LXV—can regulate and govern local public affairs
autonomously. The Court supervises operation of the LGs but only in the case of
infraction of the law does it have the right to interfere with its decisions. The funda-
mental rights for local self-governance are:
• the right to autonomy;
• the right to democratic use of local power;
• the right to legal protection of self-governmental rights.
The formation and operation of their institutions can express the autonomy of LGs. An
LG—within the legal framework—can form its own organizational and operational
structure, create local governmental symbols, and create local badges of honor.
Because of the political conflicts that emerged from the undemocratic and strongly
centralized soviet style council system, the former council units, once covering more
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settlements, have broken up. The former “supply district” and “urban surrounding
zone” categories also have come to an end. Cooperation between new LGs has been
based absolutely on voluntary associations.
Regulation of the minimal size LGs was missing in the beginning. Today, the increas-
ing number of split of settlements and growing fragmentation has demanded some
regulations. Legislation in 1994 changed the preconditions for establishing new LGs.
To establish a new LG, the minimum number of inhabitants is 300. In addition, it has
to prove its ability to accomplish the obligatory tasks arising from the law.
1.2.2 The Unprecedented Large Scale of Local Governmental Competencies
Local communities self-governments were uniquely allotted a lot of authority from
the state to manage public tasks. Most of the compulsory tasks are defined in the Act
on Local Governments itself and we list some of these in chapter 2.2.1. According to
current legislation, the compulsory tasks must be provided by every settlement, irre-
spective of its size and capabilities. Besides these tasks, other “sector” regulations can
also determine compulsory tasks for the LGs, and they usually do just that. The
number of compulsory tasks for LGs increases continually, but without the continu-
ous increase of access to resources needed to accomplish these tasks. Due to the
increasing “sector” tasks, LG offices engage 70% of their capacities to the completion
of central obligatory tasks and only in 30% to deal with local affairs. [Ministry of
Interior, 2001]
1.2.3 The Lack of Spatial Hierarchy
and Differentiated Local Governmental Tasks
The structure of public administration in Hungary has traditionally had three levels
branching from the central one. These included the communities, the districts and
the counties. District governments were abolished in 1984. After 1990, every LG,
even those situated at different territorial levels, gained the same rights within the
Hungarian governmental system. Within the former political system, county gov-
ernments played a central role in unfair redistribution of development resources.
This is why such a strong antipathy evolved against them. This is also why county
and capital governments have no greater authority than that of small villages and
there is no difference in authority between smaller and larger settlements, nor towns
and villages. Subordination between LGs is completely missing from the Hungarian
governmental system.
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LG dominance is expressed through its no more than assisting role of county govern-
ments on the division of competencies. County governments must carry out all those tasks
that are not obligatory for the LGs. Such tasks are public services that cover a part of, or
the whole, county. The county in this structure is not an integrating unit and its most
important character is its on mid-level operation of institutions.
Differentiated delegation of governmental competencies—as prescribed by the Act
on Local Governments—means that local authorities may carry out different tasks
according to local demands and their capabilities. Yet, the legislative body has the
right to delegate more tasks and authority to those LGs with a larger number of inhab-
itants or more developed capabilities. But the LGs priorities are also expressed: The
LG of a smaller community by itself, or by formulating association with other LGs,
can undertake tasks which are delegated as obligatory tasks to larger LGs or county
governments. (In this case, the LG has the right to receive the same subsidy from the
central budget.) However, in practice, while the “sector” authorities give an increasing
number of tasks to the LGs, these tasks are rarely differentiated. They do not differen-
tiate between LGs from villages or towns, smaller or larger communities. Furthermore,
they do not help county governments become real territorial governments with higher
levels of competency.
Delegation of competencies to district centers is part of the rationalization behind the
first tier of public administration. The architectural authority and the department of
child-protection have operated in districts formulated around selected towns since the
1st of January 2001. City administration is responsible for these tasks and LG bodies
have no power in this regard. These districts have been designated by the central
government. Tasks delegated to districts can be fulfilled by voluntary LG administra-
tive associations only in the case of certain architectural affairs. This possibility was
chosen only by a limited number of districts. This is not so suitable for LGs compul-
sory and optional tasks, especially in the case of distributing public services in integrated
territorial units, because the state does not have the right to control and intervene with
matters under the LGs authority.
1.2.4 Freedom to Form Voluntary LG Associations
According to 44th paragraph of the Hungarian Constitution, a local representative
body can freely form association with other local representative bodies. The Act on
Local Governments declares that LGs, within the frame of the Act, can form voluntary
associations with other LGs. The local representative body has the right to decide to
form associations. The Act on Local Governments defines the possible legal forms of
associations. These are the following: administrative authority, institutional directives
and joint representative bodies.4
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Parliament modified the Act on Local Governments and then, in 1997, passed
the Act on Associations and Cooperation of Local Governments. The Act on Associa-
tions and Cooperation of Local Governments only accepts those associations based on
agreement and precisely defines the content of this agreement. This represents an
important legal guarantee for the unified operation of the associations. It also specifies
that the agreement must be sent to the Public Administration Office, which has the
right to make legal reflection. The Public Administration Office then endorses the
establishment of the association, if it corresponds to the rules of the Act. The associ-
ation can begin operation legally only after endorsement. Registration with the court
is not obligatory. The Act makes it possible to form associations with autonomic finan-
cial rights and liabilities. (For example; in the case of common investment, distributing
services or operating institutions.) In this case, the association must be registered with
the court as a legal entity. Such an association can establish institutions, can undertake
authority from LGs, and can even impose taxes (but there is no precedent for this
yet). For the formation of an association as a legal entity, beside the association agree-
ment, a statute is also needed because the association would become a central budget
institution. The County Public Administration Office and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office supervise the operation of local governmental associations. In regards to finan-
cial affairs—in case of the presence of public money—the association would be
supervised by the State Audit Office.
1.3 Traditionally High Levels of Redistribution
The aim of the Concept for Spatial Development [OTK, 1971] was to provide a more
balanced spatial structure in Hungary.5  For this purpose, OTK constructed a hierar-
chical settlement structure system for defining the central function(s) of each level.
The distribution of resources was strongly correlated to the concentration of capital
investments in order to achieve this structure. In large and medium size towns, dis-
tricts with housing blocks were set up equipped with all required facilities, like public
utilities (roads, waterworks, sewage system, central heating, gas works) and human
infrastructure (kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, medical services). At the
same time, public administration and public services (education, health care) became
very centralized. At the village level the number of local councils reduced from around
3,100 to 1,500. According to the rational of the OTK, 2,000 villages became a so-
called ‘settlements without a role’.
As a result of this policy, 90 percent of state grants for capital investment targeted
Budapest and the city network. [Vági, 1982] At the same time, the greater share of the
country (60 percent of the population) was left to enjoy only 10 percent of the capital
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investment resources. Non-centers had almost no chance to develop. ‘Settlements with-
out a role’ applied to two thirds of Hungarian settlements and 20 percent of the country’s
population. However, they received only 3–4 percent of the available financial support
for their development [ed. Kusztosné, 1998]. Since the early 1980s, more voices emerged
calling for a more equitable distribution of capital expenditure because of the great
demographic losses and the growing unbalance in the demographic structure of most
villages.
In the late 1980s, the proposals for the reform of local finance focused on the
following elements [Pitti–Varga, 1995]:
• switch from expenditure oriented to revenue oriented budgetary planning;6
• the revenue system of local councils, including state grants, should be legally
defined based on objective measures adopted by Parliament;
• regulations should be promoted to generation of own revenues;
• local councils should get their properties back;
• the financial background of local councils should be based on locally generated
revenues and normative distributed state grants;
• local councils located in underdeveloped areas and with weak income genera-
tion capacity should get extra state grants (equalization grants) on a normative
basis.
Because of the system change, instead of the reformed council system, the local
self-government system was born in 1990. The principles listed above were also built
into the Local Government Act. Both the distribution of capital investment and state
grants support of LGs capital expenditure became more balanced during the Transi-
tion. In smaller villages (below 1,000 inhabitants), the distribution of these indicators
better reflected the distribution of population.
The share of capital expenditure is a little bit lower. At the same time, the share of
state grants supporting capital expenditure is a little bit higher than their population
proportion. Budapest’s weight changed drastically over this period. The capital
absorbed less than 10 percent of capital expenditure related state grants, about half of
its population share.
Under the soviet style council system, the decisions on public investment were
made on a central level (CG and ministries). Since 1971, the county level received a
greater role in this. Besides the basic priorities of cities and any types of central func-
tion, there has been strong competition amongst counties at the central level, and
among local councils at the county level, for development funds. Success has depended
on the ‘bargaining position’ of each council. [Vági, 1982]
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Table 2.2
Distribution of Capital Expenditure [%]
Category Number of Total State grants
Support
Population LGs Capital Expenditure
1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Counties 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.60 15.93 7.95 49.70 18.92
Budapest 18.56 17.18 0.75 0.76 16.23 26.20 13.94 7.88
Cities 42.69 47.01 5.56 7.43 40.26 34.53 23.36 31.09
Large 19.11 19.69 0.65 0.69 16.93 12.80 7.99 5.97
Medium size 20.45 21.04 3.40 3.49 20.25 15.79 13.68 17.81
Small 3.13 6.28 1.50 3.24 3.07 5.93 1.69 7.31
Villages 38.75 35.81 93.07 91.22 27.58 31.33 13.01 42.10
Above 5,000 inhabitants 8.10 5.11 3.66 2.27 6.03 4.82 2.03 4.73
Between 1,000–4,999 inhabitants 23.37 23.14 38.53 35.95 15.93 20.23 6.47 27.93
Between 500–999 inhabitants 4.89 4.89 22.91 21.84 3.53 3.98 2.32 5.74
Between 200–499 inhabitants 2.08 2.31 20.46 21.78 1.66 2.04 1.58 3.28
Below 200 inhabitants 0.31 0.36 7.52 9.38 0.43 0.26 0.60 0.43
NOTE: Large cities—cities with county rights; medium size cities—cities above 10,000 inhabitants;
small cities—cities below 10,000 inhabitants.
SOURCE: Calculated by Lados, M, based on LG Financial Database of TÁKISZ, 1991 and 2000.
1.4 Regional Divisions
The political electoral districts were determined during preparation for the first demo-
cratic elections in 1990. The main consideration in determining the electoral districts
was equal division of the voters. The country was divided into 176 electoral districts,
with 45–50 thousand voters and 50–60 thousand citizen in every district. In larger
towns there was more than one district and the relationship between the communities
was not taken into consideration. In one district, there can be more than one commu-
nity and, in regions full of small villages, it can be the case that 80 communities form
one district. It also can happen that a part of one town forms one district with the
nearby villages.
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In Hungary today, there is no general principle for organizing public administra-
tion or spatial planning that could influence or determine the formation of general
public administrative districts.
The administrative districts established during the de-concentration process of govern-
mental or partially governmental tasks covered the whole country without overlapping,
but the different tasks have different divisions. The districts of police departments, the
courts, the ambulances, the fire departments, sanitation, the chambers, the enterprise
development agencies, the employment offices, the farmers assistance services and ad-
ministration offices, the tourist agencies, etc., only rarely totally overlap each other and
are supervised and controlled by completely different departments or national author-
ities. The national organizations, because of the lack of coordination, do not know each
other’s spatial structure. They operate their own spatial institution independently
from each other often consuming a lot of local resources uneconomically.
The township districts for public administration have been operating since 2001 as
part of a new regional structure. They were created by delegating special administra-
tive tasks (child protection, construction management) from the villages to town
governmental offices. Their number is less than the number of towns, so, not every
town has public administration district and authority connected to this.
The statistical districts were defined in 19967  and modified in 1999. The basic
requirement was a statistical territorial classification system conforming to the Europe-
an NUTS system. Beside the 7 NUTS II regions, 138 statistical small regions were
determined in 1996 and, due to some adjustments, this number has increased up to
150 now.
Table 2.3
The Hungarian NUTS System
NUTS Level Number of Number of Spatial Units Which
Spatial Units Form a Spatial Unit on the
Next NUTS Level
Average Min–Max
Larger Regions NUTS 1 1
Regions NUTS 2 7 7 7
Counties NUTS 3 19 2.4 1–3
Smaller Regions NUTS 4 150 7.7 5–13
Settlements NUTS 5 3,135 21 3–85
SOURCE: Central Statistical Office Yearbook, 2000.
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Figure 2.2
Development Regions (NUTS II) in Hungary
The division method considered traditional relationships between the settlements
but some deviations from this were tolerated because of the endeavor to create propor-
tionality and implement a town-oriented approach. The average size of the smaller
regions is 21 settlements and 58,000 citizens (excluding Budapest). But the variation is
great. According to the settlement statistics, the smallest small regions are in Hajdu-
Bihar County, where 3–4 settlements cover one small region. According to population,
the smallest ones are in Vas County where there are a lot of small villages. Small regions,
including the county capital, have 5–6 times higher population than the others be-
cause of the large cities and their large surrounding-zones formed by 40–80 settlements.
More than a dozen existing regional divisions (that belong to the three major
groups mentioned above) have no connections to each other. The political, the admin-
istrative and the statistical districts cover each other only by chance.
Table 2.4
Spatial Units (2000)
County Electoral Districts Statistical Small Regions
Total The Smallest The Largest
Districts Districts
Number Average Num- Average Per One Unit Num- Popu- Num- Population
Population/ ber Number Population ber of lation ber of
Spatial Unit of Settle- Settle- Settle-
ments ments ments
Budapest 32 56,611
Central Hungary 48 59,255 14 14 201,407 13 12,684 13 1,785,122
Central Transdanubia 19 58,315 23 18 48,721 5 13,198 17 110,982
Western Transdanubia 17 57,843 20 32 50,203 22 7,661 55 207,692
Southern Transdanubia Southern Great Plain
Central
Transdanubia
Western
Transdanubia
Central
Hungary
Northern Hungary
Northern
Great Plain
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Table 2.4 (continued)
Spatial Units (2000)
County Electoral Districts Statistical Small Regions
Total The Smallest The Largest
Districts Districts
Number Average Num- Average Per One Unit Num- Popu- Num- Population
Population/ ber Number Population ber of lation ber of
Spatial Unit of Settle- Settle- Settle-
ments ments ments
Southern Transdanubia 18 54,154 22 30 45,692 10 11,808 75 206,695
Northern Hungary 23 55,180 23 26 57,157 13 12,395 43 287,812
Northern Great Plain 27 56,402 23 17 69,034 6 15,434 22 300,795
Southern Great Plain 24 55,872 22 11 62,978 4 17,409 14 205,612
Total 176 57,064 147 21 57,829 22 7,661 13 1,785,122
Total excl. Budapest 144 58,632 69,759 22 300,795
SOURCE:  TSTAR Statistical database, 2000.
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FRAGMENTED LOCAL
GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
2.1. Fragmentation of the Local Public Administration System
As a part of the political changes, the former council-system, characterized by joint
councils, ceased. The new local government system (introduced in 1990) returned to a
community basis and duplicated the number of local administration units. Consequently,
the average size of village governments is very small, about 1,300 inhabitants. The local
identity of local self-governments became very strong with the almost unlimited free-
doms. However, it often led to autarchy and did not allow the formation of efficient
administration and a territorial provision system based on LGs’ cooperation.
In 1990, one third of the LGs under a population of 1,000 (528) did not participate in
joint LG offices. The purpose of the joint LG office is to do administrative tasks for those
LGs that are in association. In the instance of LGs with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants,
the law recommends this formation. But a certain sector of LGs refuse to form joint
offices. A smaller part of these LGs, not willing to form joint offices, operate in small
villages. A larger part of them consists of LGs bigger than 1,000 inhabitants that
maintain their independence because of the distance to the next larger settlement or
the lack of traditions. [Szigeti, E., 1994].
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Because of negative experiences during the soviet style council-system, and the lack
of state stimulus for joint LG offices, the spread of this of form of integration decreased, not
increased, during the first half of the 1990s. A slow disintegration of joint LG offices was
experienced during the first 6 years of the new local government system. From 1991—
1993, their number decreased by 6% (30), and the number of LGs integrated to joint
offices decreased by 8% (129). In 1997, the Ministry of Interior that supervises the
LGs decided to make fundamental changes. It formed a new system for centrally fi-
nancing joint LG offices. This included an extra subsidy, in addition to the former base
subsidy, which could be given to every joint office without stipulation. The extra
subsidy is allocated monthly to the offices and its amount depends on the number of
LGs and total population. The new subsidy system allocates extra money to joint LG
offices centered in towns or other large settlements. What is more, the state budget in
2000 put the subsidy system into a normative base. Consequently, in the second part
of the 1990’s, the atomization of local units of administration in the country had
stopped, and the number joint LG offices increased.
But the integration process is not evident; the number of LGs in joint offices is 65
less in 2000 than it was in 1991. So, we can see a process of disintegration again. This
process results in less efficiency and a less professional local administrative structure.
Table 2.5
The Number of Joint Local Governmental Offices and
Their Members Between 1991–2000
Year Number of Joint Member LGs Rate of the Total Average Number
LG Offices Number of LGs [%] of LGs
1991 529 1,526 49.6 2.9
1993 499 1,397 45.0 2.8
1997 492 1,298 41.2 2.6
2000 535 1,461 46.6 2.7
SOURCE: Szigeti E. (1994), p.617, Settlements in the Hungarian Republic, Budapest, 1997, p.10. Fürcht P.
(2000), p.535.
The tendency toward fragmentation of local administration—especially compared
to the former council-system—is better expressed by the number of population served.
The total population served is around 1,000–2,000 for half of the general administrational
units. There are very few single or joint LG offices where the population is over 5,000
people, which is the European optimal standard. [Zehetner, F., 1982; Stern, K., 1968;
Damskis, H., 1993; Knemeyer, F.L., 1993; Marcou, G., and Verebélyi I. (Ed.), 1993]
Most of these administration units maintain a town as their center.
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Table 2.6
Regional Differences in Density of Joint Local Governmental Offices (2000)
and Common Councils (1987)
Region Rate of Rate of Rate of Joint Rate of Commun- Average
Communities Communities LG Offices (2000) ities Belonging  Number of
 Belonging  Belonging in Common to Joint LG Communities
to Common to Joint LG Councils (1987) Offices (2000) Belonging
Councils (1987) Offices (2000) [%] in Communities to One Joint
[%] [%] Belonging to LG Office
Common Coun- (2000)
cils  (1987) [%]
Average for Counties Data
Central Hungary 47.5 8.7 20.0 45.7 2.3
Central Transdanubia 63.7 38.1 75.4 58.8 2.2
Western Transdanubia 88.6 61.7 85.1 69.5 2.9
Southern Transdanubia 85.1 75.9 106.4 77.6 2.8
Northern Hungary 68.7 36.2 60.8 54.5 2.6
Northern Great Plain 64.4 17.6 30.3 26.6 2.3
Southern Great Plain 26.9 10.6 46.7 59.3 2.0
SOURCE: According to Settlements in the Hungarian Republic 2000, Central Statistical Office Budapest,
2000. pp.137–147, Spatial Statistical Yearbook 1987. CSO Budapest, pp.12–13., E. Pfeil (ed.).
Legislation states that the modification or ceasing of administrative authority asso-
ciations is an autonomic decision for the LGs. In this case, every LG has the right to
leave a joint association without any consideration to the greater interests and without
consideration of the interests of any of the other member communities. If LGs are not
able to compromise with each other in order to form a joint office, or there is a LG that
remains without administrational authority, supervising authorities have the right to
oblige the formation of a joint LG office and determine its members. But there are only
a few instances of this.
The quality of local administration depends on the fact that LGs with populations
under 1,000 are not obliged to take part in a joint LG office, it is enough to employ
a chief officer with the necessary qualifications. Legislation does not determine any
criteria for establishing a single office. In practice, to employ a chief officer and one or
two administrators is enough. However, the Ministry of Interior has worked out a
model for LG offices in which the minimum number of employees and their qualifi-
cations are determined according to the LGs’ size and the type of duties to be performed
by the staff. But this model is usually not taken into consideration by the LGs. The
ideal size for an office staff would be 5–6 people, but villages often do not want to
make sacrifices for a more qualified administration. The National Audit (2000) has
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determined that the number of civil servants within LGs is rather low, but the qual-
ification levels are improving.
Examination of 400 LGs by the National Audit Office (2000) has confirmed that
joint LG offices operate efficiently and economically. In 1999, the average cost of LGs’
administrational services per capita were 10,500 HUF. In the joint offices, this num-
ber was 6,500 HUF. In the case of LGs maintaining their own local offices, it was
14,500 HUF. So, the differences are significant. What is more; the greatest differences
are in the case of LGs with 500–1,000 citizens. In these communities, the mainte-
nance of common offices was three times cheaper than independent ones.
2.2 Local Services
2.2.1 Local Service Delivery
The provision of services by the Hungarian LGs is based upon the principle of manda-
tory and optional tasks defined by the Act on Local Governments. Mandatory tasks are
separated into two categories. The first must be provided by/for every community
regardless of type or size. This includes supply of drinking water, kindergartens and
basic education, basic health and welfare services, public lighting, maintenance of local
public roads and cemeteries and the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights. The sec-
ond is determined by legislation and the financial means necessary for such purposes
must be allocated from the state budget. [Temesi, 2000]
This second type is regulated by the Act on Local Governments, which says LGs
with larger populations and greater capabilities may be assigned more mandatory func-
tions and powers in comparison to other LGs. The requirements for different sized
LGs’ personal provision is an example of such regulation:8
• above 2,000 inhabitants, it is mandatory to provide daily social care institu-
tions for elderly people;
• above 10,000 inhabitants, it is mandatory to provide temporary social care
institutions for elderly people;
• above 20,000 inhabitants, it is mandatory to provide various daily social care
institutions for local residents;
• above 30,000 inhabitants, it is mandatory to provide various temporary social
care institutions for local residents.
Services are obviously only for local residents and other provisions are optional.
According to this regulation, only these municipalities receive special grants related to
those services, not others. That is why other municipalities do not install such services
on a voluntary base.
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Considering the general rule that LGs have various functions and powers depend-
ing on the requirements and capabilities of their territories, each LG may undertake
very different tasks. Through the locally elected representative bodies or by decision of
a local referendum, LGs may voluntarily transfer any local public affair, not assigned to
them by law, to the competence of another organ. LGs may also form special associa-
tions to provide local services. Yet, managing voluntary tasks must not endanger the
fulfillment of their obligatory functions.
Between municipalities and county LGs, there is no hierarchical relationship.
Table 2.7
LGs’ Responsibilities in Hungary
All LGs Cities Counties
I . EDUCATION
Pre-school (Kindergarten) M M
Primary M M
Secondary V M
Technical V M
Schools for Handicapped V M
I I . SOCIAL CARE
Nurseries V V
Personal Services for Elderly People M M
Welfare Homes for Elderly People M M
Welfare Homes for Handicapped People V M
Special Social Services (e.g. Homeless) V
 Social Housing V
I I I . HEALTH CARE
Primary Health Care M M
Hospitals V M
IV. CULTURE, LEISURE, SPORTS
Libraries V V M
Cultural Centers V V M
Theaters V V M
Museums V V M
Parks V V
Leisure, Sports V V
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Table 2.7 (Continued)
LGs’ Responsibilities in Hungary
All LGs Cities Counties
V. PUBLIC UTILITIES
Supply of Drinking Water M M
Sewage M M
Central Heating V
VI. ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC SANITATION
Cemeteries M M
Refuse Collection M M
Refuse Disposal M M
Environmental Protection V V
Street Cleaning V V
VII. TRANSPORT, TRAFFIC
Road Maintenance M M
Public Lighting M M
Public Transport V
VIII. URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Master Plans (Structural Plans) V M
Local Economic Development (inc. Tourism) V V
Spatial Planning M
IX. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
Protection of Ethnic Minorities’ Rights M M
Authoritative Functions (e.g. Licenses) V V
Fire Brigades V V
Civil Defense V V
M—mandatory tasks; V—voluntary tasks.
SOURCE: Edited Lados, M. based on Temesi (1993) pp.382–384.
The Act on Local Government assigns tasks for County LGs that are to be provided
throughout the country or for people living in an expansive area covering the area of
several municipalities. However, municipalities may provide other services, like hospi-
tal or secondary schools (gymnasium) if the elected body decides to deliver the service.
They have a right to do so, if more than half of the users, on average, were local residents
in the last four years.9
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2.2.2 Efficiency of Local Services
The unit costs of services change according to the size of the LG and/or the provider of
the service. Services are cost effective when the increase in the effected population or
geographical area of the service does not cause additional costs. Sometimes, however,
empirical studies show contradictory results when testing this principle. Average unit
costs have a ‘U-shape’, which means that services are most costly for the biggest and
smallest municipalities. Decreasing (with increasing size) unit costs characterizes
capital-intensive services in places where the implementation of the service depends on
the use of technology and the level of specialization. In the case of labor-intensive
services, higher management and communication costs increase the average unit costs.
[Hermann et al., 1998]
According to a study conducted in European countries, public services are eco-
nomically efficient for municipalities of around 5,000 inhabitants. However, this size
cannot be the optimal size for LGs because each of public service has different optimal
size based on population. [ACIR, 1974]
Since the first years after the fragmented system was created, in 1990, some profes-
sionals have been arguing that this system is very costly and have called for integration.
In their view, based on the old principle about the relationship of size and unit costs
cited above, increase in service units will reduce the unit costs. Several research projects
tested the principle in Hungary, but the results varied according to variety of services
or unit costs measured by the direct beneficiaries of a particular service or total popu-
lation within the LG. In several cases, at a minimum service unit size, costs became
constant (the shape of the unit costs curve goes horizontal) or ‘U-shaped’. [Hermann
et al., 1998]
We have to separate local public services into two categories. The first includes
public utilities like electricity, gas works, water works, sewage and sewage plants and
other public services like public transport and solid waste collection and disposal.
These services are provided by larger (covering the area of more counties) or smaller
(smaller regions in each county) regional utility and service companies. This is why
potential amalgamation would not have an immediate effect on the unit costs of these
services. However, there is a proposal to create larger local government units on the
basis of the area covered by regional public utility companies. [Hermann et al., 1998]
Nowadays, related to these services, the question is rather about the break down of
monopolies than optimization size.
The other group of local public services is human services like education, health
and social care and public administration. We tried to test those local services that are
• mandatory by the Act on Local Government,
• represent a higher cost to the total local running expenditure of villages, and
• potentially available to most LGs.
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Administration, pre-schools and primary schools represent more than 50 percent
of local expenditure in villages. Further evaluation is made on these sectors only.
A) Costs of Administration
The costs of administration within LGs’ running expenditure has significantly changed
throughout the 1990s. The average share of these costs has increased from 7.8 to 9.9
percent, affecting LGs of all different sizes. There is a very strong correlation between
the size of a LG and increase in the share of administration costs within the total
running costs, for both the beginning and the end of the last decade. In 2000, all levels
of village administrations absorbed at least one fifth of the total running costs. In the
smallest LGs, this figure was above 40 percent.
On a per capita basis, the position of each level also changed. It is most visible in
relation to Budapest. Its indicator was 94.7 percent of the country average in 1991
and 128.3 percent in 2000. Budapest’s shifting position is caused by two factors.
Firstly, costs of administration in Budapest increased much faster over this period than
the country average (Budapest: 807%; country average: 610%). Secondly, Budapest
experienced an intense population flux. In 2000, Budapest had 9.5% fewer inhabit-
ants compared to 1991. The country’s total population has decreased only by 2.2%
over the same period. The principle of size and costs relation is indicated among the
different size of cities for both years. In villages, per capita costs increased by the de-
creasing size up to category size 500–999 inhabitants. In the smallest LGs, the indicator
became lower than the village average.
The unit costs measured per public employees have a totally different shape. Ac-
cording to the different levels (capital–cities–villages), and the different cities’ sizes
(including Budapest), unit costs are smaller if the size of the LG is smaller. For villages,
the trend is similar. However, the mid-range size groups are becoming rather horizon-
tal in shape with unit costs very close to each other. On one hand, the reason behind
these results is the relatively significant proportion of wages within the total adminis-
trational costs (45.4%). On the other hand, it is due to the strong hierarchy of wages
within the LG size categories. In larger LGs, employees get much higher wages for the
same position than those employed in smaller ones. For administrations in Budapest
during 2000, the average personnel costs including wages was 141.3 percent of the
national average. In contrast, the same figure for small cities and villages was 81.1 and
82.5 percent.
B) Costs of Pre-schools (Kindergartens)
Due to the decreasing number of children and the emerging provisions of the private
sector, the share of kindergartens costs within the total running expenditure has fallen
from 6.3 to 3.7 percent. This figure is much higher in villages for both years, but the
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Table 2.8
Costs of Administration
LGs by Size Category
Share in the Total Per Capita Cost Costs Per Adminis-
Running Costs trative Employee
[%] [Thousand HUF]
1991 2000 1991 2000 1991* 2000
Total 7.83 9.94 2,189 14,418 969 3,380
Budapest 5.81 9.74 2,073 18,499 1,675 5,017
Cities 7.59 12.67 2,007 13,171 1,006 3,521
Large 6.91 11.22 1,736 11,849 1,167 3,938
Medium size 7.61 12.69 2,129 13,715 960 3,438
Small 11.64 18.31 2,854 15,491 825 2,977
Villages 16.48 23.47 2,451 14,097 751 2,694
Above 5,000 inhabitants 13.59 20.64 1,960 11,361 1,054 3,238
Between 1,000–4,999 inhabitants 15.90 22.07 2,494 13,506 714 2,690
Between 500–999 inhabitants 20.72 26.55 2,996 17,933 704 2,501
Between 200–499 inhabitants 27.32 36.81 2,524 16,923 697 2,678
Below 200 inhabitants 30.14 42.85 2,824 13,171 710 2,085
*  Data from 1994
SOURCE: Edited by Lados, M. based on LG Financial Database of TÁKISZ, 1991 and 2000.
trend is the same (1991: 12.1%; 2000: 9.2%). This is no surprise considering the
number of kindergartens has fallen by 12.7 percent over the same period. The most
drastic change has taken place in medium size cities, where this figure is above 30
percent.10  As a result of this process, except in the smaller size villages, the average size
of the service—measured by children per kindergarten—has risen slightly. The aver-
age size of kindergartens is decreasing with the decreasing size of the LGs.
We have more options related to this service available for measuring unit costs of
the service. In both years, unit cost decrease if the size of the LG is smaller in compar-
ison to the LGs’ level (Budapest-cities-villages). Among city levels, the cost curves are
mostly horizontal or reversed ‘U-shape’. In villages,11  unit costs reflecting the number
of children and teachers clearly show the principle of the relationship between an LG’s
smaller size and higher unit costs. In terms of physical measurement (unit costs by
number of kindergartens), the cost of service is lower if the size of LG is smaller at all
comparative levels and for both years.
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Table 2.9
Unit Costs of Pre-Schools (Kindergartens), 2000
LGs by Size Category 1 2 3 4
Total 3,633 94 163 1,875
Budapest 347 139 189 1,963
Cities 1,112 144 162 1,800
Large 458 144 160 1,804
Medium size 498 144 166 1,841
Small 156 148 155 1,833
Villages 2,174 61 155 1,902
Above 5,000 inhabitants 126 158 148 1,939
Between 1,000–4,999 inhabitants 1,190 75 155 1,879
Between 500–999 inhabitants 626 30 158 1,945
Between 200–499 inhabitants 226 19 182 2,034
Below 200 inhabitants 2 38 104 1,581
1 Number of kindergartens.
2 Average size of kindergarten by number of children (children/kindergarten).
3 Unit costs per number of children (thousand HUF/children).
4 Unit costs per number of teachers (thousand HUF/teachers).
SOURCE: Calculated by Lados, M. based on LG Financial Database of TÁKISZ, 1991 and 2000.
C) Costs of Primary Education
The process connected to primary schools is very similar to the experiences of the
kindergartens. Due to the changing conditions and environment, the share of costs
for primary schools within the total running expenditure has fallen from 13.6 to
10.0 percent. In villages, this figure is much higher, but the trend is the same (1991:
26.1%; 2000: 21.0%). In cities, the major change in the number of schools is due to
economic efficiency. In villages, the changing number of schools is rather the result of
the changing number of LGs in each size category (e.g. in villages with more than
5,000 inhabitants, the number of schools has fallen by 37.5 percent, the number of
LGs by 35.7 percent). As a result of this process, except in smaller size villages, the
average size of this service—measured by students per schools—has become signifi-
cantly higher (by 20–60 percent) in cities and slightly higher (by 12–16 percent) in
larger villages. The average size of a primary school decreases by the decreasing size of
the LG.
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Table 2.10
Unit Costs of Primary Schools, 2000
LGs by Size Category 1 2 3 4
Total 3,156 358 132 1,906
Budapest 294 601 151 2,222
Cities 921 671 123 2,081
Large 365 763 126 2,345
Medium size 413 627 122 1,957
Small 143 565 117 1,725
Villages 1,941 172 139 1,565
Above 5,000 inhabitants 100 508 116 1,583
Between 1,000–4,999 inhabitants 1,153 207 137 1,568
Between 500–999 inhabitants 550 74 176 1,537
Between 200–499 inhabitants 136 31 191 1,520
Below 200 inhabitants 2 159 142 1,880
1 Number of primary schools.
2 Average size of primary schools per number of student (student/school).
3 Unit costs per number of students (thousand HUF/students).
4 Unit costs per number of teachers (thousand HUF/teachers).
SOURCE: Calculated by Lados, M. based on LG Financial Database of TÁKISZ, 1991 and 2000.
The shape of the cost curves is different depending on the LGs’ level and has
changed over the last decade. In 1991, per capita costs and unit cost per student and
teacher, rather, followed the ‘larger size, lower unit costs’ principle in all major com-
parison groups. According to the unit costs per physical indicators (classrooms, schools),
unit costs usually decrease if the LG and the average size of the school are smaller. The
picture has become both more homogenous and contradictory in 2000. Unit costs
per teacher, classroom and school are lower if the size of LG is smaller on all compar-
ison levels. Related to per capita costs and unit costs per student, each comparison
level has a different feature. On LG levels (Budapest-cities-villages) one has a ‘U-shape’,
the other has a reversed ‘U-shape’. In cities, unit costs decrease with the decreasing
size of the city and schools. In villages,12  these curves follow the ‘larger size, lower unit
costs’ principle.
According to the different LG levels (capital-cities-villages) for unit costs per user,
the system is slowly moving towards larger size LG’s and services with higher unit costs
or an ‘U-shape’ model. The reason partially behind this is the wage hierarchy along
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with the hierarchy of LG size. However, looking at the different size categories within
cities and villages, the picture is more complicated. Analyzing cities (or villages) alone,
we discover that larger local governments usually have lower unit costs. This is very
clear especially in the 1991 data, while a similar trend can be traced in 2000 as well.
These findings are summarized in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11
The Shape of Unit Costs by LG Size Category
Unit Costs by Services LG Levels1 Cities Villages
1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000
Administration
– Per Capita Costs LL U/LL LL LL H/U RU
Pre-schools (Kindergartens)
– Unit Costs Per Number of Children Attending LH/H LH LL RU RU/H LL
Primary Schools
– Unit Costs Per Number of Pupils U U LL LH LL LL
1 LG levels—Budapest, cities’ total, villages’ total.
NOTE: LL – Larger size of LG and lower unit costs of service.
LH – Larger size of LG and higher unit costs of service.
H – Horizontal.
U – ‘U-shape.
RU – Reversed ‘U-shape’.
SOURCE: Edited by Lados, M.
Another reason, rather hypothetical than factual, is that larger LGs have higher
revenue generating capacities so they can add more resources locally from CG transfers.
Some local cases show that local kindergartens and schools in larger LGs have a better
chance to accumulate additional resources, for example through local foundations.
Our assumption is that a higher per capita revenue position ensures higher expendi-
ture potential. In this respect, higher unit costs partially means higher quality of service
with better and more modern equipment, more facilities for users (children, students).
Naturally, there are differences among schools and kindergartens within a city (schools
in ‘slums’ or tradition style schools). Regarding quality of service in basic public edu-
cation, however, the majority of inequalities in Hungary are based on the LG hierarchy
by the size of population.
With the long-term negative natural growth of the Hungarian population, there
is also a trend of declining number of school year children. In cities, there is the
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potential to join classrooms or schools together, maintaining the level of service and
unit costs. In most larger and medium size cities, this process began in the second half
of the 1990s. In villages, if LGs want to keep a service within the community, they
can manage it by reducing the level of services. Another possibility is partnership and
joint management of the service with another LG. The law on associations ensures
this potential form of the partnership. In 1999, around 7 percent of children and
students studied in jointly manage kindergartens and schools. The number of kinder-
garten and school associations fluctuated from between 500 and 550 over the second
half of 1990. This fluctuation indicates that the introduced financial incentives for
maintaining jointly managed institutional associations have not been effective enough.
[Halász, 2000]
2.3 Local Democracy, Which is More Powerful
in the Case of the Smallest and in the Largest LGs?
The formation of democratic society in Hungary began many years before the political
transition. However, the formation of its final structure and efficient operation is a
much bigger process and is still under way today. According to our interpretation of
social and political democracy; social democracy has a wider view and comprises many
parts of political democracy. This is especially true on the local level, since local de-
mocracy involves the fundamental parts of political democracy, but cannot be stable
without the evolution and operation of local social democracy. LGs play a key role in
this process due to their position and authority. They are the leaders of local political
democracy, and—if not in everyday work, but in the long term—have a crucial role in
the formation and evolution of local social democracy.
According to our previous examinations [Szarvak, T. 1997, 2000; Szoboszlai Zs.,
1998, 1999, 2000], the viability of local democracy—under the existing legal frame-
work—depends mainly on the traditions of the community; its economic-social-cultural
circumstances; the family background of the citizenry; the developmental level of the
civil society and its publicity; the level of attentiveness and honesty and socialization of
the local governmental representatives. Some connections between the size of LGs and
the function of local democracy can be seen in the following examples.
2.3.1 The Various Intensities of Political Activity
At national, as well as local levels, the institutions of political democracy have been in
operation since 1989. The institutions of political democracy stabilized, thanks to the
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national and local governmental elections in 1990 and the legislation of the new democ-
ratic parliament and the further elections in 1994 and 1998.
Regarding the number of political parties and the preference of parties among the
citizens, there are differences among LGs of various sizes. The function of political
organizations is concentrated in towns. Only the Hungarian Socialist Party and the
Independent Smallholders’ and Civic Party have organizations in the villages, but in
decreasing numbers. Since 1998, there has been an increasing number of FIDESZ-
Hungarian Civic Party organizations in the countryside. In smaller villages, citizens’
party preferences come up only at election time. While the formation of party organi-
zation is mainly a typical city feature, party preference among the citizenry does not
depend on the type or size of the settlement. Along with age, level of education and
sex, the political preference of a person also depends on the developmental level of his
or her dwelling place and its geographical location. According to a regional survey
during the last election, political preferences are more stable in the western part of the
country than to the east or south.
Also, national “large” politics and the local politics are increasingly separated. In
smaller LGs (regarding the small towns also), citizens are less interested in “large”
politics than in the capital or in the county capitals, but local politics has a stronger
emphasis in the smaller ones. Citizens of the capital and the county capitals are inter-
ested similarly in “large” and local politics. The strongest influences of the “large”
politics reflect life in the largest cities, and the marks of political division are most
visible here. Participation in local elections seems to refute this statement. In small
villages, the higher rate of participation was explained by the stronger personal rela-
tionships among the citizenry and not by the activities of the political groups.
[Andorka, R. 1997]
Table 2.12
Rate of Participation in Local Elections by LGs’ Size
Size of LGs 1990 1994 1998
0–499 59.68 71.60 70.64
500– 999 56.62 64.09 63.04
1,000–1,999 53.69 58.18 56.83
2,000–4,999 50.15 51.55 50.62
5,000–9,999 44.09 44.52 43.50
10,000–49,999 38.41 41.58
50,000–99,999 36.44 39.91
100,000– 33.44 40.17
SOURCE: Central Election Office of Ministry of Interior, 2002.
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2.3.2 The Various Intensity of Civic Organizations
Civic initiatives are an important prerequisite for the formation of social democracy.
Formed in the mid–1980’s, they had experienced significant development in the sec-
ond half of the decade, becoming the base of political party organizations at a local
level. On one hand, the democratic political institutions swallowed up most of the
activists from civic associations. Yet, on the other hand, new relationships and political
conflicts began to take shape between the new political elite and civic associations. The
opposing interests and their intervening (economic, political) power became more
express between the two active poles of local democracy, the LGs with their powerful
parties and civic organizations. These opposing interests still exist today.
Civic associations of the 1980’s formed in the cities; some of them functioned as
“protoparties” but, after the formation of the political parties, they lost their civic
character and most of their active members too.
The social legitimacy of local and regional associations creates the base for develop-
ment of civil society. Activities in which differences are articulated make the social base
of associations stronger. This can make associations more attractive for those who have
never experienced the beauty of community work in an autonomous association. Space
and willingness and capability for cooperation are both necessary for these activities.
About 70% of civic organizations are located in communities larger then 10,000
inhabitants, mostly towns. Besides the multi-color characteristic of larger towns, it
seems that direct connection between the inhabitants is also important. This can be
seen in the appearance of non-profit organizations. The net of non-profit organizations
is thickest in communities with more than 50,000 inhabitants and in communities
less than 2,000 inhabitants.
Table 2.13
Appearance of Non-Profit Organizations According to LG Size
Population Number of LGs Number of Civil Rate of Civil Number of Population/
Organizations Organizations [%]  Civil Organizations
0–499 997 1,516 2 182
500–999 691 2,959 5 170
1,000–1,999 656 4,975 8 189
2,000–4,999 507 6,335 10 243
5,000–9,999 141 4,372 7 223
10,000–49,999 122 13,512 21 174
50,000–99,999 12 6,509 10 118
Over 100,000 8 9,253 14 127
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Table 2.13 (Continued)
Appearance of Non-Profit Organizations According to LG Size
Population Number of LGs Number of Civil Rate of Civil Number of Population/
Organizations Organizations [%]  Civil Organizations
Budapest 1 16,003 24 109
Total 3,135 65,334 100 146
SOURCE: TSTAR database, 1999.
2.3.3 Participation in Local Public Affairs, Trust, Expectations and
Satisfaction With Local Governments Depending on the Level
of Socio-Economic Development
We consider Public affairs those local matters and activities of the citizenry or/and their
groups, that are connected with the provision, development, etc. of the given commu-
nity and have an effect on more of the local citizenry. Those activities, not obligatory to
everyday work activities, we must consider participation in public affairs. Our empirical
experience shows that participation in public affairs is differentiated according to the
LG size. Especially in larger towns, and in county capitals as well, participation in
public affairs and the intensity of its direction are diverse in various sections of town.
According to a survey of Szolnok city, the citizens in the city center are less satisfied and
more active, while the citizens of the suburban region are active, satisfied and patient.13
The citizens in the industrial zone are less interested in the public affaires, membership
in civic associations is low, and their opinions rarely surface. The reason for these ten-
dencies is that qualified citizens with high status live in specific parts of town.
Trust in local governments, in our opinion, also depends on the development level of
the settlement, the employment situation, the level of services, and the position of the
individual citizen. Party preference only fall into these two categories: Citizens living
in average or above average conditions and whose basic needs are fulfilled, therefore,
they are more satisfied and citizens with higher criterion, young people and men are
less satisfied and more critical.
The results of research into 9 Hungarian counties (6 in the East and 3 in the South)
have verified this statement. Where the number of inhabitants is less than 10,000, the
respect of the mayor is higher (it scored 82 points of 100) than in settlements with
more than 10,000 inhabitants (it scored 72 points). The respect for the governing body
of the local authority is also higher in the smaller settlements (less than 10,000—71
point; more than 10,000 inhabitants—66 point), than in the bigger ones.
According to appreciation of leaders roles, there is a significant difference between
small and large LGs. Citizens in smaller villages highly esteem the mayor and yet they
do not consider the other local representatives and the local governmental bodies.
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Surveys conducted in several villages show that village dwellers are more aware of
the work of the LG and trust in it more than town dwellers.14 Smaller LGs have a
deeper participation in the citizens’ everyday lives. So, citizens expectations and satis-
faction are stronger, more visible and based on reality. Due to the more laminated and
complicated economic and social structure within the cities, the active participation of
LG (e.g. in solving of employment problems) is less possible and less required. So,
expectations are focused on local infrastructure, services and culture. Yet, trust and
acceptance do not necessarily go hand in hand with satisfaction or reduced expecta-
tions toward the LGs. Political trust or distrust can only be perceived before elections,
especially in big cities.
Table 2.14
Evaluation of the Role of the Local Mayor and the Representative Body
in the Life of a Community (On a Scale of 100 Grades*)
Northern Hungary Southern Great Plain
Role of the Mayor Role of the LG Body Role of the Mayor Role of the LG Body
0–499 93 56 73 67
500–999 80 76 83 74
1,000–1,999 79 70 78 76
2,000–4,999 77 64 78 71
5,000–9,999 80 68 88 80
10,000–49,999 64 58 81 71
50,000–99,999 67 65 68 63
100,000– 77 66 75 74
Total 73 64 77 71
* On the 100 grade scale, the score below 50 has a negative meaning (opposition, dissatisfaction) and
the score above 50 has a positive meaning (sympathy, satisfaction).
SOURCES: Surveys conducted on patterns of 3,200 people (N=2,000 in Northern Hungary, N=1,200 in the
Southern Great Plain region) by the Social Research Group (in Szolnok) of Center for Regional
Studies in 1998 and 1999.
2.3.4 The Diverse Tools of Local Publicity
and the Various Levels of Informality
Local publicity and regular local communication are essential elements for the opera-
tion of civil society and LGs. Local publicity is a social space where the information
transfers and reconciliation of interests takes place permanently. [J. Marelyin Kiss–A.
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DÉNES, 2000). Publicity is a medium of communication between the citizens, orga-
nizations and other players in society. It is important to realize, however, that solving
communication problems is not enough to create a social base. It alone is not able to
solve the problem of legitimacy, on the other hand, a developed social background
will, at the same time, produce a high level of publicity as well.
Local newspapers, radio and television are the most important bases of local identity
and community development. These instruments are under formation and it seems that
technical development, the content of publicity, as well as the creation of legal, finan-
cial, technical and social backgrounds for its operation, still need more time. All the
same, we have to take into consideration the emerging effects of development on the
information society during the next decade.
The role of local publicity and local media has received less attention than it
deserved in the last decade. Politicians focused on influencing national mediums.
However, we can see a huge development process in local publicity also. Since 1988,
hundreds of local newspapers have not only appeared in big cities, but in smaller
communities, too. During the 1990’s, only a small number of local television stations
operated (especially in the capital and in some county capitals) and we do not know
of any local radio stations of the time. In 2001, according to KÖRMÉDIA statistics,
there were 49 circulating TV stations, 156 local cable TV stations and 109 local
radio stations.
Local print and electronic media became essential participants in the local and
regional news market.
There are some contradictions between LGs’ size and the role of local publicity.
The smaller the LG, the less the possibility of operating local publicity as a for-profit
business. In this situation, the operation of local media needs a subsidy from the LG.
But, if they are financially reliant on local public money, how can independence and
objectivity be ensured? And, if the subsidy of the LG is exhausted, how will operation
of the local TV, radio or newspaper continue? These are significant sources of problems.
Even in the case of the most correct and fair LGs; these are also serious ethical and
political traps. In most places, it seems that the head of the LG forgot about the
communicational principle, that both giving information and receiving of information
are necessary.
In contrast, there are more possibilities to solve grievances, to handle cases of injus-
tice efficiently, as well as to build up and operate informal channels to the civil society
in smaller LGs. The traditional public forums, legally required of LGs by law, do not
provide ample opportunity to articulate and expose community intentions [Horváth
and Péteri, 1997, Central Budget Policy, p.21.], however, new structures have not yet
formed.
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2.4 Changing the Intensity of Local Developmental Activity
In the first four years of the local governmental system, LGs endeavored to concentrate
on themselves. Even the smallest LG wanted to be self-sufficient. Moreover, every LG
wanted to achieve developments exploiting the most favorable financial possibilities
between 1990 and 1994. They strongly believed that they now had a chance to dic-
tate their own future. The new system of resource allocation, described above, promoted
this idea. This was one of the main reasons, why all localities decide to form their own
LG instead of joint LGs.
LGs’ initiatives then became significant to development of the basic infrastructure.
The result is very visible. Villages have reduced the gap, reflecting the basic infrastruc-
ture, like provision of drinking water and gas works over the 1990s. These utilities are
not the privilege of cities anymore. Closing the gap related to sewage management
takes more time because, according to EU accession, settlements above 2,000 inhabit-
ants are the focus. Smaller villages have started to form ‘Sewage associations’ to get the
effected population to set up the required sewage systems and sewage plants The local
road system has also become more balanced across the size hierarchy of LGs.
Table 2.15
Level of Basic Infrastructure, 1990 and 2000 (At the End of The Year) [%]
Dwellings and Their Facilities
Number of Share of Dwellings With
Category Dwellings Water Works Sewage Gas Works
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Total 3,859,250 4,102,362 82.7 92.6 43.0 50.2 37.4 66.7
Budapest 799,908 829,712 98.3 99.3 92.2 84.9 52.9 78.8
Cities 1,618,024 1,885,232 88.9 93.5 54.1 59.5 52.8 71.7
Large 737,211 811,037 96.0 96.5 72.3 77.5 72.4 79.9
Medium size 765,939 828,410 83.7 91.3 41.1 48.7 41.9 66.0
Small 114,874 245,785 77.9 90.8 24.9 36.7 29.5 63.8
Villages 1,441,318 1,387,418 67.3 87.5 3.3 16.7 11.6 52.8
Above 5,000 inhabitants 297,337 190,039 72.8 90.2 4.2 25.5 23.0 70.1
Between 1,000–4,999 inhab. 863,270 886,002 68.4 87.6 3.8 17.7 10.3 55.5
Between 500–999 inhabitants 184,851 194,986 61.3 85.9 0.9 10.3 4.1 40.0
Between 200–499 inhabitants 81,617 97,684 52.5 85.4 0.2 5.9 1.9 27.3
Below 200 inhabitants 14,243 18,707 44.9 82.9 0.0 4.3 0.0 15.8
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Table 2.15 (Continued)
Level of Basic Infrastructure, 1990 and 2000 (At the End of The Year) [%]
Road Infrastructure
Category Total Length of From This: Length Share of Paved Roads
Local Roads  of Paved Roads  in Total Length of
[km] [km] Road [%]
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Total 52,717 57,772 33,208 41,103 63.0 71.1
Budapest 6,390 8,346 4,808 6,448 75.2 77.3
Cities 15,959 20,012 9,898 14,420 62.0 72.1
Large 5,345 5,962 3,730 4,719 69.8 79.1
Medium size 8,710 9,823 5,029 9,690 57.7 68.1
Small 1,904 4.226 1,139 3,011 59.8 71.2
Villages 30,368 29,415 18,502 20,235 60.9 68.8
Above 5,000 inhabitants 4,898 3,238 1,998 1,694 40.8 52.3
Between 1,000–4,999 inhab. 16,908 18,101 10,271 12,582 60.7 69.5
Between 500– 999 inhabitants 6,039 4,908 4,458 3,566 73,8 72.7
Between 200–499 inhabitants 2,072 2,557 1,449 1,922 69.9 75.2
Below 200 inhabitants 451 611 326 472 72,3 77.2
SOURCE: Edited by Lados, M. based on LG Financial Database of TÁKISZ, 1991 and 2000.
During the last decade, all the utility investments in villages have been made in
small region scale. Villages formed special utility associations related to each type of
investment. Usually, one LG has a leading role in coordinating the process: planning,
application for funds, and providing financial management including the collection of
the LGs, local citizens and firms contributions.15
Central governmental resources, LGs’ own resources, and contributions of citizens
make such improvements possible. Larger development was implemented in the smaller
settlements, so a strong equalization occurred. Still, it was not enough to offset defi-
ciencies originating from the former 40 years. In contrast, some wantonly large schools,
community houses with a capacity to accommodate hundreds of people, and some
new local governmental offices were built in settlements of 200–300 inhabitants and
below. This illustrates some of the mistakes made during this period.
The largest part of local governmental investments is utilized for local infrastruc-
ture development. However, the increased local autonomy has resulted in more energetic
local economic development as well as LG enterprises. The tasks of job creation, tele-
C
it
ie
s
V
ill
ag
es
65
S I Z E  O F  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S ,  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  A N D  L O C A L  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y  I N  H U N G A R Y
phone services development and local business development received higher priority
over the provision of basis public services in 1993.
LGs’ business activities—based on a survey conducted in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén
County—was most energetic in small communities with populations under 1,000
and in the larger towns with populations over 30,000. In the former case, they had
only a few entrepreneurs with very weak economic output. Due to this, they were
forced to create the local businesses themselves in order to keep the basic functions of
the settlements running. In the latter case, the motivation of businesses run by LGs
was the larger financial autonomy and utilizable properties.16 
Local governmental investment far exceeds their own capability and they need
support from the central government. The average level of investment is 9–14% of the
total amount of total local expenditures. In case of smaller LGs, this rate is 9–10%. In
LGs with populations over 5 thousand, the share is much closer to 14% [I. Barati,
2001]. Based on the principle of additionally, the strategy used by LGs to finance
their investments, especially large scale investments, is to obtain as many central in-
vestment grants as possible. Due to their larger own revenue capacity, the bigger LGs
can absorb more investment grants and other national developmental supports.
Figure 2.3
The Average Share of Investments in Total Local Government Spending
Population Number of Settlements
SOURCE: Barati, I., 2001.
According to a survey conducted by I. Barati, every third LG has two or more large
scale investment plans for the mid-term period. These are mostly projects for modern-
ization of water works, the establishment and construction of sewage collection and
cleaning, waste collection and the modernization of central heating systems. In the
instance of LGs with populations between 5–10 thousand, this rate is the highest,
about 70% and shows a larger demand for state contributions. Among LGs under one
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thousand inhabitants, only 29% plan development projects of this scale and 33%
definitely do not plan such investments. Figure 2.4 clearly shows that the percentage
of municipalities without large scale investment plans declines with growing popula-
tion size and the share of municipalities with two or more large scale investments
increases with growth in the population size.
Figure 2.4
Demand for “Large” Investment According to LG Size
Population Number of Settlements
Rate of LGs With Two or More Large Scale Investment Plans
Rate of LGs Without Large Investment Plans
SOURCE: I. Barati, 2001
In the mid-1990s, the central government began to realize that operation of the
public administration system was rather expensive. They also realized that certain
settlements had accomplished infrastructure investments that could supply a whole
small region. The central government, using economic and legal means, began to refresh
LGs on the necessity of association and cooperation. Parallel to this process, the LGs
recognized that it was not enough to accomplish the investment task. They also needed
to sustain operation, which resulted in a considerable burden to the budget. LGs were
increasingly looking for cooperation possibilities with other LGs.
In the last half of the decade, the extra subsidy (10–15%) from the central govern-
ment took effect. Opposing the formerly isolated investments, joint developments via
LGs’ cooperation came to the forefront. Development associations, and later the local
governmental associations, became the organizational background for co-operative lo-
cal development.
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3. FORMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEGRATION
3.1 Unpleasant Memories of Former Integration Practices and
Contradictory Preconditions Stemming from the Former
Public Administrative System
As the existing fragmented local governmental system seems to be untenable, and
there was a more integrated system before, the reasons and experiences from the former
structures must be understood. This is important because many barriers in the new
amalgamation process originated from the past.
3.1.1 Transformation of the Regional Structure
of Public Administration During the 1970s
Centralization was controlled by the central government and managed by administra-
tive tools. Then there was the introduction of an administration model, territorially
based on urban surroundings. This situation and experience were the two most impor-
tant initiatives that brought optimization to the size of local administrative and service
units during the 1970s.
The soviet style council-system was established in 1950 and local, district and
county councils were formed. The aim of this top down process was to provide a state
presence in every community as close to the citizens as possible. But fragmentation of
local administration units hindered the proper quality of their function and develop-
ment was hampered by the de-concentration of financial resources. The forced merger
of agricultural cooperatives had removed economic and political resources from many
communities, which also meant the withdrawal of local functions and that could be
the ideological base to amalgamate local councils too. The legal basis for amalgamating
local councils had existed since 1950. However, these activities only accelerated during
the mid-60s and then ended by the early 1980s.
Even though Hungary was then a member of the communist block, the rational-
ization process of the regional structure of public administration had many similarities
with the spatial reforms of western countries. The most drastic method, namely the
total merger of communities, was ignored by the Hungarian government. On one
hand, the policy considered the fragmented and professionally weak local administra-
tion. On the other hand, the quality and quantity of the series of tasks waiting to be
efficiently solved. It preferred professionalism to local community values and had pro-
duced artificially integrated administration units. Besides the arguments for an optimal
administration unit that also should also be appropriate for specialization, more eco-
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nomic local services and development were considered in case of determining a concen-
trated regional structure for public administration.
The common councils formed administrative districts, which did not necessarily
mean economic or public service attraction zones. There was always a kind of internal
conflict in the institution of common councils. Common councils integrated both the
center and the satellite communities but the satellite communities retained their legal
status. In the statistical registers, they appeared as independent communities and the
election laws guaranteed them representation in the common council, proportionate
to their population. The law stated that every satellite community had to elect at least
three representatives to the common council. Council members from the satellite
communities became members of local leadership and they formed a quasi-partial gov-
ernment, according to a 1983 modification of the law. This meant that there was no
hierarchy between the center and the other communities. Only one council body, one
executive body and one administrative department fulfilled the tasks. As a consequence
of the amalgamation, the settlement network and the network of councils had been
separated. This was performed in various ways by the counties, according to the fea-
tures of the settlement network. In counties with many small communities, the councils
were common ones. While in the Great Plain, there were much fewer common coun-
cils and the communities were left alone.
Table 2.16
The Relationship Between Communities, Local Councils and
Local Governments
Year Communities Communities With Communities With Number of Councils
Their Own Council a Common Council or Local Governments
1950 3,229 2,862 361 3,032
1970 3,244 1,784 1,440 2,294
1980 3,122 811 2,311 1,525
SOURCE: Yearbooks of the Central Statistical Office
The next step was the decentralization of competencies. This prepared for a reduc-
tion of public administration to two levels. The target groups of this process were the
amalgamated political and administrative units and, further formation of a level be-
tween localities and counties.
The council-system only accepted one form of institutional cooperation by the
councils and this was to carry out state-administrative tasks on a joint basis. By the mid-
1980s, an expanded network of administrative associations operated, especially in counties
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full of small villages and they drew out a new level of public administration. In some coun-
ties, they covered the whole territory. In the instance of local public services, the law did
not accept these kinds of associative institutions. The council headquarter was respon-
sible for local public service distribution for all its own citizens and those from the
satellite community.
A governmental decision founded in 1968 ordered the merge of annual budgets
and development resources from those communities in a common councils in order to
accomplish the council’s investments in the central settlements. In the satellite settle-
ments, only the basic institutions and infrastructure were allowed to develop. The
basic public service institutions (schools, health care, nursery schools, homes for the
elderly, culture centers) were concentrated in the council center and were difficult to
reach because of bad transportation conditions.
The negative effects of this centralized development policy were further enhanced
by the redistribution of development resources designated by county councils.17  The
redistribution of economic resources in the county was not proportional and rational,
but based on despotic approach and service of certain clienteles.
3.1.2 Abolision of Districts and Institutionalization
of Surrounding Urban Areas During the 1980’s
The concept of public administration by urban surroundings appeared fairly early in
1969. At that time it had become possible to put certain villages under urban guid-
ance. In 1971, the third Law on Councils had introduced the notion of “the village in
urban surroundings” and determined the criteria for urban surrounding communities.
The criteria were as follows: strong geographical, social, economic, employment and
transport connections between the town and the nearby village and specific reasons
for their coordinated development. The real aim of the institutionalization of urban
surroundings was the gradual change toward a two level administration structure. The
urban surrounding, as a form of public administration, evolved into a type of develop-
ment, which nobody had thought of before. After the abolishment of districts in
1984, urban surroundings became more administration-oriented. In reality, the rela-
tionships between the towns and the villages had become much more complex. The
urban surrounding administration covered three kinds of activities [Kara, P., Kilényi,
G., Kökényesi, J. and Verebélyi, I., 1983]:
• the towns provided services for the surrounding villages under an horizontal
relationship,
• the towns, taking part in county administration, controlled the surrounding
villages’ councils,
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• the towns and the larger villages became the second level of authority over the
surrounding villages and it made a hierarchy between the communities with a
strong dependency building up between the town and the villages.
The mixture of these functions was accepted, only because it was seen as a transi-
tional situation. The urban surrounding administration finished only after the political
change in 1990, when the local government was established. The urban surrounding
administration system created 139 administration districts, of which 105 were towns
surrounding districts and 34 were larger villages surrounding districts.
3.2 The Need and Willingness of Local Governments to Cooperate
3.2.1 The Notion of Local Autonomy
and Co-Operation with LGs in the Minds of Local Leaders
The integration process that took place in the 1970s had its affect. Ongoing conflicts
which have flared between communities belonging to a common council, the center
and the other communities, towns and villages, the local and the county councils, all
rooted in the past, can only be destroyed within decades. These conflicts also shaped
citizens attitudes towards cooperation with other communities and inspired them to
insist on the autonomy of the LGs.
Results of a survey conducted in Somogy county in 2000 show LGs attitudes toward
cooperation. Mayors and local representatives from various sizes of LGs were ques-
tioned. According to their opinions, LGs protect their autonomy but are willing to
cooperate, mainly with their neighboring LGs. Insistence on autonomy is fairly strong,
especially in case of LGs under 500 inhabitants, but they came out in support of
forming associations.
Village governments focused on building relationships with neighboring villages,
while towns emphasized small regional connections as their most important mission.
In all LG size categories, they expected to develop small regional strategies, common
projects and fundraising activities through cooperation on a small regional level. These
interests are also common and strong for establishment and operation of a common
information infrastructure. The towns have less interest in distribution of public ser-
vices and implementation of central tasks in cooperation. Consultation between mayors
is also not so necessary for villages. The smallest LGs show less interest in common
infrastructure development and co-ordination of employment and social care.
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Figure 2.5
Which Public Administration Purposes are Important in the Future?
(Opinions Ranked on 10–Grade Scale)
Independence of the LG Independence of the LG Independence of the LG Independence of the LG,
and its Institutions Even With Reduced Tasks with Co-Operations and
at the Expence of the and Competencies and Associations in Small
Lower Quality of Public Institutions Regions and
Administration Neighbourhood
Neighbourhood Small Region County Region
Towns
Community over 1,000 inhabitants
Community between 500–1,000 inhabitants
Community under 500 inhabitants
SOURCE: Németh, J., 2001. pp.14–15.
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Figure 2.6
What Do You Expect From Small Regional Cooperation?
(Opinions Ranked on a 10-Grade Scale)
Working Establishment Evaluations Common The Co- Common Common Consultation
out of Small and Made by Infrastructure ordination Provision Development of Mayors
Regional Supervision of Experts Development of Social and of State of Com-
Aims, Plans, Public Service Employment Tasks munication
Aplication Organisations Tasks Technology
Towns
Settlements over 1,000 inhabitants
Settlements between 500–1,000 inhabitants
Settlements under 500 inhabitants
SOURCE: Németh, J., 2001. pp. 4–15.
3.2.2 The Relationship Between LGs
Which Were Formerly One Administrative District
The relationship between LGs, which had shared a common council in the previous
council-system, can be examined through the existence and intensity of joint LG offic-
es and LG associations. As far as we know, there is no survey dealing with this topic.
Still, we have data from empirical research conducted in Baranya County, a typical
small village region. This survey illustrates the network and institutional framework of
300 LGs with average populations of around 550 people.
In the case of Baranya County, the LGs set up their joint offices with the same structure
as the common councils. The LGs were not able to change the relationships built up in
the former regional administrative structure because of some objective factors. The
council administration districts had become an integral part of the citizens’ everyday
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lives: the regional transport system, distribution of services, and location of economic
units determined the formation of any new structures. It turned out, that it was not
possible to revitalize the organic system of centers and their surroundings as they
existed before 1949. But it is a fact that, in this county, the number of LGs maintaining
their own office increased to 23 in 1991. While, during the council-system, the number of
common councils had only been 9. Among these LGs, only two have a population near to
1,000, the suggested limit (according to the law) for hiring a chief executive. In five
cases, former common council centers split from the associated LGs and set up their
own independent office.
Through the formation of LGs, 64 LGs have changed administrative districts,
21.4% of the total number of LGs. The regional structure of local public administra-
tion system remained unchanged for least 60%.
Table 2.17
The Changing Numbers of Joint LG Offices and Common Councils
As Well As Their Member Communities in Baranya County Between 1989–2000
Year Number of Common Number of Average Number of Share of Local Govern-
Councils  or Joint LG Members Members ments in All Joint
Offices Local Governmental
Offices [%]
1987 66 290 4.4 94.8
1991 74 269 3.6 90.3
1997 78 255 3.3 84.7
2001 81 259 3.3 85.1
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of County Baranya 1987, Settlements in the Hungarian Republic 1991, 1997,
edited by E. Pfeil according to the data of the Central Public Administration Office in Baranya
county.
3.3 Small Regional Associations and Their Characteristics
3.3.1 Administrative Authority Associations and Associations of
Institutional Control18
The complex examination of local governmental associations (which were formed to
supply firstly administrative, then later other types of tasks) are hampered by the
situation—in contrast with the system of joint local governmental offices—that there
is no uniform registration system. Although all of the association agreements have had
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to be sent to the Public Administration Office since 1998, the processing of data has
not happened by this time.
According to data collected nationwide, the differences between the counties re-
garding the willingness of LGs to form associations are rather significant. In some
counties, (Somogy, Komárom-Esztergom, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Vas) the density of
cooperation is great and it influences the LGs work greatly. But we have to be careful,
as the systematic processing of association data is absent, we do not know the extent of
the overlapping.
Table 2.18
The Situation of Associations in Hungary as of 31 December 1999
Name of the Region Number of Number Average The Number of Rate of LGs
Associations of LGs Population LGs Joining Joining
of LGs Associations Associations [%]
Central Hungary 50 185 15,374 84 51
Central Transdanubia 220 407 2,734 345 85
Western Transdanubia 270 646 2,105 538 83
Southern Transdanubia 409 653 1,451 574 88
Northern Hungary 282 603 2,105 496 82
Northern Great Plain 106 388 3,933 237 61
Southern Great Plain 93 253 5,283 155 61
Total 1,430 3,135 3,204 2,439 78
SOURCE: Ministry of Interior.
By the first of January of 2001, the number of associations has increased to 128 in
Baranya County. If we add the number of joint local governmental offices to this
number, there are 210 integrated institutions of LGs in the county. These 210 orga-
nizations have a total number of 932 members (local governments). This number
shows that in Baranya County, on average, every LG is a member of 3.1 associations.
This results in a dense organizational network among the LGs, which denies the
statement that LGs are not willing to form associations. Consequently, the new legis-
lation about LG cooperation had a positive effect on LGs within the county that are
full of small villages, where cooperation is an evident necessity to the LG structure.
Comparing different parts of the country, the settlement structure dominated by
large villages on the Great Plain necessitates less associations than in Trans-Danubia
and Northern-Hungary. Among 82 LGs in Hajdú-Bihar County, all examined under
the same conditions, [Papp, Zs., 2000] there were 17 associations. They averaged 40
member LGs each. Furthermore, there were five joint local governmental offices, with
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13 member LGs. Comparing the two counties, it turns out that for a county in the
Great Plain region a LG is, on average, a member of 0.66 associations. Can we draw
the conclusion that the variance in the organizational form between two parts of the
country for supplying local service goods has got a decent explanation? Perhaps this
amount of discrepancy is not evident because the average population of LGs in H-B
County is only about 2,000?
Another form of LGs association is an ‘association of institutional control’, a com-
mon operation of institutions, mainly for primary schools (in 1996 there were 489
such associations). There is only few number of waste management, public infrastruc-
ture associations (51), even though these can operate in small regional level more
efficiently. Further, there are 283 associations which cannot be ranked into any of the
categories. [Fürcht, 1998]
Multipurpose cooperation amongst the same LGs is very rare. Though it frequently
happens that LGs in the same administration district will make a second or a third
agreement of association for supplying public services or operating institutions togeth-
er. Joint local government offices only represent a common office for the LGs. Legally,
it is not appropriate for supplying public services to fulfill local governmental tasks
because it does not have its own representative body. Consequently, the associations
operate in a regional structure full of overlapping and dispersion. This means that the econ-
omy of size required for efficient supply of tasks is out of the question. A great part of the
associations are nourished by compulsion, which means that during communism the
institutions were established in the center settlement and were the joint property of
the member communities. So, these institutions can be maintained only jointly. The
formation of larger and multi purpose associations, especially in regions full of small
villages, would create an arranged situation. For this to happen, the inducement of
central support is necessary.
Despite this, the Act on Association and Cooperation of Local Governments and
the introduction of new types of associations have helped the upswing of local govern-
mental cooperation in Hungary. At the same time, because of the deficiencies in the
regulations, it is not able to handle the problem of diversity. Some of the questions still
pending are:
• There is no way of introducing an obligatory set up for cooperation in Hunga-
ry because the new Constitution has not been accepted yet.
• The legislator has not dealt with the question of the institutionalization of
urban surroundings.
• The participation of private persons is not possible in any type of these asso-
ciation.
• The responsibility of performing duties can not be passed to any kind of asso-
ciation. If the institution is not able to perform its tasks, members LGs have
direct responsibility.
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• Most of the associations cannot be subject to financing from the national bud-
get. So, the LGs can require subsidies from the central budget as the member
of an association and not from the association itself.
(A new type of association, introduced by the modification of Act on Local Gov-
ernment, has been the only exception since 1997. An association with a legal personality
can take over competencies from its members and get subsidies from the state.)
3.3.2 Regional Development Associations19
The first village associations were formed in 1989–1990, in the most underdeveloped
part of the country. Four processes influenced the formation of bottom-up associations:
• improvement of the public administration system;
• regional policy and its realization;
• other sector policies;
• organization of civic associations.
Between 1994–1999, the number of small regional associations doubled. Two mea-
sures inspired the formation of the new associations. In 1993–94 a PHARE Pilot
Program and, in 1996, the Act on Spatial Development both gave an impetus. The
formation of associations was rapid in counties full of small villages but, thanks to the
Act, the associations covered more then 90% of the communities in each county.
The first associations were a mixture of local governmental, business and civic
members. They formed in a real bottom-up process but without any legal registra-
tion or with legal status of social organization. After the 1996 Act, only associations
with LG members were considered by the state and many former associations had to
change their legal form and membership. They have become purely local govern-
mental organizations.
Among the different possible legal forms for small regional development organizations,
local governmental associations dominate—2/3 of organizations belong to this type.
In the eastern part of the country, this number is larger as is the rate of small regional
development associations working as civic associations (the rate is 1/3). Here, the for-
mation of small regional associations occurred a bit earlier and was closer to being a
movement. Among organizations set up after 1996, the rate of civic associations is only
8% and the form of public corporation is much higher.
The size of small regional associations, in regards to the population and number of
LGs is very different. More than 3/4 of associations contain less than 20 LGs. Only in
regions full of small villages do associations have a greater number of LGs.
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Figure 2.7
Increasing Number of Small Regional Development Associations
SOURCE: Fekete, É.G., 2001.
The average population for small regional development associations is 34 thousand
people. The most common are the ones with populations between 15–40 thousand.
The rate for small regions full of small villages, where the population is under 10
thousand people, is 20%. In areas with large villages, the average size of an association
is over 40 thousand.
The regional pattern for small regional development associations and connection to the
NUTS IV regions are crucial questions for the future. Developing strategies for small
regions is the task of small regional development local governmental associations. The
basic unit for planning, according to EU legislation, is the level of NUTS IV, which
includes the statistically smaller regions. Among 184 small regional development asso-
ciations, 34 (18%) cover the area of their statistical districts, 37% operate in a smaller
areas and 11% in larger areas. Around 29% of the organizations cover areas larger than
the statistical district. To solve the problem of the total overlapping of small regional
associations and statistical districts it is not necessary. However, it is a requirement that
smaller regions comprise a statistical planning district.
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Figure 2.8
The Division of Small Regional Associations According to the Number
of the LGs and Population
a) Number of LGs
3–9 10–19 20–39 40–59 80–
b) Number of Population
1-–9.9 thousand people 10-–19.9 thousand people
20–39.9 thousand people 40–59.9 thousand people
60–79.9 thousand people 80–99.9 thousand people
100-–149.9 thousand people 150– thousand people
SOURCE: Fekete, É.G., 2001.
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Figure 2.9
Spatial Pattern of Small Regional Associations and Related NUTS IV Regions
a) Territory of Small Regional Associations Compared to Territory of Statistical Districts
The same Smaller Larger and smaller Larger Covers more districts
b) Territory of Statistical Districts Compared to Territory of Small Regional Associations
One organization covers the whole area
More organizations cover the whole area
One organization, but crosses the border
More organizations of which a minimum of one cross the border
SOURCE: Fekete, É.G., 2001.
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The rate of small regional associations, which are larger than one statistic district
and belong to two statistical districts, is 68%. This is 18% for those who belong to
three statistical districts. Those organizations belonging to more than four statistical
districts are umbrella organizations.
Approaching this from another angle, we can state that in every statistical district
there is a small regional organization. Of the statistical districts, 25% are completely
“all right”, a further 41% contain more than one association, but do not extend past
the district border. In 34% of statistical districts, the spontaneously organized associ-
ations cross the border of the statistical districts.
Between 1996 and 1999, most of the projects fulfilled by smaller regional devel-
opment association were the planning and creation of development strategies. While
an increasing number of associations were established on a territorial basis from the
NUTS IV, indirect development activities received priority to direct ones. Infrastruc-
ture and tourism development projects greatly stand out among the investment type
projects while other economic projects have less popularity.
Table 2.19
Sector Patterns for Small Regional Projects and Their Tendencies
Number of Finished Number of Projects Future Project/
or Ongoing Projects with Prepared Present Project
Feasibility Studies or
Planned in the Future
Forestry 23 70 3.04
Quality Control 54 161 2.98
Food Processing 53 139 2.62
Handcrafts 40 94 2.35
Village Renewal 139 325 2.34
Innovation, R+D 21 48 2.29
Exploitation of Thermal Water 58 97 1.67
Agriculture 240 398 1.66
Environmental Protection 109 151 1.39
Job-Creation 236 265 1.12
Information Technology 195 203 1.04
Other 52 54 1.04
Industrial Park, Business Zones 94 97 1.03
Education, Training 142 145 1.02
Infrastructure 411 400 0.97
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Table 2.19 (continued)
Sector Patterns for Small Regional Projects and Their Tendencies
Number of Finished Number of Projects Future Project/
or Ongoing Projects with Prepared Present Project
Feasibility Studies or
Planned in the Future
Tourism 281 258 0.92
Marketing 114 102 0.89
Protection of Cultural Heritage 112 100 0.89
Business Advice 127 102 0.80
Community Development 155 111 0.72
Youth Programs 224 134 0.60
Social Services 123 73 0.59
Total 3,003 3,527 1.17
SOURCE: Fekete, É.G., 2002.
According to surveys conducted by the North Hungarian Department of the Cen-
ter for Regional Studies, the most successful associations were those that:
• covered a territory that they were able to handle (it was not too big) and where
regional identity is still perceptible (it was not too small),
• worked in an integrated manner,
• had an appropriate development strategy and more feasibility studies for their
projects,
• were able to produce results at every stage which helped keep alive their trust
in the cooperative actions,
• were able to get support from both inside and outside,
• involved elected leaders who knew the concept of local development and were
able to adopt innovations and mobilize the local people,
• had experts who worked as members of the association, making it possible to
continuously provide information and advice to local staff and for a relatively
cheap price,
• were able to adjust to the requirements of the governmental level.
The size of LGs influences their success only in that, the smaller the community
the larger the necessity for cooperation. Results are much more influenced by the size
of the region. Firstly, it must be sufficiently large to have considerable quantity and
quality of local resources. Secondly, it must be small enough to make the process,
happening within the region, understandable and make daily communication among
local actors possible.
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3.4 The Ability and Means of the Central Government to Handle
Diversity in Local Administration
The policy of the central government to induce formation of associations is hampered
by two factors. For one, there is no precise information about the intensity and struc-
ture of associations, especially in the case of public services. Yet, since 1994 there has
been a regulation in the Act on Local Governments that stipulates associations can be
endeavored by financial means. Still, a comprehensive governmental subsidy system is
impeded by the idea that legislation for the different sectors must point out those
activities that are practical for associations to apply and only after this may these activ-
ities be subsidized.
According to this, education and social sectors use more financial subsidies to
motivate cooperation between LGs. In the case of elementary schools and child care,
extra financial support is available if they are operated by associations, but they must
only work in forms determined by the law. Consequently, in last few years, new asso-
ciations were formed only in these two sectors. Unfortunately, the preferences of state
policy are confused. Subsidies for LGs with small populations and without association com-
pete with the above mentioned extra subsidies given to associations. For example, in the
education sector within Baranya County during 2000, LGs received 2.8 times more
supplementary subsidies because of size rather than because of their operating in asso-
ciation. There is no professional or efficiency criterion that should be necessary for
receiving financial support.
One of the basic requirements for cooperation and joint running of public institu-
tions is accessibility. School buses may increase better commute to joint schools. The CG
promoted buying school buses during the mid-1990s. Utilizing this incentive, mu-
nicipalities bought 128 school buses in 1996. This amount provides services for one
quarter of the joint school associations and effected 304 LGs. However, the grant was
only offered for investment. Municipalities have experienced a lot of difficulty in main-
taining the service. They needed support for the running expenditure of the school
buses too. Instead of extension of support, the CG stopped this kind of incentive.
[Halász, 2000]
Delegation of competencies to district centers is a tool for the state, but it can
increase the efficiency only of public administration. The district centers obtain sup-
plementary subsidies also. We mention here again the differentiated subsidy system for
joint LG offices.
In Hungary, there is a kind of financial support handling the issue of LGs that,
through no fault of their own, get into a critical financial situation. One of the key
selection criteria for applicant LGs is their use of the potential capacity of local public
facilities (such as kindergartens or schools). The regulation gives different requirements
for municipalities above and below 3,000 inhabitants. For the former, the rate of use
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should exceed 70%. The threshold for smaller municipalities (in 2001 and 2002) was
50%. Another criterion is related to the compulsory existence of joint offices or mem-
bership in associations by municipalities below 500 citizens.
Since 1997, the state introduced an indexing system for the average level of costs of
the institutions differentiating according to the size of the LGs. This is the basis for
judgement of the applications. Year after year, less divergence from the average level is
accepted. So, the greater the difference from the average, the smaller the state subsidy
a LG can receive. If the expenditures are higher than 110% of the LGs average expen-
diture, support is decreased. If the expenditures are lower than 90% of the national
average, support is increased.
The first problem with this legislation is that it came too late. The second problem
is that the limit of compulsory formation of association (500 inhabitants) is too low.
Moreover, it opposes with the paragraph stipulation stating, in the case of LGs with
populations under 1,000 it is recommended they form joint offices. Larger LGs are
preferred for this kind of subsidy.
Table 2.20
Support for LGs in Handling Financial Problems Caused Through
No Fault of Their Own
Categories Supported Applications Amount of Subsidies
Number Rate [%] [Million HUF] Rate [%]
Below 1,000 Inhabitants 779 57 3,066 25
1,000–5,000 Inhabitants 454 33 3,736 31
Above 5,000 Inhabitants 21 2 330 3
Villages 1,254 92 7,132 59
Towns 103 7 4,158 34
Towns with the Rights of Counties 1 0 180 1
Counties 13 1 726 6
Total 1,371 100 12,196 100
SOURCE: Puskás, I., 2000. p.124
While 7% of applications come from towns, they received 34% of this subsidy
type in 1999. The preference for towns is explained by their more differentiated tasks.
They will need extra subsidy until the delegation of competencies becomes less con-
centrated. [Puskás, I., 2000]
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4. SUMMARY OF THE DEBATES AND SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING THE SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
AND THE CONFLICTS THAT EMERGED FROM FRAGMENTATION
4.1 Suggestions for Slowing Down Fragmentation and Creating
an Optimal Pattern for LGs in Regards to Their Size
Suggestions for the criteria for establishing a new LG are based on the legal philoso-
phy stating that, during the second decade of the new local governmental system in
Hungary, the reference to the forced amalgamation of communities during the com-
munist era provides no reason to split up any more LGs. Establishment of a new LG
must meet serious requirements in order to hamper further fragmentation of the local
governmental system.
A dialogue on the issue, prepared by the Ministry of the Interior (2001), summa-
rizes the possible ways to develop LGs. The opinions represented in this paper’s debate
deal with this question. According to the paper: The precise content for the right to
establish LGs must be determined by the Constitution. The rights that entitle every
voter in every local community are the following:
• the right to directly elect their representative body and mayor;
• the right for referendum;
• the right to own property, their own budget, state subsidies and local taxes;
• the right to decide on and regulate local public affairs.
Despite these, the tasks and authorities of LGs must be differentiated and deter-
mined according to their potential.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to decrease the fragmentation of LGs. For instance,
small areas where located businesses with huge incomes are not allowed to separate
from their town and form a new LG. The solution for the LGs with declining popula-
tions and weak self- governing potential is to join another LG. There is a belief that the
formation of a common representative body should only be induced in areas with a
fulltime mayor with a population limit of 1,000, this later became 1,500 inhabitants.
The opinions connecting to the official opinion further strengthen the sugges-
tions. [Debate About the Local..., 2001] The right to establish an LG is considered a
significant achievement but, again, the opinion is that those under a certain popula-
tion size should not be able to establish an independent LG, only a joint representative
body. The paper prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, suggests the minimum
limit should be 1,000 inhabitants but others consider this too high, suggesting the
minimum be 500 inhabitants. In order to strengthen local identity, the category of
joint LGs would be extended to some districts of towns that possess their own identity.
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Others emphasize the necessity of differentiated provision of tasks and authorities ac-
cording to the size of LG. For example, it would be possible to differentiate between
villages with a population between 500–1,000, over 1,000, small towns and large
towns.
The compulsory formation of joint offices above 1,000 or 1,500 inhabitants was
also followed by debate. However, more opinions were in favor of it rather than against
it. Besides the minimum population limit, it was necessary to define the maximum
number of LGs that can join offices. According to experience, the administration of
3– 4—according to others, 7—LGs can be performed collectively. [Debate About the
Local..., 2001]
Besides population size, further criteria were drawn up. According to a decision by
the Constitutional Court, the availability of the financial assets necessary to operate an
LG cannot be criteria of establishment of a new LG. According to E. Pfeil (2001), the
new LG should prove the possession of its own institutional background for perform-
ing basic and obligatory tasks. So, it should be determined that the LG, that wants to
split, will be able to perform its future obligatory tasks—accomplished commonly
before—in to proper degree or will perform them in an other way (i.e. involving the
economic or social sphere). The other criterion, according to the suggestion, is the
verification of the existence of a local society through the presence and strength of civic
organizations in the given communities. Finally, there remains the existing criteria for
the method of property sharing and calculating a budget for the new LG.
4.2 Amalgamation, Political Integration and Functional Cooperation
No one in Hungary considers amalgamation of LGs as a political alternative. One
reason for this is that the strained rigidity of the formation of districts is still living in
the memories of the people. In spite of this, the opinion that larger local governmental
units should be created annually reappears. This is especially in the case of providing
physical public services (like transportation, water supply, waste handling) and repre-
senting territorial interests on higher levels. The opinions against it emphasize that the
different services have different optimal spatial units and the amount of money saved—
as these are the smallest LGs is not significant. [Hermann Z., Horváth, M.T., Péteri
G., and Ungvári G., 1998] The strongest barrier for amalgamations, which entails
disappearance of settlement names, is increasing local identity. This is why, in the
present reform of the public administration, value is placed on local communities
staying in the center of the LGs system and this value must be preserved.
For the formation of a common representative body, this means political integra-
tion,20  the situation has also not matured. Only in special cases are LG’s willing to give
up their autonomy. Although legislation made the formation of common representa-
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tive body possible, there are rarely any examples of it. Despite this, the integration
concepts are formed during the conception of the public administration reform.
The most realistic type of integration is to strengthen LGs functional associations.
In Hungary today, there are more than 200 small regional spatial development associ-
ations and thousands of other local governmental (administrative) associations operating
at a small regional level. The situation is more confusing if we consider that the role of
small regions in the vertical system is unclear and relationships at the community level
and within the regions are not regulated. This confusing situation is the result of a
permanent adjustment to small regional organizations according to the actual redistri-
bution policy. The most chaotic characteristics of the system: 1. the mixture of functions
and authorities at both the vertical and horizontal level, 2. spatial patterns that do not
match each other. Consequently, these two problems must be solved in order to strength-
en functional integration between LGs.
There is a suggestion to form the state policies that will introduce and expand on
the models of multipurpose associations. These multipurpose associations could guar-
antee transmission of a more integrated local development policy and efficient operation
of public services, organized over a bigger territorial base and achieving higher qual-
ity than currently. The supported model of associations should fulfil criteria such as
the following:
• established by a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 10 LGs;
• population size within their territory should be higher than 2,000;
• they are engaged in basic education, social care, maintaining local roads, han-
dling waste materials, settlement development and zoning.
Subsidies for distribution of services should based upon a cost-benefit analysis
determined according to the action plan for development of the public administration.
According to some, local governmental competencies should be reorganized into
separated organizations (local governmental associations), each with the same au-
thority as authorized to the LGs themselves for the given task. Others think that this
is an infringement on governmental autonomy and do not agree with this solution.
The law has closed this dispute. Since 1997, the modified Act on Local Governments
now provides the opportunity for local governments to delegate competencies to
their associations and the Act on Association of LGs makes it possible to form associ-
ations with the inclusion of a legal personality. This legal person may have properties
and undertake any obligation in order to implement its tasks and provide services to
its member communities. Its decision maker body is the associative council. [Fürcht,
P., 1998]
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4.3 Voluntary and Forced Formation of Associations
The idea of obligatory formation of associations emerged in regards to joint LG offices.
During the former parliamentary cycle (1994–98), a proposal on alterations of the
Constitution was prepared. This was ultimately refused by Parliament. This proposal
included creation of an institution of obligatory joint offices. For their introduction, a
modification of the Constitution is necessary. According to the paper, produced by the
Ministry of the Interior in 2001, the formation of joint offices would be compulsory,
firstly under 1,000 inhabitants, later under 1,500 inhabitants and the possibility to
employ a full time mayor would be connected to the joint offices. Beside this, the
compulsory formation of association was considered possible in case of certain obliga-
tory tasks financed by central budget.
There is agreement on the necessity of LG stimulation to form larger supplied
areas but indirect means are preferred. Such indirect stimulation can be as follows:
• normative subsidies according to village population in relation to the town or
according to the number of inhabitants supplied;
• more significant and complex subsidization of multipurpose associations.
The principles of voluntary versus obligatory formation of associations are not to-
tally exclusive. The voluntary principle can be considered the main rule but the
obligatory principle, requiring a two-third majority decision, within the legislation
can be applied in a few cases too. [Fürcht, P., 1998]
4.4 One and Multicolor Patterns of Association
There is a debate about the question of whether simplification of local governmental
integration, by creating one organization responsible for all common tasks, is an achiev-
able and correct solution. This type of organization would improve the comprehensible
arrangement for a spatial system of task provisions. Still, it is recognized that different
tasks have different spatial divisions. What is more, these change over time. Moreover,
besides LGs, other actors are emerging both in local services and in local develop-
ment. Public-private partnerships require small regional institutions, more then public
administration. It is clear, that local governmental associations, or de-concentrated
state organizations, are not able to undertake tasks organized by small regional devel-
opment associations in a bottom-up process and based on wide social participation.
Nor can they integrate economic and civic actors in order to mobilize local resources
for local development. They are not able to manage integrated local development, in
the first instance, due to their purely local governmental membership and, in the
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second instance, because of the waning interest of the state and its bureaucratic
manner. State governmental, self-governmental integrated associations and develop-
ment action groups are also necessary for effective development. A flexible system
involving more types of organizations is needed. They might form a multicolor
pattern of associations, which means more types of associations with several purposes,
more types of LGs and those including, not only LGs, but private persons and busi-
nesses as well.
There is an interesting pilot project managed by the local governmental develop-
ment association for the town of Siklos and its surrounding communities. Within this
project, a complex small regional public-service system is under formation. They set
up an organizational and operational framework for collective performance of regional
development, economic development and public administration tasks as well as mak-
ing a pioneer attempt to unify administrative and regional development associations
working in the same small region. [Csefkó F., 2001]
It is an important element lacking in the present legislation that no form of
association has been made suitable to receive members of the private sphere, such as
representatives of civic organizations or businesses. This critique is made especially in
regards to associations with a legal entity being financed by the central budget. The
situation of local development associations acting outside the Act of Local Govern-
ments is rather problematic, since the principle of partnership should be determinant
in their operation. It can be useful to consider the admission of social and economic
players into local governmental associations based on public law, since getting under
social and state control would become suitable for functions not exploited before.
The limited admission of chambers, economic associations and civic organizations
into certain types of associations should happen while maintaining the dominance of
the public sphere. In this regard, it is a frequently attempted method in Western
Europe to allow private actors or representatives to possess a maximum two-fifth of
the votes.
4.5 Differential Delegation of Competencies and Financing
Every function allotted to local governments has a geographical attractive zone, i.e. the
zone influenced by the settlement as a “central place” for the area. Presently in Hungary,
these zones have been reduced to the level of local communities or counties.
Revision of the issuing of tasks and authority is a general requirement for experts
dealing with this topic. Beyond raising the questions about task sharing between the
state and the LGs [Csefkó, 2000; Kara, 1999], there is a central question on task
sharing amongst LGs: Differentiation of delegation of competencies and financing
would be possible according to the Act on Local Governments, but it is rarely used in
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practice. The concept of differentiation of competency delegation and financing offers,
to form a more sophisticated system where different functions have different geograph-
ical attractive zones based on size. Bigger units get the power and tools (from the state)
to provide services for smaller ones. In this case, LGs in the service centers are respon-
sible for the smaller units, too. Of course, we speak only about obligatory tasks. In the
case of optional tasks, the local government should decide to maintain its own institute
or create association with others. (In this instance, inhabitants living in smaller units
may miss those services.)
P. Fürcht (2000) suggests differentiating between LGs in towns and villages when
their competencies and public tasks are delegated. According to him, village govern-
ment must provide the public services that are necessary for living there (roads, healthy
drinking water, public light, electricity, gas works, and local administration for daily
life, etc.) For other services sector models should be worked out. According to this,
there can be three types of task-delegation:
• local provision of tasks, where population and capacity make it possible;
• provision of tasks through LG associations (voluntary or, if the Constitution
makes it possible, in the case of certain obligatory public services, compulsory
ones);
• through towns, in case the town supplies services for the surrounding commu-
nities according to the sector model. (In this case, towns would get financial
resources directly from the central budget or the villages would contribute to
funds under a contract that guarantees accountability. Both individual LGs
and their association could be the contracting partner of the town.)
By allotting public services to the towns, 65% of the whole population obtains
the services locally and an additional 35% living in nearby villages. [Fürcht, P., 2000.
p.536]
J. Németh (1999) considers the role of the cooperation of neighboring villages
(these can be define as micro-regions) very important. Z. Kéki (2000) differentiates
three types of task and authorities:
1) sham tasks and authorities: These are in the Act of Local Governments, but
never supplied because of lack of demand, financial resources, or other possi-
bilities based on the size of the LG. (For example: provision of new flats, public
transport, fire protection, public security, financing scientific public social, art
and sport activities);
2) tasks and authorities without means: These are provided, but not by the LG
itself, rather by other actors; (for example: nursery schools, primary schools
and health care)
3) wandering tasks and authorities: These can be transferred to the county gov-
ernment; (for example: secondary schools, hospitals)
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According to these types, the following suggestion was drawn up for the designa-
tion of tasks and authorities:
Table 2.21
Suggestion for Differentiated Delegation of Competencies
(According to the Opinion of Chief Executives in County Capitals)
Level of Administration Title of the Tasks and Authorities
1.1  County Governments
• The maintenance of institutions operating on the
local level exempting districts and county centers
• The maintenance of museum centers and National
Archives
• Homes for the elderly
• Children’s homes
• Youth houses
• The maintenance of other institutions supplying
special tasks
• Co-ordination of regional development
• Passing zoning plans for the county
What are still questioned:
• Maintenance of resources centers
• Offices of dues (Tax Office)
• Civil defense (State Agency)
• National defense (State Agency)
1.2 Local Governments for Communities
1.2.1 County’s Central Towns • The maintenance of resources centers
• The maintenance of institutions supplying regional tasks
• Optional tasks designated by the county government
• Regional co-ordination
• Maintenance of social institutions (home for the
elderly, youth houses)
• Supporting artistic activities
• Supporting scientific activities
91
S I Z E  O F  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S ,  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  A N D  L O C A L  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y  I N  H U N G A R Y
Table 21
Suggestion for Differentiated Delegation of Competencies
(According to the Opinion of Chief Executives in County Capitals)
Level of Administration Title of the Tasks and Authorities
1.2.2 Local Governments for Small Regional Centrums
         Towns • The maintenance of educational institutions supplying
small regional tasks (secondary schools, hostels)
• Small regional co-ordination
• Civil defense in small regions
• National defense in small regions
• Fire protection and rescue operations in small regions
• Tourist tasks in small regions
• Local public transport
• The maintenance of certain institutions (homeless
shelters, child protection, nurseries, day-care, family
services)
• The operation of sewage cleaning plants
• Co-ordination of economic development
Towns
• Housing
• The operation of a foster-parents network
1.2.3 Villages With populations between 1,500–2,000
• Participation in public security
• Maintenance of primary schools
• Supporting general education and sport
• Maintenance of nursery school
• Maintenance of space for life long learning
• Mayoral office or joint LG office
• Building up sewage system
With populations below 1,500
• Primary schools
• Nursery schools
• Healthy drinking water
• Social aid
• Public lighting
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Table 2.21 (Continued)
Suggestion for Differentiated Delegation of Competencies
(According to the Opinion of Chief Executives in County Capitals)
Level of Administration Title of the Tasks and Authorities
• Public roads
• Public cemeteries
• The enforcement of national and ethnical minorities rights
• Settlement physical planning, settlement development
• Environmental protection
• Drain pipes
• Maintenance of public spaces
• Basic health care
• Basic social care (meals provision or helping system at
home—in association, through enterprises or by their
own institutions)
NOTE: The tasks of the higher level contain the task of the lower levels, of course.
SOURCE: Kéki, Z., 2000. pp.161–162.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Within the framework of a highly fragmented Hungarian local governmental system,
the following connections can be made between the size of the LGs and local adminis-
tration, the distribution of public services, local democracy and local development:
• In local public administration:
The competence and efficiency of public administration is in direct ratio to the
size of the LG. That’s why, in the case of LGs with populations under 1,000,
legislation stimulates formation of joint offices and the idea of compulsory
formation of joint LG offices was taken seriously. However, due to the unprec-
edented autonomy of Hungarian LGs, a two-thirds Parliamentary majority is
required to modify the legislation necessary to change this situation.
• In operation of local democracy:
According to the local media and activity during political elections, communi-
ties with a population above fifty thousand and below two thousand show the
liveliest local society. In the latter case, the most likely reason for this is the
strength of the informal structures. While in the former case, it is likely the
provision of the spiritual and technical resources necessary for operation of
local publicity and public life.
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• In the provision of local public services:
The principle of economy of size prevails in the case of public services. Due to
the enormously high rate of wage-cost for services, the efficiency of the services
depends on the number of people supplied and it changes in direct ratio to that.
• In local development:
The factor influencing local development, rather than the size of the LG, is the
location and distance from the core of regional development and the level of
regional development. Directly after the political changes, development activ-
ity in the smaller LGs was stronger than in larger ones. This can be explained
by the “compensation” of the infrastructure developments which formerly had
not occurred.
Today, it is widely accepted that the fragmentation of the local development sys-
tem has hampered the taking of further steps. Demands for public services remain
unsatisfied in certain areas while, in other areas, solutions leading to the waste of re-
sources were carried out. But the formation of common LGs, for political reasons,
cannot be the solution. Attention has turned toward associations. For these, there are
reasons for both the obligatory as well as the voluntary associations. Besides the stimu-
lation of associations and, in certain cases, the enforcement of them, the most important
future duties are creating more strict legislation for formation of new LGs, the differ-
entiated delegation of local governmental competencies and the geographical harmoniza-
tion of public administrative spatial units. Suggestions summarized in section IV are
related to the following propositions for these problems:
1) Give up the strong attachment to locality and settlement boundaries in order
to find an optimal territorial framework for local services, local society and local
development. In many terms, small regions function as a locality.
2) Harmonize the spatial division of top-down districts and bottom-up associa-
tions based on regional identity, but it should not mean unification. Territories
of several organizations and the statistical districts should fit but not necessar-
ily be equal to one another.
3) Because of the extremely large size of statistical smaller regions with big cities
(especially county capitals), there is a need for typology which should be the
basis for programming and redistribution of financial resources.
4) Create criteria for establishing new LGs connected to population size (more
then the presently required 300 inhabitants) and some additional indicators
(capacities, civic organizations ...). However, it should be kept in mind that
even the authors of this proposal do not agree on the extension of these criteria
to existing LGs.
5) Compulsory formation of joint offices and provision of a full time mayor only
to populations above 1,000 or 1,500 inhabitants and as would be necessary.
This is included in the national plan for developing public administration.
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6) Strengthen the functional associations of LGs: clear functions and authorities
on both vertical and horizontal levels, spatial patterns that fit to each other.
7) Form a state policy to introduce and extend the models of multipurpose
associations.
8) Create normative subsidies for provision of small regional services. For exam-
ple, according to village population in relation to its town or according to the
number of inhabitants supplied
9) State governmental, integrated self-governmental associations and develop-
ment action groups should all be taken into consideration and develop a
flexible system for them.
10) Involve the representatives of local, social, and economic spheres in small
regional associations in order to encourage partnership development.
11) Delegate different competencies and functions to different sized communities
12) The Local Government Act defines cities with county rights as a type of local
government. Instead of a separate entity for such municipalities, there is a
need to formulate rules for cooperation between bigger cities and their sur-
roundings. Legislation should deal with this issue.
13) In some areas, such as regional development, legislation should accept a
wider concept of cooperation between localities. Beside municipalities, local
citizens, civil organizations and enterprises should be allowed to join rele-
vant local associations.
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NOTES
1 Constitution of Hungarian Republic.
2 Act on Local Governments.
3 Act CXXXV of 1997 on Associations and Co-operation among Local Governments.
4 See a detailed explanation in chapter III.
5 Regional policy wanted to create a stronger city network, which would be able to
absorb migration from the villages and stop the inadequate growth of Budapest.
6 Expenditure oriented budgetary planning: The base for planning is the accepted
level of expenditure. Local councils had own revenues. Central government ensured
the difference of expenditure and own revenues by state grants.
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Revenue oriented budgetary planning: LGs have own revenues, shared revenues, state
transfers allocated on normative base and transfers from other LGs and/or NGOs.
LGs have access to credit too. Each LG’s expenditure cannot exceed its total revenue.
7 “a” point of the 5th paragraph of the Act of XXI on Regional Development.
8 Act No. III. in 1993 on Social Provision. (Note: Higher categories include all
mandatory functions of lower categories.)
9 Act on Local Government 69. §. Paragraphs 1–2.
1 0 In villages with more than 5,000 inhabitants the number of kindergartens has
fallen by 40 percent. The real decline is much lower because a major change in this
category has occured from the changed position of 40 villages (one third of villages
in this size category), who received city status during the 1990s.
1 1 Figures from the smallest villages are not relevant for comparison because of the
298 villages in this category, only 2 have kindergartens.
1 2 Figures of the smallest villages are not relevant for comparison because of the 298
villages in this category, only 2 have primary schools.
1 3 According to surveys conducted by MTA RKK in Szolnok, Kisújszállás, Gyoma-
endrôd, Kalocsa, Mátészalka.
1 4 Households and firms directly contribute to utility investments through utility
associations. The share of their contribution is usually around one third of the total
investment budget.
1 5 Bódi Ferenc, 1992: The enterprise supporting policy of the local governments in
Borsod Abaúj Zemplén County. Spatial research in County BAZ. MTA RKK ÉMO.
1 6 The counties in the middle of the regional hierarchy were, on one hand, the stretched
arms of the state which transferred the central decisions to the towns and villages. On
the other hand, they represented the interests of the communities to the State. The
county council controlled the local councils in two ways. The county council was
the second-grade authority in public administration affairs and, what is more, it
was the county council that reallocated the development resources taken from taxes.
1 7 According to the Act CXXXV of 1997 on Associations and Cooperation among
Local Governments.
1 8 According to the Act XXI of 1996 on Regional Development.
1 9 Representatives are elected from separate lists set up by communities, but they
form an common body.
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Separate Existences Above All Else
—Local Self-Governments
and Service Delivery in Slovakia
Jaroslav Kling, Viktor Niznansky´ Jaroslav Pilát
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Development of Public Management Since 19891
Prior to 1990, public administration in Slovakia was managed through a three-level
network of the národny´ vy´bor (national committees)—miestny (local), okresny´ (district)
and krajsky´ (regional). These committees represented the state’s power; they were the
bodies of state administration as well as of economic management. The lower level
depended upon both the higher level and the central government. In 1990, these com-
mittees were abolished and the reform of public administration in Slovakia had begun.
With the acceptance of Municipal law no. 369/1990, public management in Slo-
vakia split into elected local self-governments and state administration. At this time,
a dual model of public management was introduced with one, municipal, level of
territorial self-government.
Until 2001, further developments in public administration reform were purely
related to reform of the state administration, with some amendments to Municipal
law. Firstly, in 1990, the kraje level of state administration was canceled and a new
level, subordinated to okres (district) level, was created called obvod (sub district). The
territorial units of state administration in Slovakia from 1990 to 1996 included 38
districts and 121 sub districts.
Secondly, in 1996, the territorial structure of state administration changed. The
sub districts were revoked and the number of districts increased to 79. An interim tier
of local state administration was created. Eight regions (kraj) were then established.
Political pressure during creation of new districts resulted in disproportionably large
districts. During this period, the difference between the largest and the smallest dis-
tricts was 150,000 inhabitants (the Nitra district—163,419 inhabitants vs. the
Medzilaborce district—12,597 inhabitants in 2001). Although the number of dis-
trict offices increased in comparison to the previous division, they did not cover the
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entire territory of Slovakia proportionally. Besides the district office seat, another 43
permanent and temporary district offices were created.
After the 1998 elections, the attention to public administration reform turned
towards territorial self-government. In 1999, a government Plenipotentiary for the task
of decentralization and reform of public administration was appointed. The group of
experts elaborated upon the concept of decentralization of public administration. After
several obstructions and delays in the launch of the decentralization project, due to the
lack of consensus amongst politicians within the wider government coalition, the nec-
essary laws were only approved in 2001. Since January 1, 2002, there are eight
self-governmental regions (samosprávny kraj) in Slovakia.2  In September 2001, the
Parliament adopted the act that defines the scope and timeline for competencies to
transfer to territorial self-government.
1.2 The Current Form of Public Management in Slovakia
1.2.1 State Administration
Figure 3.1
Structure of State Administration in Slovakia
Government of the SR
Other Bodies of the
Central Government
Ministries
Specialised Local State
Administration
General Local State
Administration
Ministry of Interior
of the SR
Regional Offices
District Offices
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1.2.2 Territorial Self-Government
Figure 3.2
Structure of Territorial Self-Government in Slovakia
Municipality is the foundation of territorial self-government in Slovakia. In com-
pliance to the Slovak Constitution (Art. 64), the two basic self-governmental territorial
units are: municipalities3  and higher territorial units (self-governmental regions). In
Slovakia, all municipalities are technically equal. The scope of competencies is the
same for any size of local self-government. The law specifies the certain conditions
when a village may be declared a town. The only municipal size-category regulated
by the special law is over 200,000 inhabitants (i.e. the Act on the capital of Slovakia,
Bratislava, and the Act on Kosice). These two cities have special systems of local self-
government. Bratislava consists of 16 sections (mestská cast ’), all with the status of
local self-government and there is also an entire local city self-government body (mag-
istrát) above them. The structure in Kos¡ice is similar to that of Bratislava. There are
22 city sections in Kosice.
Table 3.1
Structure of Local Public Administration in 2000
 Number Population Average
of Units Average Range Territory [km2]
Local Self- Municipalities 2,883 1,874 2–447,345 17
Government Self-Governmental Regions 8 675,318 551,441–787,483 6,129
Local state Districts 79 68,387 12,597–163,419 621
Administration Regions 8 675,318 551,441–787,483 6,129
SOURCE: Statistical Office of the SR.
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1.3 Division of Competencies Within Public Management
1.3.1 State Administration
The regional offices and district offices exercise state administration at the regional and
district levels. These offices deliver services provided by the state. In Slovakia, state
administration delivers a vast majority of services in the categories of education, health-
care, social welfare, environmental issues, cadastre, registry of enterprises and business
licenses, etc. These services are administered in the district and regional offices. Indi-
vidual branches, responsible for the state administration exercised by these offices, are
methodologically run by the respective ministries. The Ministry of Interior plays a
coordinating role in local state administration and other ministries related work.
District and regional offices are appealing bodies for the administrative issues of terri-
torial self-governments. They can also assist territorial self-governments in delivery of
their services. The networks for special offices in individual branches of state adminis-
tration (tax offices, military offices, fire departments, etc.) are further bodies of local
state administration.
1.3.2 Territorial Self-Government
Municipality
The major purpose of a municipality is to take care of the municipal territory’s develop-
ment and the needs of the citizenry. A municipality’s territory can consist of one or
several cadastral territories. The central government can found, cancel, divide or join
municipalities. Such an act can be performed only upon agreement by the municipality
and the respective regional office. Along with exercising other self-governmental func-
tions, the municipality carries out activities related to proper management of municipal
property and state property left for the municipality’s use. The range of competency for
local self-governments is not very wide. Practically, the services that are fully, and exclu-
sively, provided by local self-government include; municipal road management,
municipal waste management, development of municipal territory (construction of
municipal facilities and development of municipal property), territory management
and green areas, local public transportation and public lighting. The services which
may be, or may in part be, delivered by local self-governments include; water works, gas
works, sewage systems, environmental issues, culture, sport, other leisure time activities,
healthcare, social welfare and education. Generally, these services are delivered by the
state administration. Local self-governments also deliver some services delegated to them
by the state administration (such as residential registry, building permits, etc. Local
self-governments can issue ordinances and have their own municipal police to secure
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public safety.4  In reality, not every municipality carries out all the services listed due to
lack of capacity (the smallest municipality consists of only two people, see section 2).
Municipalities also carry out founding and some economic and managerial func-
tions in some areas decentralized in 2001, from the state administration level down to
local self-government. The areas are as follows: water management, social services, edu-
cation, culture, healthcare, regional development and tourism.
Self-Governmental Region
Beginning in 2002, an interim tier of territorial self-government functions in Slovakia.
The self-governmental region individually manages its own property and own reve-
nues. The territory of the self-governmental region is identical with the territory of the
region (kraj), a state administrative unit. It cooperates with other state bodies, other
self-governmental regions, municipalities and other legal entities. The relationship
between the self-governmental region and municipalities is not based on the principle
of subordination, but partnership. The self-governmental regions have competencies
primarily in the area of conceptualizing and planning projects for individual branches
of social life. Firstly, the competence transferred to them concerns regional develop-
ment. The self-governmental regions mainly create the conditions for development of
environmental protection, education, healthcare, social welfare and culture. They are
allowed to issue ordinances on the matters concerning local self-government. The rela-
tionship between regional self-government and state administration is based on
partnership, not subordination. Self-governmental regions also carry out founding eco-
nomic and managerial functions for some areas decentralized in 2001 (Act no. 416/
2001) from the state administration level to the local self-government. The areas are as
follows: road management, transportation, social services, education, culture, health-
care, regional development and tourism.
1.4 Political Mechanisms for Public Management Operation
Concerning the political mechanisms within public administration, the two divisions of
public administration, state administration and local self-government, must be differ-
entiated. Basically, state administration is appointed and local self-government is elected.
1.4.1 State Administration
The operation of all state administration bodies depends upon the results of the
parliamentary elections. The elected political parties then appoint leadership for the
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central bodies as well as the leadership of local state administrative bodies. This prin-
ciple creates low accountability on the part of state administration bureaucrats, who
are basically only responsible to their nominating political party. In the summer of
2001, the Slovak Parliament adopted an Act on state service that specifies the legal
parameters for state administrative positions, the qualification requirements and the
terms of state administration employment. It hoped to eliminate the present strong
influence of political affiliation in the process of accepting candidates for state admin-
istrative positions.
1.4.2 Territorial Self-Government
Political mechanisms, for the operation of local self-government, stem from the Consti-
tution. The determining factor is the principle of election.
Municipality
The municipal council and the mayor are the two municipal bodies. The municipal
council (obecné zastupitel’stvo) consists of the councilors, elected for four years in direct
elections by the residents of municipality. Prior to this date, the municipal council
specifies the number of councilors elected for the next elections. There are a maximum
of three councilors in municipalities up to 40 inhabitants. Municipalities over 100,000
inhabitants have usually 23 to 41 councilors. In Slovakia, municipal elections are based
upon the majority electoral system. There are multiple mandate election districts,
within each municipality, for municipal councilors elections. The number of mandates
for each particular district depends on its population. The maximum number of coun-
cilors elected in one election district is 12. The municipal council is a decision-making
body seeing to the basic areas of the municipal life.
The mayor (starosta/primátor), elected in direct elections every four years, is a high-
est executive body of a municipality. For mayoral elections, each municipality forms
one a one-mandate election district. The majority electoral system also applies to
mayoral elections. The Municipal law also specifies the terms and conditions for
removing the mayor from office before the end of his/her term.
Political mechanisms at the local self-government level are almost exclusively ruled
by the principles of the electoral process. Certainly, the political orientation of the
elected representatives is important at this level too. At the municipal level, political
influence is significantly lower than at the national level. The municipal issues being
addressed very often yield to political interests.
The local self-government is managed by its elected representatives. The options
for removal of a mayor are quite clearly stated in the Municipal law. Incidentally, the
111
S E PA R AT E  E X I S T E N C E S  A B O V E  A L L — LO C A L  S E L F – G O V E R N M E N T S  A N D  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y  I N  S LOVA K I A
municipal councilors cannot be removed due to low quality of his/her work prior to the
end of their term.
Self-Governmental Regions
The council of the self-governmental region and the chairperson of the self-govern-
mental region are the bodies of the regional self-government.
The council of the self-governmental region (zastupitel’stvo samosprávneho kraja) speci-
fies the number of councilors to be elected in the next elections, based on the specifications
of 12,000 to 15,000 inhabitants per one councilor. Elections to this body have the
same rules as municipal elections.
The chairperson of the self-governmental region (predseda samosprvneho kraja) rep-
resents it. He/she is its statutory body. Act no. 302/2001 specifies the conditions of his/
her removal prior to the end of the term. The election of the chairperson is different
than election of the mayor. The candidate who receives plus 50% of the votes in the
direct elections becomes the chairperson. If none of the candidates pools this number
of votes, the two most successful candidates advance to the second round. In the second
round, the candidate with majority of votes becomes the chairperson. The regional
self-government body’s terms are four years.
1.5 Financial Mechanisms for Public Management Operation
1.5.1 State Administration
The state budget is the funding source for the state administration’s central bodies
and the regional and district offices. Individual branches within the district and regional
offices are financed through the budget chapter of the respective regional office. In
2001, the government came to the decision to decrease the number of budget chapters.
The regional offices chapters will be abandoned. The local state administration was
to be financed through the chapter of respective ministry or the Ministry of Interior
of the SR. Later on, the entire system shall be revised by the Act on the state treasury.
1.5.2 Territorial Self-Government
Municipality
The municipality funds its needs primarily through its own revenues, state subsidies
and other sources. Major sources of municipal revenue are:
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a) Share in the state tax revenue: The funds from the state tax revenue (person-
al income tax, corporate tax and road tax) are distributed to the municipalities
in compliance with the given rules. These rules changed during the 1991–
2000 period. Revenue from the personal income tax are distributed according
to the population (of the municipality). Distribution of corporate tax reve-
nue reflects the localization of the corporation. Sixty percent of revenues are
distributed proportionally by population and another forty percent accord-
ing to the residence of the taxpayer. Municipalities receive 40% of road tax
revenues. These funds are distributed proportionally according to the pop-
ulation. The overall portion of state tax monies allotted to the municipalities
is annually determined by the state budget (except for the share in the road
tax revenues).
b) Revenue from local taxes and local fees: The real estate tax is an exclusive
municipal tax. It is calculated as a multiple of the rate for individual types
of real estate given by the notice of the Ministry of Finance of the SR. The
maximum multiple is as follows:
1.0 In municipalities up to 1,000 inhabitants
1.4 In municipalities from 1,001 to 6,000 inhabitants
1.6 In municipalities from 6,001 to 10,000 inhabitants
2.0 In municipalities from 10,001 to 25,000 inhabitants
2.5 In municipalities over 25,000 inhabitants
3.5 In the seats of the district and spa municipalities
4.0 In the seats of the region
4.5 In Bratislava
Local fees (taxes) include fines/licenses for: dogs; alcohol and tobacco
products sale; gambling and slot machines; cash registers; car entry into the
historical center of the city; taxes for lodging; advertisement; public en-
trance; spa and recreation; non-residential use of an apartment; public
property use; air pollution; waste disposal as well as other fees.
c) Revenues of enterprise and property ownership.
d) Administrative and other fees and payments.
e) Capital assets sale revenues.
f) Revenues from provided loans.
g) Revenues from rental of buildings and facilities, transfers from contributory
organizations and transfers from the financial funds of the municipality.
h) Donations and voluntary fundraising for municipality revenues. Besides these
revenues, municipalities can have also the following revenues.
i) Transfers and other subsidies from the state budget: Subsidies to munici-
palities for the provision of self-governmental services belong under this
category. Until 1995, all municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants were eli-
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gible for this subsidy. The subsidy was given based upon the quality of soil
in the territory, as defined by the Ministry of Agriculture of the SR and the
size of the municipality. Since 1996, the population stipulation dropped to
3,000 inhabitants. Further subsidies include: subsidies for local public trans-
portation in Bratislava, Kosice, Presov, Zilina and Banská Bystrica; subsidies
for completion of complex housing construction; subsidies for regional de-
velopment; and other specific transfers and subsidies provided by individual
chapters of the state budget.
j) Subsidies from state funds: This category consists mainly of transfers from
the State environmental fund for construction of technical infrastructure
facilities (sewage, wastewater treatment facilities, etc.) Also, Pro Slovakia,
the State fund for funding cultural activities, the State water management
fund for supporting the construction of water supply systems and the State
fund for housing development and construction.
k) Received credits and revenue from municipal bonds.
Self-Governmental Region
The self-governmental regions mostly use the revenues from their share in state tax
collections, surcharges to personal income taxes they create, and funds of horizontal
leveling of self-governmental regions. In addition to these sources, self-governmental
regions can use financial sources similar to municipalities. As of the time of this study,
exact mechanisms for the finance of self-governmental regions do not exist.
2. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN SLOVAKIA
The municipal structure of Slovakia features instability and a large number of small
municipalities (fragmentation). In 1950, there were 3,344 municipalities in Slovakia
averaging 1,029 residents. In 1989, there were only 2,694 municipalities with an average
population of 1,963.  After the changes in 1989, the number of municipalities rocket-
ed to 2,825 in 1991 (Figure 3.3).
In 2000, Slovakia had 2,883 municipalities. Of this number, 138 had the statute
of city. More than two thirds of the municipalities were under 1,000 inhabitants.
Over 42% had less than 500 inhabitants. A total of 123 municipalities (4.3%) had
fewer than 100 inhabitants. Príkra, the smallest municipality (two inhabitants) is lo-
cated in the Svidnik district in northeast Slovakia.
Smizany was the village with the highest number of inhabitants (7,367 people).
Besides this village, another seven villages exceeded the threshold of 5,000 inhabitants.
On the other hand, Modry´ Kamen was the smallest town, with a population of 1,441
people. A total of 22 towns fell into the size category of under 5,000 people.
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Figure 3.3
Development of the Number of Municipalities in Slovakia Since 1950
SOURCE: Scítanie l’udu, domov a bytov 1993, Statisticky´ lexikón obcí 1961, 1970 a 1980; calculations
and figure: M.E.S.A. 10.
Historically, the decrease in the number of the smallest municipalities (less than
499 people) could be observed until 1989 (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Development of the Size Structure of Municipalities in Slovakia [%]
Size Category The Share of Municipalities in Given Size Categories
1950 1961 1980 1991 2000
Under 500 44.6 35.8 35.3 41.2 41.5
500–999 30.6 31.5 29.2 27.6 27.0
1,000–1,999 16.7 20.1 20.8 18.5 18.6
2,000–4,999 6.2 9.9 10.3 8.4 8.7
5,000–9,999 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.8
10,000–49,999 0.7 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.1
Over 50,000 0.06 0.06 0.3 0.4 0.4
SOURCE: Scítanie l’udu, domov a bytov 1993, Statisticky´ lexikón obcí 1961, 1970 a 1980; calculations:
M.E.S.A. 10.
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In the first post-1989 Census, conducted in 1991, the number of the smaller
municipalities rose again. The process of integration can explain the rapid growth of
the towns over 10,000 inhabitants since 1970. This process took place mainly during
the 1970s and the 1980s in Slovakia. Similar explanations may be used for the contin-
ual decline of the smallest municipalities up until 1991. These municipalities were
annexed either to neighboring towns or villages. The joint municipalities then shifted
into a higher size category.
In 1950, 13.3% of the Slovak population resided in municipalities with less than
499 inhabitants (the proportion of this size category on the total number of munici-
palities was 44.6%). In 2000, when these municipalities accounted for 41.5% of all
municipalities in the country, only 6% of population lived there. The population
proportion from municipalities with less than 999 people decreased with a similarly
high rate (from 20.3% in 1950 to 10.3% in 2000). All municipalities with less than
999 inhabitants represented as much as 68.5% of the total municipalities in the Slovak
Republic in 2000. However, only 16.3% of population actually lived there. To the
contrary, in the case of the largest size categories, the proportion of inhabitants grew
more than twofold, in some cases as much as threefold (cities over 50,000 people). The
municipalities in the size category 5,000–9,999 inhabitants have maintained relative-
ly stable proportions over the last 50 years (Figure 3.4). Based upon development in
the number of municipalities and municipal population, this size category seems to be
the most stable element of the settlement structure of Slovakia.
Regarding the spatial aspect, several remarks can be made as to the settlement
structure of Slovakia. The largest concentration of small municipalities can be found in
the northeastern part of Slovakia. This part of the country is the continuous economic
periphery of Slovakia. This explains also the low population within these municipali-
ties. Another area with a large number of small municipalities is situated in the
Juhoslovenská kotlina (Southern Slovak Lowlands located in the southern part of Cen-
tral Slovakia). The western part of Slovakia is the opposite. Primarily medium-sized
large villages and towns are concentrated here. The areas in the Vah River Valley, the
Orava River Valley and central part of Slovakia have similar concentrations.
The recent shape of settlement structure in Slovakia is influenced by several factors.
Firstly, it is the difficult vertical segmentation of Slovakia’s terrain. Secondly, it is the
historical patterns of settlement in Slovakia—various settling of the wild terrain (colo-
nization). Later on, it was the development of economic activities and their concentration
in select locations. In the second half of the 20th century, there were two contradicting
processes taking place in two different societal systems in Slovakia. The integration of
municipalities, during the period of state socialism was the first process. The disinte-
gration caused by the implementation of democratic elements into management and
administration of the state after 1990 was the second process.
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Figure 3.4
Population Distribution Amongst Municipalities by
the Size Categories Since 1950
1950 1961 1970 1980 1991 2000
SOURCE: Scítanie l’udu domov a bytov 1993, Statisticky´ lexikón obcí 1961, 1970 a 1980; calculations and
figure: M.E.S.A. 10.
Figure 3.5
Size Structure for Municipalities in Slovakia as of December 31, 2000
SOURCE: Statistical Office of the SR 2000; map: M.E.S.A. 10
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2.1 Integration of Municipalities Prior to 1990
As part of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic was the agriculturally oriented section
with a great deal of rural settlements. After 1948, the process of balancing the differ-
ences (inadequacy) between Czech and Slovak lands had begun. Slovakia’s fragmented
settlement structure was considered one of its barriers to rational development of its
society. Amalgamation of villages and urbanization of Slovakia was believed to be the
solution to this problem. In the 1950s and the 1960s, urbanization lagged behind
industrialization. In 1970, those who lived in municipalities5  with populations under
1,999 inhabitants made up as much as 42.7% of the population. This situation, more
or less, activated forced integration processes within cities as well as formation of the
central municipalities system (strediskové obce). In 1972, the proposal for long-term
settlement development in Slovakia was approved. It contained the list of municipali-
ties appointed to provide central functions. Based upon this plan, 77 of municipalities
with sub district status and 624 municipalities functioning as local centers (a hierar-
chical structure) were established. The central municipalities were to concentrate on
investment activities. They were to be the gravitation points for issues of employment
and education as well as the cultural and social centers for these catchment areas. Each
catchment area was to contain about 3,000 inhabitants. The municipalities not ap-
pointed to be central municipalities were sentenced to a gradual decay. No development
at all was allowed in these municipalities. The settlement structure continued to devel-
op in accordance with the directives of the Project for Urbanization in the Slovak
Socialist Republic, until the changes in 1989.
The two primary types of integration processes in Slovakia at this time (according
to Bucek, 1997) were:
a) Via merging of villages;
b) Via creating joint national committees for several villages.
Municipality mergers were not undertaken voluntarily. Their decision-making
bodies were district national committees. Such integration exceeded all reasonable rates
and the dangers of this were pointed out. Shortly after the changes in 1989, this
prophesy ended up coming true as a rapid fragmentation process began. Integration
via mergers meant that those municipalities that merged, or incorporated, with other
municipalities basically ceased to exist as legal entities. Creation of joint national com-
mittees was considered to be a more favorable solution since then the village, as a legal
entity, would not cease to exist.
Bucek(1997) provides a parallel between municipal integrations and the integra-
tion of JRD (agricultural cooperatives). A system including 624 central municipalities
was the  final result of the municipal integrations. The JRD integration resulted in 638
organizations in 1989 as compared to 2,683 JRDs in 1960.
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Overall, during those 40 years, almost 800 administrative changes within the Slo-
vak municipalities took place. A vast majority of these changes were integration changes.
Compared to 1950, the number of municipalities decreased by 650 in 1989. The
most frequent type of integration process was the merger of villages, neighboring cities
or larger villages. Andrle argues that such integration accounted for as much as 33% of
the overall population increase within Slovakian cities during this period. The integra-
tion processes of the 1970s and the 1980s were the largest interventions into the
settlement structure in 20th century Slovakia [Matula, 1986 in Slavík, 1998]. These
processes had tremendous impact on the size structure of municipalities and city growth
dynamics. They caused a significant decrease in citizen participation in the process of
governing and decision-making in municipalities [Slavík, 1994.
2.2 Fragmentation After 1990
The forced behavior and often irrational reasoning behind integration policies during
the period of state socialism was confirmed soon after the Municipal law was approved
in 1990 and the process of local fragmentation began. Still, before the Census of 1991,
173 new municipalities were created (Figure 3.6). At the same time, integration took
place as well with 16 villages ceasing to exist, many attaching to other villages. Integra-
tion changes from 1991 can also be observed, with 15 municipalities that ceased to
exist. At the same time, this year was the last one that integration changes exceeded the
fragmentation changes. Beginning in 1993, no municipality ceased to exist (in 1992,
two municipalities ceased to exist). Out of 283 municipal territorial changes in last
decade, 250 were fragmentation changes and 33 were integration changes (Table 3.3).
The highest number of municipalities was created by the separation from other
villages (132). A total of 95 municipalities were created via the separation of originally
rural villages from cities. Cities between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants recorded
these activities after 1990 the most often. Even in the case of Bratislava, both the
capital and the largest city, the tendency to separate rural parts was noted. However,
the citizens of the respected areas did not support the separation efforts in local referen-
dums. The voices that called for separation probably did not consider several of the
advantages formerly rural villages had gained through being the part of Bratislava (mass
transportation system, a fire department, municipal road maintenance, etc.).
By the end of the 1990s, following the territorial changes boom of the early 1990s,
the creation and extinction of municipalities (as legal entities) tuned down. In 1999,
only five fragmentation changes occurred and in 2000, only two. Yet, before the law
limiting the size of municipality became effective on January 1, 2002, three more
villages with less than 3,000 inhabitants successfully separated and gained indepen-
dent legal status during 2001.
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Figure 3.6
Territorial Changes of Municipalities After 1990
Fragmentation changes Amalgamization changes
SOURCE: Slavík, 1998, Directives of the Slovak government 1999, 2000; figure: M.E.S.A. 10.
Table 3.3
Types of Territorial Changes After 1990
Type of Territorial Change 1990 1991 1992 1993 1990–2000
Creation of Rural Village Via Separation From City 49 2 13 11 95
Creation of City Via Separation From Other City 1 0 0 0 1
Creation of Village Via Separation From Other Village 107 0 6 7 132
Creation of Villages Via Breaking Away From a Municipality 16 1 1 3 22
Total Fragmentation Changes 173 3 20 21 250
Incorporation of Rural Village to a City –2 –1 –1 0 –4
Incorporation of Smaller Village to Other Village –13 –12 –1 0 –26
Equal Merger of Villages 0 –2 0 0 –2
Physical Extinction of Rural Village –1 0 0 0 –1
Amalgamation Changes Total –16 –15 –2 0 –33
Total Increase/Decrease of Municipalities 157 –12 18 21 217
NOTE: Data is not provided for every year of the 1990s due to substantially lower intensity of changes
in the period of 1994–2000.
SOURCE: Slavík, 1998, Directives of the Slovak government 1999, 2000.
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2.3 Conditions of Settlement Structure Stabilization
Municipal law no. 369/1990 did not originally set up any preconditions for munici-
palities that intend to separate from other municipalities or municipalities that intend
to split into several new municipalities. In accordance to this law, a local referendum
and the agreement of all participating municipalities were sufficient to separate or join
municipalities. Yet, the Fall 2001 amendment to this law determined some conditions
for the creation of new municipalities via separation from other municipalities. Effec-
tive January 1, 2002, a municipality may break away only if: The territories of the new
municipalities create a coherent territorial unit; and the new municipalities have at
least 3,000 inhabitants and new municipalities had not created an urbanite unit with
the mother municipality before the change. The municipality cannot be broken up
when the extricating part has been given an investment that is of importance to the
entire municipality (such as a waste water treatment facility). These provisions are the
contribution to stabilization of the settlement structure in Slovakia, since it prevents
the creation of further small municipalities.
The stabilization and optimization of the settlement system through amalgam-
ation of municipalities is not acceptable for the representatives of local self-governments
[ZMOS, 1999]. The experience of forced amalgamation remains a major barrier to it.
The support for the central village in an amalgamated municipality and the contrary,
shutdowns of any development in the non-central villages, during state socialism caused
voluntary amalgamation to be unacceptable. Another barrier to amalgamation is that
municipalities are not willing to give up any of their control to another municipality
once they have gained their independence. There is a widely held opinion among
citizens than if the municipality consists of several parts (villages), the home of the
mayor will be developed the most. It is also perceived that smaller villages in such
municipalities are not decently developed. The later opinion prevails among the citi-
zens from the rural parts of the cities. These citizens sense they are being shortchanged
in some way. According to their complaints, the city council does not pay appropriate
attention to development of rural city sections and it only deals with development of
non-rural parts.6
Amalgamation, however, is not an exclusive solution for fragmented settlement
structure in Slovakia and is an unfavorable structure for municipalities as administra-
tive units. Inter-municipal cooperation, actually one type of it, joint municipal offices,
is an alternative solution (see section 4). Creation of joint offices, however, runs into a
from all participating municipalities [PHARE, 1998].
Stabilization of the size structure of municipalities must take place in Slovakia so
that municipalities can provide to their full capabilities. Discussion on the proper size
of a municipality, as the smallest administrative unit, has existed in Slovakia for 50
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years,  beginning in the period of state socialism. As we have already mentioned, the
system of central municipalities operated with a catchment area of about 3,000 inhab-
itants. This number is often used as a threshold for self-governing municipalities, even
today. Populations of 5,000 inhabitants are being discussed as a minimum population
for a municipality as well. This number enables municipalities to create own adminis-
trative capacities with various expertise and financial coverage (The Concept of
Decentralization and Modernization of Public Administration, 2001). In Slovak legis-
lation, 5,000 inhabitants is the threshold for a village upgrading to a city (Act no. 369/
1990).
In 1999, ZMOS7  turned to its regional associations of municipalities for their
comments on the optimum size of local self-governing units. The opinions differed.
The most widely accepted limit was 3,000 inhabitants. However, limits such as
5,000 and 8,000 appeared as well. The exact limitation for the minimum and max-
imum size of municipality was absolutely unacceptable for all the regional associations
[ZMOS, 1999].
The issue of self-governmental unit size was also elaborated within work upon
decentralization of public administration in Slovakia. Even though the exact size for
local self-governments was not set up, 169 nodal municipalities were recommended as
the center of a basic administrative unit of territorial self-government, in comparison to
2,883 current local self-governments (The Concept of Decentralization and Modern-
ization of Public Administration, 2001). These centers would provide administrative
services for local self-governments. The delivery of economic services would not be
limited to their nodal region. The catchment area for these services would be based
upon the economic efficiency of delivery.
2.4 Conclusion
The process of decentralization of public administration in Slovakia decidedly needs to
have the issue of settlement system fragmentation solved. If the current situation per-
sists, full provision of decentralized services to local self-governments is impossible. The
necessity of it is multiplied by the reality that municipalities are to provide, not only
their original tasks, but also tasks delegated by the state administration. These delegat-
ed tasks are mainly provisions from decisions of individual-legal matters.
The optimal size of municipalities cannot be developed solely on economic princi-
pals. The volume of direct costs of public services in individual size categories of
municipalities is important, but not crucial. Other assets can balance the higher costs.
As we have already mentioned, the amalgamation was not realistic. Perhaps inter-
municipal cooperation is the more acceptable and realistic solution (see section 4).
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3. SERVICE DELIVERY
3.1 Economy of Local Self-Governments
Unlike the public sector as a whole, the performance of local self-government is perma-
nently in surplus (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4
Public Budgets and GDP
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Local Budget Revenues [SKK bill.] 20.1 22.2 25.4 28.8 28.9 27.3 33.7
Local Budget Expenditures [SKK bill.] 19.1 18.9 23.2 26.6 27.4 26.1 31.2
State Budget Expenditures [SKK bill.] 162.0 171.4 191.9 192.8 199.5 234.9 241.1
GDP in Current Prices [SKK bill.] 466 546 606 686 751 815 887
Revenues of Local Budgets/GDP 4.3% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.8%
Expenditures of Local Budgets/GDP 4.1% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9% 3.4% 3.2% 3.5%
SOURCE: State financial statements, Statistical Office of the SR.
The Slovak republic has not ratified the supplement to Article 9 of the European
Charter of Local Self-governments, on financing local self-governments, because the
current system does not enable its fulfillment. The right of local bodies to have appro-
priate own financial resources, fair financial leveling, provision of free subsidies and
consultation of the drafts of law within local self-governments, are the major problem-
atic areas.
Every year, self-governments fight for an increase of state budget funds directed
towards them. They are not completely successful every year. The share of revenues
municipalities receive from the annual state budget accounts for about 1/3 of local
budget revenues (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5
 The Local Self-Governments’ Share of State Budget Expenditures
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Subsidies and Other Transfers [SKK bill.] 1.75 1.75 2.08 1.9 2.11
State Taxes [SKK bill.] 6.28 6.47 7.41 7.37 8.29
Transfers to Municipalities Total [SKK bill.] 8.03 8.22 9.49 9.27 10.40
Share in State Budget Expenditures [%] 4.2 4.3 4.8 3.9 4.3
SOURCE: State financial statements.
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Local self-governments uncertainty, of the volume of funds from state budget,
results in problems with approving local budgets. Until the final days of each year,
local self-governments do not know what funds will be available for them and often
local budgets are approved at last moment or corrected immediately after the new
budgetary year starts.
3.1.1 Structure of Local Budgets Revenues
Development of local budgets revenues is documented in Table 6. Beginning in 1993,
tax revenues have accounted for the largest portion of revenues within local budgets.
This situation corresponds to the fact that tax revenues should be a principal revenue
item of local self-governments. Tax revenues are the basis of a local budget’s autonomy.
Tax revenues then reached their maximum in 1993, when they accounted for 52.2%
of total revenues. Since this year, their share persists at around 40% of total local
budget revenues.
Table 3.6
Development of Local Budget Revenues in 1991–2000 [SKK Million]
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1. Tax Revenues 3,564.5 7,541.8 10,945.0 9,576.3 8,544.9 10,163.1 10,569.4 11,402.2 11,608.5 12,799.2
Income Taxes Total: 2,683.5 5,656.3 5,647.4 5,583.3 5,089.8 5,857.3 6,070.5 6,817.1 6,855.1 7,666.9
– Personal n. a. n. a. n. a. 3,946.1 3,525.4 4,656.0 5,284.2 5,459.2 5,875.1 6,440.2
Income Tax
– Corporate Tax n. a. n. a. n. a. 1,637.2 1,564.4 1,200.4 786.3 1,357.9 980.0 1,226.7
Real Estate Tax n. a. n. a. 1,610.9 2,032.0 2,051.8 2,861.0 3,124.1 3,199.5 3,352.6 3,606.2
2. Non-Tax 4,649.4 6,450.9 5,999.5 7,774.2 8,965.5 8,992.6 10,294.8 10,646.6 9,116.6 10,691.6
Revenues
3. Grants 7,960.8 6,634.1 3,017.8 1,795.3 1,494.5 3,608.7 5,026.3 3,784.6 3,362.3 3,739.4
(Subsidies)
– Current 2,275.4 1,587.6 1,149.5 840.1 883.3 1,377.4 2,155.9 1,950.0 1,859.6 1,843.7
– Capital 5,685.4 5,046.5 1,868.3 955.2 611.2 2,231.3 2,870.4 1,834.6 1,502.6 1,895.7
4. Credits Received 404.0 n. a. 1,003.7 926.8 3,231.0 2,565.7 2,733.2 2,942.7 3,162.9 6,302.8
5. Other Revenues n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 93.8 161.9 96.5 93.4 124.3
Total Revenues 16,578.7 20,626.8 20,966.0 20,072.6 22,236.0 25,423.9 28,785.5 28,872.6 27,343.5 33,657.4
SOURCE: Bercík 1999, State Financial Statement 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
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The portion of individual source revenues within the total revenues differs by the
municipalities’ size category (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7
Major Sources of Revenues in Municipalities in 2000 [%]
Income Tax and
Corporate Tax Revenues 26.9 29.1 30.2 31.9 32.2 28.0 29.9 27.3 28.8 22.8 11.3
Real Estate Tax 13.5 12.3 13.6 13.1 12.3 23.3 12.1 11.5 14.4 11.3 5.5
Revenues
Non-Tax Revenues 36.2 36.1 34.2 31.8 39.5 33.2 31.6 35.7 41.0 44.5 19.0
Transfers 17.7 15.5 14.8 14.4 7.1 8.8 12.5 6.9 3.9 9.1 12.3
Loans 1.3 2.2 1.9 3.3 4.1 1.3 6.9 9.5 5.7 7.9 48.6
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001; note: data for local fees by the size category were not available.
In Slovakia, municipalities’ tax revenues are formed primarily by state taxes (person-
al income tax, corporate tax and road tax). Local self-governments have no direct impact
on the revenues from these taxes. Distribution of the income tax revenues among the
local budgets shows that the revenues of municipalities above 5,001 inhabitants and
primarily of towns above 100,001 inhabitants began increasing in 1996. This increase
resulted from the change of rules for corporate tax revenue distribution within the
current system. Since companies are primarily registered in the towns, the towns re-
ceive a higher portion of the corporate tax revenues. The 2000 figures show the
municipalities over 100,001 inhabitants, Bratislava and Kosice had the largest reve-
nues per capita. The smallest municipalities, under 500 inhabitants, received only
73% of the revenues per capita of these two municipalities in 2000.
Real estate tax is solely a municipal tax. Since 1993, it has become a stable element of
the revenues side of local budgets. In 1993, it accounted for 14.7% of tax revenues,
corresponding to 7.7% of total revenues. Starting from 1996, it has permanently ac-
counted for about 28% of local self-governments’ tax revenues (about 11% of total
revenues). Differentiation of real estate tax revenues in individual size categories of mu-
nicipalities is larger than in the case of personal income tax and corporate tax revenues
(Table 3.14). Municipalities with 4,001–5,000 inhabitants have permanently had their
highest revenues from this tax. Even the two largest cities in Slovakia collected only 78%
of their revenues per capita in 2000. High real estate tax revenues in municipalities with
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4,001–5,000 inhabitants stem from the fact there are prevailingly family houses and
production facilities located here. In 2000, this size category comprised of 37 munic-
ipalities, with 161,313 inhabitants. There are several reasons why municipalities over
5,001 inhabitants collect fewer taxes. In the 1990s, the municipal privatization of
apartments had taken place. The real estate tax on these apartments was waived for five
years for the new owners. Next, there are large plots and numbers of buildings that are
not taxed because they are the location of schools, hospitals, parks, state administration
institutions, and spas in renovated areas of towns. Further, there are small pockets of
agricultural land inside the townships’ territories for which land ownership has not yet
been settled. The most significant feature influencing revenue differentiation is the fact
that real estate tax rates do not reflect the market value of real estate. Due to a coeffi-
cient respecting the soil quality in the territory of given municipality, real estate tax
revenues in smallest municipalities are comparable, in some cases even higher, to reve-
nues collected in larger villages or towns. In 2000, only municipalities over 20,001
inhabitants (besides municipalities with 4,001–5,000 inhabitants) collected higher
revenues per capita than the smallest municipalities. Small municipalities have a low
portion of tax-waived land in the investment areas and there are large plots of agricul-
tural land in their territory.
Table 3.8
Real Estate Tax Revenues Per Capita [SKK]
1993 448 451 439 442 407 607 322
1995 509 472 463 429 417 642 314
1996 549 483 506 511 462 750 505
1997 515 447 506 442 430 947 535
2000 507 428 462 417 403 855 531 417 440 526 520 671
SOURCE: Bercík 1999, Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001; note: figures in 1995 constant prices, calculat-
ed through the gross domestic product prices deflators, as published by the Statistical Office of
the SR 2001.
During the last decade, non-tax revenues have reached 28–41% of total revenues
annually. Municipalities over 5,001 inhabitants collect the highest non-tax revenues.
The 2000 figures show that municipalities over 50,001 inhabitants account for a
majority of non-tax revenues in the category of municipalities over 5,001 inhabitants
(Figure 3.7).
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The transfers from budgetary and contributory organizations, transfers of funds
from previous year, and building renting revenues are major sources of non-tax reve-
nues for all size categories of municipalities. Non-tax revenues contain also capital
assets revenues. Local self-governments that cannot cover their investment plans due to
their insufficient tax revenues try to counter this with the sale of their property.
Revenues coming from the sale of municipal property increase with the size of the
municipality. The smallest municipalities reach the lowest revenues because they do
not have suitable property to sell. Contrary to this, municipalities over 10,001 and
especially those over 20,001 use the sale of property for the sake of improvement of the
local budget revenues.
Figure 3.7
Non-Tax Revenues Per Capita in 2000 [SKK]
Credit and deposit interests
Administrative and other fees and payments
Capital revenues
Enterprising and ownership revenues
Other non-tax revenues
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001.
Transfers from state budget accounted for a significant portion of local budget reve-
nues primarily in the first years of the local budget’s existence. In 1995, they accounted
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for 6.7% of total revenues, the lowest portion ever. After their increase to 17.5% in
1997, they dropped to 11.1% of total revenues in 2000. Capital (investment) trans-
fers clearly prevailed in 1991 and 1992. In the following years, however, investment
and current transfers were approximately balanced. Municipalities over 100,001 in-
habitants recorded the highest revenues per capita (Table 3.9), mainly due to subsidies
for the operation of mass public transportation in selected cities accounting for SKK
1,325 million in 2000 (3.9% of total revenues). Fairly high municipal revenues, for
those up to 3,000 inhabitants, stemmed from the subsidy for provision of self-govern-
mental services (SKK 450 million in 2000). Further sources of these revenues were
contributions by the state funds to investment activities in these municipalities (utili-
ties construction).
Table 3.9
Transfers Per Capita in 2000 [SKK million]
Size Category
– Current Transfers 593.5 418.8 292.9 222.8 166.8 123.1 140.6 37.7 33.5 241.3 1230.1
– Capital Transfers 289.9 297.2 375.1 385.9 144.3 303.1 429.5 313.5 154.3 315.6 769.1
Total Transfers 883.4 716.0 668.0 608.7 311.0 426.1 570.1 351.2 187.8 556.9 1999.2
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001.
State subsidies for local public transportation have been provided since 1991. The
objective of this subsidy is to partially cover the building of technical facilities for local
public transportation and its operation in selected cities—Bratislava, Kosice, Presov,
Zilina and Banská Bystrica.
Subsidies for provision of self-governmental services and subsidies for local public
transportation are two principal elements of this chapter of local budgets. The primary
objective of the subsidy for provision of self-governmental services is to support the
provision of basic administrative services in small municipalities. Especially for those
not able to cover elementary operation of the municipality with their tax and non-tax
revenues. These subsidies have strict distribution rules and cannot be used for con-
struction projects.
Continuous shortage of tax and non-tax revenue funds and the acute need for local
self-governments to finance their municipal investment projects (mostly construction
of the infrastructure) force them to look for additional financial sources that might be
used immediately, i.e. loans and municipal bonds. If credit burdens for municipalities
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had increased only moderately in 1996–1999, the volume of received credits was
almost two times higher in 2000 by comparison (Table 3.10).
Until 1998, the revenues from credits and municipal bonds accounted perma-
nently for about 10% of the total revenues for local budgets. This portion has risen
since 1999. It reached 18.7% in 2000. This increase was primarily due to the loan
provided by the Deutche Bank Luxemburg S.A. to Bratislava in the amount of SKK
4.7 billion. Differences among the size categories of municipalities and the volume of
received credits per capita are shown in Table 3.11.
Table 3.10
Credit Burdens of Municipalities [SKK Million]
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Revenues 26,172 22,026 22,236 24,325 25,840 24,655 21,910 25,331
Received Credits 1,253 1,017 3,231 2,455 2,453 2,513 2,534 4,744
% Total Revenues 4.8 4.6 14.5 10.1 9.5 10.2 11.6 18.7
SOURCE: State financial statement 1993–2000; note: figures in constant prices of 1995.
Table 3.11
Received Credits Per Capita [SKK]
1995 63 139 178 243 134 55 368
1996 101 166 194 321 295 124 665
1997 64 164 178 244 206 167 686
2000 50 76 64 105 135 47 1,521 238 362 208 367 5,931
% of Total 1.3 2.2 1.9 3.3 4.1 1.3 26.5 6.9 9.5 5.7 7.9 48.6
Revenues Per
Capita in 2000
SOURCE: Bercík, 1999, Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001; note: figures in constant prices of 1995
The largest debts are recorded in the largest cities. In 2000, the overall debt owed
by municipalities in Slovakia was SKK 12,965 million (4.4% of the total public sector
debt). The three most indebt cities accounted for 67% (Bratislava SKK 5 billion,
Kosice—SKK 2.2 billion and Banská Bystrica—SKK 1.5 billion). Table 3.10 shows
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that small municipalities, up to 500 inhabitants and municipalities with 4,001–5,000
inhabitants, engage in loan taking least often. This relates to the capacity of a given
municipality to be accepted for a loan as well as from the fact large cities are the seats of
state administration facilities and other important institutions and naturally appear to
be more “good looking”. Local self-governments do not perform favorable financial
(credit) policies that are sure not to jeopardize the municipal finances for the next
election term. Many local politicians do not think past the time period of their term in
office. In 2000, credit revenues accounted for over a quarter of total revenues in munic-
ipalities over 5,001 inhabitants. The majority of this debt was created by the
aforementioned cities. In municipalities over 100,001 inhabitants, credits revenues
accounted for as much as 48.6% of total revenues of local budgets.
The often unreasonable creation of debt by some municipalities finally resulted in
the legislative action of 2001. The resulting amendment to Act no. 303/1995, on
budgeting rules, specifies that the Slovakian Ministry of Finance must authorize all
credits given to municipalities over SKK 75 million. At the same time, further provi-
sions preventing excessive creation of debt will come into effect January 1, 2005. Certain
municipalities can use returnable funds or credits in order to provide their services.
They may do so only if the total debt of municipality at the end of the budgetary year
does not exceed 60% of the current real revenues for the previous year. Another condi-
tion is that annual repayment installments (including interest) for the debt cannot
exceed 25% of the real current revenues for the previous budgetary year. Overall, debts
incurred by local self-governments equaled about SKK 12,965 million in 2000. This
year, it was 56.6% of current revenues (SKK 22,909.1 million). Total expenditures
related to indebtedness were SKK 6,204.9 million in 2000, corresponding to 27.1%
of current revenues of municipalities in 2000.
3.1.2 Structure of Local Self-Governments’ Expenditures
Budgetary expenditures may be broken into current (operational) and capital expendi-
tures. Provision of loans, property shares, and debt installments are registered separately.
The ratio of current expenditures (plus debt related expenditures8), and capital expen-
ditures, oscillated from 58.6%: 41.4% to 76.7%: 23.3% during the last ten years.
Starting in 1997, the ratio had increased, in favor of operational expenditures, to 76.7%:
23.3% in 2000.
In 2000, the overall ratio of current and capital expenditures was more or less
identical for all municipal size categories (Table 3.12). Municipalities with 2,001 to
3,000 inhabitants achieved the lowest ratio. Capital expenditures accounted for 29%
of total expenditures. Municipalities over 100,001 inhabitants experienced a different
ratio. Capital expenditures were only 19%. We have to point out that this percentage
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also originated from high debt related expenditures (Bratislava municipal bonds were
due in 2000). The increase of operational expenditures at the expense of capital ex-
penditures results in a shortage of funds for municipal economic development and
other capital expenditures related to the provision of municipal services. The increas-
ing operational expenditures force municipalities to borrow funds to realize their
development projects.
Table 3.12
Structure of Local Budget Expenditures in 2000
Operational Expend- 79.0 75.5 71.6 71.0 73.7 74.5 73.3 74.0 76.1 75.3 81.0
itures + Credit Related
Expenditures [%]
Capital Expenditures 21.0 24.5 28.4 29.0 26.3 25.5 26.7 26.0 23.9 24.7 19.0
[%]
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001.
Personnel expenditures within local budgets are the second most significant item of
operational expenditures (after expenditures on procurement of goods and services).
Local self-governments employ about 50,000 people.
Table 3.13
Personnel Expenditures of Local Self-Governments Per Capita [SKK]
1996 1,028 868 700 634 697 731 575
1997 1,015 879 715 638 700 690 612
2000 1,245 993 805 681 792 728 624 714 599 539 483 848
SOURCE: Bercík 1999, Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001; note: figures in constant prices of 1995.
Smaller municipalities, under 500 or 1,000 inhabitants, have the highest expendi-
tures per capita for salaries and social security payments (Table 3.13). These expenditures
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decrease with increasing size of municipality. Expenditures in municipalities over 5,001
inhabitants are lowest. This fact is often used as an argument for amalgamation of
municipalities. Breaking up the category over 5,001 inhabitants, we can see the per-
sonnel expenditures decrease up to 100,001 inhabitants. In two largest municipalities,
expenditures rapidly increase to almost double the figure for the previous size category.
The wages are highest in these two cities, Bratislava and Kos¡ice, in general. The wages
for the self-governments only reflect them. The number of employees in local self-
government is also much higher in these cities than in other cities due to the two-level
organization of local self-government.
The share of capital expenditures decreased from 37.6%, in 1997, to 23.3%, in
2000. This decrease was due to the decay of investment activities by local self-govern-
ments in the last few years. The decrease of capital expenditures was recorded by all size
categories of municipalities (Figure 3.8). The smallest municipalities registered the
lowest capital expenditures mainly due to their financial capacity.
Capital expenditures were highest in municipalities over 5,001 inhabitants. We
can see the differentiation within this broad group of municipalities. The highest ex-
penditures per capita were achieved in municipalities over 100,001 inhabitants: Bratislava
and Kosice. Bratislava accounted for the majority of these expenditures because Kosice
struggled with its debts during 2000. Investment activities in 1996, and mostly in
1997, probably resulted from the construction of a technical infrastructure. The local
self-governments wanted to carry out as many investment plans as possible before the
end of their term. By the end of their term, 1997–1998, the local self-governments
had renovated the central squares in their cities. Slovakia witnessed the unveiling of
many renewed squares, just before the parliamentary and municipal elections of 1998.
Figure 3.8
Capital Expenditures of Local Budgets Per Capita [SKK]
1995 1996 1997 2000
SOURCE: Bercík 1999, Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001. Note: figures in constant prices of 1995.
[SKK]
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We have already pointed out the increase in municipal debts. Comparing the re-
ceived credits in 1993–2000 (Table 3.10) and expenditures related to debts during
this period (Table 3.14), we see that debt related expenditures in 1994 and 1999
exceeded the revenues from received credits and issued municipal bonds.
Table 3.14
Debt Related Expenditures for Local Budgets
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Credit related expenditures 829.4 1,018.8 1,136.4 1,717.5 1,809.4 2,148.3 2,560.7 4,710.2
[SKK million]
% Total expenditures 3.4 4.9 6.0 7.8 7.6 9.2 12.3 19.8
% Operational expenditures 5.2 7.2 8.8 12.2 12.1 14.2 16.8 25.8
SOURCE: Bercík 1999, State financial statement 1997–2000. Note: figures in constant prices of 1995.
In 2000, expenditures increased to 25.8% of operational expenditures. Such a
high share of debt related expenditure is dangerous for a local self-government. The
share is differentiated also according to the size of the municipality. In 2000, the
largest financial funds for debt settlement per capita were spent in municipalities over
100,001 (Table 3.15). The aforementioned municipal bonds for Bratislava, due in
2000, accounted for a majority of these expenditures.
Contrarily, the lowest expenditures were achieved in smallest municipalities. Low
expenditures related to debt were due to the fact these municipalities were simply not
getting into as much debt as large municipalities. Small municipalities do not have a
suitable property to be used as collateral for bank loans.
Table 3.15
Debt Related Expenditures Per Capita in 2000 [SKK]
Debt Related 102.6 211.6 128.4 284.1 262.1 208.2 421.7 781.8 544.9 1,232.9 6,071.3
Expenditures
[%] Total 2.3 5.2 3.2 7.4 6.4 4.6 9.8 16.4 12.0 21.0 39.0
Expenditures
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001.
133
S E PA R AT E  E X I S T E N C E S  A B O V E  A L L — LO C A L  S E L F – G O V E R N M E N T S  A N D  S E R V I C E  D E L I V E R Y  I N  S LOVA K I A
3.2 Economy of Services Delivered
In 2000, the highest expenditures were in the category of municipal administration.
Operation of municipal offices and wages for the elected local representatives account-
ed for 21.4% of local expenditures (Table 3.16). The situation was similar in 1999,
when they accounted for 25.7%. In 1996 and 1997, the share was about the same as
in 2000 but the expenditures for housing and construction were higher for these two
years. These expenditures accounted for the second largest portion of total expendi-
tures for local budgets also in 1999 and 2000.9
Further significant types of expenditures in 2000 were for transportation and the
local economy. The first type, transportation, comprises of such services as local public
transportation and construction and maintenance of local roads. Services for the local
economy contains mainly public lighting, funeral services, and public services. In 2000,
the next rank of expenditure is filled by protection of the environment. This group of
expenditures consists of such services as public green care, cleaning and winter mainte-
nance of local roads and waste management.
Table 3.16
Expenditures for Services Delivered in 2000
[SKK] [%] Per Capita
Water Management 2.57 150.6
Transportation 10.13 594.0
Bank Operation 20.06 1,176.1
Physical Activities and Sport 1.87 109.4
Culture 4.18 244.9
Social Care 1.45 84.9
Housing 13.74 805.5
Services of Local Economy 9.74 570.9
Protection of Environment 6.52 382.4
Security 1.92 112.4
Administration of Municipalities 21.38 1,253.7
Other Financial Measures 2.98 174.9
TOTAL 100 5,863.6
NOTE: Only areas accounting for over 1% of total expenditures are included. Source: Ministry of
Finance of the SR, 2001.
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All the aforementioned services, together with water management services (water
supply and sewage), which accounted for 2.6%, fall under the basic responsibilities of
local self-governments. Culture, social welfare, physical education, healthcare, school-
ing and education accounted for a portion of local budget expenditures proportional to
the scope of competencies given to local self-governments in these areas.10
The following section deals with select examples of services delivery by local self-
governments, diverging by size category.
3.2.1 Road Management
The municipality is the owner of the local roads. It is obliged to provide for their main-
tenance and function. The municipality carries out construction of local roads as well.
In 1997, a total of 24,978.7 km of roadways were under municipal ownership. Besides
these, municipalities owned 11,347 km of sidewalks, 1,022 city squares, 9,172 park-
ing lots, 127 transportation-training playgrounds, 9,080 bridges, 3,490 pedestrian
bridges, 1,094 railroad crossings and 258 traffic lights.
Local self-governments provide these services differently, depending on the size of
the municipality. The cities have their municipal organizations to take care of road
management. Such organization is called the Technické sluzby (technical services) and
it often also provides waste management, public green care, management of cemeteries,
etc. If the municipality does not have such an organization, it contracts either the state
company taking care of state roads or another private provider. This is usually the case
in small towns and villages.
In 1997, expenditures for road management reached SKK 1,640.9 million (ex-
cluding winter maintenance) corresponding to 6.2% of the total expenditures for the
local budget. It then increased to SKK 1,993.5 million (7.6%) in 1999 and to SKK
2,063.9 million (6.6%) in 2000. Differentiation among the different size categories of
municipalities can be observed (Figure 3.9).
The largest expenditures per capita were made in municipalities with 4,001 to
5,000 inhabitants. These municipalities have fairly large territories and a respective
length of local roads. Road management expenditures accounted for 11.9% of total
expenditures in these municipalities (2000). High expenditures in this category were
reached also in municipalities over 100,001 inhabitants (the highest per capita expen-
ditures). The expenditures for local roads’ winter maintenance played a substantial role
in these municipalities (52%). In 2000, this accounted for more expenditures than for
construction and maintenance of local roads (42%). In the other size categories, the
expenditures for construction and repairs of local roads prevailed. The highest expendi-
tures of this nature were reached in municipalities with 4,001 to 5,000 inhabitants
and over 100,001 inhabitants.
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Figure 3.9
Expenditures for Road Management in 2000
  Local roads [km]      Per Capita [SKK]        Per km [SKK]
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR, 2001, Statistical Office of the SR 2002.
Per capita expenditures show the capacity of municipalities to deliver road manage-
ment. The expenditures per one km of served roads, however, indicate a similar situation
as with expenditures per capita. The expenditures increase with the increasing size of a
municipality. Contrary, the length of local roads decreases with the increasing size
category of municipalities. This fact primarily stems from the rules of distribution of
road tax revenues to individual municipalities. These revenues are distributed propor-
tionally to the population. Figure 3.5 shows small municipalities up to 2,000 inhabitants
account for only 30.4% of total population of Slovakia. At the same time, these mu-
nicipalities account for 53% of local roads length (Figure 3.9). Therefore, the current
system of road tax revenues distribution, as the primary funds for road management at
municipal level, is not correct and does not reflect the needs of municipalities in this area.
3.2.2 Municipal Waste Management
During socialism, the state did not pay proper attention to the issues of the environ-
ment and disposal of municipal waste. The towns and larger villages had collection and
disposal systems; however, the monitoring of landfills did not exist. In smaller villages,
an organized system of waste collection did not exist and the citizens disposed of their
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waste individually in so-called “illegal” landfills. After 1989, the law delegated that
environmental care, including collection and disposal of municipal waste, were ser-
vice responsibilities of the local self-government. In accordance with Act no. 238/
1991 on waste, municipalities are the producers of waste and, therefore, responsible
for its disposal.11
In 2000, municipalities produced 3.7 million tons of waste, 690 kilograms of
waste, per capita, per year. Only 10% of municipal waste in Slovakia was recycled
(1999). The rest of municipal waste was land filled or burned. All municipalities in
Slovakia use landfills for disposal. Municipalities either dispose the waste in their ca-
dastre or in the territory of other municipalities, upon contract. Waste disposal in the
territory of another municipality can be considered a certain form of inter-municipal
cooperation. The expanding trend toward such cooperation can be supported by the
fact that only 612 municipalities had a landfill in their cadastre. The rest of the munic-
ipalities (78.7%) used the landfills of other municipalities.
Waste management expenditures within local budgets have been increasing, they
reached SKK 619.7 million in 1997 (SKK 304.8 million in 1992, SKK 569.3 million
in 1996). In 1999, these expenditures were SKK 664.7 million and SKK 748 million
in 2000. Municipalities under 500 inhabitants recorded the highest expenditures per
capita, as well as per one ton of municipal waste (Figure 3.10).
Figure 3.10
Expenditures for Waste Management in 2000
   Per One Ton [SKK]   Per Capita [SKK] Waste Per Capita [t]
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001, Statistical Office of the SR 2002.
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Even though this size category maintained a low volume of municipal waste pro-
duction in comparison to the other size categories, the expenditures are higher than in
other categories. The expenditures of local self-governments per capita decreased with
increasing population. The expenditures per one ton feature almost U-shape distribu-
tion throughout the size categories. This distribution pattern is interrupted only by
the largest cities (above 100,001 people). Contrary to expenditures distribution per
ton of waste, the volume of waste per capita reached inverse distribution with a maxi-
mum in the 4,001–5,000 inhabitants size category. In the largest municipalities, which
contract special companies to carry out waste management, the transfers to such com-
panies to cover potential losses account for a majority of the total municipal expenditures
for waste management (analyzed here). Further targets of municipal spending in this
area are the expenditures for construction of monitored landfills and to support pro-
gressive methods of separation.
3.2.3 Municipal Office Administration
Municipalities’ administration expenditures are the major item on local budgets’ ex-
penditure agenda. These expenditures comprise of the expenditure on elected local
self-government representatives and for administration of the municipal offices.
The mayor’s financial allowances are provided by Act no. 253/1994. The mini-
mum wage for the mayor is a multiple of the average monthly wage within the economy
for the previous year. The multiple differentiates according to the population of the
municipality. For example, in municipalities up to 500 inhabitants the multiple equals
1.35 and in municipalities with 50,001–100,000 inhabitants the multiple equals
3.06. The municipal council can grant the mayor bonuses up to 50% of his/her min-
imum wage. The municipal councilors receive small financial rewards (as approved by
the council) for every meeting.
In 2000, the expenditures for municipal offices operation totaled SKK 6.4 billion,
what accounted for 20.5% of local self-governments’ total expenditures. In 1999, the
amount was the same, but it accounted for 24.6% of total expenditures. The expendi-
tures were SKK 4.8 billion in 1996 (20.7%) and SKK 5.4 billion in 1997 (20.3%).
Personnel expenditures (wages and social security) accounted for a majority of these
expenditures. As for the size categories of municipalities, the expenditures per capita
are highest in municipalities up to 2,000 inhabitants. In 1999, the expenditures were
also comparably high in the two largest Slovakian cities.
Information on the expenditures of individual size categories of municipalities for
administration of municipal offices is provided in Figure 3.11. Municipalities under
500 inhabitants had the highest expenditures in 2000. These expenditures accounted
for almost 50% of the total expenditures for these municipalities. If we consider that
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municipality administration (municipal office administration and expenditures of the
municipal council) spends over a half of the local budget, the funds for delivery of other
services assigned to municipalities are not big. Similar situations occur in the next few
size categories of municipalities (up to 2,000 inhabitants). However, none of their
municipality administration expenditures exceeded 50% of their total expenditures.
In the size categories of 1,001 to 2,000 inhabitants, range 4,001 to 5,000 inhabitants,
and ranging over 100,001 inhabitants, the expenditures have comparable levels. How-
ever, in the last two size categories, they account for only 28.9% and 8.4% of total
expenditures respectively.
Figure 3.11
Municipal Office Administration Expenditures in 2000
Expenditures per capita Share in overall expenditures
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of the SR 2000; graph and calculations: M.E.S.A. 10.
Differentiation in the municipal offices administration expenditures shows the ad-
ministrative costs of local self-governments in smaller municipalities are high. These
expenditures stem from the fragmentation of settlement structure in Slovakia. There is
a large number of municipalities in the smallest size categories, and the same number
of municipal offices. In many cases, the municipal office has only one full time employ-
ee besides the mayor. Respecting these facts, the current size of the self-governmental
unit should be questioned. Can such small units spend over a half their funds for the
municipal office operation and still deliver all the services assigned to local self-govern-
ments properly? With all due respect to the personal qualities of the mayors in these
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small municipalities, one person cannot manage delivery of all those services. Concern-
ing expertise, as well as the mere physical potential, it is just not possible for one person
to do. Establishment of joint municipal offices or defining the minimum size of an
administrative unit of local self-government by the law can be solutions to this problem
(see section 6). Both alternatives, however, bring some negatives that are discussed in
settlement structure chapter and the inter-municipal cooperation chapter.
3.2.4 Economic Development
Municipal law no. 369/1990 obliges a municipality to administer and appreciate its
property and form suitable conditions for living in the municipality. Municipalities in
Slovakia are also allowed to carry out entrepreneurial activities. The revenues of such
activities can be used for development of the municipality.
Local self-governments are allowed to support economic development in their ter-
ritory indirectly through creation of appropriate environments for development of
enterprise activity. The only direct support they can provide for potential enterprise is
the provision of waivers or reduction of real estate taxes or other local fees. Municipal-
ities use this option quite often and we can see this from the municipal revenues of real
estate taxes in municipalities over 5,000 inhabitants. These municipalities have the
largest concentrations of business activities (section 3.1.1). A further tool for directly
supporting economic development is favorable fees for rental of municipal property for
the sake of performing some economic activity in it. Municipalities can enhance
economic development through direct participation in a commercial company. Local
self-governments often participate by putting its property (building, land) forth to
such companies.
The municipalities create conditions for economic activities in their territory through
physical planning activities, investment into building of water works and sewage sys-
tems, assisting in building of energy distribution lines. Since 2001, municipalities can
use the creation of industrial parks to attract economic activities to their territory.
However, the construction of industrial parks is not funded solely by municipal sourc-
es. The state budget can grant a subsidy worth up to 70% of the expenditures for
construction of an industrial park. The subsidized investments are mainly for construc-
tion of the technical infrastructure in areas appointed for industrial parks.
The capacity of individual municipalities to engage in activities towards economic
development differs according to their size. Small municipalities have smaller budgets.
We have already shown before that these municipalities spent substantial portions of
their budget for delivery of basic administrative tasks and for financing the operation of
municipal offices. Small municipalities have consequently little funds left for invest-
ment into economically enhancing development in their territory. Small municipalities
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do not even have an updated Master Plan, since there are no funds left for it. The
Master Plans of many small villages have not been elaborated since Socialist days. Large
portions of municipalities use amendments to still existing (yet outdated) Master Plans
instead of elaborating new ones. The development of municipalities is therefore, to a
large extent, not systemic. Large municipalities, and larger villages and towns, have
lower expenditures for municipal offices operation and their capacity to gain returnable
funds is much higher than in the case of small municipalities. These municipalities can
focus on almost any kind of plan supporting economic development in their territory.
4. INTER-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND SERVICES PROVISION
4.1 Legal Settings for Inter-Municipal Cooperation
In Slovakia, municipalities can associate with other municipalities for the sake of pro-
viding services of common interest. The framework contained in the Constitution of
the Slovak Republic is further elaborated in the Municipal Law.
There are three basic groups of inter-municipal cooperation:
1) Provision of administrative tasks—there are several legal forms for executing
administrative competencies of local self-governments through inter-munici-
pal cooperation:
• Joint municipal offices—Art. 16a of the Municipal law namely allows
creation of joint municipal offices. This provision was added in 1992.
The municipalities have not often used this option given by the law. They
argue the law did not set up details for creation and operation of the joint
municipal offices.12  According to the law, joint municipal offices are es-
tablished upon voluntary principles. Individual municipalities participate
financially in the operation of the joint office in accordance to their agree-
ment. The control of the tasks’ fulfillment and the funds’ use can be carried
out via individual municipal councils or in the joint meeting of all founders
of the joint office;
• Delegation of delivery to the bodies of other municipalities;
• Delegation of delivery to other public entities.
2) Provision of social and economic development and services—inter-municipal
cooperation that carries out social and economic development, utilities and
entrepreneurial activities can be realized, in accordance to the Slovak legisla-
tion and practice, via several legal forms such as interest associations, private
enterprise with the municipal share, non-profit organization and cross-border
cooperation.
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3) Other cooperation—there are other forms of inter-municipal cooperation, which
do not fit into the previous two groups such as country, regional, and municipal
interest associations, municipal conferences and cooperation of the partner
cities and villages.
The legal system in Slovakia enables all entities (except the bodies of state adminis-
tration) to carry out any activity the law does not forbid and does not collide with good
manners. Based upon this specification within Slovak legislation, municipalities will-
ing to engage in inter-municipal cooperation have found legal support in laws other
than the Municipal law. The existing examples of inter-municipal cooperation are the
best proof of such a statement. The following sections provide some examples of inter-
municipal cooperation in Slovakia.
4.2 Areas of Inter-Municipal Cooperation
Local self-governments’ limited financial sources and limited personnel capacity, as
well as the scope of services they have to provide within the public administration
in Slovakia, are the main reasons municipalities associate their funds and provide
some services together. Basically, there are two main groups of local self-govern-
ment competencies: administrative and economic-social. So far, the municipalities
have used inter-municipal cooperation prevailingly for provision of their economic-
social competencies. These competencies expect fairly high investments and a number
of municipalities, mostly small ones, do not have them.
In the section about local self-government financing, we pointed out the increase of
operational expenditures of local self-governments as an expense of investment expen-
ditures. This fact is the main reason for municipalities to engage in inter-municipal
cooperation. Further reasons are the fact that provision of economic-social services is
more economically efficient as the joint activity of more municipalities and the lack of
qualified personnel to provide administrative competencies for local self-governments.
Out of the forms of inter-municipal cooperation allowed by Slovak legislation, the
following two are the most common:
1) Regional associations of universal character. In Slovakia, an Association of Cities
and Villages in Slovakia (ZMOS) exists. It associates 2,719 cities and villages
in order to articulate the joint interest of local self-governments.13  There are
57 regional associations operating within ZMOS. The scope of their activities
is very universal. They focus on the creation of conditions for the different
forms of above-mentioned municipal relations, formulation of joint comments
and organization of joint steps in issues concerning local self-government. ZMOS
transfers information within local self-governments; it negotiates needed laws
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with ministries and deputies of Parliament; it is the commenting body within
the law-approving process; it organizes the education of the elected representa-
tives and employees of local self-governments.
The Union of Cities of Slovakia, the interest association for Slovak cities, fol-
lows a similar goal. It comprises of 43 member cities and 8 rural municipalities.
This association was created due to specific city problems resulting from the
structure of local self-governments. According to the founders, these specifici-
ties were not sufficiently articulated via ZMOS.
2) Specific purpose associations of municipalities are being created in order to provide
greater competencies in economic and social development. The majority of
such cooperation is a one-purpose cooperation of municipalities. Complex
research into such cooperative activities has not yet been done in Slovakia. Even
ZMOS, as an association of local self-governments, does not follow such activ-
ities by its member municipalities.
Inter-municipal cooperation in Slovakia is developed mostly in the areas of: munic-
ipal waste management; waste water treatment, tourism, protection of the environment,
regional education, culture, education, social issues, coordination and planning of de-
velopment activities, joint projects of technical infrastructure (gas and water supply),
organization of regional advisory and information centers, regional development agen-
cies, healthcare and joint enterprise (in cooperation with the private sector).
Act no. 416/2001 covers the transfer of some competencies from the bodies of state
administration to municipalities and self-governmental regions. It also sets up poten-
tial areas of inter-municipal cooperation: social help, local and regional culture,
elementary and specialized education and retraining, primary and secondary contact
healthcare, Construction Act implementations, and water management.
4.3 Examples of Inter-Municipal Cooperation
4.3.1 Economic and Social Services
Municipal Waste Management
Inter-municipal cooperation mostly focuses on finding solutions to the issues of mu-
nicipal waste management. Perhaps the best-elaborated scheme is offered through the
example of the Komplex association of Sered’. In this association, the city of Sered’ and
ten surrounding rural municipalities joined together to address the issue of localization
of a landfill and organization of waste management. Similar associations exist among
surrounding municipalities of Malacky. Six municipalities, including the city of Mal-
acky, and four private companies joined to address the waste management issue. The
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association of 48 municipalities, and the city of Sobrance, focuses on construction and
management of landfills too. There is cooperation between 15 municipalities in the
regional association of Podunajsko on a project of municipal waste, including its sepa-
ration and use. The landfill issues are the purpose of the regional association of
municipalities for the 23 municipalities of the Laborec area. There are several associa-
tions of municipalities for the separation of waste in Slovakia, for example, the Association
of municipalities for the waste separation—SPIS—and the Association of Municipali-
ties for Waste Separation in Javorina-Bezovec.
Komplex-Lobbe s.r.o., Sered’
In 1992, the interest association Komplex was established in Sered’. Its main objective was the
preparatory works for, and operation of, the landfill in Pusté Sady. The membership compris-
es of ten neighboring villages of Sered’ and the city of Sered’. Basic capital for the association
consists of financial contributions by the founders, subsidies, credits and operational profits.
The founders funded the association with financial assets totaling Sk 5.56 million, propor-
tional to their population. Pusté Sady did not have to contribute financially since the landfill
was to be built on its territory. New members must be approved by 3/5 of the members and
have to pay a fee in the amount of Sk 40 per capita. At the same time, every member shares the
obligations of the association proportional to the volume of contribution made to the associa-
tion. The bodies of the association are: general assembly, board of directors and supervisory
board. Every participating village has a representative in the general assembly (the mayor or an
appointed person). The general assembly elects the members of the board of directors and
supervisory board for four year terms. The membership in these two bodies cannot be com-
bined. In 1994, Komplex–Lobbe s.r.o. was founded to carry out collection and disposal of
waste and operation of the landfill in Pusté Sady. The Komplex association contributed to the
landfill in Pusté Sady. Lobbe Slovakia s.r.o., a private company, contributed by financial
deposit. Both parts have a representative in the general assembly of the company that secures
they have to come to an agreement on every issue. The catchment area for the operating
landfills is about 105,000 people. The contractors of the company are: 29 villages, 3 towns
and 215 private enterprises. Three of the contract towns, Sala, Sered’ and Hlohovec, contrib-
ute the largest shares to the landfill disposal. The members of the Komplex association pay
special, discounted fees for the municipal waste disposal. The landfill complies with the
European ecological standards and it should be in operation for 30–40 years.
Lobbe Slovakia engages in five more similar companies projects (in cooperation with other
municipalities) dealing with municipal waste, special waste management, and landfill
disposal.
Water Supply and Sewage Management
Based on the Civil Code, there are seven municipalities associated in order to construct
the sewage collection via Varín—Terchová. Five member municipalities, of the regional
association Podunajsko, cooperate in the sewage and water treatment facility issue in
Hamuliakovo. Since 1997, Trencianske vodárne a kanalizácie (Trencín water supply
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and sewage system company) has operated a joint action by 48 municipalities in the
Trencín district. Two municipalities, Studienka and Laksárska Nová Ves, joined their
funds for the construction of a mutual drinking water reservoir.
Tourism
Development of tourism is the third area of frequent inter-municipal cooperation.
Such activities are primarily connected to development of rural municipalities, ecolo-
gy, and protection of the environment. The interest association of nine municipalities,
Slovensky´ raj, is one example of such cooperation. The main mission of the association
is to coordinate tourism development activities and to provide maintenance and repair
for technological facilities located in the national park belonging to the municipalities.
The funds for its activities are provided by the contributions of the participating mu-
nicipalities, the State environmental fund, and other commercial entities. There are
associations similar to this one, such as the association of municipalities in the Detvian-
ska Huta area (joint development of agritourism), the association of ten municipalities
in the Nitra area, the garden of Europe, the association of municipalities in the Marí-
ková valley for rural tourism and agritourism Zomda (five municipalities), Ivamoza
(three municipalities by Ivánka pri Dunaji), etc.
Agency for Development of Tourism in the Tatras Region
The Regional Association of the Tatras and by-Tatras Municipalities has been operating since
1993, when the Association of Historical Tatras and by-Tatras Municipalities changed its
name. This Association founded several companies as a direct outcome of the inter-municipal
cooperation. In 1993, four towns and 11 villages, together with further private companies,
established a publishing company called Marmota Press. This publishing company deals with
the publication of periodicals and non-periodicals, promotion materials and promotional
activities. Even though Marmota Press‘s connection to tourism is more than obvious, the
original idea was actually to rescue the publisher of regional weekly. The municipalities’ share
in Marmota Press is 29%.
Marmota Press deals only partially with the tourism issue. More complex cooperation in the
area of tourism is dealt with in the region through the Agency for Development of Tourism in
the Tatras Region, established in 1996. The founders consisted of 18 municipalities, 34
private companies and five non-governmental organizations. The Agency registered as a non-
profit organization and later on changed its legal status into association of legal and physical
entities.
The bodies of the Agency are: the general assembly, board of directors and supervisory board.
Every member has one vote in the general assembly with no relation to the volume of its
contribution. The board of directors consists of nine members. Four members represent public
sector (municipalities), three members represent private sector and two, non-governmental
organizations. The supervisory board consists of three members. One member represents the
public sector and two, the private sector. In 1998, the Association had 130 members, when
new members from the Liptov and Orava regions joined the Agency.
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Originally, the funding was intended to be multi-source funding. Besides regional sources
(members’ contributions), they also intended to finance from the existing tourism projects
taking place in the region. Since these projects ended in 1998, members’ contributions became
the primary financial source. Municipalities contribute Sk 3 per capita. Private companies
contribute proportional to their turnover. The annual member fee for individual private
person (not as a citizen of municipality or enterprise) is about Sk 300.
The main purpose of the Agency is marketing and promotion of tourism products within the
territory of member municipalities; collection, analysis and provision of information for the
members and contractors; organization of trainings and conferences oriented to exchange
experiences within the Agency; special consultancies; search for financial sources for the region-
al tourism development funds; and strategic planning for sustainable development of tourism
within the territory of member municipalities.
Healthcare
Inter-municipal cooperation has also developed in less traditional areas, such as health-
care. This is especially the case if healthcare is not the responsibility of the local
self-government and is fully provided by the state administration.14  The accumulation
of funds in four municipalities by Sárovce, to be able to purchase special medical
equipment for the local doctor, is an example of short-term inter-municipal coopera-
tion. The cooperation of seven municipalities on the left bank of the Váh River is an
example of long-term inter-municipal cooperation. These municipalities accumulated
their funds to build a dental clinic for their citizens to be located in one of the munic-
ipalities, Trencianska Turná. The 23 municipal members of the Laborecky´ regional
association of towns and villages established a foundation to finish one section of the
hospital in Medzilaborce. Six municipalities near Gemerská Poloma worked in part-
nership with the local doctor in providing healthcare services for the citizens.
Social Welfare
Partially, social welfare belongs among the responsibilities of local self-government. For
example, the Social care center Podhorie, and the Service center of social care in Krásna
Ves, created by the regional association of municipalities located in upper Bebrava
River Valley. Another example is the social taxi for the five municipalities of the Pri-
dunajsko region by Dunajská Luzná.
Podhorie
The distance to the district seat (Bánovce nad Bebravou) and location in the upper Bebrava
River Valley inspired several citizens in the area to establish the civic association Podhorie.
Initiation and support of developmental programs and realization of this, in the territory, were
the main objectives of the association. Its activities developed in the areas of development of
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local self-government, economy, ecology, social welfare, spiritual activities, culture, tourism,
education, and publishing activities.
Based upon this civic activity, the local self-governments in this micro-region joined the
Association of Municipalities for the Podhorie micro-region. The main goal of the association
is the unification of efforts towards development of micro-region, and the strengthening of
democratic governance and public administration. The eight participating municipalities
total only something above 3,000 inhabitants. Individual municipalities delegated some
responsibilities to Association and rationalized the operation of their administration.
The joint project in the area of social welfare is being realized in Krásna Ves. The former fire
station was renovated and a facility for 15 citizens was created. The Center of Social
Welfare, Podhorie, provides care for elderly citizens, including immobile citizens. The
facility also provides care for citizens who need only part-time assistance, regular health care
from a specialist, rehabilitation and catering for non-residents. It serves as a spiritual and
cultural center for elderly citizens as well. The Agency of Domestic Nursing Services operates
via the center as well. It provides nursing and rehabilitation, doctor’s examinations  and
transportation by ambulance.
The financing of such facilities is a problem for municipalities. There are limited funds in
municipal budgets and the individual patients’ relatives are not willing to participate finan-
cially in social care.
Regional Development—Local Economy
Regional development agencies and information centers are an interesting area of inter-
municipal cooperation. The municipalities engage in such cooperation directly or
through the regional associations. The regional innovation center, Rovinka, is an exam-
ple of a development agency. It aims at development of entrepreneurial activities in the
Podunajsko region. It comprises of 24 municipalities. The society of the topol’ciansko-
duchonsky micro-region municipalities is a similar form of cooperation. Its primary
goal is development and maintenance of tourism, activation of enterprising and overall
development of the micro-region. It comprises of eight rural municipalities and the
city of Topol’cany. Workshops for entrepreneurs is just one of its activities. The associ-
ation also built a bike trail and educational trail near the historical mountain railway
and succeeded in getting its member, Podhradie municipality, ownership rights to the
medieval castle, Topol’cany. The regional advisory and information center established
by the Regional association of the Tatry region municipalities in 1992 is another exam-
ple of the second type of cooperation in this area.
4.3.2 Administrative Services
Although Slovak legislation enables local self-governments to create joint municipal
offices, this form of inter-municipal cooperation is not common. Primarily, provision
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of administrative competencies is the main area of such cooperation. Cooperation will
probably develop more after 2002, when local self-governments start getting more
competencies and small municipalities will no longer be able to carry them out (finan-
cial and personnel reasons). Despite the previous statement, it is not uncommon in
Slovakia that the municipal offices of larger municipalities carry out payroll agendas or
entire financial agendas for their smaller neighboring municipalities. The financial and
payroll offices of the association of municipalities of Humenné, are such an example.
The municipal office in Humenné provides these services for 68 municipalities. Indi-
vidual municipalities proportionally contribute to the operation of the financial and
payroll office in Humenne.
4.4 Evaluation of Existing Examples of Inter-Municipal Cooperation
Although, after 1989, identity of the municipality, its independence, autonomy and
accountability for management of local affairs (see settlement structure analysis) are
considered to be the basic spirit of the local community, there are some reasons for
inter-municipal cooperation:
• Similar issues can be addressed more economically effective without loosing
autonomy;
• Resources necessary, for addressing existing issues sufficiently, exceed the ex-
pert and material availabilities of any of the individual municipalities;
• The nature of the provided service—drinking water supply, wastewater treat-
ment facility, waste collection and waste disposal, etc.;
• Cultural, social or economic orientation of several municipalities creates the
need for specific articulation of joint manifestations and joint activities;
• Communication and brainstorming support creative ideas, an atmosphere of
solidarity and cohesion creates a good base for political and social stability in
the given territories.
Examples offered suggest that service area for inter-municipal cooperation differs
depending on the services provided. These service areas are most different in the provi-
sion of the economic-social services. Drawing a universal service area is easier in the area
of administrative services. Mainly, regional and historical relations among participat-
ing municipalities influence the size of service area for joint municipal offices. Natural
landscape is an important factor as well. Municipalities all located in one valley are
more willing to join. However, they are willing to join, merely for provision of certain
administrative tasks, without loosing their law status.15
In some cases, inter-municipal cooperation is the only viable option for public ser-
vice provision at the local level. Otherwise, it can be absent from a particular territory,
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the municipality will have to merge with other municipalities, or a higher level of local
self-government will provide the service.
Municipalities engage in inter-municipal cooperation mainly because they are short
on the financial funds and personnel to carry out their tasks, as well as general ineffi-
ciency of their execution. Inter-municipal cooperation enables municipalities to
accumulate financial and human resources. However, such accumulation can be insuf-
ficient too. Therefore, it is favorable to involve the private sector in cooperation (see
Marmota Press and Komplex Lobbe examples).
Based upon inter-municipal cooperation in waste management, we can determine
that the provision of economic tasks of local self-governments is more favorable through
creation of a commercial company (Komplex–Lobbe). Participation in such a compa-
ny can take various forms. Respecting the fact it provides public services, municipalities
should have sufficient control rights included in the contract. Municipalities should be
able to direct the activities of the company through their representatives in its bodies.
Commercial companies not only allow private enterprises to participate in inter-mu-
nicipal cooperation, but also foreign enterprises. The easing financial burden, otherwise
put solely on municipalities, is the advantage to inter-municipal cooperation via com-
mercial companies. Commercial companies enable production of new resources, for
the further operation of the inter-municipal cooperation, without burdening munici-
pal budgets.
Inter-municipal cooperation in tourism needs greater funds.16  Solution to this
problem is often to engage more private companies in the tourism business. Then,
these companies bear a significant share of financial costs for the operation of inter-
municipal cooperation.
The results of existing projects in inter-municipal cooperation suggest that estab-
lishing simple and uncomplicated structures for inter-municipal cooperation is the
best. Management, financial, and control (including accountability) relations must be
highly transparent and spending on newly created administration and material needs
cannot be inadequate. The one-task orientation of inter-municipal cooperation should
be sustained, because associations for more general orientation (orientation to provi-
sion of more tasks) can disrupt the nature of territorial self-government itself.
The provision of services delegated by state administration bodies to the local self-
governmental bodies is a significant influencing factor concerning the lack of funds for
fulfillment of local self-governments’ original tasks. Local self-governments are often
delegated to provide state administration tasks and delegations that are not followed
by the respective funds, however. In compliance to Slovak legislation, municipalities
cannot refuse to provide any of the tasks delegated to them by the law approved by the
National Council of the Slovak Republic. At the same time, the Constitution of the
Slovak Republic and the Municipal law state that a municipality must carry out the
task only if the funds to cover it are delegated by the law too. Therefore, if municipal-
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ities do finance the tasks of state administration, provided by them from the municipal
budgets, they act in conflict with the rules of the municipal property management,
financing of municipalities, and creation and respect for the municipal budget. The
ambiguity of the legal provisions, and various interpretations of the respective laws, has
resulted in illegality of some municipal activities. Local self-government contributes to
provision of tasks assigned by state administration under public pressure. Such activi-
ties occur mainly in the areas of education, healthcare, public transportation, culture,
gas supply construction and energy facility construction. Through such activities,
municipalities break their duty to exclusively appreciate the property of municipality
[Niznansky´, 1998].
4.5 The Willingness of Municipalities to Engage
in Inter-Municipal Cooperation
Self-government representatives’ attitudes towards participation in inter-municipal
cooperation can be derived only from partial surveys. In Slovakia, general surveys on
this issue do not exist. The Ministry of Interior for the Slovak Republic carried out a
survey on the willingness of municipalities to provide services in the area of education
and social care after decentralization from state administration (Ministry of Interior of
the SR 2000). In the sample municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants3 , 76% of the
municipalities intended to provide administrative tasks for these services after their
decentralization, individually through their municipal office. Only 17% of munici-
palities intended to use inter-municipal cooperation. The largest support for inter-
municipal cooperation was expressed in the smallest municipalities, up to 200 inhab-
itants (61%), and in municipalities with 200–499 inhabitants (30%). This fact supports
our argument about fragmentation of settlement structure in Slovakia and the conse-
quent inability of smaller municipalities to provide all the services assigned to local
self-government. The intentions differ according to the type of facility as well. Only a
slight majority of municipalities, up to 200 inhabitants (53%), intended to use inter-
municipal cooperation in the area of daycare. As for elementary schools and facilities of
social care, a clear majority of smallest municipalities (77–88%) intended to use inter-
municipal cooperation. As for elementary schools, support for inter-municipal
cooperation prevailed also in municipalities with 500–999 inhabitants.
Mayors in the Podhorie micro region municipalities support our argument about
the greater willingness of small municipalities to engage in inter-municipal cooperation
[PHARE, 1998]. While the mayors of smaller municipal members of the Association
of municipalities of the Podhorie microregion praised existing inter-municipal cooper-
ation, the mayors of larger municipalities were more reserved. Basically, the mayors
who did not have any social case in their municipality did not see any reason to engage
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in inter-municipal cooperation in the area of social services. From this, we can derive
that municipalities engage in inter-municipal cooperation only after they get into prob-
lems with public services delivery themselves.
As for legal forms of inter-municipal cooperation for provision of these services, the
mayors preferred the legal entity upon the agreement of public character (38.1%).
Two further forms favored by the mayors were inter-municipal cooperation upon agree-
ment for the taking over of competencies and tasks by one of the participating
municipalities and creation of a specific association of municipalities for the sake of
joint provision of tasks.
The way the mayors expected the tasks, decentralized to municipalities and pro-
vided through inter-municipal cooperation, to be financed suggests a strong sense of
autonomy amongst local self-governments’ representatives and distrust in other mu-
nicipalities. Over a half of the mayors preferred the transfer of state funds to the budget
of the municipality, where the facility is located. Basically, it is the way it works now.
Today, the funds are transferred to a particular facility and not to an individual receiver
of a given service. Only a quarter of municipalities favored the transfer of funds to each
participating municipality and these municipalities would, consequently, contribute
proportionally to the joint delivery of service (Ministry of Interior of the SR 2000).
4.6 Conclusion
There are basically two ways for territorial self-government to provide public services
under the financial limitations of local self-governments:
a) Through mandatory cooperation.
The minimal size and service area for a basic unit of local self-government is
defined by the law. Such cooperation is inevitable, mainly for service provision
delegated to local self-governments by the state administration.
For example, a local self-government carries out the tasks of state administra-
tion in the area of Construction Act provisions. Not every municipality has the
personnel capacities to do so. Therefore, the municipality that would carry out
these tasks for other municipalities must be appointed to the defined criteria.
Similar situations also exist in other areas. Designation of service areas can be
the basis for defining the lowest administrative units of local self-government.
b) Through voluntary cooperation.
This type of cooperation can mainly be developed with the provision of origi-
nal competencies of municipalities (economic-social competencies).
Inter-municipal cooperation creates respective service areas for individual ser-
vices provided by local self-governments. Historical development of the
settlement structure in Slovakia, popular attitudes and local self-governments’
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attitudes suggest that the voluntary nature of service provision through inter-
municipal cooperation should persist. Recognizing fragmentation of settlement
structure (as one of the main causes of municipalities’ inabilities to carry out
their tasks), the system of economic motivation of municipalities leading to-
wards inter-municipal cooperation must then be thoroughly elaborated. In
compliance with democratic principals, it is more appropriate to let citizens
decide (through their elected representatives—local self-government), which
way of service provision they would prefer. The first way of inter-municipal
cooperation makes public services provision in municipality more effective.
The second path is an individual provision of public services and citizens may
have to bear the negative side effects, like local self-governments’ financial shortage
and consequent inability to properly address the problems of the municipality.
This decision should not be left for bureaucrats in state administration. There
are several problems connected to their decision-making, mostly reflecting the
level of their responsibility and the level of their knowledge about the particu-
lar local problems.
Mayors’ opinions suggest that they are apprehensive about loss of municipal
identity and independence when some forms of inter-municipal cooperation
are used [Ministry of Interior of the SR, 2000]. At the same time, the fear of
small municipalities lagging in the system of central municipalities can be
noted. Another source of fear is belief that the deficit, of financial funds for
provision of economic and administrative tasks, would increase. Municipali-
ties, therefore, prefer looser forms of cooperation and put emphasize on the
voluntary principle of cooperation (in the selection of the type of cooperation
as well). Based upon their opinions, the joint municipal offices should be cre-
ated within micro regions, territories smaller than the former sub districts or
recent districts.
5. SERVICES DELIVERED AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY
5.1 Citizens Participation in Local Self-Government
Creation of local self-government in 1990 restituted citizens’ options for direct partic-
ipation in development and management of municipalities. The Municipal Law provides
the following options:
• Municipal elections;
• Local referendum;
• Participation in public citizen meetings;
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• Participation in the municipal council meetings;
• Submission of petitions, proposals or complaints to the local self-government;
• Questioning the representative of the local self-government.
Through these initiatives, the citizenry can control the local self-government. Local
self-government has to inform citizens about the municipal budget proposal as well as
the municipal financial statement. It must allow the public to comment on the chang-
es of physical plan of municipality.
Municipal elections are generally considered the most important right citizens have
to participate in local self-government. A public survey undertaken by FOCUS agency
in March 1997 demonstrated that popular engagement in public affairs mainly begins
and ends with their participation in the elections [Niznansky´, 1998]. In November
1990, 64% of eligible voters participated in the first municipal elections. Turnout in
another municipal election, in November 1994, was only 52.2%. Four years later, in
1998, the turnout slightly increased to 53.9%. Contrary to this development of turn-
out in municipal elections, the turnout in parliamentary elections permanently exceeds
75% (1994–75.6% and 1998–84.2%). Fairly low turnout in the 1998 municipal
elections does not correspond to polls that indicated about 75% of eligible population
intended to vote in municipal elections [FOCUS, 2000].18  Intended participation in
elections was highest in municipalities up to 1,000 inhabitants (84.4%). This de-
creased according to the size of municipality. In two largest cities of Slovakia, Bratislava
and Kosice, only 64% of eligible voters intended to vote in January 2000.
Citizens’ participation in municipal elections is derived from the interest of citizens
in solving the problems of their municipality. From 1997 to 2000, only 26.1–28.7%
of population in Slovakia attempted to solve the problems of their municipality
[FOCUS, 2000]. In 2001, it was only 19% [IVO, 2001]. Similar to the election turn-
out, the citizens of smaller municipalities, under 2,000 inhabitants, were engaged the
most by trying to solve the problems of their municipality (35.9%). The greatest rate
of citizen passivity was recorded among the people living in municipalities between
50,000–100,000 inhabitants (only 14.4% attempted to participate in addressing the
municipal problems). Out of those who attempted to address the problems, 60% have
experience the problem solved. This suggests that municipal problems can be solved
when the public questions the local self-government. It also increases the perception of
a meaningful existence for self-government. Even though self-government is fairly suc-
cessful in addressing the issues after dialogue with the citizenry, citizens do not engage
in solving municipal problems. The main reason for this is that citizens do not know
how to contribute to addressing municipal problems (26.1%). Another reason is the
lack of time the citizens are willing to spend in order to help the municipality (20.1%).
The third reason, identified by the survey, is that citizens are not interested in helping
to solve municipal problems (12.6%) [FOCUS, 2000].
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The use of particular forms of citizen involvement on local issues depends on the
size of municipality (Table 3.17). In smaller municipalities, under 2,000 inhabitants,
the people use mainly personal contact with representatives of the local self-govern-
ment and public presentation of opinions during public meetings. Influence through
indirect contact with the local self-government through influential acquaintances, non-
governmental organizations, political parties or letters are more often used in larger
municipalities. The public does not use the church when attempting to question local
self-government, even though the church is one of three poles of power in municipal-
ities, as identified by citizens [IVO, 2000].
Table 3.17
The Forms Citizens Use to Make Local Self-Government
Solve Local Problems [%]
Under 2,000 – 5,000 – 20,000 – 50,000 – Bratislava, Slovakia
2,000 5,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 Košice Total
Addressing the Mayor or the 96.3 92.9 86.5 88.8 75.7 76.0 90.3
Municipal Councilor in Person
Presentation During Public Meeting 46.8 49.4 30.5 40.3 42.8 40.8 43.1
Influential Acquaintances 30.8 28.9 39.6 57.6 42.6 40.8 36.9
Letter to a Representative of the 26.2 42.5 37.3 42.6 55.4 46.9 36.1
Local Self-Government
Presentation During the Municipal 27.0 29.5 27.0 19.1 39.8 16.1 26.4
Council Meeting
Community Organization, NGO, 21.2 34.8 27.1 22.4 47.1 28.1 26.6
Social Club
Political Party 13.9 16.6 27.6 30.3 22.0 10.6 18.8
Church 9.6 9.6 10.9 2.6 3.3 0.0 7.7
SOURCE: FOCUS, 2000.
5.2 Public Attitudes Towards Local Self-Government
When the citizens of Slovakia were asked to express which territorial unit they have the
closest relationship to, they identified the municipality they lived in [Tiburg University,
2000]. Two thirds of Slovakian inhabitants are proud of their municipality [IVO, 2000].
Local self-government has also been continually evaluated as one of the institutions
with the highest level of public trust. In 1998, local self-governments had the trust of
59% of inhabitants. In 1999, the trust increased to 62%. In 2000, 56% of inhabitants
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trusted local self-government [UVVM, 1999; FOCUS, 2000]. The highest level of
trust is in the smallest municipalities, under 2,000 inhabitants. As many as 70% of
their citizens trust in the activities of their local self-governments. The level of trust
decreases with the increasing size of municipalities. The lowest level of trust is among
the citizens of the two largest cities, Bratislava and Kosice, at only 47.8%. As for dis-
trust, the highest level of distrust can be found among the citizens of municipalities
between 20,000–50,000 inhabitants, at 47% [FOCUS, 2000].
The amount of information available to the public about the activities and deci-
sions of local self-government is an important factor in the trust/distrust issue. Citizens,
who have sufficient information about these, express the highest levels of confidence in
the local self-government (78%). The people with no information equally trust and
distrust in activities of local self-government. The survey shows an interesting situa-
tion. Amongst people who are not at all interested in the activities of local self-government,
more trust in it than distrust it (45% vs. 38%) [FOCUS, 2000]. Overall, fairly low
levels of public information about local self-government activities exist. In 1997–2000,
only 26–31% of citizens were informed sufficiently. Contrarily, about 42% of people
did not have information about local self-government activities. About the same portion
of people who are sufficiently informed, are not interested in any information about the
activities of local self-government. The previous statement supports the argument about
low citizen interest in the municipal life. Again, citizens living in the municipalities
under 2,000 inhabitants are the best informed. In contrast, the citizens of municipali-
ties with 20,000–50,000 inhabitants had the lowest level of information about local
self-government activities. The percentage of uninformed citizens exceeds the percent-
age of informed citizens in all municipal size categories. As for sources of information,
they rely mainly on neighbors and family (59%), local/regional radio stations and local/
regional newspapers (39%). The following methods are used for getting information as
well: announcements in the public places, various materials from municipal offices and
public meetings with representatives of the local self-government.
Citizens perceive the mayor as the most influential person in the municipality
(63%) [IVO, 2000]. On one hand, this finding can support the credentials of local
self-government. On the other hand, it can also reflect the existence of the extreme
authority of one person and the passivity of citizens (identified in previous analysis).
The primacy of mayor is highlighted by the fact that the second most influential
institution in municipalities, are the municipal councils, identified by only half of
those who identified the mayor (31%). Further groups, according to their influence,
are: local entrepreneur/s (26%), local state administration (23%) and church (18%).
The perception of importance of local state administration in municipalities is often
overestimated. The influence of the political parties is at about the same level as per-
ceived by the mayors (14% vs. 10%). The distribution of power, according to individual
poles, differs upon the size of municipality (Table 3.18).
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Table 3.18
Poles of Power/Influence in Municipalities in the Slovak Republic
Size of Municipality Major Poles of Influence/Power in Municipalities
Under 1,000 Mayor Local council deputies Church, church representatives
1,000–2,000 Mayor Local council deputies Church, church representatives
2,000–5,000 Mayor Local council deputies Church, church representatives
5,000–20,000 Mayor Local council deputies Local businessmen
20,000–50,000 Mayor Local businessmen State administration
50,000–100,000 Mayor State administration Local businessmen
Bratislava, Kos¡ice Mayor State administration Local council deputies
SOURCE: IVO, 2001.
From this table, the basic division of Slovakia is visible. In villages (generally up to
5,000 inhabitants), the mayor, the municipal councilors and the church are the major
poles of power. In towns, the poles of power are distributed among the mayor, the
entrepreneurs and state administration. The perceived influence of the mayor decreas-
es with the increasing size of municipality. In contrast, the power of entrepreneurs and
the state administration increases with the increase of the size of municipality.
These facts confirm all the previous findings. The level of local democracy and the
citizens’ participation decreases with increasing size of municipality. The differences
in the poles of power between rural and urban areas are related to rural areas remaining
more traditional while urban areas are more modern. The question deriving from our
analysis pops up: What is the proper size of a municipality? In regards to citizens’
participation in local self-government, and their participation in addressing the mu-
nicipal issues, a small size municipality is certainly more favorable. As the size of
municipality increases, the interest of citizens in municipal issues, and local self-gov-
ernment as such, decreases.
5.3 Satisfaction with Local Self-Government Operation19
We have already mentioned there was a 56%  confidence vote in favor of the local self-
government in 2000. The percentage of people trusting in local self-government results
from its success in addressing municipal problems and citizens satisfaction with its
operation. The municipal problems, as identified by citizens, tightly correlate with the
overall economic situation in Slovakia in 2000. When breaking down the sample by
the size of municipality, there are differences in the prioritized problems. A shortage of
jobs is the most important local issue in all the size categories, except for the two largest
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šcities, Bratislava and Kosice. In these cities, employment ranked fourth in the order of
importance behind crime, housing, and corruption in local self-government. In some
regions, the unemployment rate exceeds 30% and, not surprisingly, employment was
problem number one. The municipalities, however, have almost no tools for influenc-
ing employment in their territory because they do not have power over the necessary
competencies to boost local economy. In municipalities under 2,000 inhabitants, the
order of problems was as follows: sewage, access to sport and cultural activities, health-
care and social welfare, transportation and road management, and education. Out of
these areas, the local self-government has some competencies, but only in the areas of
technical infrastructure. Even though municipalities have no competencies for delivery
of healthcare, and broad range of social services, they engage in addressing these prob-
lems anyway and participate in addressing the problems with local elementary schools
too. Following these issues, crime and corruption in local self-government were identi-
fied as the other problems. In municipalities between 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, the
order of the issues were very similar. In these municipalities, housing was perceived as
more important problem than sewage, and transportation and road management was
identified as less important issue than crime and corruption in local self-government.
The order of problems in the rest of the size categories was almost identical. This
analysis suggests the inhabitants of smaller municipalities see more problems in the area
of infrastructure (technical and social). While citizens living in large municipalities see
more problems rather in the areas related to ethics (crime and corruption).
Satisfaction with the local self-government activities in addressing local issues is an
inversed function of the importance of individual problems. Citizens are most satisfied
with addressing the technical and social infrastructure. Contrarily, they are unsatisfied
with addressing the issues of job shortage, housing, and crime. When looking at satis-
faction in individual municipal size categories, the relationship between satisfaction
and importance, outlined above, is preserved. The most important issues are addressed
least successfully and vice versa.
Generally, the main reasons of why municipalities cannot address local problems
are: the lack of funds, lack of competencies, and the lack of quality in the local self-
government operation. Citizens of all size categories identified financial shortage being
their reason for failure. For the rest of the reasons, we can see the differentiation. In
municipalities under 2,000 inhabitants, lack of competencies was identified as a pri-
mary reason. Then, it was low quality of local self-governmental operation, insufficient
participation by citizens, and political differences amongst the representatives of the
local self-government. In municipalities above 2,000 inhabitants, low quality of local
self-governmental operation was the major reason. Lack of competencies was one of the
least influential reasons. Fairly high importance was attributed to the unwillingness of
citizens to participate in the local issues addressed in municipalities between 2,000 to
5,000 inhabitants and 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants (50% and 52.7% respectively).
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE POLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
Territorial Self-Government
Until 2002, territorial self-government operated only at a municipal level. The Slovak
Constitution treats all municipalities as equal, with no differentiation based upon size.
The size of municipalities ranges from population 2 (Príkra) to 447,345 (Bratislava).
The scope of services delivered by any given municipality is the same, except for Brat-
islava and Kosice. These two cities also provide some services, which in other cases
would be provided by state administration (road network management, firefighters).
By 2002, a majority of services was delivered by the state administration. In 2002,
regional level of territorial self-government was established and a gradual transfer of
competencies to territorial self-government had begun.
Settlement Structure
The settlement structure in Slovakia features high fragmentation (2883 municipali-
ties) and a large portion of small municipalities (municipalities up to 1,000 people
account for 69% of all municipalities and 16% of the total population of Slovakia).
Such a fragmented structure stems from two major processes taking place in Slovakia in
the second half of the 20th century. During state socialism, integration of municipali-
ties reduced their numbers from 3,344 in 1950 to 2,694 in 1989. After 1990, rapid
fragmentation started and continued on up to 2001 when the law began regulating
the minimum size for newly created/separated municipality. Expert discussions on
optimum size of municipality took place in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. Minimum
sizes of municipalities between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants resulted from these dis-
cussions. The experiences in the small villages, during the period of state socialism
system of central villages, restrained their higher amalgamation.
Economic Performance
The financial stance of local budgets is better than the financial situation of the public
sector as a whole. In total, local budgets have been permanently in surplus throughout
the last decade. Major sources of local budgets’ revenues are shared in state taxes reve-
nues, real estate tax, local fees, municipality property ownership and enterprise revenues,
transfers from public budgets and loans. State tax revenues are distributed proportion-
ally by the population, therefore, the revenues of municipalities do not differ by the size
(per capita revenues). Real estate tax revenues account for 5.5% (over 100,001 people)
to 23.3% (4,001–5,000 people) of local budget revenues. It peaks in the 4,001–5,000
inhabitants size category of municipalities. Non-tax revenues account for more than the
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revenues from state taxes. They range from 19% (over 100,001 inhabitants) to 44.5%
(50,001–100,000 inhabitants). Smaller municipalities depend on transfers from pub-
lic budgets more than larger municipalities. These transfers consist primarily of subsidies
to support provision of self-governmental functions in municipalities fewer than 3,000
inhabitants. Contrarily, smaller municipalities do not gain funds from loans to the
extent larger municipalities do. Bratislava is the most indebt municipality in Slovakia.
As for expenditures, operational expenditures increase on expense of capital expen-
ditures and credits related expenditures. The personnel expenditures are primary items
of the operational expenditures of local budgets. They account for 25.2% of the oper-
ational expenditures and 16.1% of total expenditures. The highest expenditures are in
municipalities with under 1,000 inhabitants and over 100,001 inhabitants. In the
two largest cities, Bratislava and Kosice, the expenditures stem from a two-level organi-
zation of local self-government in these cities. Capital expenditures per capita decrease
with the increasing size of municipality. Debt related expenditures rise with the size of
municipalities, culminating at 39% of total expenditures for municipalities over 100,001
inhabitants (2000).
Economy of Services Delivery
Administration of municipalities, the operation of municipal offices, and costs for the
accounts of the elected local representatives total 21.4% of local expenditures. Expen-
ditures for housing and construction account for 13.7% of total expenditures. Further
significant categories of expenditures are transportation expenditures (10.7%) and lo-
cal economy expenditures (9.7%). In 2000, ranking just after was protection of
environment (6.5%). These expenditures consist of such services as public green care,
cleaning and winter maintenance of local roads, and waste management. Analysis of
local budgets expenditures in selected areas shows that smaller municipalities (up to
1,000 people) have significantly higher expenditures per service unit than municipal-
ities with higher populations. Road transportation is an exemption from this statement.
The expenditures of local roads per km increase with increasing size of municipality
mainly due to the system of road tax revenue distribution as a primary source of funds
in this area. The administration of municipal offices clearly shows the lack of econom-
ical sustainability, for municipalities with less than 1,000 people, when the operation
of municipal offices accounts for as much as 42–49 percent of their total expenditures.
Municipal activities towards economic development in their territory are limited to
planning, construction of technical infrastructure, participation in commercial projects,
and competencies in the area of real estate tax rates.
Inter-Municipal Cooperation
Legal settings for inter-municipal cooperation have existed in Slovakia since 1990.
Major areas of inter-municipal cooperation are: municipal waste management; waste
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water treatment, tourism, environmental protection, regional education, culture,
education, social issues, coordination and planning of development activities, joint
projects for technical infrastructure (gas and water supply), organization of regional
advisory and information centers, regional development agencies, healthcare and
joint enterprise (in cooperation with the private sector). The provided examples
confirm these are reasonable ways to address the problems related to the size vs.
capacity issue in delivery of some services. The municipalities are willing to engage
in cooperation for delivery of economic and social services, but less willing in the area
of administrative services. Geographical location, tradition of cooperation and size of
municipalities are major factors that make municipalities conditioned to engage in
inter-municipal cooperation.
Citizens Participation and Satisfaction
The options for citizen’s participation in local self-government are defined in the Mu-
nicipal law. The level of popular interest is best reflected in the local election turnout
(about 54% in 1998). The public interest in local matters declines with the increasing
size of municipalities. Active participation has a similar trend.  Local self-governments
enjoy quite a high level of public trust in comparison to other public institutes in
Slovakia. The mayors are major poles of power and influence in municipalities of all
sizes. In cities over 50,001 people, the influence of local council and church decreases
in favor of state administration and the local business community. Local problems
identified by citizens differ from the problems often publicized by the representatives
of local self-governments. The public identified insufficient funds and competencies of
local self-governments as being the major reasons for municipalities’ failure to address
the issues.
6.2 Recommendations
Due to the transfer of further competencies to local self-governments, the Slovak Re-
public must deal in more precise manner with the relationship between efficient size of
local self-governmental administrative units and the impact of citizens on the scope
and structure of provided services. It is impossible that all 2,883 municipalities would
provide newly transferred tasks individually without respecting their different size and
capacity (Príkra vs. Bratislava).
A document that deals with this issue does exist. It is the Concept of Decentraliza-
tion (2001) and it has already been approved by the Government. It addressed the
issue of the relationship between the size of administrative unit, the scope of delivered
services and the influence of citizenry in deciding on the structure and quality of deliv-
ered services.
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This document and our analysis of services delivery through inter-municipal coop-
eration (section 4) show the type of provided service does influence the decisions on the
size of administrative units. The criteria, for defining an administrative unit’s optimal
size, differ by the type of service. Creating maximum efficiency and reflecting the influ-
ence of citizens on the service delivery are generally valid criteria, mainly for delivery of
economic and social services. Further criteria must be included when delivering ad-
ministrative services (decision making in personal areas), such as accessibility and number
of decisions. Until recently, accessibility was measured through conventional means of
transportation. Development of IT and electronic signature will decrease the impor-
tance of distance. At the same time, however, the necessity of knowing the specifics of
a local environment by the public service provider will persist. Particularly, the admin-
istrative tasks that require knowledge of the local environment are those most requested
(construction permits, social help, cadastral office, enterprises registering, etc.).
Our analyses showed small municipalities operated with financial severity and per-
sonnel, as well as a low overall capacity to carry out the necessary tasks. Based upon the
recent experiences of local state administration offices operation, the financial and per-
sonnel severity of operation of the given services providers (current departments of
district offices) becomes efficient at the size of 40,000 inhabitants. The financial anal-
ysis of municipal expenditures shows expenditures per capita decrease with the increasing
size of the municipality (section 3.1.2).
For provision of administrative tasks of local self-governments, the Concept of De-
centralization (2001) suggested that 169 municipalities should be administrative centers.
In this network, the distance of citizens to the administrative office would not exceed
15 km and the size of unit would not be less than 5,000 inhabitants (extreme cases).
The average size of the administrative unit for provision of administrative tasks of local
self-government would be 32,000 inhabitants. The legal status of every municipality
would be preserved and, consequently, the impact of citizens on the service delivery
through elected representatives and through contracts between municipalities includ-
ed in administrative unit.
However, the reform of public administration proposed by the Concept of Decen-
tralization is not to be carried out after the Parliament’s decision on self-governmental
regions. The solution used today defines inter-municipal cooperation as the exclusively
voluntary activity of municipalities. Municipalities can freely decide to provide services
individually or in cooperation with other municipalities. However, all mandatory tasks
of local self-governments must be delivered, with no exceptions for small municipali-
ties with limited capacities.
The current size differentiation of local self-governments and the way it is ad-
dressed by law is not optimal for several reasons:
• It will not enable further significant decentralization of competencies to mu-
nicipalities, mainly due to their fragmentation and the low capacities of the
smaller ones;
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• Direct connection between public service provision and the citizen’s influence
on it directly, or through elected representatives, will not exist in several areas;
• Fragmentation of local levels complicates territorial economic development;
• Fragmented local levels make administration more expensive (see 3.2.3).
Even though, in recent phases of public administration reform, the voluntary prin-
ciple in inter-municipal cooperation rules, and our analysis of the municipalities’ will
engage in the inter-municipal cooperation confirmed by this, territorial reform of local
self-government at municipal level must be prepared. The reason is basic and it is
shown in our analyses. Small municipalities have no sufficient capacity to carry out
their tasks while they must spend almost  half their budgets on operation. Despite the
fact that municipalities do not like mandatory cooperation, the increase of efficiency of
local self-governmental operation is impossible if it is left to free will of the municipal-
ities. Certain regulations must be implemented (mainly the small municipalities, with
a few hundreds of inhabitants, that greatly value their separate existence above their
financial severity).
Territorial reform of local self-government at the municipal level should be phased
out. The settlement structure in Slovakia, and the requested quality of services, re-
quire a compromising solution between amalgamation (absolutely mandatory act)
and inter-municipal cooperation (voluntary cooperation) as well as differentiation
between these in individual regions. The compromise for the first phase could be
based on the following:
• Mandatory amalgamation of municipalities under 200 inhabitants (about 382
municipalities with 49,000 inhabitants) or their mergers to larger municipal-
ities. Their identity would be preserved through their status of local section;
they would still have their councilors in the municipal council.
• Voluntary unification of municipalities into administrative units through amal-
gamation or inter-municipal cooperation associations to provide administrative
tasks so that they create administrative units of more than 5,000 inhabitants.
• State administration bodies would oblige the municipalities that did not join
the aforementioned associations, whose size is less then 5,000 inhabitants, to
join it (then voluntary unification from previous item becomes voluntary only
until it is realized by municipalities themselves).
Even though a 5,000 inhabitant threshold is not sufficient for establishing full
administrative and financial capacity for local self-governments, it was selected as the
first phase because this size enables creation of local government’s own administrative
capacities with different expertise, as well as their financial coverage. The process of
amalgamation or association would affect about 96% of municipalities. The aforemen-
tioned steps would reduced the number of municipalities by 382 (from 2,883 to
2,501), reduce the number of administrative units, reduce the number of elect-
162
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
š
š
š
š
š
š
ed bodies while preserving democratic control over  public service delivery. We can also
assume that service delivery quality would improve.
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NOTES
1 For a more detailed account of  public administration development in Slovakia, see
Horváth 2000.
2 The adopted acts (302/2001 and 303/2001) changed the drafts, approved by the
Government, for the number of self-governmental regions. Through this decision,
the socio-spatial organization of Slovakia was broken. The borders of natural re-
gions were not respected. The original proposal considered 12 regions ranging
from 266,332 to 725,018 inhabitants. Such a division also respected the results of
a public survey, that stated 66% of population in Slovakia identified a natural
region with the territorial unit with the closest relation. Such an attitude by the
population does have an impact on their participation in public affairs.
3 A municipality is called, in Slovak terminology, obec. Every municipality is a local
self-government. Municipalities in Slovakia can be towns (mesto) or villages (dedina).
Towns and villages can consist of several settlement units. In this study, towns/cities
and villages are used as local self-governments. When the term municipality is
used, both types are the subject.
4 A more detailed list of the local self-government competencies can be found in
Horvath 1999, Municipal Law no. 369/1990 and Act no. 416/2001.
5 Even though under state socialism there was no local self-government, today’s
municipalities existed as statistical units of settlement structure. Therefore, when
referring to municipalities in this subsection, we are referring to similar units as
recent municipalities.
6 This is the personal experience of the authors taken from city council meetings,
attitudes of representatives of its rural sections, as well as experience drawn during
public meetings undertaken during work on the Concept of Decentralization and
Modernization of Public Administration in 1999–2001.
7 ZMOS—the Association of towns and villages of Slovakia, an association repre-
senting the interests of local self-governments.
8 Debt related expenditures comprise of credit interest and principal payment and
fees for credit administration.
9 We excluded bank operation expenditures that accounted for 20% of expenditures
in 2000. These expenditures included mainly debt related expenditures—the afore-
mentioned redemption of municipal bonds for Bratislava.
1 0 Until 2001. The scope of competencies of local self-governments expanded after
2002.
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1 1 The New Act on waste no. 223/2001 was approved in 2001. Starting January 1,
2002, every individual inhabitant of a municipality became the personal producer
of municipal waste, not the municipality as a whole. Municipalities specify the fee
for waste management per capita in compliance with local conditions.
1 2 Theses provisions were incorporated by an amendment to Act no. 369/1990, Fall
2001.
1 3 The overall number of municipalities in Slovakia was 2,883 in 2001. ZMOS asso-
ciates 94.3% of them.
1 4 Act no. 416/2001, concerning the tranfer of some competencies from state admin-
istration bodies to municipalities and regional self-governments, changed this
situation. Effective July 1, 2002, more tasks in healthcare and social care will be-
come the responsibility of municipalities and regional self-government.
1 5 In 2001, the Open Society Foundation provided support funds for creation of
joint municipal offices and these conclusions drew upon the submitted projects.
1 6 In 2001, the draft law on creation and financing of the tourism association was
elaborated upon.
1 7 Only municipalities which had daycare, elementary school or social welfare facili-
ties within its territory have been taken into account.
1 8 In February 1998, 69% of eligible population intended to vote in municipal elec-
tions [FOCUS, 2000].
1 9 This section elaborated upon the surveys undertaken by the FOCUS agency in
1997–2000.
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Does Larger Mean More Effective?
Size and the Functioning of
Local Governments in Bulgaria
Stefan Ivanov, Guinka Tchavdarova, Emil Savov, Hristo Stanev
1. INTRODUCTION
During the years of transition, the administrative and territorial structure in Bulgaria
was characterized by relative stability of the lowest (decentralized) level of local go-
vernment—the municipalities. The preserved size of local government here is in
contrast with the relative fragmentation occurring in some of the other Central and
East European countries. At the same time, a slight trend towards formation of new
municipalities, through division of some settlements, has also been monitored in
the recent years.
The fragmentation of municipalities strengthens the link between the population
and the local government and is a manifestation of the democratic process rising
forth after the collapse of communism. On the other hand, large size municipalities
enable the provision of more and higher quality local services while other things
remain the same. That is why, in the last 20 years, a trend towards aggregation of
municipalities is being monitored in West Europe (for example the Scandinavian
countries). Meanwhile, there are also examples of very fragmented structure and
conservative attitude towards any administrative changes (France).
Fragmentation or aggregation—two approaches, each of them with advantages
and disadvantages. Which of them is more adequate for the conditions, and for practice,
in Bulgaria? How is the link between the population and the local government in the
municipalities of different sizes established? How does this influence the democratic
process of election, local representation, citizen satisfaction and citizen participation
in decision making? Are large municipalities able to conduct more independent
local policy and to provide more and higher quality services to citizens and businesses?
The goal of this paper is to answer to these questions by analyzing Bulgarian
practice, evaluating the influence of the size of local government on the coverage
and quality of the provided local services, and local democracy.
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All municipalities in Bulgaria are placed in one of 5 groups for the purpose of the
analysis:
• Group 1—Sofia (capital city of Bulgaria);
• Group 2—the municipalities with a population above 75,000 people;
• Group 3—the municipalities with a population between 30,000—75,000
people;
• Group 4—the municipalities with a population between 10,000—30,000
people;
• Group 5—the municipalities with a population below 10,000 people.
The paper has the following structure:
• Main macroeconomic indicators, characterizing the share of the local governments
in the public sector;
• Presentation of the administrative and territorial structure of the country and
the main characteristics of the municipalities;
• Analysis of the relationship between the size of local governments and their
operation and the manifestation of local democracy;
• Presentation of national debates on the size of municipalities;
• Conclusions and recommendations for changes in the size of local governments
and their operation.
1.1 Background Information
The share of local budget expenditures within the consolidated state budget and
GDP in the ‘90s was characterized by strong changes. Several periods can be identified:
Period One—up to 1992. In this period, reforms in the country began (1991)
leading to a strong decline in the share of consolidated state budget in the GDP. The
share of central institutional expenditure declined, while the share of local budget
expenditures increased in relative terms;
Period Two, from 1993 to the crisis of 1996–1997. The local finance reform
practically started in the beginning of 1993 with the introduction of the intergovern-
mental transfer formula. A rapid decline of the share of local expenditures in GDP
and in the consolidated state budget was monitored during the entire period. The
total public expenditures were also declining, but their rate of decline was smaller
than that of the local budgets;
Period Three, from 1998 to the Present. This period is characterized by a second
stage of legal changes within local government activities and beginning of large
structural changes in local budgets. In 1998, both the share allocated to local budgets
from the consolidated state budget and the GDP increased as a result of the
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introduction of the Local Taxes and Fees Act and the Local Budgets Act. A stable
share of the local budgets in GDP ensued, while central government expenditures
increased, leading to a relative decline in the share of local expenditures allocated by
the consolidated state budget.
Since the beginning of the reforms in the country (1991–2000), the share of
public expenditures in the GDP has declined by 13% during the entire period.
This is the result of a 9% decline in the central government expenditures and 28%
decline in the local government expenditures. This indicates that, during the entire
period, the financial problems connected with the reform have been transferred
from the central to the local governments.
Table 4.1
Share of Central and Local Government Expenditures
in the Consolidated State Budget (CSB) and GDP [%]
Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
CSB/GDP 67.48 51.11 53.66 56.09 54.41 49.09 43.65 39.50 40.27 43.52 44.53
CG/GDP 55.14 40.16 40.63 44.78 45.17 41.38 37.32 33.71 32.57 35.38 36.65
LG/GDP 12.34 10.95 13.04 11.30 9.24 7.71 6.34 5.79 7.70 8.14 7.88
LG/CSB 18.28 21.43 24.29 20.15 16.98 15.70 14.52 16.31 19.12 18.71 17.70
The relative contraction in the public institutions’ budgets is logically explained
and justified following a period of total state domination in economic and social
relations. Meanwhile, local governments financial resources decline faster compared
to those of the central government. The decline in local government financial resources
is also greater than the decline in the public goods and services produced and provided
by municipalities. The foremost reason for the present financial situation of munici-
palities is due to this lack of correspondence.
During the period studied, local revenues have also been influenced by inflation.
The great nominal increase is accompanied with a strong decline in real purchasing
power. The local budgets lost over 50% of their real purchasing power in the period
between 1991–20001  (See Figure 4.1). This decline occurred entirely in the second
period, between 1993–1997, when the municipal financial resources depreciated
by almost 3 times. An increase in the real value of the local budgets was observed in
1998, followed by a period of stabilization and slight growth.
The non-elastic revenues from taxes and fees were the reason for the decline in
the purchasing power of municipal financial resources. So, for example, tax bases and
fees are fixed by law, it also determines the relative decline in the revenues resulting
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from them. The wage increases are smaller than the growth of inflation, which, in
turn, decreases the PIT revenues. Only the revenues from CIT are closer to the
inflation rate, and only they can be defined as elastic.
Thus, inflation turns out to be the second factor in the declining financial power
of local governments.
Figure 4.1
Influence of Inflation on Municipal Budget Revenues
Other characteristic features of local budgets are their total dependence on the state
transfers (subsidies and shared taxes) and local governments’ growing budgetary deficits.
Intergovernmental transfers form between 80–90% of all local budget revenues
during the period studied (See Figure 4.2). The structure of local budget revenues is
practically formed under the definite influence of changes in the mechanism in allocation
of the intergovernmental transfers. Centralization of the local revenues from shared
taxes was observed throughout the first two periods (up to 1996). This increased the
relative share of local revenues (local taxes, fees, revenues from local activities). Then,
in the beginning of 1997, high inflation depreciated the local revenues by returning
to the structure of the local budget revenues to where it had been during the first year
of economic reforms in the country—1991. The new Local Taxes and Fees Act contributed
significantly to the increase of local revenues in 1998. The revenue from borrowed
funds had marginal importance for the local budgets. The country’s financial situation
had been generally deteriorating within recent years and, in particular, the conditions
for borrowing and issue of bonds. This led to a gradual decline in the number of
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borrowed funds, which had almost reached zero by 1997. The few attempts in this
sphere since 1998 are not likely to become a trend because this is all related to Sofia and
the State Budget Acts for 2000 which imposed legal restrictions for local investment.
The crisis years between 1996–1997 were the origin of the local budget deficit.
In 1996, the budget deficit amounted to 9.5% of local budget expenditures. Then,
in 1997, the government tried to combat the local deficit by providing a significant
amount of extraordinary subsidies—2.6% from all local expenditures. As a result of
this, the deficit declined to 2.35%. The deficit has been growing ever since that
moment, although the amounts provided during the certain years of extraordinary
subsidies has continued to grow.
The centralization of municipal financial resources is the third reason for
municipalities’ current financial situation.
Figure 4.2
Structure of Local Budgets (1991–2000) [%]
1.2 Administrative and Territorial Divisions in Bulgaria
1.2.1 Brief History of the Changes in the Territorial Division of Bulgaria
Size of municipalities is very important for the formation of strong and democratic local
governments. In relation to this, administrative reform that began in the early ‘90s,
introduced laws that guaranteed the participation of the population in the formation
of municipalities and their size.
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The territorial division and the government tiers resulted from the guidelines
provided by the Constitution, but two special laws concretely regulate them.
Five administrative reforms have been conducted in the last 50 years. These reforms
included changes and transformations in the administrative units at the different
government levels and they are illustrated by Table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Dynamics of the Administrative Reforms
Year of Administrative Units Average Population
the Reform [Number] in One Administrative Unit
[Thousand People]
Okrug Intermediate Obstina Okrug Intermediate Obstina
Tier Tier
1947–1950 14 102 2,178 516.3 61.8 3.3
1959–1961 28 — 979 261.0 8.0
1979 28 — 291 315.9 30.4
1987 9 — 273 997.4 32.9
2000 28 — 262 284.8 30.3
Based on the analysis of the administrative reforms carried out during this period,
the following conclusions can be drawn:
• The Bulgarian municipality (obstina) has become the main component in
the structure of the Bulgarian state and is permanently present in Bulgarian
society. The daily lives of the Bulgarian people are closely linked with their
municipality, where important issues are resolved. The disadvantages of local
government have been caused by the aspirations of the central government to
subordinate it both administratively and financially. The strong positions
and traditions of the municipalities within the vicinity of local government
have been restored after the 1989 changes. Since 1991, local government has
become constitutionally and legally regulated.
• Bulgaria maintains a two-tier administrative division, with the exception of
the period between 1947–1959.
The administrative units existing on the regional tier are called okrug and oblast.
They perform main central government functions. An intermediate unit, called okolia,
has existed for a short period of time between the regional and the local (municipal) tier.
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1.2.2 Situation of the Present Administrative Divisions in Bulgaria
According to the present Act on Administrative and Territorial Division of the Republic
of Bulgaria, the country has a two-tier administrative structure, including two types
of administrative units—oblast2, and a municipality system.
The region (oblast)  is an administrative unit of the central government. It comprises
of one3  or several neighboring municipalities. The regions can be created and liquidated
only under certain laws. A regional governor, appointed by the Council of Ministers4 ,
governs the regions. Presently 28 regions exist. These were established by splitting
the 9 regions that existed before 1999.
The regions are defined by the following parameters:
• Population: average population—285,000 people; minimum population—
131,000 people (Vidin Region); maximum population—1,174,000 people
(Sofia City Region);
• Territory: average territory—4,000 sq.km.; minimum territory— 1,300 sq.km.
(Sofia City Region); maximum territory—7,700 sq.km. (Bourgas Region);
• Number of municipalities: average number—9 municipalities; minimum
number—1 municipality (Sofia City Region); maximum number—22 muni-
cipalities (Sofia Region);
• Number of settlements: average number—191 settlements; minimum number
38 (Sofia City Region); maximum number—478 municipalities (Kardjali
Region);
According to the Constitution, the municipality (obstina) is the main (and by now
the only) tier of local government in the country. A municipality is comprised of one
or more settlements and its territory comprises of the territories of the component
settlements. The municipality is then named after the administrative center. The
municipality is a legal entity. It has own independent budget and property that it can
use to serve its interests. The bodies of local government—the municipal council and
mayor—are elected directly by the population within the whole municipality. The
municipalities can still have their own structural units—districts and mayoralties.
Districts (raioni) can be established in larger cities, with populations over 100,000
people, based on the decision of the municipal council or, within the large cities
with population over 300,000 people themselves, based on the law. Presently, only
the capital city of Sofia and the second and third largest cities have districts. The
number of these districts is as follows: Sofia—24 districts, Plovdiv—6 districts, and
Varna—5 districts. The mayoralties (kmetstva) can be established with the permission
of the municipal council and they comprise of one or more neighboring settlements.
Presently 1,696 mayoralties exist in Bulgaria. The number of mayoralties varies
depending on the policies of the municipal councils. The mayoralty is a diluted
municipal administration (located in a settlement) governed by an elected person.
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Table 4.3
Characteristic Features of the Regions in Bulgaria
Regions Territory (2000) Population Municipalities Settlements
[sq.km] [%] [Number] [%] [Number] [%] [Number] [%]
Blagoevgrad 6,449.5 5.8 343,370 4.3 14 5.3 280 5.2
Bourgas 7,748.1 7.0 426,028 5.3 13 4.9 257 4.8
Varna 3,819.5 3.4 465,012 5.8 12 4.6 158 3.0
Veliko Turnovo 4,661.6 4.2 294,790 3.7 10 3.8 336 6.3
Vidin 3,032.9 2.7 131,215 1.6 11 4.2 142 2.7
Vratza 3,619.8 3.2 227,766 2.9 10 3.8 123 2.3
Gabrovo 2,023.0 1.8 144,849 1.8 4 1.5 356 6.7
Dobrich 4,719.7 4.3 217,012 2.7 8 3.0 215 4.0
Kardjali 3,209.1 2.9 164,958 2.1 7 2.7 471 8.8
Kjustendil 3,051.5 2.7 163,388 2.0 9 3.4 182 3.4
Lovech 4,128.8 3.7 171,236 2.1 8 3.0 150 2.8
Montana 3,635.6 3.3 183,353 2.3 11 4.2 130 2.4
Pazardjik 4,456.9 4.0 313,059 3.9 11 4.2 117 2.2
Pernik 2,394.2 2.2 150,318 1.9 6 2.3 171 3.2
Pleven 4,653.3 4.2 330,745 4.1 11 4.2 123 2.3
Plovdiv 5,972.9 5.4 721,905 9.1 17 6.5 215 4.0
Razgrad 2,413.9 2.2 146,444 1.8 7 2.7 101 1.9
Russe 2,877.4 2.6 270,161 3.4 8 3.0 84 1.6
Silistra 2,846.3 2.6 142,815 1.8 7 2.7 118 2.2
Sliven 3,544.1 3.2 220,273 2.8 4 1.5 120 2.2
Smolian 3,192.9 2.9 140,664 1.8 10 3.8 242 4.5
Sofia City 1,344.4 1.2 1,173,811 14.7 1 0.4 38 0.7
Sofia Region 7,062.3 6.4 273,882 3.4 22 8.4 284 5.3
Stara Zagora 5,151.1 4.6 372,849 4.7 11 4.2 206 3.9
Targoviste 2,710.4 2.4 142,872 1.8 5 1.9 199 3.7
Haskovo 5,533.3 5.0 279,067 3.5 11 4.2 261 4.9
Shumen 3,389.7 3.1 205,198 2.6 10 3.8 151 2.8
Yambol 3,355.5 3.0 156,631 2.0 5 1.9 109 2.0
Total 111,002.2 100.0 2,973,671 100.0 263 100.0 5,339 100.0
Average 3,964.4 3.6 284,774 3.6 9 191
179
D O E S  L A R G E R  M E A N  M O R E  E F F E C T I V E ?  S I Z E  A N D  T H E  F U N C T I O N  O F  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  B U L G A R I A
Presently, 263 municipalities exist in Bulgaria. One new municipality has recently
been established. Although legal possibilities for the splitting and merging of
municipalities exist, their numbers are not very dynamic. Seven new municipalities
have been established in the last five years. More intensive changes have been observed
on the borders of the municipalities because populations within certain settlements
may have actually requested that settlement locate within the borders of another
municipality.
The municipalities are defined by the following parameters:
• Territory: average territory—422 sq.km.; minimum territory—44.4 sq.km.;
maximum territory—1,367 sq.km.
• Population: average population—30,000 people; minimum population—
1,300 people; maximum population—1,134,000 people.
• Number of settlements: average number of settlements—20; minimum
number of settlements—1; maximum number of settlements—134.
Table 4.4
Distribution of Municipalities in Bulgaria
Based on Population in 20015
Groups Number % of Total Population % of Total
1,000–5,000 people 28 10.65 94,582 1.19
5,001–10,000 people 71 27.00 529,954 6.65
10,001–20,000 people 77 29.28 1,124,143 14.10
20,001–30,000 people 30 11.41 736,231 9.23
30,001–50,000 people 24 9.13 872,738 10.95
50,001–75,000 people 13 4.94 819,563 10.28
75,001–100,000 people 8 3.04 673,633 8.45
100,001–160,000 people 6 2.28 725,332 9.10
Over 160,001 people 6 2.28 2,397,495 30.07
Total 263 100.00 7,973,671 100.00
What is evident from the data is that the group of municipalities with
populations of 10,000–20,000 people dominates with a total  of  77 (or 29.28%) of
the municipalities. They are followed by the population group with 5,000–10,000
people, with a total 71 municipalities.
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1.2.2.1 Nature of Administration by Government Tiers
It has already been pointed out that the regional administration is part of the central
government administration. The total number of employees in the regional administ-
rations is small—about 1,100 people, 80% of whom have university degrees. Women
prevail among the regional administrations at 64% of all employees.
The municipal administrations perform local government functions. The municipal
councils have the legal powers to determine the structure and the number of employees
in the municipal administration. However, many centrally determined legal requirements
as well as restrictions, also exist. The number of municipal administrators is 18,000
people, over 40% have university degrees. The municipal administration is mainly
localized in the settlement, which is the administrative center of the municipality.
This houses 65% of the municipal servants. The rest of the municipal servants
work within the mayoralties and the districts.
1.2.2.2 Legislation Regulating Changes in the Country’s Territorial Organization
The Act on Administrative and Territorial Division of the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted
in 1995, determines the way and the conditions for establishing and changing
administrative units. The adoption of this law determined a new meaning for the
term “administrative and territorial structure”. It means; “a continuous process for
creation of administrative and territorial units in the country, for development of
local government and conducting administrative changes according to the will of
the population and the state interests”. The law is based on a number of principles,
the most important of which are: the principle of territorial neighborhood; compliance
between the size of the administrative units and their competencies and resources;
the subsidiarity principle; the principle of succession and territorial stability of the
administrative structure and democratic choice in decisions that effect particular
administrative and territorial changes.
The law determines the following conditions necessary for creation of a new
municipality:
• The total combined population of the settlements, to be included in the
municipality, should be over 6,000 people.
• There should exist a settlement that can serve as the center, with established
social and technical infrastructure and ensuring the servicing of the population.
• The maximum distance between the center of the municipality and the
settlements should not exceed 40 km.
• The new municipality may include those neighboring settlements that can
neither become a separate municipality nor join another neighboring muni-
cipality.
• The new municipality should be able to finance its expenditures with own
source revenues, which should be equal to at least half of its average own
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source revenues for the municipalities as approved by the state budget act
for that respective year. For example, if the municipalities in the country
support 50% of their expenditures with own source revenues on the average,
then the newly established municipality should have the ability to cover at
least 25% of its expenditures with own source revenues.
The new municipalities are created through:
• Separation of one or several neighboring settlements from an existing municipality
and establishment of a new municipality;
• Merging of two or more municipalities within one municipality, or one
municipality annexing another one;
• Splitting of one existing municipality into two or more municipalities.
The procedure for the establishment or liquidation of a municipality requires
the enactment of a local referendum and a positive vote from the population. A
decision by the Council of Ministers and a decree from the President should follow
this. In cases of a positive vote from the population, it is possible for the government
to decide not to establish a new municipality. However, the opposite is impossible:
to create/liquidate a municipality following a negative vote from the population.
The establishment of districts (as components of the municipality) is based on
some conditions for the number of population (over 25,000 people). Districts can
be established in cities with populations over 100,000 people. The mayor proposes,
and the municipal council approves, the establishment of districts. This procedure
is not applied in the case of districts established in the capital city and in cities with
populations over 300,000 people because their territorial division is subject to special
laws.
The establishment of a mayoralty (as a component of municipality) requires a
population over 500 people and capacity for the performance of functions assigned
by the municipality. The procedure also includes a referendum. The municipal council
can only make a decision after a positive vote from the population of the new mayoralty.
The country’s main changes in the administrative and territorial structure can
be performed through mergers, divisions, annexing, separation and liquidation.
The legislation oversees when each of these procedures is performed. Referendums
are always required for the municipalities and the mayoralties. No such requirement
is needed for the districts.
The legislation also regulates the procedures for changing the center of the
administrative unit, the name of the settlement, creation of a new or liquidation of
an existing settlement, giving “city” status to a village, etc.
The main features of the present legislation concerning administrative and
territorial structure can be summarized as follows:
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• Legal criteria are used to establish each category within the administrative unit.
These criteria are objective and easily determined;
• All changes in the administrative and territorial division are done based on clear
procedures and taking the will of the population into consideration;
• Continuous change, pending the will of the population, is guaranteed but
only permissible two years after passing similar legislation;
• The authorized bodies cannot impose authoritarian decisions when the population
has voted negatively against it;
• Each act can be claimed in court.
Special legal codes are needed for the establishment of regions and changes in their
borders. The general procedure for such changes does not envisage a referendum. A
decision of the Council of Ministers is needed to separate one or several settlements
from one municipality and include them in another municipality on the territory
of another region.
1.2.3 Local Government Disparities
1.2.3.1 Demographic and Settlement Structures
As it has been noted in the present paper’s introduction, the municipalities are
placed in 5 groups based on population.
Table 4.5
Distribution of Municipalities by Groups Based on Population
Groups Population Number of % of % of Average
Municipalities Municipalities Population Population per
Municipality
Group 1 Sofia 1 0.38 14.79 1,211,531
Group 2 Above 75,000 20 7.63 33.21 136,011
Group 3 30,000–75,000 39 14.89 21.42 44,990
Group 4 10,000–30,000 110 41.98 23.40 17,426
Group 5 Below 10,000 92 35.11 7.17 6,387
Total 262 100.00 100.00 31,263
The municipalities differ not only based on population but also based on their
major demographic characteristics. The data on Table 4.6 indicates that decline in
the size of municipalities is accompanied by:
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• Decline in the share of urban population. The amount of urban population
within the country averages about 68%. However, the rural population
dominates in most municipalities.
• Deterioration of the demographic structure of the population. This is manifested
mainly through the decline in the working age population and the increase
of the elderly population. The integral evaluation is represented by the
coefficient of demographic structure6. The table indicates that the most favorable
population structure is observable in the larger municipalities while the
most deteriorated population structure is observable in the smaller muni-
cipalities.
• Intensifying depopulation process. The reasons for this are both negative
natural growth and migration abroad. The last column of the table indicates
that depopulation affects the municipalities in all groups, except Sofia.
Table 4.6
Main Demographic Characteristics of Municipalities
Groups Share of Population Coefficient of Share of Changes in
Below Working Age Above
Demographic Urban Population
Working Age Working Age
Structure Population (1999/98)
Group 1 15.49 61.97 22.54 101.52 95.69 100.99
Group 2 17.84 62.09 20.07 110.50 87.05 99.59
Group 3 18.23 56.70 25.07 99.99 55.98 99.12
Group 4 18.59 52.95 28.46 94.59 44.90 99.17
Group 5 16.14 47.60 36.26 80.67 35.46 98.59
Average 17.63 57.72 24.65 100.00 68.09 99.52
SOURCE: Data from the National Statistical Institute, 31 December 1998 and 31 December 1999
Table 4.7
Territory and Settlement Structure
Groups Territory [sq.km] Average Number [Sq.km/Settlement]
of Settlements
Group 1 1,344 38 35
Group 2 583 36 16
Group 3 677 32 21
Group 4 423 20 21
Group 5 272 12 22
Average 424 20 21
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The country’s unfavorable demographic processes still has not significantly
affected the settlement structure. Settlements are relatively evenly distributed across
the country. Data indicates that larger municipalities have larger territory and include
more settlements. The splitting of municipalities in the 1990s affected the group
of smallest municipalities and contributed to their small territory and the few
settlements within them.
1.2.3.2 Socio-Economic Disparities
According to data from the Year 2000 Annual Report7 , the level of socio-economic
development within the municipalities is evaluated based on 10 indicators represented
by an integral indicator. The average level of these indicators for the groups is
presented in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8
Level of Socio-Economic Development of the Municipality Groups for 2000
(Average for the country=100)
Groups Integral Indicator for Socio-Economic Development
Group 1 195.53
Group 2 105.19
Group 3 84.98
Group 4 80.54
Group 5 75.48
The data indicates a relationship between the size of municipalities and the
integral evaluation of their socio-economic situation. Evaluations for groups 4 and
5 would rank even lower if about 10 municipalities, those with territory where
large industrial companies are located, were excluded. These 10 municipalities are
among the most developed municipalities in the country, according to the per
capita value of the indicator.
This fact distorts the concrete economic indicators even more. Table 4.9 indicates
that the municipalities from group 4 emerged ahead of the municipalities from
group 3 based on the indicators created by corporate profit and monetary incomes
per capita. So, for example, only 6 highly developed municipalities (out of the total
110) from group 4 made 32% of the profit and had 46% of the income of the
entire group. Using the same logic, 6 developed municipalities from group 5 (out
of a total of 92) formed, respectively, 31% and 32% of the total profit and the
income of their group. That is why the influence of these municipalities should be
taken into account when interpreting the results.
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The size of municipalities and the social indicators are in reverse relation. The
problem with the distorting influence of the small and highly developed municipalities
does not exist here yet. Relatively high unemployment and large groups of population
receiving social benefits are what has been noted here.
Table 4.9
Main Socio-Economic Indicators by Municipality Groups in 2000
(Average weighted values, average for the country=100)
Group Corporate Monetary Social Unemployment Rate
Profit Incomes Benefits
31.12.1999 31.12.2000
Group 1 250.74 226.72 32.77 26.31 25.01
Group 2 92.94 101.85 80.87 81.51 81.21
Group 3 52.03 64.24 107.39 111.68 112.54
Group 4 76.37 64.71 142.71 145.53 146.13
Group 5 42.24 52.06 165.76 156.73 157.12
Average 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The data from the table indicates significant disparities between Sofia and the
rest of the municipalities based on all the presented indicators. In fact, Sofia occupies 5th
place in the ranking of municipalities based on the level of socio-economic development.
The difference between Sofia and the small, highly industrialized municipalities is
that the social and economic indicators for Sofia are relatively evenly distributed. In
contrast, some indicators for the small-industrialized municipalities have very high
values and others have very low values.
Such even distribution of the values of the socio-economic indicators is also
noted for the large municipalities in Group 2. The larger municipalities have values
lower than the average for the country as a result of the shut down of major industrial
enterprises and decreasing incomes. Such municipalities are Vidin, Pernik, Sliven,
Yambol, Pazardjik, etc.
1.2.4 Political Mechanisms and Political Representation
The main municipal bodies entitled by law to make governmental decisions are the
municipal council and the mayor. The municipal council is the representative body
for the local government that determines the policies for development of the munici-
pality, adopts the budget, and ensures the management of municipal property. The
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mayor performs executive functions. The mayor directly manages the municipal
administration as well as ensures the performance of the municipal budget and the
decisions of the municipal council.
The municipal council comprises of the elected municipal councilors. The Local
Government and Local Administration Act determines the number of municipal
councilors based on the population of the specific municipality. The number of muni-
cipal councilors varies from 11 to 61 people. The procedure for electing municipal
councilors is determined by the Local Elections Act. Municipal councilors are elected
on the basis of proportionate representation. The registered political parties, or coalitions,
register their candidates on independent lists. These are blocked lists, they cannot be
changed during the vote. Independent candidates not linked with any party may also
participate. A committee, comprising of a certain minimum number of voters that have
signed the nomination petition, submits their nomination. The distribution of the
positions depends on the votes and is based on the d’Hondt method. The mandate
of the municipal council is 4 years.
The local elections held at the end of 1999, elected 262 municipal councils
with 5,249 municipal councilors. Men prevailed among the municipal councilor
seat takers (79.1%).
The mayor of the municipality and the mayor of mayoralty, for settlements with
population over 500 people, are elected directly by the population of the municipality
for a 4-year mandate. This procedure is outlined in the Local Elections Act. The
elections for mayor take place in two rounds, based on the majority system. The leader-
ship of political parties and coalitions propose the candidates for mayors. Independent
candidates can also run for mayor. The candidate who gains the absolute majority
of votes in the first round, becomes mayor. A second round is organized if none of
the candidates has been elected. The second round takes place a week after the first
round and only the first two candidates may participate. The candidate who gains
the most votes becomes mayor.
The mayor nominates and the municipal council elects, in a secret election, one
or more deputy mayors for the municipality. The municipal council is based on the
nomination of the mayor elect, by the secret vote of the mayors’ representatives.
The mayor’s representatives are elected by the municipal council to represent the
mayor in settlements with populations below 500 people. Legislation says that the
powers of the mayor’s representatives should be determined by the Regulations for
the operation of the municipal council and the municipal administration, adopted
by the municipal council.
In the local elections that took place at the end of 1999, 262 municipal mayors
and 1,696 mayors of mayoralties were elected. Over 40 political parties and coalitions
participated in the elections and over 20 of them are represented through the elected
mayors and municipal councilors. The independent municipal councilors nominated
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by committees form about 4% of the total number of municipal councilors. Over
15% of the elected mayors, were independent candidates.
The election rules in the country are valid for all municipalities, regardless of
size. The only exceptions to this rule are the numerous mandates within the municipal
councils, depending on the population size of the municipalities.
Role of the Political Parties
Political parties can participate directly or indirectly in the political life of the munici-
palities. The direct participation of political parties occurs during the election process,
in which the political parties form election lists and perform election campaigns.
The indirect participation of political parties in the municipal policy is enacted through:
the municipal councilors; groups of municipal councilors united on party principles;
the chairperson of the municipal council (who is usually the representative of the party
with most members in the municipal council); the statutory committees in the
municipal council (if the party has a majority in them); the mayor of the municipality
(if he/she has been nominated by a certain political party). The participation of
political parties is more active in large and medium size municipalities.
The relationship between the mayor and the local leaders of political parties is
mainly connected with the executive activities. Problems may occur when the mayor
belongs to one political party and the majority of municipal councilors come from
another party. Legal prerequisites exist that state the mayor should resign when 2/
3 of the municipal councilors vote against him. The law forbids the mayor, the deputy
mayors and the mayor’s representatives to participate in the leadership of political
parties and/or to participate in any commercial activities.
1.2.5 Allocation of Functions Among Tiers of Administration.
Reforms Affecting Allocation of Functions.
Inter-Municipal Disparities in the Scope of Local Services
The public sector in Bulgaria consists of three government tiers: central, regional and
local. The regional level comprises of 28 administrative diluted units of the central
government that do not provide public services. Their main responsibilities consist of
managing state property in the respective region, coordination of regional units of the
line ministries, preparation and execution of the National Plan for Regional Develop-
ment, etc.  They do not have revenue raising authority, nor their own budget. So,
in terms of service provision responsibilities, they cannot be included into the study.
Public services are organized in nine major functions, each of them containing a
number of activities. The central and the local governments provide services in each of
these functions, as the ratio of their shares in the consolidated public expenditures varies
for the different functions. Local governments spent around 18% of total public expen-
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ditures (i.e. 70–55% of the public expenditures) in education for years 1990–2000,
75–42% in health, 5–8% or above in social assistance, 40–65% in housing, etc.
The main public services have three functional features:
1) Prevailing state services—administration, defense, public order and security,
social insurance and social care, economic activities, etc.
2) Prevailing municipal services—housing and public utilities.
3) Mixed services—education, health and culture.
Serious changes in the amount, and the share of, municipal expenditures have been
documented in two functions—education and health. In the first half of the 90s, the
municipalities financed about 70% of the educational expenditures. In the recent
years, this share dropped to 55–57%. The change was caused by the fact that the
expenditures for the secondary professional schools and the schools for disabled
children began to be financed by the state.
There is a similar trend in health care. The reason in this case was the gradual
introduction of the health insurance system, which begun in 1999. By the end of
the health care system reforms in 2003, municipal expenditures are expected to be
about 15% of total public expenditures.
The state and the municipalities share the expenditures for cultural affairs and
the municipalities have a relative level of independence in decision-making.
The municipalities presently perform 56 main types of activities through which
they provide local services for each of the nine function areas. There is no municipality
engaged in all 56 of the activities. Table 4.10 presents the number of activities provided
by the various municipality groups.
Table 4.10
Number of Local Services Provided Based on the Size of Municipalities
Municipality Municipalities Services Share from
Groups [Number] [Number] All Services [%]
Group 1 1 48 85.71
Group 2 20 34 61.07
Group 3 39 25 44.60
Group 4 110 18 32.81
Group 5 92 13 23.80
Average 262 19 33.76
Total 262 56 100.00
 The greatest number of public services—48—is provided in Sofia. This number
decreases with each group, extending down to a total of 13 services for the munici-
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palities with populations below 10,000 people. Two factors most influence the number
and scope of local services:
• The territorial distribution of public institutions with regional importance—
schools, boarding houses, hospitals, etc.
• The specific features of the various types of municipalities and the specifics
of their population—urban/rural, daily flow of passengers, main business, etc.
1.2.6 Financial Resource Structure
The main sections of revenue going to municipal budgets are:
A) Intergovernmental Transfers
These are formed by two main sources—subsidies and shared taxes. Table 4.11 presents
the role of these sources in the formation of local budget revenues.
Table 4.11
Share of Intergovernmental Transfers within the Local Budget Revenues [%]
(Total Revenues=100%)
Revenue items 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1. Total intergovernmental transfers 78.80 90.32 82.83 76.79 79.03
of which: Subsidies (net) 32.75 34.79 36.61 35.92 40.66
Shared taxes 46.05 55.52 46.22 40.87 38.37
The intergovernmental subsidies are general purpose and target subsidies. In recent
years, they increased the share of the extraordinary subsidies allocated during the fiscal
year. Most of these subsidies are accounted for as general purpose subsidies but, in
practice, they are granted with detailed guidelines for utilization.
The municipalities receive part of their revenue from state (shared) taxes. The most
important shared taxes are:
• the personal incomes tax (PIT), the revenue from this tax is allocated 50%
for the local budgets and 50% for the central budget, and
• the corporate incomes tax (CIT), municipalities receive 10% of the taxable
profit generated by companies.
B) Local Revenues
These are gathered from three main sources: local taxes, local fees and other local revenues
(such as local activities—rents, sales, sanctions, interests, confiscation, leftovers, etc.).
Table 4.12 presents the structure of these local revenues.
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Table 4.12
Structure of Local Revenues [%]
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total local revenues 19.27 9.36 15.86 18.19 17.47
Local taxes 5.36 2.03 4.95 4.43 4.40
Local fees 4.85 3.16 6.21 6.13 6.69
Other local revenues 9.07 4.16 4.70 7.63 6.38
Since the 1998 local tax reforms, the share of local tax revenues has been decreasing
(the municipalities have no power to determine their share); the share of local fees has
slightly increased (the municipalities have limited powers to determine their share);
the share of the rest local own revenues (in which the municipalities have full power
to influence) has increased significantly.
C) Borrowed Funds
These are revenues from the issue of municipal bonds, loans from financial institutions,
interest-free loans from the central budget, loans between the municipalities and
loans from off-budget funds. Yet, they are not a significant source of revenues to the
local budgets. In 2000, their share was 3.5%. In practice, 81% from the borrowed
funds are used by Sofia and another 17% by the large municipalities in Group 2.
The distribution of local revenues by municipality groups in 2000, based on
their size is presented in Table 4.13.
The data indicates:
• A U-form curve for distribution of all revenues per capita: with a significant
disparity between the per capita revenues for Sofia and the rest municipalities;
medium size municipalities having the lowest per capita revenues; and per
capita revenue in the smaller municipalities higher in comparison to the
larger municipalities;
• The levels of shared taxes, local revenues and borrowed funds decline with
the size of municipalities;
• The intergovernmental subsidies increase when the size of municipalities
decreases.
The data indicates that the high level of revenues in Sofia is mostly due to shared
taxes. The small municipalities are ahead of the large municipalities in terms of
revenues per capita, due to the large amounts of intergovernmental subsidies.
It is normal for small municipalities to receive more intergovernmental subsidies
per capita. They must compensate for the shortage of funds caused by low fiscal
potential and relatively low amounts of municipal property. However, the sky-rocketing
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amount of total budget revenues per capita indicated for the municipalities from
group 5, in comparison to the municipalities from groups 2–4, has no logical explanation.
The municipalities from group 5, surely, finance fewer services compared to the other
municipalities. The elevated amount of their necessary revenues could be due to: relatively
higher municipal administrative expenditures compared to the large municipalities;
services in these municipalities that are not so concentrated in the central settlement,
used by less consumers, which makes them more expensive (calculated per capita);
the unit costs for service production are higher—additional transport costs are needed,
they have poor technical equipment, etc.
Table 4.13
Structure of Municipal Revenues in Municipality Groups for 2000 [%]
(Average for the Country=100)
Groups Total Revenues Shared Taxes Subsidies Local Own Borrowed
Revenues Funds
Group 1 140.18 224.22 18.63 161.45 524.37
Group 2 93.93 95.36 88.60 112.34 48.25
Group 3 86.90 62.04 122.18 76.06 3.98
Group 4 91.58 71.75 127.30 70.40 6.03
Group 5 107.40 50.84 185.01 69.22 0.36
Average 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE AND THE FUNCTION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY
2.1 Local Government Size and Citizens’ Satisfaction.
Citizen Participation
2.1.1 Citizen Participation
Citizens are able to resolve issues relating to the activity of the municipality and the
public services it provides, but only within the competencies given to the municipa-
lities. What is the scope of local competencies? According to one study8 , all municipal
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activity is divided in three groups based on the decision-making power of the local
authorities—limited, shared, and full powers. “The data indicates that the municipa-
lities actually manage slightly over 19% of their budget expenditures, as most of them
(95%) are for current expenditures.  It is alarming that the municipalities have little
influence on labor expenditures, although they occupy over 45% of the total budgetary
expenditures.”
The results from another study9  say “Our conservative methodology has reached
the conclusion that the fiscal burden of the expenditures for the mandatory services,
as assigned by the central government to the municipalities, amounts to approximately
60–70% of total municipal expenditures”. The municipal powers of expenditure
management prevail only in the categories of public utilities, culture and economic
activities.
In the conditions of financial shortage the municipalities are forced to reduce
expenditures, which increases the relative share of the mandatory expenditures compared
to the expenditures, which the municipalities can influence.
The municipalities have even more limited powers to influence revenues. They
are free to influence the amount of the so-called “other local revenues” and, within
certain legal limits, revenues from fees and loans. This makes about 12–15% of all
revenues going toward the municipal budgets.
It is evident that legislation limits the local possibilities for taxing the population,
accumulating financial resources and making decisions on major issues related to
the provision of local services. The municipalities provide a certain set of municipal
services because they are obliged by law to do so and the citizens pay taxes and fees
because they are also obliged to do so. The population cannot trace the link between
the taxes that it pays to the municipality and the quality of services. Nor do the local
governments assist in resolving existing problems. All this remains an obstacle for
the creation of  links between citizens and local governments.
All these statements are supported by the results of a sociological survey10  conducted
in three municipalities—a small municipality (Boichinovtzi), a medium size municipality
(Berkovitza) and a large municipality (Montana). The citizens there are rather un-
interested in the workings of the local governments. They feel they are not, and are
actually not, informed of the sources of local revenues and the local activities. The
lack of interest and the unawareness increases with decreasing the size of municipality.
So, for example, 30.2% of the population within the large municipality declared
that they were not interested in the workings of the municipality. For the medium
size and the small municipalities, these percentages were respectively 40.9% and
44.8%. In the large municipality, 4.7% of the interviewed people have attended a
municipal council session. These percentages are, respectively, 2.6% and 0.9% in
the medium size and small municipality.
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Between 60% (large municipality) and 80% (small municipality) of the population
do not have any view about the question: “What strategy for local services would you
support if there were a shortage of financial resources?” The majority of the people
prefer the scope of services to be diminished and that payment should not be increased.
The population is also not aware of the scope of municipal powers. However, it
supports the opinion that the municipalities should have certain powers to set local
taxes and fees, although limited under the law. Populations from larger municipalities
are more likely to support increasing local powers in comparison to populations in
the small municipalities.
2.1.2 Citizen Satisfaction
Two categories of issues are analyzed:
• The work of the municipal administration and the municipal council; and
• The quality of local services provided. Four groups of services are reviewed—
technical,11 social, waste collection, and maintenance of infrastructure. The
quality of services provided and the fees paid are compared.
The work of the municipal administration is generally better regarded than the
work of the municipal council (the positive evaluations are 21.7% against 3% and
the negative evaluations—10.1% against 21.7%). The share of people who abstain
from evaluation is great (31.6% against 49.5%). Citizens from small municipalities
give relatively better marks for the work of municipal administration and the municipal
council. For example, the positive evaluations for the municipal administration in
the direction “big>small” municipality are respectively 13.2%, 23.5%, 29.8%.
It is common within the three municipalities that the people are satisfied with
the quality of the technical and social services provided and they are not satisfied
with the quality of sanitation.
The quality of technical services is better regarded in the small municipality.
The best evaluations are given for the services related to the issue and certification of
documents, and poorer evaluations are given to the services related to construction—
issue of construction permits and permits for trade. Only these services receive mostly
negative evaluations in the large municipality.
Child-related services—schools, nurseries, kindergartens and camps, receive the
highest evaluations among the social services. Social assistance and health care receive
the poorest evaluations. The citizens of the smaller municipalities give the highest
marks (average evaluations: 4.77—small municipality; 4.22—medium size munici-
pality; 4.03—large municipality).
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Evaluations of the situation of sanitation are extremely negative in all three muni-
cipalities. There are no significant differences among the municipalities.
The services related to street maintenance, street lighting, water supply and sewage
are evaluated in a different way by the certain municipalities. Evaluations of the streets
are negative in the three municipalities. However, the share of the dissatisfied drops
from 73% in the large municipality, to slightly over 50% in the smallest municipality.
No correlation between the size of the municipality and the quality of service is monitored
for the other two services. So, for example, the quality of street lighting in Montana
receives mainly positive evaluation. The street lighting in the other two municipalities
receives extremely negative evaluations and the citizens say that such services simply
doesn’t exist. The quality of water supply is positively evaluated in the largest and the
smallest municipalities, and negatively in Berkovitza, which possibly encounters
difficulties.
The rates of the fees are generally evaluated as normal, except for the solid waste
fee, which is considered high. The attitude towards the rates of the fees becomes more
negative with increasing size of the municipality.
The general conclusion is that the citizens of the small municipalities are more
satisfied with the local services.
2.2 Catchment Areas
Some important municipal services cannot be provided by all municipalities due to
a number of historical and economic reasons. Nevertheless, the citizens should have
equal access to them. Health care is a typical example of this. The health establishments
network consists of various types of hospitals and policlinics. Often times, the citizens
do not have any choice but to visit the regional hospitals because they are the only
providers of specific health services. In smaller municipalities (groups 4 and 5), one
can receive ordinary health services (regular check-ups, maternity consultations,
etc.). The regional hospitals provide more sophisticated services for a number of
reasons—equipment, qualified doctors, etc.
The municipalities continued to finance the pre-hospital and hospital medical
assistance, despite the progress of the health reforms of 2000. The territorial distribution
of the hospital network and its staff also determines the concentration of health
services. Table 4.14 presents data for three types of health care institutions providing
health services—regional hospitals, municipal hospitals and social care nurseries,
for all municipalities in 2000.
Great disparities exist in the share of health expenditures within total budget
expenditures—8.4% for the smallest municipalities and 30.5% for the big cities.
The disparities in terms of health expenditures per capita are even greater.
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The per capita expenditures for the regional hospitals providing unique services
amounts to BGN 33 in the big cities. Part of these funds are spent for servicing
neighboring municipalities from groups 4 and 5, which actually do not make these
expenditures for their population.
The situation with the municipal hospitals is similar. The group 3 and 4 munici-
palities pay 3–4 times more per capita than the smallest municipalities, and they
also service their population.
Social care nurseries are concentrated in the large cities and the smaller municipa-
lities, again, do not pay anything for the use of their services.
The Local Government and Local Administration Act has envisaged mechanisms
for the horizontal cooperation of municipalities in the provision of certain services
and correct distribution of the expenditures. In practice, there are no such examples
except for some capital improvement projects of regional importance. The main
reason is related to the intergovernmental transfers system, which forms a major
part of the budget revenues for the small municipalities. The general subsidies from
the central government, by design, create several disincentives for better use of the
funds—if one or more local governments achieve better results in terms of cost
savings the subsidy will be reduced in the next year, by the amount of these savings.
We need to add here, that the severe budget problems in the municipal sector, as a
factor in general, did not contribute to horizontal cooperation.
There are many examples when specific groups of patients are transferred to
neighboring municipalities due to break down of specific medical equipment. The
compensation to the affected municipalities is directed towards the central budget
to correct relations with the municipalities (subsidy/contribution).
The methodology for setting the annual intergovernmental transfers contains
an element, which allocates funds to the municipalities in the form of objective
criteria, as each of them has definite weight. All of the three types of health institutions
should bring more funds to the municipalities, in whose territories they are located.
The main problem to this approach is the residual approach12  for determining the
subsidies. Another problem is the inability to react to changes in the provision of
the service during the fiscal year. In the best case scenario, the affected municipality
may expect to receive part of the funds no earlier than the next fiscal year.
There are some examples of joint actions amongst municipalities for optimization
of the expenditures and increasing service quality. For several years the municipalities
worked under the guidance of the Ministry of Environment and Waters for the
joint construction and made use of 14 regional solid waste landfills. With this
approach, the municipalities using one regional modern landfill, received 100% of
the capital construction costs and shared the operational maintenance costs on the
basis of objective indicators, like amount of waste deposited, number of citizens,
etc. This policy stimulates the local governments to reduce capital costs for the
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Table 4.14
Municipal Expenditures for Major Health Services
Total Health Share of Health Expenditures Expen- Expenditures Expen- Expenditures Expen-
Expenditures Expenditures Health Expen- for Regional ditures for Municipal ditures for Social Care ditures
[BGN] [BGN] Expendi- ditures Hospitals for Hospitals for Nurseries for Social
tures per [BGN] Regional [BGN] Municipal [BGN] Care
in Total Capita Hospitals Hospitals Nurseries
Expen- [BGN] per Capita per Capita per Capita
ditures [BGN] [BGN] [BGN]
2,005,805,394 413,861,239 20.6% 48 141,180,935 17 76,165,742 9 14,055,473 2
Group 1 432,057,881 61,267,239 14.2% 46 21,109,321 16 2,136,391 2 1,079,402 1
Group 2 665,421,711 202,973,788 30.5% 67 99,438,003 33 9 ,384,553 3 11,111,513 4
Group 3 352,539,372 79,988,489 22.7% 46 18,329,730 11 34,145,570 20 1,576,367 1
Group 4 412,866,504 57,611,737 14.0% 30 2,303,881 1 27,845,033 15 95,804 0
Group 5 142,919,926 12,019,986 8.4% 21 0 0 2,654,195 5 192,387 0
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landfills and allocate more resources for improving the services within the city limits.
They have a real interest in applying full-cost recovery with the solid waste fee and
being more accountable to the taxpayers.
2.3 Relationship Between the Municipal Center
and Individual Villages
On average, Bulgarian municipalities comprise of 20 settlements. The inter-municipal
disparities vary from 134 settlements (Gabrovo municipality) to only 1 settlement
(10 municipalities).
The municipal councilors are elected on the basis of the proportionate system.
There are no electoral districts within the municipality that guarantee the representation
of the certain settlements. This means that the representation of the certain settle-
ments is not guaranteed by the local legislative assembly. For example, Razgrad
municipality has a population of 71,000 people and 19 settlements—the city of Razgrad,
the municipal center, and 18 villages. The municipal council of Razgrad municipality
has 33 members—30 from the city of Razgrad and 3 from the villages. The population
of the city of Razgrad constitutes 68% from the total population of the municipality,
while its councilors total 91% of all municipal councilors. The other 3 councilors
are from three, relatively large, villages within the territory of the municipality.
Mayors of the mayoralties are elected directly in the settlements with populations
over 500 people. The municipal council then elects mayor’s representatives for
small settlements with populations below 500 people. These people are directly
responsible for coordination with the municipal center.
The functions that the mayoralties perform, and their financial resources, are not
clearly regulated by law. These issues are resolved by the municipal council, which
means that different municipalities have different practices. However, observation confirms
that the country’s municipalities have very centralized structures. The municipality
has a clearly outlined periphery (usually villages), whose problems are underestimated.
If the example with Razgrad municipality is considered again—the municipal council
makes all decisions concerning investment. The mayoralties have limited financial
resources for operating needs. For example, 97% of the total municipal budget
(13,131 thousand BGN for 2001) are managed centrally and go to the municipal
center, while only 3% are allocated to mayoralties. The limited responsibilities and
financial resources of the mayoralties cause certain pressures.
Some good practices are used for improving the interaction. For example, certain
sessions of the municipal council and its committees can be conducted outside the
municipal center. On specific days, the municipal administration may work in settle-
ments outside the municipal center, etc. Nevertheless, there are certain problems
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that can only be resolved by changing the Electoral system, i.e. the majority election
of municipal councilors engaged with a certain election districts.
Legislation also envisaged another opportunity for ensuring better service to the
population—the opening of municipal administration units, not only in certain
settlements but also, in their neighborhoods. Due to the lack of funds and the extreme
reduction in the number of municipal administrations, the municipalities do not
implement this opportunity. The reduction of municipal administration staff is a
result of requirements imposed by the central government.
The “municipality-mayoralty” relations were partially subject to two surveys of
municipal decision-makers13  (mayors and deputy mayors). The first survey was conducted
in September 1997, immediately after the adoption of the two major laws regulating
local finance—the Local Budgets Act and the Local Taxes and Fees Act. The second
survey was conducted after the enforcement of these two laws in the period of May–
June 1998. Both of these surveys covered 25 municipalities. The main results are
presented below.
Most of those interviewed (72%) shared the opinion that the mayoralties should
not be separated into independent municipalities and 20% stated that this was
appropriate only in some cases. About 52% of those interviewed stated that the
separation of the mayoralties, into independent municipalities, would contribute
to the more successful resolution of local problems, and 28% thought that this
would increase financial and administrative independence. About 16% of the inter-
viewees didn’t see any advantages in separation. The main disadvantages to this
were lack of staff (84%) and the unnecessary expansion of the local administration
(68%). Only 20% of interviewees stated that it was necessary to give more power to
the mayoralties and 68% stated that the mayoralties should be given more power
only in some particular spheres. About 32% of those interviewed agreed that the
mayoralties should be provided with more power in the administration of the revenue,
and 64% stated that the mayoralties should be given more rights in the administration
of expenditures. Many of the interviewees gave more than one answer, with 24%
agreeing that the mayoralties should be given more power for management of the
municipal property located in its territory.
It is obvious that the majority of local authorities have a negative attitude towards
the subdivision of the municipalities, but at least a relatively big number of them
are willing to give greater competencies to the mayoralties in some spheres although.
The second survey indicates that the opinion of the interviewees, towards
separating the mayoralties in independent municipalities, has not changed and has,
in fact, become even more conservative in some aspects. For example, 52% of those
interviewed in the second survey didn’t see any advantages in this (16% in the first
survey). About 76% of the interviewees stated that this would increase administration,
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and 32% gave a new answer—this would impede the relationship between the
municipalities and the central authorities. The share of those who didn’t wish to
give more power to the mayoralties increased from 12% to 28%. The other 72% of
interviewees admitted the granting of more powers, again emphasizing that these
power should concern the management of municipal properties.
It is evident that the number of local government representatives, who are not
likely to support the idea of fragmentation of municipalities, is growing. The number
of those, likely to give more competencies to the mayoralties, is also significantly
lower. This means that the tense conditions between the municipal center and the
periphery are deteriorating. The process of fragmentation in Bulgarian municipalities
is limited only by its complicated procedures and the minimal legal requirements
for settlements separation into separate municipalities.
In the last five years, seven new municipalities have formed via separation of settlements.
What do these settlements gain or lose? Table 4.15 presents the main parameters of
their budget performance for 2000. The following conclusions can be drawn:
• The fragmentation process covers mainly small municipalities;
• All mother municipalities have a level of socio-economic development below
average, and unemployment rates above the average, for the country (except
Rhodopi municipality). Newly established municipalities have parameters,
lower than those of the mother-municipalities. The only exception is Pri-
morsko municipality;
• The mother municipalities have lower revenues per capita than the newly
established municipalities. The main reason for this is that the newly established
municipalities receive significantly higher intergovernmental subsidies. The
latter have lower tax potential and accumulate lower local revenues per capita.
The only exception is Primorsko municipality, which is in a relatively better
financial situation than the mother municipality.
Thus, the socio-economic conditions, in the newly established municipalities
and their influence on the revenue raising capacity, are worse compared to the mother-
municipalities. However, this is compensated by a number of advantages, the most
important of which are:
• Elimination of the dependence on former municipal centers. The newly
established municipalities constitute an independent municipal council and
decide independently (within their legislative powers) upon their local problems;
• Increase of financial resources, which are no longer centralized in the former
municipal center. The newly established municipalities receive relatively higher
intergovernmental subsidies;
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 Table 4.15
Major Indicators for the Mother Municipalities (in gray) and the Settlements,
Which  Have Separated From Them and Formed New Municipalities
Code Municipalities Groups Integral Rank Unemp- Budgetary Revenues per Capita
Indicator loyment
for Socio- Rate Total Shared Sub- Local
Economic 31 Dec. Taxes sidies Reve-
Situation 2000 nues
5213 Tzarevo 5 28.01 81 25.61 340.94 61.15 140.41 131.57
5208 Primorsko 5 41.33 16 14.43 598.34 132.36 249.75 210.04
6612 Rhodopi 3 29.72 67 13.82 183.88 70.35 79.49 28.51
6605 Krichim 5 22.86 133 30.29 241.81 40.30 147.41 35.83
6608 Perustitza 5 20.83 166 31.71 374.61 39.87 259.10 57.45
6614 Stamboliyski 4 24.61 104 25.72 207.30 44.97 109.49 36.50
7318 Samokov 3 24.59 106 22.70 190.58 41.71 104.34 28.28
7306 Dolna Banya 5 18.65 210 29.86 186.18 12.20 132.36 21.45
7405 Maglizh 4 20.34 175 26.76 192.02 29.12 127.14 25.31
7402 Gurkovo 5 17.75 229 29.42 230.90 24.85 176.60 15.00
7406 Nikolaevo 5 15.32 252 30.94 248.40 13.36 206.64 12.70
Average- Bulgaria 31.34 47 17.86 236.57 90.77 87.30 41.32
As a result, the population in the newly established municipality begins to
receive relatively more public services, more investment in local infrastructure, etc.
It is important to point out that local leaders receive greater opportunities to
contribute and the constitution of the municipal administration offers new job
opportunities.
2.4 The Impact of Size on Unit Costs of Service Delivery
The present section reviews the features of provision of a selection of typical municipal
services based on the size of the municipalities. The analysis is based on standard
financial and non-financial data reported for 2000, which all municipalities are
obliged to provide.14
The most straightforward, and easily interpreted, analysis on the impact of size
on unit costs may be constructed on administrative services (Table 4.16).
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Table 4.16
Expenditures for Municipal Administration
Expenditures for Share of Expenditures Expenditures for
Administration for Administration Administration
[BGN] in Total Expenditures [%] per Capita [BGN]
Total 153,010,895 7.6 17.9
Group 1 14,728,675 3.4 11.1
Group 2 38,459,778 5.8 12.8
Group 3 28,918,379 8.2 16.8
Group 4 47,723,351 11.6 24.9
Group 5 23,180,712 16.2 40.5
The table diagrams the municipal expenditures for administration, both executive
(mayor’s office) and for the city council. The share of these expenditures within the
total municipal budget increases as the size of the local government decreases. There
are mandated management functions that every local government must perform.
So, in terms of budget effort, the smaller local governments pay more to share the
resources available. This is partially due to the fact mentioned earlier that smaller
local governments provide a smaller number of essential services and the composition
of the municipal function area is different and size-sensitive. A similar pattern can
be seen in the expenditures for administration per capita. Groups 4 and 5 spend
more funds per inhabitant for the provision of similar services.
In the case of other services, interpretation of the data is much more difficult. The
first reason is that not all municipalities provide all functions. For example, 10
municipalities do not provide sanitation services and nurseries are provided by barely
over half (131) the municipalities. Secondly, real expenditures are often more dependent
on the financial capacities of the local government than on unit costs differences. In
the case of kindergartens, Sofia has above-average/per child spending, but it also provides
more services to the children attending. On the other hand, the smallest municipalities
group also has above-average/per child expenditures, but the main reason for this is the
low number of children served (per institution) and the relatively constant operational
costs of the institution.
In the case of secondary education expenditures/per student in Sofia, these are again
above the national average. However, to interpret this fact, one needs to remember
that Sofia is the only municipality which does not have arrears in payments. For
example, it may turn out that the expenditures accounted in Sofia include salaries
for 12 months, while in some other municipalities—it is for 11 months or even
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less. Yet again, expenditures in the smallest municipalities are also above the national
average, but this is due to the greater transport expenses for teachers and is necessary
to ensure normal education process.
The per capita spending in big cities is also higher in the case of waste collection.
The city of Sofia spends 5.5 times more funds per capita on waste collection than
the smallest municipalities and 2.5 times more than the average for the whole country.
This difference results from the combination of following factors: higher costs of waste
transportation in big cities, wider scope of services provided (for example snow removal)
and the quality of these services.
Available data does not allow precise measurement of the role of individual factors
neither allow us to determine the real relationship between the size and unit cost using
an assumption of the same scope and the quality of services. That is why we need to
limit our firm conclusions in this section to basic administrative services.
2.5 Local Economic Development and Investment Policy
2.5.1 Local Economic Development
The Local Government and Local Administration Act does not contain explicit
regulations for the municipal responsibilities regarding the local economic deve-
lopment. On the other hand, the municipalities are directly engaged in the provision
of public utility services: water works, sewage, electrification, district heating, telephone
service, maintenance of streets, squares, parks, gardens, correction of river beds, solid
waste management, public transport, operation of municipal baths, laundries, hotels,
garages and cemeteries (Article 11, point 6).
The National Regional Development Plan of Bulgaria was drafted in 2000. Every
municipality participates in this plan, each with certain priority development areas
that do not always coincide with the services listed above. The main disadvantage of
the regional plan is that it is not supported with enough resources. Practice indicates
that the municipality is a natural center and an active participant in initiatives promoting
economic development, particularly in areas of local importance.
The transformation of property in the last decade created a significant amount
of municipal property mainly by separating it from the state property. The newly
acquired property became a major instrument for the municipalities for influencing
the local economic environment. There are three major ways for using the property
to stimulate economic activity:
• Privatization;
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• Right to construction on municipal land;
• Management of municipal property.
The total revenue from property form slightly over 3% of the total budget revenues
for the municipalities. This percentage varies from 3.5% in the smallest municipalities
to 5% for Sofia. The small share of these revenues is mainly due to the fact that the
municipalities are not able to finance investments with these revenues. Due to the
lack of balance in the local budgets during the recent years, all budgetary revenues
are used for financing current expenditures. This is a reason for decapitalization of
municipal assets.
The revenues from concessions are insignificant—below BGN 1 million. In 1999,
the state deprived municipalities of the right to concession of the waste collection
and transportation, as well as activities such as gas supply. For activities like water
works and sewage, the municipalities do not own the companies providing the
service and, thus, the powers for giving concession cannot be used.
Table 4.17
Revenues from Municipal Property in 2000
Total Revenues Share Sales Share Concessions Share
Revenues from  from from from
Property the the the
Total Total Total
Reve- Reve- Reve-
nues nues nues
[%] [%] [%]
Total 2,021,567,382 62,026,148 3.1 22,936,760 1.1 948,457 0.0
Group 1 438,768,511 16,983,911 3.9 4,043,915 0.9
Group 2 667,448,676 21,819,823 3.3 8,090,104 1.2 237,698 0.0
Group 3 354,782,380 11,071,943 3.1 3,978,459 1.1 165,375 0.0
Group 4 416,506,013 9,251,620 2.2 4,726,426 1.1 422,550 0.1
Group 5 144,061,802 2,898,851 2.0 2,097,856 1.5 122,834 0.1
2.5.2 Investment Policy
Municipalities investment possibilities are restricted by law and their financial
capacity has declined in the last 3–4 years. The annual state budget acts to limit
the investment expenditures with which the municipalities can make their own
revenues (up to 10% for 1998 and 1999, and up to 5% in 2000). The legal environ-
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ment does not allow the implementation of successful bond issues. Commercial
banks are unwilling to provide long-term financing to municipalities, due to their
deteriorated financial state, the uncertain macroeconomic framework, and the
impossibility to apply traditional bank instruments to the specifics of public finance.
Thus, the privatization revenues and the target subsidies for capital investment
become major sources for financing municipal investments. Table 4.18 presents
data for the budgetary capital expenditures for all municipalities in 2000 and the
subsequent target subsidies.
Table 4.18
Local Budgetary Capital Expenditures and Target Subsidies
for Capital Investment
Total Capital Share of Own Capital Target Share of
Expenditures Expenditures Capital Capital Expendi- Subsidy Capital
[BGN] [BGN] Expendi- Expendi- tures per for Capital Expendi-
tures in tures per Capita Investment tures
the Total Capita [BGN] [BGN] Financed
Expendi- [BGN] with
tures Target
[%] Subsidy
[%]
Total 2,005,805,394 157,956,805 7.90 9.9 18.5 73,184,092 46.33
Group 1 432,057,881 87,268,774 20.20 53.8 66 16,037,060 18.38
Group 2 665,421,711 23,136,071 3.50 2.0 7.7 17,042,248 73.66
Group 3 352,539,372 15,406,082 4.40 0.8 8.9 14,064,816 91.29
Group 4 412,866,504 22,382,015 5.40 2.7 11.7 17,176,521 76.74
Group 5 142,919,926 9,763,863 6.80 1.6 17.1 8,863,447 90.78
The municipalities allocated almost 8% of their budgets to capital investment.
For Sofia, this share was over 20%. The capital expenditures mainly include
rehabilitation and purchase of assets. The finance of capital investment is particularly
low in the big cities, which allocate 3.5% of their expenditures for capital investment.
This is over two times lower than the country’s average. This is rather alarming
because these municipalities hold over 35% of the population and concentrate
mostly on urban infrastructure. Other analyses points out that most of the municipal
financial problems are concentrated in this types of municipalities.
The smallest municipalities spend twice as much on investment per capita than
the municipalities from group 2, but their investment is financed primarily with target
subsidies from the central government—91%. Capital investment within medium
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size municipalities from group 3 is financed in the same way. At least Sofia relies on
target subsidies from the central budget—slightly over 18%.
The study clearly shows the link between the economic and financial potential
of the municipalities, and their ability to invest. Sofia is the only city which issued
euro bonds, to use as the main source of investment funds. The potential for
municipalities to have their own investment, without relying on target subsidies,
clearly distinguishes two groups of local governments—Sofia and all of the others.
Municipalities from groups 2 and 3 take most of the financial burden of the reforms
and, as an obvious result, their investment capabilities are close to zero. Most of the
large and medium size cities mostly rely on privatization proceeds to fund their
investment programs. The current financial strain makes the importance of the
budget investment funds insignificant. Small cities only spend on investment
resources that which they receive from the central government.
2.6 Inter-Governmental Relations—Does Number and Size
of Local Governments Influence the Nature and Efficiency of
Negotiations with Central Institutions?
The municipal structures have a positive influence on the negotiations between the
central government and the local governments. The Bulgarian municipalities are relatively
large and have the relevant internal potential for effective development and provision
of public services. On the other hand, there exist institutionally strong organizations
within the local governments. These are the National Association of Municipalities
in the Republic of Bulgaria (NAMRB), 10 regional associations of municipalities,
professional associations of municipal officials—legal experts, financial experts, chief
architects, secretaries, environmental experts, etc.
The legal possibility for administrative and territorial changes did not produce
significant fragmentation of municipalities. The size of local governments favors effective
interaction with central government institutions, as well as the performance of the reforms
for particular areas. The intensity of certain problems, mainly related to the financial
link between revenue and expenditure responsibilities, additionally motivates the
local governments to unite in their efforts to speed up reforms.
On national level, the dialogue between the central government and the local govern-
ments is carried out between NAMRB and the relevant executive and legislative bodies.
NAMRB, originally founded by 1/3 of Bulgarian municipalities, now unites all
municipalities in the country and enables them to have a stronger “voice” in their
negotiations with the central government.
Regional associations of municipalities are successfully used for considering the
specifics of each municipality, from the views of different parts of the country. These
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associations are established on a geographical principle—municipalities from the
Danube region, from the Black Sea region, the Rhodopi mountain region, the Stara
Planina mountain region, etc. The capacity of the municipal employees’ professional
associations is used in the preparation of important municipal proposals. The
program that forms general NAMRB positions, guarantees that this position should
only include proposals reached with consensus. Thus, the initial stage of discussions
includes a variety of ideas, while the final stage of discussions is limited to summary
proposals supported by all municipalities.
The specific interests of the different municipalities by size are ensured through
the representation mechanisms. All executive and working bodies of NAMRB are
formed based on the equal representation of large, medium and small municipalities,
and the relevant geographical and political representation. Thus, the Executive Board
of NAMRB (which is elected by the General Assembly) has 28% representatives
from small municipalities, 33% representatives from medium size municipalities
and 33% representatives from large municipalities. The mayor of Sofia’s municipality
is also a member of the Executive Board of NAMRB.
Coinciding principles are followed in the drafting of all key proposals.
Presently, the specialized committees of NAMRB are the main standing forums
for reaching agreement on different interests. Better mechanisms for considering
the specifics of the small municipalities are still sought. The relative share of
population living in these municipalities is very small—1% in municipalities with
populations below 5,000 people, and 7% in municipalities with populations below
10,000 people. Nevertheless, these municipalities are 38% of all municipalities in
the country. The main problems with these municipalities, as discussed in the
negotiations, concern their capacity rather than the specifics of their powers.
The eventual fragmentation of municipalities may impede the conduct of
negotiations in the following directions:
• Finding acceptable solutions for some of the very smallest size municipalities;
• Delay in coordination among municipalities for formulation of common
positions;
• Use of the municipal fragmentation for political purposes;
• Winning or losing influence among the political parties in power;
• Threats of new centralization due to the rationalization that the municipalities
have insufficient capacity;
No tendency for increasing the number of municipalities is observed. The
municipalities started to develop good and motivated positions in their on-going
negotiations with the central government.
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL DEBATES
ON THE SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
In Bulgaria, two public political debates regarding the size of local government have
commenced in the past ten years.
The first political debate began in 1990–1991, when the Constitution and the
Local Government and Local Administration Act were drafted. This debate continued,
with several interruptions, until 1995. It includes two significant steps. The first
step was made after the democratic changes by the first National Assembly with the
participation of some of its statutory committees, many members of parliament, members
of government, experts and academia. The discussions concerned the size of the
administrative and territorial organization of the country—tiers; types of administrative
and territorial units; number; optimal size; mayors’ basis powers, functions and
responsibilities; election of the executive bodies, and other specific parameters. The
debate aimed to visualize and define a concrete position regarding the development
of local government. Further to this, several options for territorial organization were
reviewed, including three government tiers—oblast, okolia, and municipality.
The discussions of the regions aimed at their fragmentation, which contradicted
the vision for a three-tier organization. That is why political consensus for preserving
the existent 9 regions and their territories was so quickly reached. Thus, no debate
on the regions was held. Various division options were discussed for the other two
tiers. Despite the compromise, which was reached with difficulty, the passing of
the Constitution and the Local Government and Local Administration Act did not
include the concrete establishment of the okolia15 . So, for example, the Constitution
approved two main administrative and territorial units: oblast (region) and municipality,
but it assumed the possibility that “other administrative and territorial self-government
units in them can be established within the law.” The Local Government and Local
Administration Act regulate the structure and the operation of the municipalities
and the regions. The country’s administrative and territorial division had to be enacted
through a separate law. No administrative changes have been made in the recent
years because the procedure is very complicated and contains many limitations.
The second step in the public debate for development of the country’s administrative
and territorial organization was made in the period between 1994–95, when the
administrative reforms began. This step aimed at resolving several important issues
related to development of the country’s administrative division and the further im-
provement of local government regarding:
• Government tiers and major administrative units;
• Territorial division of the large cities;
• Procedures for establishing, transforming and shutting down administrative
units;
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• Spheres of activity and competency within particular administrative and
territorial units;
As a result of the debate:
• Consensus was reached to eliminate the legal possibility of establishing
intermediate tiers between the oblast and the municipality—okolia. The
primary reason for this was the small size of the country and a willingness to
preserve the size of the existing municipalities;
• The adoption of the Act on Administrative and Territorial Division of the
Republic of Bulgaria created a legislative basis for the establishment of ad-
ministrative and territorial units, considering it the will of the people. Agreement
was reached for preserving the present status, number, scope and territorial
coverage of the existent territorial structures. The performance of concrete
administrative and territorial changes was based on “equal start” and uniform
legal provisions for the creation of, and changes in, a particular territorial
unit; and clear technological procedures for performance of necessary activities
and democratic rules for participation of the population;
• Explicit conditions for creation of new municipalities were introduced, which
strengthened the model of strong and stable units. Procedures for relatively
limited changes in the size, coverage, and number of municipalities was
created. Thus, 8 new municipalities have been created in the last six years.
The need for legal and organizational measures led to the introduction of
concrete principles and criteria in defining the conditions, procedures, and
mechanisms for making changes, drafting of alternatives, discussing and
evaluating these alternatives and selection of acceptable solutions. Opposition
to concrete legal proposals and working assumptions came from various
directions. The main opponents were specific central administration units,
certain local elected representatives and citizen groups. Restricting the right
of free choice, by raising the requirements for creation of new municipalities,
was confronted with the argument that lower limits would assist individuals
purely with leadership ambitions or ambitions caused by personal conflicts
at the local level. The objections concerned the lower limit, minimum number
of population for establishment of municipality, as well as the possible
exceptions from the general procedure. The objections of the political parties
were not so strong. In fact, the differences mainly had a technical character
and the opposition actually concerned procedural and other issues. The
adopted Act on Administrative and Territorial Division of the Republic of
Bulgaria regulates not only the changes in the municipalities, but also the
changes in their component units (mayoralties and districts) and the primary
unit—the settlement.
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• The territorial division of the capital city, Sofia, and the cities of Plovdiv and
Varna were based on the special law. Regulations were created according to
which the cities with population above 100,000 people can have internal
division and that the municipal councils can decide upon this.
• The debate on the regional self-government tier did not take place.
The second debate was held between 1998–99. It was completely dedicated to
the reorganization of the regional tier. Resolution of these issues required the re-
evaluation of the existent number of regions and their territories, development of
the regional governor’s powers, and its interaction with the established dilution of
state administration units within the territories of the region. On the other hand,
proposals for the introduction of self-government elements into the regional tier
were not raised. The Local Government and Local Administration Act provides a
general framework and concept for the organization and operation of regional tiers.
It complies with the constitutional provisions which state that the regional governor
is appointed by the Council of Ministers, not elected.
Public debate did not actually take place. The political debates on the number
and size of new regions were conducted by the government with the participation
of experts from the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly, and the Presidency.
Although several options for changing the number and the size of the regions presently
existed, the option was adopted by 28 regions (through fragmentation of the existent
9 regions), as it was considered “flexible and responsible ” enough for making future
changes. The main motives for fragmentation of the regions were related to the
historical sustainability of the 28 units (long period of existence), larger operation
in the interaction with the municipalities (the smaller regions comprise a smaller
number of municipalities). Of course, political arguments also existed particularly
regarding the control of the central government on the local level. Despite the
shortcomings of this option like: fragmentation of resources; non-correspondence
with the EU regions; significant increase of the current expenditures; etc., the
National Assembly passed the relevant law in 1999. The strong opposition of some
political parties represented within the parliament, many international and Bulgarian
experts, and citizens did not influence this decision. The introduction of regional
self-government tier was postponed for the future. Some attempts were made to
limit the shortcomings of the adopted decision—e.g. the Regional Development
Act provided the possibility for establishment of regional development council.
The municipal councils of the component municipalities can appoint a section of
the members in these councils. Six regions for planning (NUTS II, each including
several present oblasti) were established to avoid fragmentation.  These regions for
planning can implement large regional projects.
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Despite these attempts, the problems, related to the development and operation
of the regions, remain without a permanent solution. The political powers did not
reach any consensus regarding overall development, position, size and role of the
regions. The issue of size and coverage of Bulgarian regions, and the model for their
establishment and development as self-governing units, will have further development
in the future. One reason for this is the new government’s program (the Government
of Prime Minister Simeon Saxcoburgotski, elected by the National Assembly in
July 2001) and the parliamentary majority, which have declared their commitment
to enhancing the decentralization processes, as well as their readiness for discussing
the establishment of a regional self-government level.
The following summary conclusions can be made:
Firstly: The debate on the size, number, and territorial scope of municipalities
and their component administrative structures has already concluded. Distinct legal
regulations for the making administrative and territorial changes, corresponding to
the will of the people, are being successfully implemented;
Secondly : The debate on the enhancement of decentralization and financial
independence for local governments is now on the agenda. The proposals of the
local governments, the NGOs, and the government programs all point in one
direction. The discussion is more concentrated on creating concrete forms and phases
of the local finance reform.
Thirdly: The creation of second, sub-national, government ties will be discussed
in the next two or three years. The issues that should be discussed include; the
number, the territorial scope, and the competencies of the regional level.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Conclusions
The frequent changes in the regional tier and the relative stability of the municipal
tier indicate that the central institutions are the active sector in conducting the
administrative and territorial changes within the country. However, local initiatives
have also manifested in the last five or six years, which have led to the fragmentation
of four municipalities.
Significant disparities exist among the municipalities in terms of population. Certain
relations between size, in terms of population, and the major characteristics of the
municipalities are observed. So, for example, when the size of municipalities declines:
• The number of urban population declines, the demographic structure deterio-
rates and depopulation processes intensify;
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• The territory of, and the number of, component settlements decline;
• The level of socio-economic development declines. Economic activity and
incomes decline, unemployment grows, and social benefits per capita increase;
• The quantity of provided public services declines. This is mainly due to the
services which are provided by the larger municipalities that serve the neighboring
small municipalities;
• The municipal capacity for accumulation of its own revenues declines. Smaller
municipalities become more dependent on intergovernmental subsidies;
• The amount of fees paid by the population, for the local services provided,
declines.
Some local characteristics are in reverse relation to the size of local governments.
So, for example:
• The satisfaction with the services is greater in the small municipalities;
• The per capita expenditures for the mass services—kindergartens and secondary
education—increase when the size of municipalities decrease; the same is
true for basic administrative services;
• The smaller municipalities have more investment expenditure/per capita.
This is because targeted intergovernmental subsidies are mostly directed
toward the smallest local governments. With some exceptions, the large
municipalities’ insufficient funds for covering current needs do not allow
them to allocate significant own funds for investment, and the underdeveloped
credit market does not yet allow the use of borrowed funds for investment.
Nevertheless, the capacity to find capital projects with own resources increases
with the increasing size of the local government.
Municipal councilors are elected on the basis of a proportionate system. No
election districts exist in municipalities comprising of more than one settlement (these
are 96% of all municipalities). This should guarantee the representation of particular
settlements. This causes tension and center-periphery problems. This is also intensified
by the centralized system of allocating the powers and the lack of powers in the
settlements. Re-allocation of financial resources is performed within the municipality,
which then deprives the peripheral settlements. The present local governments are
also not willing to transfer more functions and financial resources to the mayoralties.
Fragmentation is observed in the small municipalities, where the center city is
relatively equal to the rest of the settlements. This is a result of two factors: the legislative
requirements for the establishment of a new municipality and the specific attitudes
amongst populations in the certain settlements.
In the large municipalities, the municipal center is usually a big city whose
gravitational impact on the peripheral settlements is relatively big. Most of the
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population has migrated to the municipal center, making the neighboring villages
relatively small in size. The populations, still within the villages, nevertheless use
the city infrastructure and the services provided in the city. Thus, the villages become
too dependent on the municipal center. Conversely, the peripheral villages are under-
represented in the municipal council, based on their minute population. By adding
their fragmentation, it is seen that the separation of villages and turning them into
autonomous municipalities is less possible (in terms of local interests) and almost
impossible (in terms of reaching the requirements for minimum number of separating
settlements).
The conditions in municipalities with relatively smaller disparities in the size of
settlements are absolutely different. The municipal center does not have the gravi-
tational impact that a large city does on the rest settlements. They are all better
represented in the municipal council and the centralistic policy meets greater
opposition. The separation of settlements and formation of autonomous municipalities
is a result of this opposition.
Presently, the complicated procedures and the legislative restrictions impede
the stronger fragmentation of municipalities. The centralized system of relations
between the central government institutions and the local governments also contributes
to preserving the size of municipalities. The decentralization process would increase
the scope of local powers. The advantages of settlements’ separation in autonomous
municipalities are expected to increase while other things hold equal. This would
increase the centrifugal forces, particularly in municipalities, where the settlements
are relatively equal to the municipal center. An eventual mass fragmentation of
these municipalities would increase the inter-municipal disparities in national terms.
Legislation does not treat the municipalities differently in terms of their size
and capacity to accumulate revenues and manage expenditures. All municipalities—
large and small—have very limited power and influence on their revenues and expend-
itures.
The population cannot trace the link between taxes and fees, that which it pays
to the municipality, and the quality of the services. The citizens are not informed of
the workings of the local government. Meanwhile, increased activity by the local
population is observed in several places where the local governments have the power
to set fees and manage local activities. The critical attitude towards the sanitation,
where the “solid waste fee—cleaning” link is direct and the population realizes it, is
very indicative. It can be conditionally stated that the local governments in the small
municipalities are closer to the citizens and consider their preferences more often.
The possibility for municipalities to conduct local economic policies is very
limited. This is mainly done through municipal property, considering the present
legislation. It is evident that larger municipalities have greater property revenues.
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The relation between the size of local governments and their ability to conduct
local economic policy is very controversial.
Small municipalities have small bureaucracies, which allows faster response time
to the needs of businesses. Meanwhile, the property and territory of these municipalities
are less attractive. Large municipalities have greater possibilities to provide favorable
conditions, they have greater property and yet, sometimes, the complicated
bureaucratic procedures will actually impede and even repel business.
4.2 Recommendations
Bulgarian municipalities are relatively large. This creates relative advantages, on
which the social consensus for preserving their size is built. One municipality usually
includes several settlements, one of which is its center. The internal contradictions
in the municipality are provoked by the electoral system, which leaves some settle-
ments un-represented in the local parliament and causes mayoralties to have reduced
powers. Proposals for resolving these problems are:
• Change of the electoral system. Moving from the proportionate system
towards a majority system for the election of municipal councilors;
• Increasing the village mayors’ powers. Fairer allocation of financial resources
and transfer of the responsibilities for municipal property management. This
does not require any legislative changes because the municipal council performs
the allocation of powers and responsibilities among the settlements within
one municipality.
There is also something to be done for the better representation of the various
sized municipalities and the protection of their interests within the central institutions.
Conditions should be created for considering the interests of the small municipalities.
A special committee, under NAMRB, could be created for this purpose or quotas for
small municipalities in the present committees could be provided. The establishment
of a small municipalities’ association could be another alternative.
The other issue worth considering is a change in the country’s administrative
and territorial division and the possible establishment of a second self-government
tier on the level of the present administrative regions (28). The delegated state units
are suitable to be concentrated on the level of the present regions for planning (6).
There are arguments which suggest that the intergovernmental subsidy mechanism
for 2003 will be based on separation of power and the responsibility of municipalities
for the provision of public services, financed from the municipal budgets. The amount
of intergovernmental subsidies should add to the shared tax revenues and, thus,
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finance the delegated municipal services. The new formula should also include
equalizing subsidies for poor municipalities, formed in reverse relation to their tax
capacity. Such a solution would help fill the shortage of local revenues in the smallest
municipalities and compensate their higher costs of local services.
Elimination of legislative restrictions for local fee rates would, to large extent,
resolve the problem of a catchment area, for those services consumed by the population
of neighboring municipalities. The eventual establishment of a second tier of local
self-government will create opportunities  for delegating the provision of these services
by the new tier of government.
The significant disparities in the capacity of local governments suggest differential
treatment of the municipalities by the reforms aimed at fiscal decentralization and
independence of local governments. The rational approach to this relationship is
the transfer of power and responsibility towards the municipalities in a manner so
that the differential disparities in government and resource capacity are considered.
For example, the large municipalities are better prepared to undertake the responsibilities
for administration (setting the amount and collection) of local fees and set the local
tax rates. Access to greater financial resources, which they have, enables them to service
relatively bigger investment loans. In this sense, the raising of the legal limit of
investment from own source, and borrowed funds, will enable them to use their
financial resources effectively. Later on, the small municipalities can also receive
such powers when their capacity increases.
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1 3 Ivanov St., Local budgets in Bulgaria, FLGR, 1998.
1 4 We need to note that the data used does not reflect the fact that some expenditure
for 2000 is not paid by local governments and, thus, are not reflected in the
financial reports. On the other hand, these expenditures refer to the overall
operation of the services monitored in the report. The way the unpaid bills are
reported (by function area) does not allow for the necessary activity breakdown
and usage in the recent study.
The impact of the unpaid bills on the financial situations of the five groups is
different. The unpaid bills in the end of FY 2000 for Sofia represent 0.25% of
the budget expenditures reported, which means that all of the municipal
expenditures made are included into the financial statements.
For the municipalities from group 2 this ratio is 13%, for group 3–10%, for group
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1 5 Okolia—an intermediate tier between oblast and municipality.
Economies and Diseconomies
of Scale in Polish
Local Governments
Pawel Swianiewicz
Mikolaj Herbst
C H A P T E R  5
220
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
221
E C O N O M I E S  A N D  D I S E C O N O M I E S  O F  S C A L E  I N  P O L I S H  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S
Table of Contents
1. Introduction—Local Government in Poland ............................................. 223
2. Basic Description of Territorial Organization and Its Changes ................. 227
2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Characteristics
of Territorial Organizations ................................................................. 227
2.2 Debates on Territorial Organization and the Size
of Local Government Units ................................................................. 230
2.3 The Size of Local Government and Democratic Representation ...... 232
2.4 Regulations on Division and Amalgamation
of Administrative Units ....................................................................... 236
2.5 Regulations on Sub-Municipal Governments ................................... 236
3. Size of Local Government in the Leaders’ Perception ................................ 237
4. Size of Local Government and Local Democracy ...................................... 240
4.1 Size, Trust, and Citizens’ Satisfaction ................................................ 240
4.2 Size and Representation ...................................................................... 245
4.3 Decentralization Within Local Government—the Relationship
Between Municipal Authorities and Villages (or City Districts) ..... 249
4.4 Size and Function of Local Democracy
—An Attempt at Conclusions ............................................................ 253
5. Size of Local Government and Allocation of Functions
Between Tiers of Government ..................................................................... 255
6. Size of Local Government and Economic Development Policies .............. 258
7. Unit Cost, Catchment Area, Quality of Municipal Services
and the Size of Administrative Units .......................................................... 262
7.1 Basic Administrative Services .............................................................. 262
7.2 Primary and Secondary Education ..................................................... 265
7.2.1 Pre-School Education and the Size of Local Government ....... 267
7.2.2 The Primary School Network, School Size,
and the Size of the Municipality ............................................. 268
7.2.3 The Problem of Free Riding Within Secondary Education ... 270
222
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
7.3 Voluntary Co-Operation Between Local Governments ..................... 272
7.3.1 Case Study–Solid Waste Management ..................................... 273
8. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 275
8.1 Efficient Function of the Municipality—Attempts
at Building a Composite Index and Relationship With Size ............ 279
8.1.1 Defining the Efficiency (Performance) ..................................... 279
8.1.2 Matching Variables, Developing the Final Formula
for the Efficiency (Performance) ............................................... 280
8.1.3 Verifying the Relationship Between Size and Efficiency ......... 281
8.2 Practical Recommendations ................................................................ 286
References ............................................................................................................. 288
Notes .................................................................................................................... 290
223
E C O N O M I E S  A N D  D I S E C O N O M I E S  O F  S C A L E  I N  P O L I S H  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
in Polish Local Governments
Pawel Swianiewicz, Mikolaj Herbst1
1. INTRODUCTION—LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POLAND
Before 1990, the highly centralist doctrine of real-socialism left no space for a local self-
government system. Local administration was hierarchically dependent upon the upper
tiers of administration and central government branch ministries. Consequently, local
discretion to act upon any financial issues or forms of service delivery was next to none.
The constitutionally dominant position of the communist party limited any reforms
aimed at real democratization of the local political process. Nevertheless, the inefficiency
of the centralist system had been commonly observed for many years. The Polish
Communist Party then tried to introduce some forms of decentralization and local
government (see Acts of 1983 and 1988). But these limited reforms could not change
the doctrinal base of the centralist state and they were unable to create more democratic
or effective local government results.
The turning point was the round-table negotiation (between the “Solidarity”
opposition and the ruling communist party) in 1989. Local government reform was
one of topics of discussion. It is worth emphasizing that it was the only topic on which
a final agreement was not reached and a “statement of disagreement” was signed.
Nevertheless, the main directions of the future reform had been already drawn by the
“Solidarity” opposition.
Local government reform was one of the main priorities for the first post-communist
government, formed in September 1989. Reformers from the Solidarity movement
assumed that it was not enough to change the government in Warsaw in order to
launch the transformation towards a democratic country and free-market economy.
They were afraid that “old-style” local administration could block the practical
implementation of actual reforms for the countryside. Quick, but intensive, preparation
allowed for the passing of the new Local Government Act in March 1990. This was
followed by general local elections in May 1990 and radical decentralization of financial
regulations in January 1991. The 1990 reform introduced elected local government
on the municipal (gmina) level only, while upper tiers of territorial divisions remained
in the control of the state administration. This solution was treated as provisional one.
It was argued that the existence of 49 small regions (województwa) introduced by the
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communist administration in the mid-seventies was disfunctional and required modifi-
cation. It was assumed that newly elected regional governments should be introduced
along with reforms in territorial division. However, for a number of reasons which will
not be discussed here in depth, the introduction of upper tiers of local governments
had been postponed for several years, until the end of 1998.
There are some striking similarities between the implementation of the 1990 and
1998 reforms. Like in 1990, the 1998 reform were prepared very quickly. The specific
directions of the government proposal were formulated at the beginning of 1998, the
elections for county and regional councils were held in October, and new tiers of
government started operation by January 1, 1999. Again, similarly to 1990, many
important legal regulations were approved at the last minute (or even later). The Act
on Revenues of Territorial Self-Government was voted on after the October 1998 elections.
Moreover, the Act was only temporary-limitations of its validity, as specified in the
original title of the Act, were between the years 1999 and 2000. The government and
the parliament agreed that substantial revisions would be necessary after a couple years
of the new system’s operation. Also precise regulations on division of competencies
between tiers of government and between local government and state administration
were discussed by the Parliament, even after the 1998 county and regional elections. In
both cases (i.e. the municipal and the regional reform), the validity of temporary financial
regulations was extended beyond the intended period (i.e. in the case of municipal
governments—beyond 1991, when the more stable law was voted at the end of
1993, in the case of county and regional reform—beyond 2000. Currently, there are
many signs that validity of this temporary solution will be extended for 2002 as well).
As a result of this process, there are currently three tiers of territorial governments:
almost 2,500 gminy (municipalities), 308 powiats (counties), plus 65 cities with a
county status (i.e. performing both tasks allocated to municipal and county level of
governments) and 16 województwa (regions) which replaced earlier 49 smaller units. On
both a municipal and a county level, self-government is the only form of public admin-
istration. On a regional level, there is a dual structure—on the one hand—elected
self-government, and on the other—a governor (wojewoda) nominated by the Prime
Minister with his/her own administrative apparatus. However, functions of regional state
and self-government administrations are clearly separated and there is no hierarchi-
cal subordination between them.
The goal of the reform was to clearly separate functions and policy areas between
tiers of government and to eliminate vertical (hierarchical) dependency of the lower tier
upon the higher. This has been achieved in regards to the three levels of sub-national
self-governments. Obviously municipal, county and regional levels co-operate, for
example in economic development policies, but in terms of specific service delivery, the
separation is close to perfect. The situation is much more complicated in regards to the
relationship between central and local government level. In some cases (such as education
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or some of social welfare benefits), nation-wide regulations are so strict that local
government’s role is reduced to a large extent to the central government agents and
implementation of central policies.
The set of reforms granted a wider range of functions to municipal governments
while the list of county’s functions is much shorter. The aggregate county budget is
only a small fraction (about a quarter) of the aggregate municipal budgets. Such a
division of functions is possible because of a relatively large size of municipal units in
Poland.2  This issue is discussed in following sections of this chapter.
As it is presented briefly in Table 5.1, the widest scope of services is delivered on a
municipal level, county responsibilities are more limited and the role of regional self-
government in direct service delivery is very limited (although there are also some
examples of such roles, higher education and main road maintenance) but they are
mostly focused on strategic planning and regional development programs.
Table 5.1
Allocation of Functions Among Tiers of Local
and Regional Self-Government in Poland
Municipality County Region
Strategic and Physical Planning • Plans for local • Plans for • Strategic
development county’s regional planning
• Local physical development (including inter-
master plans • Building national eco-
• Granting inspection nomic relations
building permits and regional
promotion)
• Regional devel-
opment con-
tracts with cent-
ral government
Roads and Communal Infrastructure • Water supply • County road • Regional work
and sewerage network network
• Waste collection • Water
and disposal management
• Street cleaning (flood
• Street lighting protection)
• Parks and
green areas
conservation
• Central heating
• Local roads
• City public
transportation
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Table 5.1 (Continued)
Allocation of Functions Among Tiers of Local
and Regional Self-Government in Poland
Municipality County Region
Public Order and Safety • City guards • Public order
• Voluntary fire and security
brigades (police)
• Civil defense
Education • Kindergartens • Secondary school • Some higher
and primary education education
schools facilities
Health • Public health • Public health
and sanitary (regional
services hospitals)
Welfare • Social services, • Unemployment
such as housing measures and
benefits, services fighting
for elderly, social • Care for
welfare benefits homeless people
Housing • Construction of
social housing
• Management of
municipal housing
Culture, Sport and Leisure • Local libraries, • Regional
theatres, cultural cultural facilities
institutions
Misc. • Civil act • Land registry • Protection of
registration and surveying the environment
Presently (1999 data), local governments spend 10.5% of the Polish GDP, or
38% of total government expenditures. It has been a clear increase from 7.4% of GDP
and 16% of total government expenditure spent by local government in 1991. Almost
80% of self-government budgets are spent on the municipal level (including big cities
with a county status), 15%on the county level and only 5% by regional self-government.
Local governments are financed by a mixture of own revenues (mostly local taxes
which—within the limits defined by law—are set and collected by local governments),
shares in revenues collected within its local unit territory from central income taxes and
grants transfers from the central governments. The proportion of local revenues is
significant on a municipal level, while counties and regions are financed predominantly
by grants.
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2. BASIC DESCRIPTION OF TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION
AND ITS CHANGES
2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Characteristics
of Territorial Organizations
Present division into basic territorial units (gmina) was introduced in 1973 as a result
of amalgamation of earlier, smaller units, called gromada. The number of newly created
municipalities totaled about 2,400, but later, during the 1970s, there was further
gradual amalgamation and, in 1978, the number of municipal governments (including
boroughs in the largest cities) was 2,348. Later, a very slow fragmentation process
begun and, in 1988, the number of municipalities was 2,399 (again, including boroughs
in big cities).
The last decade has not brought a dramatic change to this picture. The 1990
reform liquidated division in the big city boroughs (Warsaw was the only exception).
Apart from this, the number of municipalities was relatively stable, diverging only with
the occasional rare case of splitting or joining units according to the will of its citizens.
The most significant shift in municipal structure reflects the transformation of the
rural areas into quickly developing mixed rural-urban gminas3. This involves granting
(by the Council of Ministers) urban status to the “central village” of rural municipalities.
During the last decade, there were 56 villages who received urban status and 30 such
cases in the period between 1994–2000 (most often for new cities 1994–99 and in
1996–96). However this kind of transformation, unlike splitting and joining existing
units, doesn’t affect the total number of municipalities, since each liquidated rural unit
is replaced by a mixed one.
The most common type of municipal division occurs in mixed urban-rural gminas
and results in the establishment of new purely urban and new purely rural municipalities.
There are over 500 such (mixed) local governments in Poland, many of them function
quite smoothly. However, in some cases, conflicts between the rural and urban
population (or even more frequently between urban and rural politicians) results in
strong pressure to the divide the local government unit. The reasons for such conflicts
are discussed in more detail in the following sections. The largest series of such splits
took a place in 1991, when 23 urban-rural municipalities divided into separate urban
and rural units. A few other cases took a place in 1994–1997, but central government
has been very reluctant to comply with fragmentation pressures and, since 1998, there
has not been any case of such splits.
The third type of change in municipal territorial organization was related to the
division of existing rural local government into two or more or to the separation of
districts of the city. Also this type of new local governments emergence were the most
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frequent before 1998, especially in 1994–1997 period. For example, in 1994 only as
many as 15 new local governments were created in such a way.
Other cases of splitting are very rare and, as it is shown in Table 5.2, the total
number of municipalities has been very stable throughout the last decade. The difference
between the number of municipalities in 1991 and in 2000 is 69–less than 3% of the
total number of Polish gminas.
In total, there were 2,489 municipalities in Poland in 2000, including 307 purely
urban (cities), 1,599 rural, and another 572 consisting of both urban and rural areas.
The city of Warsaw has special status and consists of eleven municipalities, each having
its own council and budget (before 1994, there were 7 (and later 8) boroughs in Warsaw).
Table 5.2
Changes in the Number of Municipalities 1990–2000
1991 1995 2000
Urban 274 304 307
Mixed 559 555 572
Rural 1,580 1,611 1,599
Warsaw 7 11 11
Total 2,420 2,481 2,489
This organizational system, based on a single decentralized level, lasted from 1990
to 1998. At that time, beside municipalities, the country was divided into 49 prefectures
(wojewodztwo) governed by the state administration. In 1999, a new three-tier admin-
istrative system was established. The basic unit for administrative division—the self-
governing municipality—remained unchanged. However, 49 prefectures were
transformed into 16 bigger regions and an intermediate county (powiat) tier was created.
Of these, 65 of the counties are big cities that have both municipality and county
status. The other 308 counties consist of a capital city with a surrounding area covering
3 to 19 municipalities.4  Starting from January 1, 2002, seven new counties were
established and the total number of counties increased to 315. This change reflects
bottom-up fragmentation pressure, which is perhaps more pronounced on a county
level rather than on a municipal level.
The organization of municipalities, counties and self-governing regions is presented
in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1.
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Table 5.3
Area and Population of Regions, Counties and Municipalities (2000)
Unit Area in km2 Population in Thousands
Average Min Max Average Min Max
Region 19,500 9,500 35,600 2,400 1,012 4,966
County 838 13 2,987 103 22 1,518
Municipality 125 3 635 15 1,3 918
Figure 5.1
Regions, Counties and Municipalities
Polish rural municipalities, being relatively large (the typical rural gmina has a
population between 7 and 8 thousand), consist of several settlement units. In 1999,
there were almost 58,000 rural settlement units. Some of them are a bit larger than
others. They are called solectwa (villages)5 and have limited autonomy within the
municipality. There are almost 40,000 solectwa in Poland. The traditional position of
a village leader is called a soltys (this position is further explained in Section 2.5). As it
is presented in Table 5.4, only a small fraction of rural local governments consist of one
village. About three-quarters of local governments consist of over 10 villages and, in
almost 90% of the cases, they have more than 10 settlement units. The most typical
Regions
MunicipalitiesCounties
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number of villages in one gmina is between 11 and 20, however, there are almost 10
local governments which have even more than 50 villages.
Table 5.4
Number of Villages (Solectwa) and Settlement Units
in Rural Local Governments (2000)
Number of Villages % of All Rural Local Number of Settlement % of All Rural Local
Governments Units Governments
1 1.1 1 0.4
2–5 4.2 2–5 3.1
6–10 17.0 6–10 8.5
11–20 44.0 11–20 32.0
21–30 26.6 21–30 27.9
31–50 6.5 31–50 6.5
51 and over 0.6 51 and over 0.6
2.2 Debates on Territorial Organization
and the Size of Local Government Units
Within the last decade, the size of municipal government has not generally been
debated. The present shape of gmina units is usually taken for granted, despite the fact
they were introduced from above, less than 30 years ago. One can point out examples
of vital discussions in individual cases (such as the split of some mixed urban-rural
governments or, quite recently, the organization of local government within the city of
Warsaw). Still, the general model for municipal government has not yet been questioned.
If there are any suggestions for systematic change in territorial organization on a municipal
level, they move in the direction of even further consolidation, not fragmentation. A
recent example is provided by the Ministry of Finance proposals for revision of the Law
on Local Government Revenues, presented at the beginning of 2002 [Weber, 2002].
The proposal suggested an additional 1% share in PIT revenues for 5 years as incentive
for local governments who decide to merge. This suggestion is primarily targeted at
county governments, but is also addressed to the municipalities. Still, it should be
stressed, once again, that territorial reform on a municipal level is not a topic of Polish
debates.
This has not been so with the two other tiers of sub-national government (counties
and regions), created only few years ago at the end of 1998. County reform has been a
central political issue since 1993, when the first proposal for division into about 300
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units was presented by the national government. Also, since the beginning of 1990s,
the existence and shape of regional self-government has been disputed.
The discussions included the topic of existence and size of the units to be created
as well as their functions and the mutual relations between the tiers of government.
Some opponents at the county level suggested that functions which are difficult to
deliver by individual municipalities should be provided by voluntary co-operative groups
within the municipal governments, rather than by a new tier. However, municipalities
were not very willing to give up part of their autonomy to any associations. Mainly
because no central incentives were provided and, although there were quite numerous
examples of such co-operation, they could not solve the general issues surrounding
some services’ provision (voluntary co-operation between municipalities is further
discussed in Section 7.3).
Before 1999, there were two general approaches to the size of county government.
Most economic analysis suggested establishing relatively large units. Many argued
that before the relevant legislation was passed the total number of powiats should not
exceed 175–200. Professor Michal Kulesza, the main architect of the reform, stated
very clearly that he was against such a reduction in a number of units because he
expected public opinion to be against it [Emilewicz, Wolek, 2000]. In fact, even
introducing a much larger number of powiats did not prevent the bitter protests of
citizens from yet another dozen cities with powiat-capital ambitions. After two years
(at the beginning of 2001), the government agreed to the modification by creating 7
new counties, increasing the number of units from 308 (plus an additional 65 cities all
enjoying powiat status) to 315.
The discussion over regional government primarily concentrated on the role of
regions. Some opponents were afraid strong regions might lead to federalization and
even disintegration of the country. They were powerful enough to both ensure a strong
position for the nominated state-administration in the regions and to limit the fiscal
autonomy of the elected regional self-governments. Size was another hot issue. The
national government’s initial proposal, to create 12 large regions, was rejected by the
parliamentary opposition and the president, who finally vetoed the relevant Act. The
new (accepted) proposal included 16 slightly smaller units. The battle centered around
regional forces, all fighting for regional capital status for their cities [Jalowiecki, 1999].
The debate is not totally over, since there is at least one more city (Koszalin) with
regional capital ambitions and these aspirations are supported by some politicians.
The third dimension of the regional division debate concentrated on the European
statistical NUTS classification. After much debate, self-governing regions are finally
equal to NUTS 2 units. This solution was strongly advocated by regional self-
governments and all major local government associations. They believed it may help
strengthen the role of local governments in implementing EU regional policies and, in
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particular, in making detail decisions on the allocation of EU pre-accession and future
structural funds.
2.3 The Size of Local Government and Democratic Representation
The number of councilors elected in each municipality depends on population size
and is determined by an Article 17 of the Law on Local Government. The 1990 reforms
decreased the number of councilors (if compared with the old “people’s councils”
system) and a recent (April 2001) amendment to the Local Government Law specified
further reductions. This is illustrated in Table 5.5.
The Polish Law on Local Election states, in Article 27, that the division of a
municipality into electoral wards is determined by the wojewoda (government’s
administrative representative in the region). The number of election wards depends on
the settlement structure. As long as they do not exceed the total number of councilors
to be elected, each village (solectwo) constitutes one ward. Urban areas are divided into
wards on the basis of sub-municipal administration structure (administration districts,
residential areas, etc.)
The Act differentiates between municipalities under 20,000 inhabitants, where
voters elect 1 to 5 councilors for each election ward, and units with populations exceeding
20,000, where the number of councilors for each district varies from 8 to 12 (Art.90).
In gminas under 20,000 inhabitants, election results are calculated according the simple
majority rule (voting for individual candidates). In larger units, the councils are elected
under the proportional system, with citizens voting in fact for the list (organization)
the candidate represents. (Art. 87,88).
Because the number of villages in a municipality is usually quite large in practice,
the number of councilors is lower than the number of villages in almost half the rural
local governments. This means, some of the villages are not directly represented by
their own deputy in the council (a more precise distribution of councilor per village
ratio is presented in Table 5.6). Obviously, the recent April 2001 amendment that
reduced the number of councilors will increase the number of “unrepresented” villages.
After the 2002 local elections, the proportion of rural governments where the number
of councilors is lower than number of villages will increase from the present 40% to
59%. Also, the proportion of governments in which the number of councilors is lower
than number of settlement units will increase from the current 63% to 76%.
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Table 5.5
The Number of Councilors per Municipality as Stated by the Act
on Local Government
Situation Before 2002 Local Elections Regulation to be Applied in Local Election 2002
(After April 2001 Amendment to the Act)
Number of Inhabitants Number of Councilors Number of Inhabitants Number of Councilors
Under 4,000 15 Under 5,000 12
4,000–7,000 18 5,000–10,000 15
7,000–10,000 20 10,000–20,000 19
10,000–15,000 22 20,000–50,000 21
15,000–20,000 24 50,000–100,000 23
20,000–40,000 28 100,000–200,000 30
40,000–60,000 32 Five for each of next 100,000
60,000–801,000 36 but not more than 60
80,000–100,000 40
100,000–200,000 45
Each Additional 5 (With total number
100,000 Started not exceeding 100)
Table 5.6
Number of Councilors per Village (Solectwo) and per One Settlement Unit
Within Polish Rural Local Governments (1999)
Number of Councilors % of All Rural Number of Councilors % of All Rural
Per Village Local Governments Per Settlement Unit Local Governments
0–0.5 4.8 0–0.5 17.7
0.5–0.99 35.7 0.5–0.99 45.6
1 4.6 1 3.7
1–2 40.7 1–2 24.1
>2 14.2 >2 8.9
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The average number of councilors per 1,000 inhabitants varies from 1.38 in the
cities to 3.14 in rural gminas (see Table 5.7).
Not surprisingly, the number of councilors per sq. km is the highest in the cities
(1.19). However, it is slightly bigger in rural (0.19) than in mixed (urban-rural) gminas
(0.16). When it comes to settlement units, rural areas have (on average) better
representation in the council (1.15 councilors per unit) than in mixed gminas (1.01).
Cities, obviously consisting of one settlement unit, can not be taken into account in
this comparison. It’s worth emphasizing that the democratic representation indicators
vary strongly within the settlement categories. In most cases, the standard deviation
exceeds half of the mean value.
Table 5.7
Democratic Representation in Polish Municipalities (2000)
Councilors Per Councilors Per Councilors Per sq.km
Settlement Unit 1,000 Inhabitants
Urban Mixed Rural Urban Mixed Rural Urban Mixed Rural
Mean 1.01 1.15 1.38 1.91 3.14 1.19 0.16 0.19
Std. Deviation 0.80 1.47 1.31 0.85 1.04 0.85 0.09 0.13
 Min. 0.24 0.20 0.10 0.58 1.16 0.11 0.04 0.04
 Max. 8.00 22.00 6.99 6.76 8.56 6.00 1.00 1.88
The common rule is that the level of democratic representation decreases with the
increase in population. In small urban areas (i.e. cities under 20,000 inhabitants) the
number of councilors per 1,000 inhabitants varies from 1 to 7, with a very strong
tendency to rise as the population decreases. In bigger cities, the indicator value is
between 0.1 and 1 (see Figure 5.2).
The indicators presented above refer only to direct forms of democratic representation
within municipalities. This is obviously a simplified view of local democracy that may
be supported, especially in larger units, by some auxiliary forms of citizens’ participation.
Political parties, NGO’s and the local media are supposed to strengthen inhabitants
influence on local public life and help them control their elected representatives.
One of the most common measures of the indirect function of local democracy is
the number of inhabitants per NGO. As shown in Table 5.8, indirect representation
improves as the number of inhabitants increases, except for the sub-sample of small
municipalities with populations not exceeding 10,000. Within this group of gminas,
the relationship between size and the measure of indirect representation is in the negative:
the smaller the municipality, the lower the number of inhabitants per one NGO.
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Figure 5.2
Democratic Representation and Population in Polish Municipalities
Table 5.8
Size and the Measure of Indirect Representation (2000)
Population Number of Inhabitants Per NGO
Less than 4,000 829
4,000–7,000 1,048
7,000–10,000 1,125
10,000–15,000 1,083
15,000–20,000 1,049
20,000–40,000 959
40,000–60,000 815
60,000–80,000 804
80,000–100,000 579
More than 100,000 591
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2.4 Regulations on Division and Amalgamation of
Administrative Units
In the Polish legal system, it is the central government that has right to decide upon
the number and range of local governments on both the municipal and county level.
The decision to change the present borders (or even more so, for amalgamation or split
of existing local governments) has to be made after consultations with the effected local
councils and citizens. However, the results of these consultations are not binding for
the government. The Municipal Government Act states (in Art. 4) that changing the
local unit borders’ should follow several principles. For instance, the gmina should be
as homogenous unit as possible, borders should respect settlement structures and spatial
organization, they should take into account social, economic and cultural ties and the
shape of borders should ensure local government capacity to deliver public tasks. These
suggestions are of a very general nature and, in fact, they leave a lot of decisions to the
discretion of the central government. The last argument (about capacity to deliver
tasks) is most frequently referred to when local attempts at fragmentation (division of
local government units) are being fought.
Quite recently, in August 2001, the Council of Ministries published a resolution
setting rules for municipalities who are interested in dividing. The municipal council
has to pass its petition to the regional governor, who (within 30 days) prepares his
(her) opinion and passes it, along with a petition, to the Ministry for Interior and
Public Administration. The central government must make their decision within a
year and the decision has to be announced no later than June 30 of the preceding year.
Such a rule allows the newly created local governments enough time to prepare next
year’s budget. The municipal petition has to include:
• estimation of the one-time, and consistent, costs of the split;
• the prognosis of local revenues and expenditures for suggested new governments
in the next financial year;
• results of social consultations (usually in the form of a local referendum) for
each village involved separately, including turn-out and the number of voters
actively supporting and opposing the change.
The basic statistics of such splits has been presented in Section 2.1 and some
further case studies are presented in Section 4.1.
2.5 Regulations on Sub-Municipal Governments
The Polish municipalities, being relatively large, provide ample opportunities for
decentralization within local government. This concerns both rural communities, where
237
E C O N O M I E S  A N D  D I S E C O N O M I E S  O F  S C A L E  I N  P O L I S H  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S
decentralization of some decisions to individual villages could have a place, and big
cities, where they might be divided into smaller districts (boroughs). The Act on
Municipal Governments leaves all important decisions on sub-municipal “auxiliary
units” in the hands of the municipal council (Art. 5). Each municipal council has the
power to decide whether such units should exist and, if so, what its geographical borders,
precise competencies, method of election of local representatives, etc. should be.
In rural areas, there is a very old tradition of limited forms of self-government led by
popularly elected village leaders (soltys). The Act on Municipal Government determined
that the most important decisions about village government are made directly through
“village meetings”, which also elects the soltys. In city districts’ citizens elect the district
council (although some issues may be decided in citizen meetings as well). Executive
power in the district belongs to the district board elected by the district council.
Both the village leader and the city district chairman of the board have a right to
participate in all meetings of the municipal council.
Although village and district councils exist in almost all local governments, municipal
councils are usually reluctant to transfer any considerable amount of discretionary
authority to them. Nevertheless, there have been some examples of innovations in this
respect, both in big cities and in small rural communities. This issue is further discussed
in Section 4.6.
3. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE LEADERS’ PERCEPTION
What do Polish mayors think about the size of their municipalities? As it was presented
in the introductory chapter, according to the survey conducted by the LDI project,6
Polish mayors see the advantages of potential amalgamation of their municipalities
more often than their colleagues in the Czech Republic or Slovakia. Nevertheless, there
are negative opinions about potential merging that prevail also in Poland. Only 5.5%
of Polish mayors said that merging with another municipality would be a very good
idea, another 13.1% said it would be a good idea, while 43% thought it would be bad
and 39.4% said it was a very bad idea.
But the idea of splitting (and creation of smaller municipalities) is even less popular
among Polish mayors. Only a small margin (0.2%) thought it would be a very good
idea, another 2.5% said it would be a good idea, while over 60% said it would be a very
bad idea and 36% called it a rather bad idea. This means a vast majority of Polish
mayors think their municipalities are a proper size and there are no convincing arguments
for enlarging or dividing them.
One might expect that arguments in favor of merging with neighboring local
governments might be more convincing in small municipalities. Interestingly enough,
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the opposite is true. Mayors in large local governments are more often in favor of
amalgamation. This is illustrated by Figure 5.3. The breakdown is at about population
size 20,000. About 40% of mayors in larger cities see advantages in such mergers,
while only 10–20% of smaller local governments do. It seems that mayors in larger
units normally think about incorporating the smaller surrounding local governments,
while those in smaller municipalities are more often afraid of loosing their autonomy as
a result of a merger with another unit of a comparable size.
Figure 5.3
% of Mayors Who Agree that Merging Their Municipalities
Might be a Good Idea (1997)
Acceptance for potential splits of local government is low among mayors, regardless
of the size of the local government they represent. It is only slightly larger in units with
population between 15–20,000. In Poland, most local governments belonging to the
group consisting of several settlement units. One may expect that local governments in
this group are large enough to generate a variety of conflicts between various parts of
local governments. Acceptance of splitting is less common in larger local governments,
because these are usually single cities, where a split would be unnatural and would
cause numerous infrastructure service problems.
Mayors’ points of view on most the individual arguments for merging local authorities
is usually unrelated to size of local government. The only clear exception is the opinion
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that “merging would help create just distribution of services among citizens”. This
opinion is more frequently supported by mayors from large local governments. Probably,
they see the possibility to reduce spillovers in service delivery as resulting from
incorporating surrounding local governments to the city.
From the same survey, we can see that an increasing number of conflicts between
areas of municipality is viewed as the strongest argument against further amalgamation
of local government. Since Polish local governments are relatively large and heterogeneous,
we may ask whether territorial roles play an important role in local political life.
Unfortunately, the only data which we have to help us answer this question comes
from a 1991 survey [Grochowski, 1991]. Local mayors were asked to assess the
importance of several problems with local governments’ functions. In the hierarchy of
perceived problems, conflicts between parts of municipality were not among the most
frequently mentioned. Problems relating to insufficient financial resources and central
control and standards were indicated much more often. Still, territorial conflicts were
indicated as important by 17% of mayors, significantly more than other local conflicts
such as conflicts between political groups (10%), between councilors and local
administration (11%), and conflicts with occupational groups (6%). This means that
territorial conflicts did not effect everyday life in Polish municipalities but, at the same
time, they were relatively frequent and important for local political life. Unfortunately,
we do not know whether the intensity of these conflicts was related to the size of the
local governments nor do we know how the situation developed after 1991. One may
speculate that, with further development of the political system in Poland, conflicts
between political parties became much more frequent, conflicts between occupational
groups have become more apparent, even though the role of territorial conflicts might
have relatively decreased. We do not have hard facts to support this intuition, although
this thesis can be indirectly supported by some case studies. For example, Malewska-
Szalygin (2001) in her analysis of one rural community in Northern Poland comes to
the conclusion that the most important contemporary local conflicts include the following
dimensions: poor versus rich citizens, teachers versus farmers, as well as members of the
communist party before 1990 versus those who were never in the party, but she never
mentions territorial conflicts. This intuition is further confirmed by results of the 2001
village leaders (soltys) survey, reported in detail in Section 4.3. Yet, some cases of splitting
existing municipalities into smaller units (some aspects of these cases are discussed in
following sections) suggest territorial conflicts still happen to play a significant role in
local politics.
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4. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY7
4.1 Size, Trust, and Citizens’ Satisfaction
In theoretical debates on the size of local government units, arguments about democracy
are among the most frequently brought up. Most often these arguments are raised by
advocates of small local units, although they can be found with proponents’ of the
amalgamation thesis as well.
From the earlier study on public perception of local government in Poland
[Swianiewicz, 2001], we know that people in small municipalities are more interested
in local governments’ activities. This is confirmed both by citizens’ verbal declarations
as well as—indirectly—by greater voter turn-out in local elections held in small territorial
units. The greater turn-out in small communities (than in big cities) is observed in
spite of usually lower education and lower income status of citizens. Size remains the
most powerful explanatory variable for turn-outs, even when controlled by other variables
such as levels of income or education of the local population.
Reform theorists [see for example Mouritzen, 1989] might argue that citizens’
willingness to participate in local politics might be more pronounced in bigger local
governments because large administrative units may be granted more functions. This
results in local politics becoming more important in people’s everyday lives. In Poland,
cities over 100,000 citizens have been responsible for more services than smaller local
government units. The 1998 reforms then granted similar extended functions to some
smaller cities which received a county status. However, empirical data does not provide
support for reform theory suggestions. In 1998, local electoral turnout in cities with
populations between 40–100,000 and county status was even a little bit lower than in
other cities of the similar size (42.1% in cities of county status and 44.3% in remaining
cities). One might argue that people were still unaware of the consequences of the
recent change in allocation of functions in 1998. But, in cities with populations over
100,000, the extended functions had been transferred to the local governments four
years before (in 1994). Nevertheless, the change in turnout between the 1994 and
1998 election was no different there, than in other local governments.
According to public choice arguments, creation of smaller local authorities should
result in the increase of local populations’ political activity. However, 1990 and 1994
analysis of local electoral turn-out, for over 40 local governments all created in 1991 as
a result of a split of larger municipalities, does not support this hypothesis [see Jalowiecki,
1995]. In newly created urban local governments, the turnout in 1994 was only
marginally higher than in average cities of similar size, while, in newly created rural
governments, turn-out was even lower than in remaining rural areas.
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Another popular argument for fragmentation says that residents in small local
governments know more about local politics and policies and communicate better
with councilors and administrative staff. This seems, to large extent, to be confirmed
by Polish data. People in small communities know their local representative much
more often than in larger agglomerations [for details see Swianiewicz, 2001].
As it was shown in the study on public perception [Swianiewicz, 2001], the level of
trust in local governments is relatively high and much higher than the overall level of
trust in national political institutions (central government, Parliament). Also in this
case, the general assessment of local government is much better in smaller communities.
In 1999, the level of trust varied from 60% in rural areas and 59% in cities below
20,000, to below 50% in cities over 100,000.
This relatively good score for local governments is undermined by the widespread
belief that municipal authorities are corrupt. Also, in this case, there is considerable
variation between the opinions of residents of small and large local governments –
better in small, and much worse in big local governments.
What do people think about the results of local government activities? As it was
shown in the “public perception” study in June 1993, the number of those who believed
that it led to positive results minimally outnumbered those who did not. The number
of positive opinions strongly prevailed in rural communities but only marginally in
cities of less than 100,000. In the largest agglomerations, the trend was definitely negative.
In 2001 [CBOS, February 2001] along with the general decline of public opinions
in Poland, satisfaction with local government activity was also much lower. The number
of negative answers for the question: “Are you satisfied with how local government is
functioning” outscored the positive opinions. However, as it is illustrated in Figure
5.4, this negative attitude was much stronger in larger, rather than in smaller,
communities. In rural communities, the number of negative answers was 42% with
almost the same number (39%) of positive opinions. In cities over 100,000, the number
of negative answers was almost twice as many as the number of positive. This is despite
the fact that, in the same year [CBOS, November 2001], overall opinions in big cities,
about the political changes after 1989, were much more positive. In rural communities,
the present political system is considered better than before 1989—but only by 35%
of respondents. In cities, the numbers satisfied with a change varies from 47% in cities
below 20,000 to 71% in cities over 500,000.
What is the Variation in the Satisfaction With Individual Services?
In 1999, over 3,000 citizens and over 600 small business local entrepreneurs were
asked about their satisfaction with the client service at their city hall [see Swianiewicz,
2000]. The level of satisfaction was much higher in rural governments than in cities of
over 100,000.
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Figure 5.4
Are You Satisfied With the Result of Local Government Functioning?
Percentage Difference Between Positive and Negative Answers
(Citizens’ Opinions)
In 1992, more positive opinions about most local services were found in small rural
communities while much more critical opinions were taken from residents of large
cities [Swianiewicz, Bukowski, 1992]. This rule was confirmed by opinions on health
care, education, water-sewage services, gas, waste collection, safety and telecom-
munication (see Table 5.9). The only exceptions to this rule concerned activities related
to local economic development—unemployment, industry, retail trade (at the beginning
of economic reform Polish local government played an important role in reforming
retail trade).
Much more recently, following a June 2001 CBOS survey, a similar relationship
between the size of local government and satisfaction with service provision was found
within primary education (see Table 5.10). People in small communities tend to
believe more often that recent education reforms produce positive results, think their
local schools better prepared for life in the contemporary world, and are more likely
to look at co-operation between schools, local educational administration and parents
as positive.
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Table 5.9
Do You Think Local Government in Your Community Has Undertaken Visible,
Positive Activities in the Following Services [% of Positive Answers, 1992]
Cities With Population: Rural
Communities
Over 200,000 50–200,000 Below 50,000
Gas, Water Services 21.9 25.2 20.3 42.0
Public Safety 19.5 16.0 18.7 22.5
Health Care 16.5 19.8 11.7 27.2
Education 13.8 10.7 19.8 21.4
Housing 13.2 23.7 16.3 18.2
Retail Trade 70.3 48.1 66.9 67.6
Local Industry 13.2 7.6 9.3 7.4
Environmental Protection 10.5 12.2 14.0 13.3
Unemployment 5.1 13.0 8.9 6.2
Street Cleaning, Waste Collection 19.5 28.2 37.7 30.9
Culture 18.9 14.5 26.8 15.4
Telecommunication 32.0 14.5 26.5 41.7
SOURCE: Swianiewicz, Bukowski, 1992.
But what does all this really tell us about policy recommendations for territorial
organization? Does the fact that citizen satisfaction is generally higher in small local
governments mean that the division of larger into smaller units would help to improve
these aspects of their operation? This is not so obvious. There are at least two reasons
why this relationship is not so straightforward. Firstly, the Sharpe observation (quoted
in Chapter 1 of this book), that the differences between bigger and larger local
governments, are not so much a consequence of the size difference, but the difference
between urban and rural life. Secondly, people may be wrong in their predictions
about the real results of suggested changes.
Three pairs of municipalities, created as a result of a split in 1991, were surveyed in
1995 in order to investigate how local population evaluates the decision to split a few
years after the fact [Jalowiecki, 1995]. The opinions were quite similar, and ambivalent,
in all six new municipalities. About 35% of respondents said the split was positive,
significantly more than the 13% who had the opposite opinion. But the number of
those who had no opinion was the largest (52%). So, one may hardly say the split led
to an explosion of enthusiasm and local activity. When asked about various consequences
of the split, citizens positively assessed the change in treatment of customers in the city
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hall, in education, and cleaning services. At the same time, most the respondents said
the division of the municipality had a negative impact on economic development.
Table 5.10
Satisfaction With Local Primary School Functions (2000)
Schools Work Schools Co- Schools Prepare Schools Prepare Schools Prepare
Better than Operate With Pupils for Pupils to Become Pupils to Deal
Before the Parents Family Life Active in Their With Various
Reform Social Environ- Contemporary
ment Problems
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Rural Community
Cities: 21 35 77 14 46 38 40 42 40 46
Below 20,000 15 43 61 31 42 48 31 58 28 60
20–100,000 20 39 67 23 32 52 30 53 34 54
100–500,000 15 33 68 21 30 59 37 48 30 56
Over 500,000 16 45 52 41 25 63 29 62 26 67
SOURCE: CBOS survey, June 2001.
Citizens surveyed thought that the most important reason for the split was the
ambition of local politicians. According to average respondents, it was politicians and
local political parties who really initiated the split. In some cases, citizens of rural
villages were seen among initiators as well but citizens in the cities played no active role
in the decision on split.
 Among the positive consequences of the division, they mentioned fairer allocation
of financial resources between the geographical parts of the former municipality. But
they also agreed the costs of local government administration and of local service delivery
increased after the split. Surprisingly, only in 4 (out of 6) new municipalities did
citizens think that the split helped to reduce number of conflicts in local communities.
The last observation on splitting local governments, yet it not necessarily resulting
in reduced number of conflicts, leads us to the question of political representation.
According to a 1993 CBOS survey, most people believe that local councils represent
the interests of ordinary citizens. Again, more positive opinions are found among
respondents from small local communities [see Swianiewicz, 2001].
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4.2 Size and Representation
Another aspect of representation is connected to the social structure of councilors in
comparison to the social structure of the represented community. Obviously, it is not
a condition of representative democracy that age, education, or gender structure of the
representatives, and of the local community, should be identical. For example, it is
quite common that people think better educated councilors would present their cases
more effectively. In practice, we also know that too wide a gap between the characteristics
of the councilors and the represented community frequently contributes to problems
of democratic representation and to the psychological distinction between “us” (people)
and “them” (authorities). In Poland, age and education (and not gender) structures
are closely related to the size of the municipality. The relationship remains strong
regardless of whether we consider all local government, only rural, or only urban areas.
This is illustrated in Table 5.11, which presents the correlation coefficients as well as
in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Figure 5.5
Age Structure of Councilors in Polish Municipalities (2000)
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Figure 5.6
Education Structure of Councilors in Polish Municipalities (2000)
Table 5.11
Size of Municipality, Education and Age Structure
of Local Councilors—Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients (2000)
All Rural Local Urban and
Municipalities Governments Mixed
(Urban-Rural)
Local
Governments
Age Structure
– % of Councilors Below 39 Years Old –0.06** –0.18*** 0.0
– % of Councilors 60 Years Old and Older +0.09** +0.11*** +0.11***
Education Structure
– % of Councilors With University Degrees +0.35*** +0.27*** +0.34***
– % of Councilors With Primary or Lower Education –0.14*** -0.21*** –0.12***
NOTE: ** means a correlation coefficient significant on 0.01 level and
*** significant on .001 level.
100
80
60
40
20
0
90
70
50
30
10
U
p 
to
 3
,0
00
3,
00
0–
4,
00
0
4,
00
0–
5,
00
0
5,
00
0–
6,
00
0
6,
00
0–
8,
00
0
8,
00
0–
10
,0
00
10
,0
00
–1
5,
00
0
15
,0
00
–2
0,
00
0
20
,0
00
–5
0,
00
0
50
,0
00
–1
00
,0
00
O
ve
r 1
00
,0
00
University degree Secondary Primary or less
247
E C O N O M I E S  A N D  D I S E C O N O M I E S  O F  S C A L E  I N  P O L I S H  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S
Councilors in small communities are usually much younger. In tiny rural govern-
ments with populations below 4,000, the proportion of councilors who are less than
39 years is over 30%. In large rural municipalities (over 10,000), it is usually about
20%. In instances of councilors who are 60 years old or over, the average proportion in
urban governments varies from about 6% in towns with less than 5,000 population to
over 13% in cities over 100,000. A similar variation may be found in rural local
governments.
The difference between large and small is even more pronounced in the case of
educational structure. In cities over 20,000, the proportion of councilors with university
degrees exceeds 50% (in cities over 100,000 it is even over 70%). While, in towns
below 10,000, this number is below 30%. In rural municipalities, the proportion
varies from slightly less than 14% in municipalities below 3,000 to over 25% in local
governments with populations over 10,000. In contrast, the proportion of councilors
with primary or lower education varies from over 20%, in rural communities under
4,000, to about 7%, in rural communities over 15,000. In cities, it is between almost
10% in towns below 5,000 to less than 1% in cities over 50,000.
Obviously, both the age and educational structure of the whole population varies
significantly between small rural and large urban communities. However, the variation
in social structure for councilors is much larger than that of the whole population. For
example, the educational structure for the population in small and large rural
governments is almost identical. Yet, the structure of councilors’ education varies rather
significantly. This means size matters. Younger and less educated people have a much
better chance of becoming local representatives in smaller local governments than they
do in larger ones. Consequently, the distance between the social structure of a local
population and their representatives is much more narrow in smaller municipalities.
Some authors argue that there are more interest groups in larger municipalities
that try to express their opinions and this leads to more pluralist politics. Such a thesis
has been formulated by T.N. Clark on the basis of statistical analysis of local politics in
American cities [Clark, 1967]. Is this true of Polish local governments? We can try to
measure pluralism in local politics by an imperfect, but significant, indicator-number
of candidates competing for a given seat in the local council. In 19948  this ratio was
significantly related to the size of municipality. As it is presented on Figure 5.7, the
number of candidates was much larger in big cities than in small communities. The
average ratio differed from below 3 candidates in local governments below 10,000 to
almost 9 in cities over 100,000. The correlation coefficient between number of candidates
and the size of governments was very high (+0.63). It also remained significant for the
rural and urban governments analyzed separately, although it was much higher in
the cities (+0.09 in rural areas and +0.64 in urban governments). We can conclude
that this prediction of the reform theory has been proved in Poland—there is more
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competition and, consequently, the political process is more pluralist in larger local
governments, more so than in smaller ones.
Figure 5.7
Number of Candidates Per Seat in the Local Council (1994 Election)
In Polish rural governments, the problem of representation is very much related to
territorial representation. As it was mentioned in Section 2, most of the rural muni-
cipalities consist of several villages. One may ask; to what extent does this cause problems
for local democracy? Are territorial conflicts between individual villages an important
dimension to local political life? Do people think councilors should represent their
village over the interests of the whole municipality? And is it true that local democracy
functions better in governments where each village has its own councilor? On the basis
of existing data, we cannot give full answers to these questions, but at least we can draw
some preliminary conclusions.
First of all, according to CBOS data, most of people think councilors should represent,
first and foremost, the interests of the whole municipality—not of his (her) own ward.
However there are those who suggest territorial representation of the smaller geographical
area should come first of all. This number is also significant, although it seems to be a
on a declining slope. This is illustrated in Figure 5.8. Unfortunately, we do not know
how the opinions of residents differ depending on the size of the municipality nor
depending on the number of villages within one municipality.
10
8
6
4
2
0
9
7
5
3
1
U
p 
to
 3
,0
00
3,
00
0–
4,
00
0
4,
00
0–
5,
00
0
5,
00
0–
6,
00
0
6,
00
0–
8,
00
0
8,
00
0–
10
,0
00
10
,0
00
–1
5,
00
0
15
,0
00
–2
0,
00
0
20
,0
00
–5
0,
00
0
50
,0
00
–1
00
,0
00
O
ve
r 1
00
,0
00
249
E C O N O M I E S  A N D  D I S E C O N O M I E S  O F  S C A L E  I N  P O L I S H  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S
Figure 5.8
If There Is a Conflict of Interest, Whose Interests Should Be Represented,
First and Foremost, By the Councilor? (Citizens' Opinions According to CBOS)
The point is that people seem to be more interested in local politics in rural
municipalities where each village (solectwo) has its own representative in the local
council. This is confirmed by data from the 1998 local electoral turn-out, which is
positively and significantly correlated with the number of councilors per village ratio.
This relationship remains significant even if controlled by population size. However,
the willingness to participate in local elections (measured by the 1994 data on number
of candidates per seat in a local council) does not show any systematic dependency
on the number of councilors per village. This relationship gap is probably caused by
two forces working in opposite directions. On one hand, people are more interested
in politics in villages represented in the council. On the other hand, the potential
danger of not having one’s own councilor may lead to the increase of competitiveness
in local elections.
4.3 Decentralization Within Local Government—the Relationship
Between Municipal Authorities and Villages (or City Districts)
As stated in Section 2.4, the functions and financial resources of village self-government
depend almost entirely on the decision of the municipal council. The relationship
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between the municipality and villages (or districts in urban governments) is not always
smooth and straightforward.
The large size of Polish municipalities, especially considering that rural communities
consist of several villages, brings forth the question of territorial representation. Is there a
real danger that the largest settlement unit may dominate the decision making, leading
to financial and economic development policies biased in favor of the central town or
village? In regards to this question, we have no systematic observations. Available
information suggests this is very unlikely to happen. As it is argued later in this section,
village leaders do not see territorial conflicts as important dimension of local politics.
The electoral system in the vast majority of multi-settlement municipalities is based on
one-councilor wards. So, each part of the municipality has its own councilor. Such a
system prevents the danger of domination by the largest town/village in the council.
Available data also suggests that, in most municipalities, allocation of resources among
geographical parts of the municipality is usually more or less proportional to need and
the populations living in these parts. Let’s briefly analyze the case of Goldap municipality,
a typical example of a mixed urban-rural municipality. It consists of the town of Goldap
(inhabited by about 70% of the whole municipality) and several small villages nearby
(with remaining 30% of population). In 2001, about 75% of capital spending was
related to investments implemented in the town and about 25% of spending went to
projects in the surrounding villages [Miros, 2002]. This means, the proportion per
capita spending in the town was not substantially different from the percentage of
town population to the total population of local government.
This does not mean that operation of multi-settlement local governments is ideal
and problem free. Research conducted on the small urban-rural local government of
Dukla shows that citizens, as well as local leaders in individual villages, concentrate
mostly on the problems in their village, and very rarely do they have common interests
and issues concerning the whole local government unit [Mielczarek, Doman´ska, 1999].
Local political life and discussions among councilors are very often organized around
bargain sessions as to which village should get the next investment funds and the
meaning of the individual projects, relating to the overall local government strategy, is
very often overlooked. All the same, the final result of this process is usually a relatively
balanced allocation of resources between geographical sections of the local government,
not a domination of one town or village.
However, according to village leaders9  surveyed in December 2001,10  territorial
conflicts between individual villages are not seen as frequent occurrences. Only 19%
of respondents said these conflicts are important, while much more often the
significance of other types of conflicts that was indicated. The most common conflict,
according to village leaders, is the conflict between “us” and “them”, i.e. between
groups of citizens and local bureaucrats (41% indicate this as important). This was
followed by conflicts between occupational groups (for example, farmers and the non-
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farming population), conflicts between rich and poor citizens, and conflicts between
political groups. Among suggested options, only conflicts between old and newly
arriving (migrant) populations was seen as less important among villages than within
local government (see also Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.9
The Most Important Social Conflicts in Local Rural Governments
According to Village Leaders (2001) [% Answers—“Very important”]
The majority of village leaders assess contact with municipal authorities as sufficient
(53%) and the general atmosphere of co-operation as good (54%). However, almost
40% claim that municipal authorities are not interested in regular contact with villages
and their leaders.
Giving limited financial autonomy to villages is not unique, though it is not uniform
practice either. In almost half of the instances (47%), local government allocated small
amounts of the budget for minor village investments, to be both decided and managed
locally. In 33% of the cases, part of the revenue from local taxes (usually from the
agriculture tax) was kept in the villages in which they were collected. It is a small
fraction of the municipal budget, at least it gives a taste of limited autonomy to the
individual villages.
Taking into account the observations quoted above, it is surprising that various
functions’ management is not delegated to villages more frequently. Such a “internal
decentralization” was declared by only 25% of our respondents. The most frequent
cases of managerial decentralization include: management of village culture centers,
repairs for local village roads, street lighting and transport of pupils to the schools.
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We can also provide some innovative examples of more radical decentralization
within local government. In one rural municipality [Zell, 2001b], each village receives
a portion of revenues from the property tax and agriculture tax collected within its
territory. They can also keep the revenue from rental of village municipal property.
Villages in that gmina are responsible for the maintenance of sport-grounds, of some of
local roads and bus stops. They also support local kindergartens and primary schools.
A very good example of far-reaching decentralization in rural areas is the rural
gmina of Brzeg in the Opole region. It has decided to transfer part of its communal
property to individual villages [Zell, 2001a]. Villages in this gmina are allowed to keep
a part of local budget revenues (plus, 100% of the agriculture tax), and are responsible
for some services such as transport of their children to the local schools, local street
lighting and maintenance of local roads. They have also their own (although very
limited) investment budget, which is spent according to the agreed village priorities.
Our survey sought to verify the hypothesis that larger municipalities, and muni-
cipalities with the most villages, facilitate more intense territorial conflicts and the
contact between municipal authorities and individual village leaders is much worse.
However, this hypothesis has not been confirmed by the empirical data from our
survey. The first analysis has even suggested the opposite to this casual relationship.
The correlation between population, size of local government, and intensity of contacts
is positive (+0.151**)11  and even stronger (+0.180***) concerning the atmosphere of
this co-operation. Bigger municipalities are also more willing to leave some resources
for village investment (correlation +0.213***) and leave revenues from some local taxes
(+0.188***). The number of villages in a municipality proved to be statistically in-
significant. However, this result is biased by the presence of mixed urban-rural local
governments in our sample. They are usually larger (in terms of population) and more
aware of the necessity to decentralize and maintain good contact with village leaders.
The picture changes if we separate the sub-group of “pure” rural local governments.
In larger local governments, the intensity of conflicts is larger. Perhaps this is because
they are more internally diversified. Interestingly enough, it affects rich vs. poor and
political groups’ conflicts much more than territorial conflicts between villages. In
larger rural governments (both in terms of number of villages and total population
size), contact with village leaders is much more frequent–perhaps they are seen as more
important within larger municipalities. On the other hand, bigger rural governments
are less willing to decentralize their finances (correlation of receiving resources for village
investments with population number is –0.191** and with the number of villages—
0.153**).
There is another variable that helps to reduce the intensity of conflicts and improve
the atmosphere of co-operation between municipal authorities and village leaders. This
is financial affluence. In general, local authorities with more money (in per capita
terms) are more often able to construct successful co-operation and function without
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devastating conflicts (compare Table 5.12). However, there seems to be a threshold
revenue (about 1,200 PLN), if exceeded, by which the authorities begin to loose their
good relationship with the village leaders.
Table 5.12
Village Leaders’ Opinions on Contacts With Municipal Authorities (2001)
Municipal Budget Revenues Frequent Enough Co-Operation Is Good More Conflict
Per Capita  Contact than Co-Operation
Up to 1,000 PLN 40% 36% 14%
1,000–1,100 PLN 54% 54% 8%
1,100–1,200 PLN 59% 59% 5%
Over 1,200 PLN 56% 51% 12%
Interests of the auxiliary units in rural areas are represented by the National
Association of Village Heads (Krajowe Stowarzyszenie Soltysów), a relatively influential
lobbying group.
The city of Kraków provides one of the most interesting examples of the decen-
tralization policy within a big city. Kraków City Council decided to divide the city
into 18 districts. They have been given discretion to decide upon certain functions
including:
• Repairs to primary schools, kindergartens and nurseries;
• Repairs to local roads, pavements and street lighting;
• Modernization of playgrounds;
• Taking care of local green areas;
• Overseeing local cultural events.
The city council must approve the rules relating to the established method of
financing the decentralized functions. A separate resolution by the Kraków council
created a stable framework for supporting small investment projects, such as construction
and modernization of water and sewage systems, as initiated by neighborhood groups.
4.4 Size and Function of Local Democracy
—An Attempt at Conclusions
Summing up the observations from the whole of Section 4, citizens perception and
interest in local government activity is usually better in small municipalities rather
than large. Exceptions to this rule, although they do exist, are not very numerous.
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Citizens in small municipalities are more interested in local policy issues, and better
communicate with local authorities. They also trust their authorities more and are
more satisfied with local service delivery. They also feel better represented by local
councilors than residents in big cities. The nature of the sociological data available is
such that we can usually only make conclusions about the differences between rural
and urban areas and between small and big cities. Therefore, we cannot be sure to what
extent a discovered relationship tells us anything about the impact of size itself and to
what extent, about the difference between urban and rural life, and/or about the
difference between life in a small urban town and big city. Yet, the rare cases where we
were able to analyze the impact of size directly (for example, through analysis of voter
turn-out, mayoral opinions about citizens interest in local politics, mayoral turn-over,
education and age structure for councilors) suggest that size does matter–not only are
there statistically significant differences between rural and urban settlements, but also
between small and big rural municipalities.
Nevertheless, drawing the conclusion that, by dividing a municipality, one may
increase the levels of trust, satisfaction with local government activity or willingness to
be active in local public affairs would be a simplification. The story of 23 mixed urban-
rural communes that split in 1991 is very telling [see Jalowiecki, 1995]. As mentioned
in Section 4.1, available analysis suggests that, the number of citizens satisfied by a
split, years after the event, outscores the number of those who think it was better
before the split. Even so, the number of those indifferent is much larger still. Also the
perceived negative consequences are as numerous as the positive feedback on the
organizational change.
The pressure to split was more frequent in municipalities with less than average
affluence–one may speculate that lack of satisfaction of needs, stimulates mutual
complaints and tensions between the city and rural villages. But did the split lead to
policies which would better reflect local preferences? It seems that, in the case of tax
policies and allocation of sector spending, this has been true to large extent. Tax
policies in new municipalities have been significantly different. For newly created city
governments, tax policies usually have concentrated on stimulation of economic activity
(average tax rates quite high, but with tax incentives for preferred economic activities)
while in new rural municipalities, they have been closer to the populist model with
reduced tax rates for the majority of voters but high rates for local enterprises. Also,
resource allocation between sectors was considerably different in newly created urban
and rural governments. It is very difficult to reach a final conclusion about the impact
of splitting to local democracy. Then again, most of residents had ambivalent feelings
for a few years after the split. They also thought the change was initiated and worked
to the favor of local politicians and their ambitions and it is very hard to find any
evidence of increased of activity within the local community. Yet again, the number of
satisfied citizens was larger than the number of clearly disappointed citizens and
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observation of local policy changes suggest they began to reflect the variation in local
preferences more closely.
5. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ALLOCATION
OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN TIERS OF GOVERNMENT
It is frequently argued that large local governments can be responsible for a wider scope
of functions. On an empirical basis, such a thesis has been supported by Page and
Goldsmith (1987) in their comparative study of the European local government system,
quoted already in Chapter 1. Consequently, larger local government units allow for
more radical decentralization. This claim seems to be confirmed by Polish data; by
citizen and leader perception as well as by the actual behavior of small local governments,
which are more afraid of new functions.
As it has been reported in the “Public Perception of Local Governments” study
[Swianiewicz, 2001], several proofs indicate that general support for transferring more
functions to local governments in Poland has been greater in big cities than in small
towns or rural communities. These variations by community size probably have two
parallel explanations. The first is rooted in the empirical observation that small local
governments are not prepared to deliver a wide range of functions. They usually do not
have enough qualified staff, the majority of users of some services recruit from more
than one local government, and the delivery of many functions by small territorial
units would lead to diseconomies of scale. These are all arguments discussed elsewhere
in this chapter and sociological surveys seem to confirm that many people are aware of
these difficulties. This is so, despite citizens of small towns and villages being of a very
good opinion about their local governments’ present activities.
The second reason might be of a political nature. Since at least 1993, the PSL
(Peasant’s Party) has been strongly opposed to many decentralization reforms, including
any transferring of responsibility for primary schools to municipal governments. The
PSL influence is strongest in small, rural communities. This means that respondents’
skepticism may partially reflect the opinions of their political leaders. However, one
may argue that it is exactly the political base of PSL, in small and relatively weak local
governments, which makes this party oppose some decentralization reforms.
The same pattern of variation has been reflected in the actual decisions made by
local governments. Before 1996, when accepting responsibility for schools was voluntary,
“brave decisions” were much more frequent in larger units. This correlation was
especially visible at the beginning of decentralization reform (1991–1992), when
responsibility for schools was accepted by less than 10% of rural communities but by
over 33% of cities over 100,000 residents. Also, in 1994, a total of 21% rural municipal
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local governments managed the primary schools. But in cities over 50,000 residents,
it was over 40% and in cities over 100,000, over 90% [Thurmaier, Swianieiwicz,
1996]. As analysis of the 1994 data proves this relationship cannot be reduced to an
urban-rural variation as to the pattern of behavior–it remains valid only if we consider
rural communities. Moreover, if we compare rural and urban muni-cipalities with
similar population sizes, there were rural governments who were often more willing to
take over responsibility for schools. This is illustrated in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10
Percent of Local Governments Who Took Over Responsibility
for Primary Schools Before 1995
Willingness to oversee management of schools was also related to the affluence of
local governments measured by per capita own revenues of local budgets. One might
expect that larger local governments are more affluent and that is why they were taking
over schools before smaller units. However, statistical data does not support such a
claim. In multi-variable analysis, size is more important than affluence of local budget
and, in a group of rural municipalities, the significance of affluence disappears completely.
It means there were also other factors (perhaps qualification of local staff was one of
them) related to size which played an important role.
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There is also evidence that administrative capacity, to provide services efficiently,
grows with an increase in population size [Swianiewicz, 2000]. In 1999, the ratio of
personal computers per one hundred employees varied from 36, in municipalities
with less than 5,000 residents, to over 57, in cities over 50,000 (see also Table 5.12).
Similarly, the proportion of local governments that declared Internet use and their
own web-site varied from 35%, in municipalities below 5,000, to over 80%, in
municipalities over 10,000. This relationship is also statistically significant if we consider
rural areas only. Moreover, regardless, whether we consider all local governments or
only rural, 10,000 population seems to be a turning point between offices with low or
with high technical potential to support their administration. A similar breaking point
was also found in case of decisions to take over responsibility for primary schools before
the compulsory date.
Also Bartkowska-Nowak (2001), in describing formal procedures for recruiting
and promoting staff in Polish cities,12  discovered that the sophistication of staff manage-
ment techniques increased with the size of government. For example, in large local
governments use of following was much more frequent: training programs for staff,
evaluation of training, formal job descriptions.
Table 5.13
Size of Municipality and Technical Capacity
of the Local Administration (1999)
Population Size PCs Per 100 Employees Internet Use and Own Web-Site
All Municipalities Rural Only All Municipalities Rural Only
Pearson’s Correlation 0.271*** 0.137* 0.209** 0.253**
Up to 5,000 36 36 35 36
5–7,000 37 35 43 41
7–10,000 35 36 37 41
10–20,000 44 48 83 92
20–50,000 48 79
Over 50,000 57 80
NOTE: * on .05 level
** on .01 level and
*** correlation significant on .001 level .
SOURCE: Survey of 208 local administrations.
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6. SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
Capacity of the local government to influence economic development depends on several
factors. In this section, we examine some of them. One of the most powerful instruments
is provision of infrastructure, which increases investment attractiveness and makes existing
firms more competitive. In Poland, there are municipal governments which are respons-
ible for most the infrastructure and that is why we limit our analysis to this tier of
government. To compare only governments with similar functions, we exclude cities
with county status.
The capacity to undertake investment projects depends on fiscal revenues and burden
of operational spending. Total revenues per capita grow with the size of a local
government, however, this relationship is not very strong (compare Tables 5.13 and
5.14).13  But even this relationship is mostly a difference between urban and rural
municipalities. If we analyze rural gminas only, the relationship is even the opposite–
larger means financially weaker. The picture changes a little bit if we consider only
revenues from own and shared taxes. The dependence on revenues on the size of
municipality becomes stronger, but it completely disappears if we limit our analysis to
rural communities. The difference results from smaller municipalities’ higher dependency
on state transfers (mainly in form general and specific grants from the state budget)
and higher burdens for operational spending. One may draw a very clear conclusion–
small local governments are more costly for the public finance system; they require
higher transfers, mostly due to higher per capita current spending. This relationship is
valid both for analysis of all Polish municipalities as well as for rural communes only. In
the latter case, there is a clear difference between municipalities smaller and larger than
population 10,000. One may expect that the fragmentation of relatively large rural
governments in Poland would result in an increased demand on the state budget to
provide the grants necessary to cope with the burden of increased operational spending.
Investment spending per capita is also higher in larger municipalities. Again, this
correlation seems to result from the difference between urban and rural areas as well as
from the difference between small and big cities. The difference between small and
large rural governments is very weak. One may speculate that only some of local
government investment, those related to infrastructure projects, has a direct impact on
economic development. However, the relationship with the size looks similar regardless
of which group of investments we consider. The only exception to this rule is the
higher burden of investment related to social welfare function in big cities and higher
investments in education facilities (mostly schools buildings) in small municipalities.
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Table 5.13a
Indicators of Capacity to Promote Local Economic Development and Size of Municipalities (2000)
Size Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Fixed Fixed Registered New Physical Development
Current Total Own and Transfers Investment Expenditures Expenditures Companies Master Plan Strategy
Spending* Revenues* Shared to Local Spending* as % of the Per Capita* With Foreign Prepared by Prepared by
Revenues* Government* Total Budget* Capital Per the End of the End of
1000 Citizens 2000 [%] 2000 [%]
1–3,000 1,154 1,377 543 834 292 70.0 735 0.62 42 42
3–4,000 1,106 1,395 578 817 243 71.9 736 0.35
4–5,000 1,028 1,221 434 787 239 72.6 710 0.31
5–6,000 1,010 1,189 427 767 213 68.2 655 0.36 38 37
6–8,000 981 1,169 434 735 221 67.4 650 0.39
8–10,000 965 1,146 440 706 227 66.9 640 0.36 52 47
10–15,000 961 1,152 500 652 236 63.6 615 0.56 58 53
15–20,000 956 1,121 541 621 222 63.0 598 0.66
20–30,000 976 1,149 602 547 226 60.5 588 0.65 67 55
30–50,000 992 1,166 706 460 240 55.6 565 0.91
50–100,000 974 1,136 707 425 248 56.3 562 0.69 65 53
100–300,000 1.12
Over 300,000 2.66
NOTE: *due to different functions, and difficulties in direct comparisons with other cities, cities of county status have been excluded from these columns.
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Size Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Fixed Fixed Registered New Physical Development
Current Total Own and Transfers Investment Expenditures Expenditures Companies Master Plan Strategy
Spending Revenues Shared to Local Spending as % of the Per Capita With Foreign Prepared by Prepared by
Revenues Government Total Budget Capital Per the End of the End of
1000 Citizens 2000 [%] 2000 [%]
1–3,000 1,113 1,305 457 849 269 71.1 721 0.24 42 44
3–4,000 1,099 1,391 565 826 239 72.3 735 0.29
4–5,000 1,008 1,198 404 794 234 73.3 708 0.22
5–6,000 998 1,177 401 776 216 68.7 655 0.28 36 36
6–8,000 961 1,153 409 744 224 67.3 648 0.31
8–10,000 947 1,131 421 710 228 67.6 638 0.31 52 48
10–15,000 936 1,143 466 667 256 63.8 614 0.51 52 61
15–25,000 903 1,100 437 664 237 63.3 604 0.58
Table 5.13b
Indicators of Capacity to Promote Local Economic Development and Size of the Municipality—Rural Local
Governments Only (2000)
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Table 5.14
Person’s Correlations Between Size of Municipality and Various Indicators
of Capacity to Promote Economic Growth (2000)
All Municipal Governments Rural Governments Only
Total Revenues Per Capita(x) 0.056** –0.072**
Own and Shared Revenues Per Capita(x) 0.115***
Operational Spending Per Capita(x) 0.105*** –0.191***
Transfers From Central Budget Per Capita(x) –0.167*** –0.283***
Investment Spending Per Capita (x) 0.099***
Fixed Spending as % of the Total Budget(x) –0.170*** –0.253***
Fixed Spending Per Capita (x) –0.101*** –0.251***
Registered Foreign Investments Per Capita 0.255*** 0.119***
Prepared New Drafts of Master Plans 0.165*** 0.151*
Prepared Development Strategy 0.159*
NOTES: (x)—without cities of county status. *  Correlations significant on .05 level; **  Correlation
significant on 0.01 level; ***  Correlation significant on 0.001 level. Blank spaces mean correlation
insignificant on at least 0.05 level.
Small local governments capacity to make strategic decisions is also limited by a
greater burden of fixed expenditures.14  This burden is higher for small municipalities
both in terms of percentage of the total budget and per capita base. In 2000, the
average share of fixed expenditures was over 70% in local governments below 5,000,
but below 60% in cities over 30,000. The difference is also clear if we only consider
rural gminas. In the latter case, the breakdown between smaller than 10,000 and larger
than 10,000 governments seems to be visible again.
To measure the capacity to promote economic development, we also analyzed
planning instruments. We use two specific indicators:
• preparation of new physical master plans. In 1996, Parliament changed the
law on physical planning requiring a new format of physical master plans to be
prepared by the end of 1999. We analyzed how many of local governments
were able to fulfill this obligation on time [for source of data see Swianiewicz,
2000]. In fact, many local governments had problems preparing the plan on
time and finally the Parliament had to ‘give up’—deciding to delay the deadline
by another two years. Only 30% of local governments prepared new plans before
the original deadline, another 23% had begun preparation, while the remaining
48% did nothing. Local governments have been very slow despite failing to
prepare the new plan could result in inability to grant any building permits
262
C O N S O L I D A T I O N  O R  F R A G M E N T A T I O N ?
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
after 1 January 2000 (not delaying the deadline would then nearly freeze any
housing or commercial investments in almost half of the country).
• number of local governments who have prepared strategies for local development.
In both of cases, larger local governments performed considerably better than small
municipalities. In case of physical master plans this correlation is stronger (than in case
of preparation of development strategic programs) and remains valid (although is much
weaker) when we limit our analysis to rural governments only. It can probably be
explained by the lower administrative capacity of small municipalities. Very small
organizations are less able to cope with complicated, new tasks.
7. UNIT COST, CATCHMENT AREA, QUALITY OF MUNICIPAL
SERVICES AND THE SIZE OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
For most local services, comparison of unit costs and the quality of delivered product is
extremely difficult. It is so both because of methodological traps and frequent lack of
relevant, reliable data. In the following subsections we try to analyze issues of unit
costs, catchment area and service quality in three, relatively simple and well-documented
cases. However, in these cases we can also not avoid some abridgements.
In regards to unit costs, all three cases document economy of scale, i.e. decreasing
standard unit costs along with the increase of service area. Proving the economy of scale
phenomena would be more difficult for other services Polish local governments are
responsible for. But in contrast, we do not know any empirical analysis which would
show (for any of the local services in Poland) the opposite case—i.e. the increase of costs
together with the increase size of local government unit.
In general, small municipal governments spend more (on per capita base) on current
operation, despite (as it has been noted in Section 4) their own and shared revenues are
lower. In 2000, the average municipality under population 4,000 was spending more
than 1,100 zloty per capita on current operation, while municipalities with over 6,000
inhabitants were spending less than 1,000 zloty per capita. Comparing smaller size
cohorts, one may notice that current expenditures per capita gradually decrease up to
the size of about 6–8,000, then remain relatively flat for larger local governments.
7.1 Basic Administrative Services
Current spending on local administration is relatively simple to analyze. Moreover,
following the Sharpe (1995) distinction, analyzing the administrative overhead, we
can really focus on the differences between small and big government, not on the
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variation between urban and rural. The same statistical relations remain valid regardless
of whether we take into account all local governments, only rural or only urban units.
The negative correlation between the size of local government and per capita
spending on local administration has been already described for Poland in the 1994
and 1996 data [Swianiewicz 1996; Swianiewicz, Amos, 1998]. It has also been supported
by the 2000 data presented in Table 5.15. We took into consideration only local
governments with comparable scopes of administrative tasks. That is why we excluded
the Warsaw city boroughs from municipal governments (due to specific division of
functions between tiers of government in Warsaw) and cities of a county status (which
are responsible for more functions than other municipalities). The correlation coefficient
between the size and per capita spending on administration is –0.339 (significant on
0.001 level) and between size and percent of budget spent on administration –0.434
(also significant on 0.001 level). The average per capita spending on administration in
a local government with a population under 3,000 is more than twice of the amount
spent per citizen in a city over 50,000. But differences are also very visible within the
group of small (for Polish standards) governments. The average Polish rural government
has population of about 7,000. Such governments spend 40% less on administration
than smaller gmina (having under 3,000 inhabitants) and 20% more than big rural
gmina (with populations over 15,000). Parallel, with increasing size, administration
spending becomes a decreasing burden from the total current budget (from 22% in
the smallest local governments to below 15% in units with populations over 15,000,
and below 13% in cities over 50,000).
The same negative correlation has also been established (although it is not as strong
in the case of municipalities) for county level government. Average per capita spending
on administration in the smallest group (below 50,000) is over 50% higher than in
the largest counties.
But one should take notice of Table 5.21, there is an even higher variation of
administration costs within individual size groups. It means, though size is a good
predictor of spending, it is not the only one. The affluence of local government is an
even more powerful explanatory variable. The correlation coefficient between per capita
spending on administration and total revenues per capita is +0.572. It is also very high
within individual size groups (varying from +0.398 for cities over 50,000 to +0.891
for governments between 3 and 4,000–all coefficients significant on 0.001 level).
The conclusions below may be additionally strengthened by an observation
concerning the split of 23 mixed urban-rural governments in 1991. After the split, per
capita administrative overhead increased by 20% [Swianiewicz, 1996].
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Table 5.15a
Current Spending on Administration and the Size of Local Government (2000)
Municipal Governments (Without Cities of County Status)
Population Size of N Operational Spending on Spending on Administration
Local Government Administration Per Capita [PLN] as % of Current Expenditures
(Thousands) Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum
Below 3 82 256 124 990 22.0 15.0 33.3
3–4 195 216 134 1056 19.8 11.7 32.5
4–5 303 186 101 370 18.2 10.6 28.4
5–6 291 180 104 470 17.8 10.7 31.1
6–8 470 163 91 460 16.6 10.2 27.8
8–10 303 150 85 365 15.5 9.1 32.8
10–15 352 146 80 375 15.1 8.5 27.2
15–20 153 137 84 288 14.3 8.7 25.7
20–50 231 129 72 344 13.1 8.5 21.4
50–100 33 121 75 176 12.4 8.4 16.8
Table 5.15b
Current Spending on Administration and the Size of Local Government (2000)
County Governments (Without Cities of County Status)
Population Size of N Operational Spending on Spending on Administration
Local Government Administration Per Capita [PLN] as % of Current Expenditures
(Thousands) Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum
Below 50 53 66 49 109 14.4 7.5 34.5
50–60 45 63 49 96 13.1 8.3 24.6
60–70 34 59 45 87 13.3 8.8 28.1
70–80 41 53 43 68 13.0 8.3 27.7
80–100 53 54 39 75 13.7 8.1 31.5
100–150 60 49 31 74 12.2 8.2 30.3
Over 150 22 43 28 52 12.2 5.0 22.8
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7.2 Primary and Secondary Education
The management of kindergartens, as well as primary and secondary schools, is currently
one of the most important and certainly the most expensive tasks undertaken by Polish
local government. Since 1990, municipalities have been responsible for maintenance
and development of pre-school education. In 1996, they took on the primary schools
(including hiring teachers) and, in 1999, counties have managed most types of secondary
schools as well as some non-mandatory educational units. To fully understand the role
of education in the Polish model of territorial self-government, it is important to realize
that, in some municipalities (especially small ones), the share of education expenditures
often exceeds half of the total annual budget.
Pre-school education is financed through own revenues of the municipalities.
Therefore, the attendance rate for children, 3–5 years old, depends on the cultural
variation and also the development of the kindergarten network as well as on the financial
capacity of the gmina consequently.
Primary and secondary education are supposed to be financed by part of a general
purpose grant received by the local authorities from the central government. This part
of the grant is called an education subvention and is aimed at covering the current
costs of school system in municipalities and counties.15  The education grant is calculated
on the basis of the weighted number of students in the municipality/county schools.
The a-priori set standard subvention is granted to the local government for each
“weighted student”.
In 2000, municipalities’ current expenditures on education (even excluding
spending on kindergartens) exceeded the received subvention by 20%. However, it
must be emphasized that the years 1999 and 2000 were exceptional in terms of local
governments’ financial efforts because of the substantial reforms of Polish education
system in process at the time .16 There is no point, at least in this paper, in comparing
education expenditure figures for the different years, since both the method of calculating
the school subvention and the scope of local government responsibilities have changed
dramatically.
Table 5.16
Current Expenditures Over the Amount of Received Grants
in Three Types Polish Municipalities (2000)
Total All Rural Municipalities All Mixed Municipalities All Urban Municipalities
20.0% 21.0% 24.3% 17.8%
Considering both primary and secondary education, there seems to be two kinds of
units where the deficit of current expenditures on education is the highest. The first
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type can be characterized as a small rural municipality with an ineffective network of
low-quality small primary schools. The “per student” costs in such municipalities are
higher because the small size of schools and classes increase the share of fixed costs in
total expenditures. This may lead to a low quality of education, since municipality
spends all the resources on current needs and is unable to provide better equipment/
faculties/teachers.
The other extreme example of high education cost occurs in the big city, where
teachers’ salaries are high,17 school programs include more faculties, and the school
equipment is better than average. The ministerial subvention does not cover the total
current expenditures, but the city spends it’s own resources in order to attract students,
teachers, investors, etc.
It seems that, for the further discussion on the relationship between size and effective-
ness of municipalities, only the first case of high cost education (small units with
inappropriate school network) is relevant.
Secondary education in Poland is highly concentrated in urban areas. Only 7% of
students attend secondary schools located in rural areas. Moreover, many students
choose schools located outside their home county. In theory, this should not cause any
disturbance to the financial system. Since the ministerial subvention is calculated per
student enrolled in the county’s schools, a migrating student simply brings money to
the county where he or she arrives to study. In reality, however, some counties invest
their own resources towards the school system in addition to those received in the form
of education grants. Therefore, students migrating to such counties act as “free riders”—
benefiting from the local taxpayers’ effort. This is especially the case for the 65 cities
with county status having dual status as a municipality and a county. These cities
experience a significant migration of secondary school students. The problem can be
defined in terms of the size of administrative unit, since the administrative boundaries
obviously do not fit to the scope of the market for services provided by the county.
The three issues briefly discussed above are analyzed in the following sub-sections.
We now focus on the cost efficiency of public education as a measure of local govern-
ments’ performance. This approach makes educational activities of different muni-
cipalities comparable, but omits the quality of the education services, hardly measurable
in the Polish education system. Until 2002, all examinations in Polish schools were
conducted and evaluated by local teachers. Therefore, the examination results do not
reflect the differences in school quality. Other indicators, such as pupil/teacher or
pupil/class ratios, are strongly correlated to the unit cost of education and are not
worth discussing separately.
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7.2.1 Pre-School Education and the Size of Local Government
The hypothesis: Smaller (less populated) municipalities have lower financial potential and,
therefore, are less capable of providing pre-school education to its citizens.
As mentioned above, kindergartens are supposed to be fully financed by municipalities
from their own revenues. This explains why local kindergartens attendance rates became
one of the most frequently used indicators of gminas’ financial self-sufficiency and
ability to provide municipal services. Table 5.17 shows the average kindergarten
attendance rate for various types of municipalities.
Not surprisingly, the highest (still, not very high) average rate is observed in urban
areas. Yet, there are towns where pre-school education practically does not exist (min.
attendance at 1.3%) and, yet again, rural municipalities where over 80% of children,
3–5 years old, attend kindergarten. Although cities are more populated than rural
areas, and have bigger per capita own revenues (see Section 6), the differences in mean
attendance rates are not enough to prove a relationship between size and ability to
provide pre-school education services. It is common knowledge that parents in Polish
villages are less interested in sending their children to kindergartens, so, the variation of
rates presented in Table 5.17 may simply reflect variation in consumers’ preferences.
Table 5.17
Average Kindergarten Attendance Rate of Children, 3–5 Years Old,
in Polish Municipalities (2000)
N Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
Rural 1,548 17.1% 0.0% 83.0% 14.6%
Mixed 567 27.9% 0.5% 75.9% 13.4%
Urban 307 44.2% 1.3% 96.7% 12.3%
Therefore, to neutralize the influence of the rural life style, it seems reasonable to
examine the variation of childrens’ attendance to kindergartens within the category of
rural municipalities. We assume that there are no significant differences in parents’
attitude toward kindergartens amongst the rural villages.
Table 5.18 shows that attendance rates increase along with the size of municipality,
as expressed in terms of population size, even if we limit our analysis to rural areas only.
The average attendance in municipalities with 5,000–10,000 inhabitants is close to the
average for all rural units. The rates for two largest size categories is almost equal, which
may suggest that 21% is a natural (not limited by the capacity of local government)
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attendance to kindergartens for rural areas. If this is so, we could intuitively claim that
the population number in rural municipality should not be lower than 10,000 in order
to provide the local government the potential to maintain their kindergartens.
Table 5.18
Kindergartens Attendance Rate in Rural Municipalities (1999)
Population Kindergartens Attendance Rate
Less than 3,000 11.9
3,000–5,000 15.2
5,000–10,000 17.2
10,000–15,000 21
15,000–25,000 21.2
7.2.2 The Primary School Network, School Size,
and the Size of the Municipality
Hypothesis: Small (in terms of population number and population density) municipalities
tend to have small schools and classes which leads to increased unit costs for education.
An average primary school in a Polish rural municipality has 148 students, in comparison
to 540 in the city. The average rural class size is 18 students, while in the city—24.
This disproportion is an obvious consequence of different settlement organizations. In
many villages, the primary school is the only social and cultural center. For this reason,
local authorities often prefer to maintain an economically ineffective school network.
The ministry of education encourages the mayors to rationalize the local school system
but, at the same time, the per-student education grant for rural areas is 33% higher
than for cities (note that the average class size ratio for urban and rural areas is 1.33).
Table 5.19 shows that, in 2000, the average municipality spent over 20% more on
education (current expenditure only) than it received within the education grant. This
rule held in all kinds of municipalities, which shows that the subvention has been
considered equally insufficient for rural and urban local governments.
As shown in Table 5.20, per-student expenditures in rural municipalities are also
about 30% higher in rural areas than those in cities. At the same time, the average per-
capita own revenues in rural municipalities are only 60% of those in cities’. This
implies that expenditures over the received subvention create much bigger financial
burdens for rural gminas than for the cities.
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Table 5.19
Received Subvention and Resources Spent on Education by
the Municipalities (2000)
Municipalities Total Subvention Total Resources Average Expenditures
Received Spent on Education Over Subvention
Rural 3,979,028 4,798,432 20.6%
Mixed 2,657,125 3,302,609 24.3%
Urban 7,472,635 9,067,450 21.3%
Table 5.20
Expenditure on Primary Education and Budget Revenues in Polish
Municipalities (2000)
Municipalities Expenditure Per Student Per Capita Own
and Shared Revenues
Rural 3,509 433
Mixed 3,104 512
Urban* 2,860 762
* Excluding cities with county status.
To examine the relationship between the municipality size and unit cost of primary
education, one must realize that the strongest determinant of per-student expenditures
is the size of classrooms in local schools. The correlation coefficient for per-student
spending and average class size is –0.68, which must be considered high, since the
calculation involved the entire Polish municipal population.
Our research hypothesis says that sparsely populated gminas tend to maintain smaller
schools and school classes, which leads to extremely high unit expenditures for education.
Again, we restrict our analysis to rural municipalities in order to neutralize disparities
coming from dramatically different settlement organizations. Table 5.21 confirms that
average class size increases along with population (except in very small municipalities).
Also, the unit cost of primary education in rural gminas is clearly negative in relation to
population.
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Table 5.21
Rural Municipality Size (Population) and Average Per Student Expenditures
on Primary Education (2000)
Population Average Class Size (Students) Per Student Current
Expenditures
0–3,000 17.8 4,181
3,000– 5,000 17.5 4,184
5,000–10,000 18 4,047
10,000–15,000 19.1 3,917
15,000–25,000 19.7 3,824
7.2.3 The Problem of Free Riding Within Secondary Education
Hypothesis: Big cities with dual (municipality and county) status provide secondary education
services not only to their own citizens. The service catchment area is larger than the
administrative jurisdiction. This leads to inefficiency caused by the free-riding phenomenon.
In order to illustrate the inconsistency of the city-county size and the territorial scope
of its educational services, it is enough to compare the attendance to secondary schools
in some cities with county status and the surrounding areas.17  The average attendance
rate in cities-counties is 132%, which obviously means that a substantial part of the
students come from outside the county to benefit from the high quality teaching,
better equipment, and further professional opportunities. Table 5.22 below presents
the comparison of attendance rates in 5 big cities and surrounding units (so-called
“around-the-city counties”).
As we can see, in all cities examined the number of students exceeds the local
population base. In the most spectacular case of Rzeszów, only 32% of students which
graduated the primary schools in surrounding rzeszowski county continue their studies
there. In the neighboring city, the ratio of recently subscribed secondary students to
last year’s local primary school graduates is 2.11.
This phenomenon can be classified as an example of free riding, since the current
costs of education are not entirely covered by the education grant received by the county.
Moreover, as shown, the financial effort (measured by the ratio of education expenditures
to the received grant) is bigger in cities-counties than in surrounding areas.
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Table 5.22
Attendance Rate in the Secondary Schools of 10 Selected Counties in 2000
County Name County Type Students in First Class Students in First Class Students in Secondary
of Secondary Schools/ of Secondary Schools/ Schools/Population
Population of Graduates of Local of 15–18 Years Old
15 Years Old Primary Schools
Torun´ City 1.61 1.49 1.31
Torun´ski Surrounding 0.20 0.21 0.21
Rzeszów City 2.28 2.11 1.9
Rzeszowski Surrounding 0.31 0.32 0.28
Kraków City 1.45 1.38 1.28
Krakowski Surrounding 0.34 0.35 0.33
Wroclaw City 1.30 1.29 1.19
Wroclawski Surrounding 0.18 0.20 0.17
Olsztyn City 1.64 1.60 1.35
Olsztyn´ski Surrounding 0.42 0.49 0.38
Table 5.23
Cities and Surrounding Counties Financial Effort for Education (2000)
County Name County Type Current Expenditures on
Education/Received Subvention
Torun´ City 1.73
Torun´ski Surrounding 1.20
Rzeszów City 1.57
Rzeszowski Surrounding 1.10
Kraków City 1.62
Krakowski Surrounding 1.11
Wroclaw City 1.73
Wroclawski Surrounding 1.03
Olsztyn City 1.65
Olsztyn´ski Surrounding 1.17
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7.3 Voluntary Co-Operation Between Local Governments
In spite of the relatively large size of Polish local governments at a municipal level (in an
European comparative perspective), there are numerous cases in which local authorities
decide it is worth joining resources and efforts with their neighbors to achieve certain
goals or to deliver some public services jointly. Article 10, as well as the whole chapter
7 of the Gmina Government Act, allow and provide the legal framework for such
arrangements. The Association (Zwiazek) created in that way is a separate legal entity,
financed and managed jointly by several local governments.
The number of such inter-communal arrangements has been dynamically growing
throughout the last decade, as it is illustrated in Table 5.24.
Table 5.24
Number of Inter-Municipal Associations in Poland
1991 1992 1994 1996 2001 (January)
50 79 125 150 191
SOURCE: Karnkowski, 1996; Kowalska, 2002.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the most common associations dealt with
infrastructure networks covering the area of more than one local government—first
of all, water and sewage systems then public transportation and central heating
[Aziewicz, 1994].
There were a few other features which were characteristic for the later development
of inter-municipal co-operation:
• creation of associations focused not only on joint delivery of services, but on
joint problem solving for more general issues, sometimes not related to the
gmina compulsory functions. Organizations created for the joint promotion of
economic development, implementation of tourist development programs or
to deal with general issues related to environmental protection, are all good
examples of this process;
• one-purpose associations began to cover some other services, not related to
indivisible infrastructure. Under this new organization, the main focus was to
reduce unit costs of service delivery. Joint arrangements for solid waste collection
and disposal are a good example;
• the legal form of association, in some cases, proved to be inefficient and was
sometimes replaced by joint communal companies established by a few local
governments. The starting point for this change was an observation that noted,
under the association arrangement, the decision making process was too slow
(because delegates of individual local governments needed frequent consultations
˛
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with their local councils) and that the position of executive boards was too
weak. A company form is less vulnerable to such negative phenomena.
Obviously, the function of both associations and joint companies is not a remedy
for all the problems related to high unit-costs or difference between geographical borders
and the catchment area of services. There are many examples where the initial attempt
to establish the co-operation failed because local governments involved could not agree
on some principles of co-operation. Aziewicz (1998) gives also some examples of the
devastating conflicts in existing associations. Definitely not all the 191 can be treated
as successful cases. But in many cases, they did all help in more efficient implementation
of developmental policies or in better management of some services.
An interesting example of the successful single purpose association is an Association
of Municipalities in Jura Region, which involves 36 gminas working together on the
development of the tourist industry in the region. Over two thirds of the Association’s
budget comes from the members’ contributions. This contribution is relatively small
(about 10 cents per annum from every citizen in small local governments), so, it is not
a heavy burden on local budgets. But co-operation of several local governments allowed
for preparation of promotional materials and participation in international tourist
fairs, which would be impossible for any single municipality. Preparation of a high
quality video, filmed with the use of a hired helicopter, is just a one example. Successes
in the join promotion of the region prove that, no doubt, the co-operation has been
cost-effective.
7.3.1 Case Study–Solid Waste Management
Waste management is another example of a municipal task which is strongly related to
the size of municipality and often goes beyond the capacity of a single gmina. One may
ask why this function has not been transferred to county government, when the upper
tier of local government was created in 1999. This is especially surprising when taking
into account the fact that central government decided to leave this function with the
gmina but, at the same time, was trying to encourage gminas within one county to co-
operate on provision of the service. Probably, the only explanation is the promise made
by central government that the 1998/99 reforms would not result in any limitation of
gmina powers and function. One of the major arguments raised by opponents of the
reform was that new tiers would dominate municipalities and central government
made a promise in order to secure the support of municipal politicians.
Regardless of the reason for present allocation of this function, efficient waste
management tends to exceed single gmina borders. There seem to be two reasons for
this: management of solid waste is expensive and it is socially difficult. Some analysis
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even estimates that complex technological solutions in waste management can be
effectively implemented for a market of approximately 100,000 consumers (citizens)
or more (Regionalna gospodarka..., 1998). These high costs are almost impossible for
smaller units to independently carry out and are related to the cost of: (1) investment
in the preparation of a new site, (2) high level of constant costs, independent of the
number of users, (3) costs of technology for recycling and utilization of wastes.
The usual problem with waste management by local governments refers to the
NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) phenomenon. Waste treatment facilities (dumps,
recycling plants) are commonly recognized as necessary, but nobody wants them to be
established in his/her municipality. There is a strong believe that such facilities negatively
affect the quality of the local environment, cause diseases, etc., even if research has
proven the opposite.
Modern waste treatment infrastructure is expensive and not every municipality is
capable of getting it. Moreover it’s hardly efficient to build a facility for a single gmina,
lets call it “A”, since once the dump or recycling plant is established, it can be exploited
by several municipalities (B,C,D) . If the facility is located in “A”, the users B,C and D
may be required to pay a fee to the authorities of “A” or to cover most of the investment
cost as compensation to A’s for their social and economic burdens related to the building
and maintenance of the waste treatment facilities.
Such arguments lead Polish municipalities to join in on purpose-oriented associations
established in order to provide waste treatment services for its’ members. The existence
of these associations proves that that the actual size and potential of many municipalities
is inadequate, at least for some of the fulfilled tasks.
Table 5.25
Purpose–Oriented Associations of Gdynia and Slubice
Gdynia Slubice
Year of Establishment 1991 1997
Number of Member 5 12
Municipalities
Total Population [Thousands] 417 104
Total Area [km2] 432 2,497
Main Activities Water distribution, solid and Waste filling, dumping and
liquid waste collecting, dumping recycling, ecological education
and treatment, heating,
environmental protection
Initial Method of Financing Contributions of municipalities Contributions of municipalities
proportional to the proportional to the
population number population number
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The two examples of the function of one–purpose-associations, presented in the
Table 5.25, take place in different regions of Poland. The association located in Gdynia
(northern Poland) groups six member municipalities, two of which are big neighboring
cities with a joint population close to 300,000. The other association consists of 12,
relatively small, municipalities located near the western border of Poland, surrounding
the town of Slubice.
Both associations do not limit their activities to waste disposal, but manage also a
variety of issues from water distribution and heating (Gdynia), to ecological education
(Slubice). Table 5.25 shows the comparison of size, scope of activities and other details
concerning the two associations.
One well-known and successful example of co-operation in waste management is
the company Beskid, established in 1993 by 18 municipalities surrounding the town
of Z
·
ywiec [Starypan, 1999]. In order to improve management mechanisms and speed-
up the decision making process, local governments decided on a company instead of
the traditional form of inter-municipal co-operation. The idea behind the Z
·
ywiec region
joint waste management program was born in 1992 when the old waste disposal plant
capacity had exhausted. There were five new locations available for the dump-site, but
all of them met with the protests of local residents. Eventually, the only acceptable new
location was within the Z
·
ywiec city limits. City government had an obvious choice:
either it builds a plant for itself or it co-operates with the surrounding, mostly rural,
municipalities. There were two arguments for co-operation: (i) exploitation of the plant
by the city only would be much more expensive in terms of unit cots; (ii) due to
considerable externalities, only a joint waste management system would provide the
opportunity for a radical improvement in local environmental protection. Currently,
the company operates one of the most modern facilities in Poland and runs a successful
program of waste segregation and recycling. It is quite clear that the positive results of
the program would have been impossible for a single gmina to achieve.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Following the Keating (1995) concept, quoted in the introductory chapter, the quality
of local government functions can be evaluated as a sum of three factors:
• capacity for economic development;
• ability to provide high quality cheap services;
• functioning of local democracy.
Theoretical expectations concerning the impact of size on these broad categories
often go in opposite directions. For instance, with capacity for economic development
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growth with the size of local government according to reform theory, the ability to
mobilize larger resources for massive infrastructure projects seems to be a decisive factor.
But according to some public choice arguments, big bureaucracy problems can be
more visible in large administrations and small units competing for investments should
be more effective. Moreover, some neo-liberal concepts suggest that the ability to plan
strategically does not matter, since only the market can provide an optimal allocation
and any planning can have harmful effects by sending false signals to the market.
As far as the ability to provide services is concerned, reform theory argues for large
governments. This is both due to lower unit costs and the ability to provide more
services. But some public choice proponents suggest that size does not matter, since
services can be contracted-out to private providers.
Last, but not least, most of arguments for local democracy opts for small units
where contact between citizens and authorities is closer, bureaucracy is smaller, and
policies may better reflect local preferences. However, reform theory suggests that big
governments, having more functions, attract more citizens attention and that—following
Dahl’s (1961) classic concept—larger communities provide space for more interest
groups competing for influence, which leads to more pluralist political models.
How do these conflicting competing theories correspond with Polish reality? The
summary of findings is presented in Table 5.26. Capacity for economic development is
definitely larger in large local governments. Public choice counter-arguments on
bureaucratic difficulties in big organizations do not seem to be decisive. Ability to
provide more services, and to provide them cheaper, works again in favor of larger
territorial units. Once again, we could not find any evidence confirming public choice
expectations. It is important to stress that these findings do not reflect simply differences
between rural (small) and urban (big) governments, but have been confirmed by analysis
of the variation between small and large rural communities as well.
However, in the case of local democracy indicators, the picture is almost opposite.
Level of interest, trust and satisfaction with local government is much larger in small
territorial units, rather than in large ones. This time, public choice expectations are
confirmed and reform theory arguments, that larger capacity results in larger citizens
interest, seem to be on a false track. However, there is one exception to this rule—as
reform theorists suggested, larger local government seem to have a more pluralist model
of politics. The findings on a variation in social structure of councilors are difficult to
classify. The proportion of educated councilors grows with the size of the local
government. On one hand, this means that “human capital” in the council increases.
On the other hand, one may argue, since the structure of a council becomes more
distant from the structure of the whole local society, it may cause representation problems.
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Table 5.26
Size and Local Government Functioning—Summary of Polish Findings
Issue Category Variables (Indicators) Theoretical Expectations Empirical
According to: Evidence
in Poland
Reform Public Choice
Theory or Localism
(Economies Theory
of Scale)
Capacity for Financial Total revenues, per capita + + 0
Economic potential investment spending
Development
Share of own revenues, per + +
capita own revenues, low
dependency on state transfers
Burden of Low share of fixed current + +
inflexible costs (salaries, energy) in
spending total budget
Ability to Preparation of first plan of + — +/0
strategic strategic development and
planning physical master plan
Ability to Share of total grants and + — ?
gather non-state aid in investment
resources spending, attracted foreign
from support investments
programs and
attract foreign
investors
Ability Capacity to Low per capita spending + — +
to provide provide cheap on administration
services services
Low unit costs of primary + +
education
Reduced free loading and + +
other problems with
catchment area
Capacity to Willingness to take + — +
provide more responsibility for primary
services schools before compulsory
deadline
Citizens willingness to + — +
decentralize more functions
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Table 5.26 (Continued)
Size and Local Government Functioning—Summary of Polish Findings
Issue Category Variables (Indicators) Theoretical Expectations Empirical
According to: Evidence
in Poland
Reform Public Choice
Theory or Localism
(Economies Theory
of Scale)
Local Citizens’ Turn-out in elections, + — —
democracy interest declared interest
in local
government
Citizens’ Various survey measures — —
trust in local
governments
Pluralist local Competition + +
politics in local elections
Citizens’ Various survey measures — —
satisfaction
Political Number of councilors + ?
transaction constituting the majority,
costs the share of big political
parties representatives
among councilors, conflicts
between parts (villages,
city districts) of local
government’s territory
Democratic Number of councilors rep. — —
representation 1,000 inhabitants and per
settlement unit
Human Councilors’ level of + +
capital education
potential
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8.1 Efficient Function of the Municipality—Attempts
at Building a Composite Index and Relationship With Size
The goal of this attempt to build a composite index of local government efficiency is to
summarize the findings described in the previous sections as well as to confirm some
general, theoretical relationships between the size and efficiency in economic development
and public management.
The construction of an index will consist of three steps:
• STEP 1—Defining the efficiency (performance) in terms of the factors described
in previous section.
• STEP 2—Matching variables for the factors and developing the final formula
describing efficiency of the municipality.
• STEP 3—Verifying the relationship between size and efficiency.
8.1.1 Defining the Efficiency (Performance)
Let us consider the overall performance (P) of the municipality as the difference between
its economic potential (E) and the sum of costs related to provision of communal
services (S) and function of local democracy (D). The formula denoting municipality’s
performance is:
(1) P = a
1
 x E – (a
2
 x S + a
3
 x D)
where a
1
, a
2
, a
3
 are weights coefficients reflecting the contribution of factors to
overall performance of local government.
Thus, we assume the linear relationship between the measure of efficiency (P) and
each of the factors E,S,D. However, we do not impose any particular form of the
relationship between overall performance (P) and size of the municipality. Indeed, the
municipality’s size (measured by population) is introduced to the analysis indirectly,
via the factors E,S,D. What our indicator says is that the impact of size on the efficiency
of local governments is an aggregate of the three relationships:
• between size and economic potential;
• between size and efficiency in service provision;
• between size and quality of local democracy.
The crucial element of the index refers to values of weights a
1
, a
2
, a
3
, attributed
respectively to the factors E, S, D. The decision to pay more attention to one factor
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depends on the values we believe in, rather than on scientific considerations. Starting
with the democratic theory, we may treat functioning of democratic system as the
most important. In a more economic-pragmatic approach, we may focus on provision
ability and costs of services. But, for example, starting from Peterson’s “city limits”
theory (1981), we may assume that capacity to promote economic development is
absolutely crucial and, in fact, determines the ability of local government to perform
any other social functions.
The values of weights a
1
, a
2
, a
3
 clearly depend on some general assumptions made
by the researcher or, under another approach, on the importance attributed to different
issues of municipality’s public life by local society. Therefore, the goal of developing
the indicator should not be considered in terms of finding “the optimal size” of the
municipality or defining the precise function explaining the influence of population
number on the local quality of life. Instead, the indicator should show how the
relationship between size and efficiency changes in reaction to the shifts in the relative
importance given to the three elements constituting the local development.
8.1.2 Matching Variables, Developing the Final Formula for
the Efficiency (Performance)
The empirical application of the equation (1) is conducted with a sample of about
1,900 (out of 2,489) Polish municipalities. We have decided to exclude cases in which
impact of size may be significantly distorted by various factors:
• 65 cities with county status–due to different (wider) scope of tasks;
• boroughs of Warsaw, which have different functions than other municipalities;
• a few extremely affluent municipalities, in which the 2000 revenue per capita
exceeded the national mean, plus 10 standard deviations;
• municipalities located within metropolitan areas, whose functions and affluence
are heavily dependent on their role within metropolitan areas.
Each factor of the indicator is represented by the unweighted average of the stan-
dardized indicators. Variables included are presented in Table 5.27.
Therefore the equation (1) takes form:
(2)
where i, j, k show the number of the variable within the three factors (E,
S, D).
P = a
1 
x Σe
i
/4 – (a
2 
x Σs
j
/3 + a
3 
x Σd
k
/3)
i = 1
4
j = 1
3
k =1
3
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Table 5.27
Variables Used in the Index of Local Government Performance
Factor Variable (Indicator) Variable Name Comments
Economic Per capita own revenues together e
1
in PLN
potential(E) with shares in state taxes (2000)
Per capita investment spending e
2
in PLN
(1998–2000)
Share of fixed costs in the e
3
in %
budget (2000)
Number of personal computers e
4
per employee in municipal office
Cost and willingness Per student spending on education s
1
in PLN
to provide services (S) (2000)
Per capita spending on s
2
in PLN
administration (2000)
Municipalities overtaking schools s
3
“dummy” (0–1)
before compulsory term variable
Cost of functioning of Turnover in local elections (1998) d
1
in %
local democracy (D)
Number of candidates per mandate d
2
in local elections (1994)
Number of councilors per 1,000 d
3
inhabitants (2000)
8.1.3 Verifying the Relationship Between Size and Efficiency
Although theoretical findings are sometimes in contradiction (for example, public choice
expects that local democracy functions better in small local governments, while some
reform theorists provide arguments for the opposite case). However, dominant literature,
as well as empirical evidence from Poland, leads to the following expectations about the
three factors mentioned above:
• municipalities’ potential for economic development increases with the rise of
population. Larger units have more resources as well as higher human and
organizational potential. Nonetheless, the relationship between size and
economic development is likely to have a diminishing marginal performance.
This expectation has been confirmed by Polish empirical data—most of
indicators of economic capacity correlate better with a log of population size
than with size expressed by linear function of the number of population;
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• the “unit cost of services’” factor is likely to work in favor of big municipalities,
as the unit cost of provided services falls with the increase of population. Also,
large governments are better equipped to provide larger number of services.
However, one may expect a threshold size, above which the service factor value
is negatively related to the size. Big cities providing services to its’ citizens, face
not only the economies of scale but also diseconomies related to the problems
of co-ordination in large organizations as well as additional infrastructure costs.
We should add, however, that the latter phenomenon has not been observed so
far in Polish empirical data;
• most of the results in Polish empirical analysis suggest that idea of local democracy
works better in small units, where relationship between authorities and citizens
is closer and more direct. An exception to this rule is the higher pluralism of
local politics identified in large municipalities.
The data available for our empirical research does not always allow us to identify
the “optimal size” of the municipality. Not by applying analyses focused on particular
issues of local development, nor by using more “holistic” model approaches. Also,
many sociological surveys which we quoted use very broad size categories which lowers
the precision of the approximations. Nonetheless, whenever we could speak of ‘efficient
size’, it has been somewhere between 10 and 50 thousand residents. For example,
local governments below and above 50,000 clearly differ from the point of view of
following measures:
• turn-out in local elections;
• education structure of councilors;
• number of candidates per seat in local election.
Those in the 10,000 size seem to be a breaking point for an even larger number of
indicators such as:
• citizens’ opinion that local powers are too narrow (somewhere around size 10–
20,000);
• mayors’ opinion that councilors often loose touch with ordinary people;
• ratio of councilors per inhabitants (somewhere around 30,000);
• size of local government spending on administrative (per capita);
• use of internet and computers in local administration;
• size of local government investments per capita;
• local government budget dependency on state grants;
• attendance rate in kindergartens;
• average class size in primary schools and, as a consequence, per pupil cost for
primary education.
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If so, one may speculate that the “ideal” balance between the beauty of being small,
and advantages and strengths possessed by being large, is in a category somewhere
between 10 and 50 thousand. Available data does not allow for a complete verification
of this brave hypothesis, but we make an initial attempt by constructing a composite
indicator for municipal efficiency, as described in the paragraphs 8.1.1 and 8.1.2.
Let us consider seven different sets of coefficients, a
1
,a
2
,a
3,
 as described in Table
5.28. In sets 1, 2, 3 we assume that evaluation should focus entirely on a single factor.
For example, we give absolute priority to the capacity to promote local economic
development or to local democracy. Set 4 reflects the “indifferent” approach, where
equal weight is given to all identified factors. Also, in sets 5 to 7, all three factors are
taken into account but one of them is considered more important and is given the
weight 3, while other coefficients equal 1.
Table 5.28
Weighted Values for Different Index Variations
Set Number Set Description a1 (Economy) a2 (Services) a3 (Democracy)
Value Value Value
1 Only economy matters 1 0 0
2 Only services matter 0 1 0
3 Only local democracy matters 0 0 1
4 Equal weight 1 1 1
5 Economy oriented 3 1 1
6 Services oriented 1 3 1
7 Local democracy oriented 1 1 3
Lets see how these relationships are reflected in empirical data for over 1,900 Polish
municipal governments. Figure 5.11 illustrates the relationship between population
size and value of local government performance (P) under the assumptions expressed in
sets 1, 2, 3 (single factor indicator). In general, the observed relationships are consistent
with the expectations presented at the beginning of this section. Not surprisingly, the
economic potential is positively correlated to the size of local government. The bigger
the municipality, the larger is it’s economic potential. However, the marginal gain in
efficiency clearly decreases for the units with populations exceeding 25,000.
Imposing a “service only” variant results in almost linear function–the bigger the
local government, the more efficient service provision is. The positive relationship
between the size and the efficiency in the service is observed all along the whole
population spread.
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As expected, in the approach focused on local democracy, the performance curve
slops downward and relatively steep. This reflects the greater citizens’ participation
and democratic representation in smaller units. However, there is a clear threshold
around populations sized at 25,000, after which the performance curve turns from
clearly negative to almost neutral (flat curve).
Figure 5.11
Local Democracy, Economic Development, Service Delivery and
Size of Local Government
The “equal weights” variant (Figure 5.12) is the easiest to defend on theoretical
grounds, since there is no good reason to believe that any of the three factors are more
important than others. This approach indicates an “optimal” size of local government
somewhere between 25,000 and 32,000, dividing municipalities into two upward
and downward sloping groups on the performance curve. The marginal gain in overall
performance for small units is much higher than the marginal loss for the municipalities
of population exceeding the threshold number.
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Figure 5.12
Index of Performance and Size of Local Government
Not surprisingly, the “economy oriented” index shows “optimal size” at around a
similar point. The major difference with the “equal weights” indicator is that, in case of
“economy oriented”, the performance curve is almost flat for the municipalities above
this population number. This may suggest no significant difference in efficiency between
the municipalities of 25,000 inhabitants and larger.
In the “service oriented” index, the threshold population size seemed to be at about
population 30–32,000. However, while the marginal gain for small local governments
is very clear (the curve is very steep), the marginal loss for larger units is not so evident.
Beyond the “optimum point” there is no clear relationship between size and performance
of local government. In more detailed data analysis (not shown on Figure 5.18) we
may, however, observe a significant variation of the performance value for big cities,
which may indicate that efficient provision of local services depends substantially on
some specific individual conditions.
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Finally, the “local democracy oriented” variant clearly “worsens” the performance
of big cities, moves the “pick performance” point down to about 22–27,000 and
makes the performance curve slop sharply downward for high population numbers.
In all 4 variants the “optimal” point is somewhere between a population of 22 and
32 thousand. Interestingly, this result is not very different from Plato’s theoretical
considerations (see the quotation in Chapter 1 of this book).
8.2 Practical Recommendations
Do the findings described in this chapter bring us to any practical recommendations for
the territorial organization of local governments? In Poland, the discussion over the size
of local government is not a very hot issue. However, it is occasionally the focus of social
attention. It is not so often the case on a municipal level, although in some cases pro-
fragmentation tendencies dominate the local political scene. More commonly, there has
been recent discussion on the size of county tier governments and one can expect that
the pressure for further changes will continue. The creation of 7 new counties at the
beginning of 2002 is a good illustration of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, a lot of the
evidence analyzed in this chapter is rooted in the municipal level. Though some examples
from counties (spending on administration, free-riding phenomenon in secondary
education) have been discussed as well. Therefore, some of our observations could be
treated as useful practical recommendations for policy makers, both on a local and
central level. Perhaps more important still, Polish experiences may be interesting material
for other countries in the Central-East European region which are now undergoing a
very lively discussion of the “size issue” (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine).
How can these practical recommendations can be summarized? Below, we present
a list of issue recommendations which are, of course, selected and formulated subjectively,
but are based on objective empirical evidences:
• Do not allow more fragmentation on a county level. This would lead to strengthen-
ing the free-riding effect, would increase the unit costs of some services (most
certainly with administrative overhead). Polish counties have very limited poten-
tial for undertaking infrastructure projects and further fragmentation would
reduce this potential even more. On the other hand, at this size level, the
expected positive change in local democracy function is rather an illusion.
So, for reasons enumerated just above, the suggested development should be
consolidation, rather than fragmentation.
• Make sure the consequences of a municipality’s split are recognized by and clear for
the local population. Sometimes the level of conflicts within a municipality makes
“divorce” difficult to avoid. There are also positive consequences of such a split
which should not be neglected, even though, as we have shown in this chapter,
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these positive results are frequently over-estimated. Quite often, the local
population is not aware of the negative consequences of fragmentation such as
increase of costs and reduced capacity to provide services. This message should
be always very clearly communicated to citizens before they have to express
their opinion in public consultation (by referendum or any other method of
consultation which is applied).
• Remember that a fragmented territorial system is more costly to the state budget.
Small local governments have larger operational spending (expressed on a per
capita basis), they cannot cover these with their own revenues and require
greater assistance in the form of transfers from the state budget.
• In case of amalgamation, protect a form of the village autonomy. This is a Polish
experience, but also recognized in other countries with multi-village rural
governments (parishes in United Kingdom, and in Scandinavia). The village
level of government, even with very limited and mostly symbolic powers, is
very important to the protection of village pride and identity. The Polish soltys
is an important local leader and his presence, together with a formal recognition
of the “village meeting” institution, clearly contributes to the strength of local
democracy in rural areas.
• Encourage co-operation between municipal governments. Regardless of the territo-
rial organization model type, there are always functions which can be performed
more effectively when a few local governments co-operate with each other. In
Poland, where municipal governments are rather large, this is clearly this case
with solid waste management, tourist development, or environmental
protection. The process of co-operation should not be left only to spontaneous
development. This is more valuable if co-operation is voluntary, but it might
stimulate co-operation if there are policies which provide incentives (possibly
including financial incentives). In Poland, lack of such incentives is a main
reason why most local governments try to cope (often ineffectively) with waste
management alone. At the same time, availability of EU funds for local infra-
structure investments caused some municipalities to co-operate on joint projects
in order to meet formal requirements which were difficult to meet alone.
• Better representation and closer links between authorities and citizens are real values
in small governments and should be protected. Therefore, the recently declared
tendency to reduce the number of councilors in Polish local governments should
be stopped, at least in rural areas. Such a change would increase the number of
villages not represented in the council and may be harmful to local democracy
in small communities. Yet again, the change in a number of councilors in large
local governments is probably not so very important from a democratic principles
point of view. While the reduction may bring some cut costs and better
organization in the decision-making process, it could mean the relationship
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between size of local government and size of a council could be more flat than
it is nowadays.
• The majority system and single-ward system is worthy of consideration for all rural
and mixed urban-rural governments, regardless their population size. Such a solution
should support balanced representation of settlement units in the council. The
proportional system (currently in all municipalities over 20,000 citizens) may
lead to a situation in which the largest settlement unit is greatly over-represented,
leaving smaller villages under- or not-represented at all in the council.
• Available evidence suggests that a population size of 10,000 provides sufficient capacity
for effective provision of many services. This factor should be taken into consideration
when any concrete decisions on fragmentation or amalgamation are to be made.
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NOTES
1 Pawel Swianiewicz is a professor and Mikolaj Herbst a research assistant at the
European Institute for Regional and Local Development, University of Warsaw.
2 Similar observations on a wider European level were made by Page and Goldsmith
(1987) who noticed that territorial organisation is very much related to the allocation
of functions. Small (fragmented) local governments are usually unable to take
responsibility for many services, which need to be delivered by upper tiers of
governments.
3 A mixed municipality consists of a (usually small) town and several surrounding
rural villages.
4 Some of these are called “around-the-city-counties” consisting of municipalities
surrounding metropolitan counties
5 It is very difficult to find the proper English terms, but in this chapter we use
the term “village” for larger settlement units (solectwo) and the term “settlement
unit” for any, even the smallest, unit.
6 LDI–Local Democracy and Innovation Project sponsored by the Norwegian
government. The survey quoted here was conducted in 1997 with a sample of
over 1,000 mayors from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.
7 Several arguments on the relationship between size of municipality and local
democracy have been already presented in the LGPP study on “Public Perception
of Local Governments” [Swianiewicz, 2001]. In this book, we do not repeat this
data. We present only general conclusions and focus on the aspects which were
not analyzed in the public perception study.
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8 Unfortunately we do not have data from the, more recent, local election of 1998
9 A village leader (soltys) plays a very important as a local leader at a village level.
Often times, a village leader plays a crucial role as a channel of communication
between the local government executive board and citizens within individual
villages [Mielczarek and Doman´ska, 1999].
1 0 Survey organized December 2001 as a part of the LGPP “size” project with the
support of the National Association of Village Leaders. A total of 395 respondents,
from 87 local governments located in 4 regions, were interviewed.
1 1 As elsewhere in this paper *** marks the correlation coefficient significant on
0.001 level, ** on 0.01 level and * on a 0.05 level.
1 2 Her research concentrated on urban municipalities with a population size under
50,000. Bartkowska-Nowak distinguished between small, average and large local
administrations on a base of the total number employed at city hall (in her
classification, small administration had less than 33 clerks and large over 52
clerks). However, the number of local administrative employees is strongly
correlated with population size, so we can draw conclusions on differences
between small and large local governments as well.
1 3 Correlation coefficients in Table 5.14 are the most telling. Comparing group
means in the Table 5.20 is sometimes misleading, because of small groups in
very small governments, which for a variety of reasons have extremely high revenues
per capita. These very limited number of very affluent municipalities are reflected
in the group mean and in a very high standard deviation for the group.
1 4 A full description of the complicated methodology to determine which of city
expenditures should be treated as fixed, as applied in this paper, would be too
long to fit within limited space available. However, to give some example, we
treat expenditures related to standard salaries of local government staff, or heating
of municipal premises, as fixed.
1 5 The subvention is formally a non-targeted grant, which means it may be spent
on any purpose, not necessarily related to education. However, in the vast
majority of municipalities, actual current spending on education is higher than
the received grants.
1 6 Among other issues, the 1999 reforms involved transforming the former 8-year
primary school into two-tier system of primary (6-year) and middle level school
(3-year). Municipalities covered most of the cost related to these changes. Also,
in 1999, the controversial law on teacher’s rights (Teacher’s Chart) was approved
by Parliament. This raised the teachers’ remuneration without sufficiently in-
creasing the education grant for the municipalities. For this, and other reasons,
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the share of municipalities’ own resources in current education spending increased
from 8% in 1998 to 20% in 2000. Also, the proportion of municipalities who
“subsidized the education grant” from their own revenue sources increased from
83% in 1994 to 96 in 1999 [C´wikla, 2001] and then to over 99% in 2000.
1 7 Average teachers’ salaries are set by law, but local governments are free to pay an
additional remuneration. Frequently, they pay more to offset the higher cost of
living in the cities and to attract foreign languages teachers, etc.
1 8 By “attendance rate”, we mean the ratio of students attending local schools vs.
the number of 15–18 years old inhabitants, or the graduates of local primary
schools.
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Is There a Third Way Between Small
yet Ineffective and Big yet Less Democratic?
Comparative Conclusions
and Lessons Learned
Pawel Swianiewicz
After the presentation of theoretical expectations in the first chapter (which are either
inconclusive or, depending on the stress on particular values, lead in the opposite
direction) and after presenting the empirical findings of individual countries, we
may ask; do these observations allow for more general conclusions? And are there
any practical recommendations stemming from them? These are the main questions
discussed in the present chapter. However, before turning to empirical evidence on
local government function in relationship to its size, we need to focus briefly on an
institutional setting which is very different in each of countries considered.
1. HOW HAS TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION CHANGED SINCE 1990?
As it was mentioned in chapter 1, the 1989/1990 political transformations brought
significant changes in the territorial organization of the municipal level in some countries
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). While in some others (Poland, Bulgaria) the
level of fragmentation/consolidation remained mostly unchanged. Contrary to the events
in several West European countries during the 1960s and 1970s (see chapter 1), the
change led rather to a more fragmented, not to a territorially amalgamated, system.
As a result, among the countries which are analyzed in this book, there are two very
distinct models of territorial organization on the municipal level: those that are territorially
fragmented, as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and those which are territorially
consolidated as in Bulgaria and Poland. It seems inevitable that allocation of functions,
relationship between municipalities, other tiers of administration, as well as the everyday
functioning of local governments, must differ in such distinct institutional settings.
 In the discussion of underlying reasons for these variations, one might put several
explanatory factors, such as:
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• the perception of the main values of local democracy. There is some evidence
that in the Czech and Slovak Republics the communitarian approach, seeing
first and foremost the representational role of local government, has been
dominant. While in Poland, the more liberal attitude, placing more emphasize
on efficiency in local service delivery, has been more visible [for more detail
see the discussion in Swianiewicz, 2001]. The former approach led to the
“freedom of fragmentation” while the latter demanded maintenance of the
larger local government units. A quite similar line of argumentation for West-
European countries has been presented by Goldsmith (1995);
• various levels of public sector control over the rural communist economy. In
Poland, a large part of the rural economy was organized around private farms
while, in other countries in the region, the kolkhoz structures (often identical
with the territorial administrative units) very much dominated every day life.
Therefore, territorial organization was “more visible” for average citizens and
the oppression of the “central village” in the municipality was much more
painful. It led to the demand for village autonomy as soon as the democratiza-
tion process would allow for such a change;
• depth of democratization and decentralization reforms. At the beginning of
1990s, decentralization reform in Bulgaria was much more modest than in
other countries discussed in this book. The limited reform did not produce
enough space (or incentives) for a bottom-up demand for fragmentation.
But whichever of these underlying reasons we treat as the most convincing, there
are some immediate differences between the ways various countries make decisions on
territorial division at the lowest level. These are differences between legal regulations.
They are perhaps the most rigid in Poland where the law says vaguely about “consul-
tations” with local community and yet the central level is free to make a decision on
the splitting or merging of municipal governments even against the opinion expressed
in these consultations. In Bulgaria, the role of local public opinion is slightly greater.
A decision on establishment or liquidation of municipality requires, not an undefined
type of consultation but, namely a referendum. It is impossible to change the territorial
division if the local community votes in opposition to it. However, if the referendum
proves there is public support for a change in the territorial organization, the central
government may, but does not have to, proceed based on this opinion. There are
several conditions in order for a new municipality to be formed: it should have a
minimal population of 6,000 people, it should have central settlement unit, minimal
financial capacity and—furthermore—the maximum distance between villages
located within the municipality should not exceed 40 kilometers.
Similarly in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, no change can be
introduced without the agreement of the local population. Since the beginning of
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the last decade, it has been automatic to follow the peoples’ preferences, which
sometimes led to enormous fragmentations. There were even some extreme cases in
which villages with less than 20 citizens declared themselves a separate local government.
Since then, national governments have introduced legislation that attempts to stop
the process of fragmentation. Most often, the threshold population size for a village
to be proclaimed as a separate municipality was adopted, with some variety of
conditions added as well. In Slovakia in 2001, a new law was introduced (effective
as of 1 January 2002) which set some conditions for the creation of a new municipality.
A minimum threshold, a population of 3,000 people, seemed to have been the most
important among the new criteria. In the Czech Republic, the threshold was declared
a population level of 1,000, with no additional conditions mentioned. In Hungary,
the limit was set at a much lower level (population 300) but additional conditions, to
demonstrate the capacity to provide all obligatory functions, were added. Any change
in the existing territorial division can be initiated only locally, but not by the central
authorities. It seems, however, that the threshold numbers introduced by new legislations
are based on intuition rather than on any concrete analysis. Indirect proof of such a
claim is provided by the fact that, in Hungary, there are no statistics available which
describe the differences between costs and administrative performance in the groups
below and above 300 citizens (the minimal size for a new municipality). The regula-
tions discussed above are briefly summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1
Decisions on the Change in Number of Municipalities
Country Method of Decision/Limitations
Poland indecisive consultations, decision made by the central government, territory of the
new municipality should “as far as possible, be homogenous, take into account
social and cultural links, and ensure capacity to provide public functions”
Bulgaria local referendum may block government decision, but can not force the central
government to create/liquidate a municipality, new municipality should have
above 6,000 citizens, central settlement unit; distances among villages should
not exceed 40 km.
Slovakia the domination of the right of every village to their own local government,
beginning in 2002, a new municipality cannot be smaller than 3,000 citizens,
infrastructure facilities serving the whole territory of the municipality cannot
be divided, cannot create an “urbanite unit” within the “mother unit”
Hungary the dominate right of every village to their own local government,
recent threshold of 300 minimum population size, newly created local government
has to demonstrate its capacity to provide obligatory tasks
Czech Republic the dominate right of every village to their own local government,
recent threshold of 1,000 minimum population size
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Another dimension of territorial changes after 1989 relates to new divisions and
the creation of elected self-governments on the regional level. During the last five
years, re-organization concerning this has been implemented in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Poland. In Hungary, the upper (county) tier of self-government has
existed throughout the whole of the 1990s, but it has been relatively weak through-
out. In Bulgaria, there is still only one level of self-government. Yet, introduction of
regional self-government seems quite unlikely in the near future  even though such
a recommendation has been formulated by several experts (including authors of the
report in this book). Interestingly enough, amongst the analyzed countries, Poland is
the only one in which the elected regional governments cover territory identical with
NUTS 2 units, which play an important role in the implementation of European
Union regional policies [Z
•
ebrowska–Cielek, 2001]. The issue of regional government
is a fascinating and very important field of analysis, however, in this book we focus,
first and foremost, on the basic level of local governments and the regional dimension
will not be discussed further in this chapter.
2. TERRITORIALLY FRAGMENTED VERSUS
TERRITORIALLY CONSOLIDATED SYSTEMS—DEFINITION
Several times in this chapter we use the term “small” or “big” local government. But
how can we define which municipal government we can call “small” and consequently,
which local government system we will call “fragmented” and which “territorially
consolidated”? As mentioned in Chapter 1, some analysis made in Western European
countries suggests that several functions cannot be performed locally in communities
of less than 1,000 citizens and that the unit costs of several functions grow
significantly below 5,000 dwellers threshold [“The Size of Municipalities...”, 1995].
The Polish chapter of this book indicates that, for various functions, the visible
threshold is somewhere about 5–10,000 citizens.
For the analysis presented in this book, let us agree to call “fragmented” systems
those in which a considerable proportion (over 25%) of local governments is smaller
than 1,000 citizens, while a vast majority (over 66%) is smaller than 5,000. As it
has been shown in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1 of this book, in the countries analyzed,
the proportion of “below 1,000” municipalities varies from none in Bulgaria and
Poland, to 54% in Hungary, 68% in Slovakia and 80% in the Czech Republic.
The pro-portion of “big” (over 5,000 citizens) varies from about 5% in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, to almost 10% in Hungary, 72% in Bulgaria and 76% in
Poland. The split between fragmented systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia, on one hand, and consolidated systems of Poland and Bulgaria, on
the other, is very clear and sharp.
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3. NATIONAL DEBATES ON THE SIZE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
In regards to the discussions on territorial organization, we could perhaps distinguish
between small, local debates on merging/splitting individual local governments, which
happens in every country, and larger, national debates on the general shape of territorial
division. The latter type is a hot topic in some of the countries analyzed. The size of
municipal governments has not recently been debated much in countries with terri-
torially consolidated systems. Bulgarian discussions related to size are not at the center
of the political agenda and are mostly focused at a regional level.
In Poland, most of the discussions relating to the size issue concentrate on the
upper tiers—regions and counties. Should twelve, sixteen or seventeen regions, over
300 or below 200, counties be created? These were very hot issues not very long ago,
and some attempts at county governmental consolidation are still under discussion.
But the size of (relatively big) municipal governments is usually taken for granted and
not disputed. What is interesting, however, is that if there are any suggestions on
systematic changes of the basic territorial organization level, they point in the direction
of even further consolidation, not fragmentation. A recent example is provided by
the Ministry of Finance’s proposals for the revisions of the Law on Local Government
Revenues, which were presented at the beginning of 2002 [Weber, 2002]. The
proposal has suggested an incentive, of an additional 1% share in PIT revenues for
5 years, for those local governments who decide to merge. This suggestion is targeted,
first of all, at county governments but it is also addressed to municipalities as well.
In the fragmented systems of Hungary, Slovakia or Czech Republic the issue of size
is the subject of very hot debates.  General amalgamation is usually rejected as unrealistic
and undemocratic, but individual countries concentrate on other solutions which are
discussed in detail within national reports and will be briefly summarized later in the
concluding chapter. For example, in Hungary there are suggestions to make notary
offices (which serve administration of several local governments) obligatory for villages
below 1,000 or even populations below 1,500. It is suggested that there should be
between 3 and 7 villages (local governments) served by one notary office. Interestingly
enough, in Poland the average number of villages in the one rural local government
is almost 20. Still one should remember that an average Polish village is smaller
than a Hungarian one. The stimulation of voluntary inter-municipal co-operation
is another direction which will be also discussed later in this chapter. It should be
added that, according to national reports, Slovakia is the only country in which the
obligatory amalgamation of the smallest villages is among the considered options.
Also in the Czech Republic, the appreciation of the low level of effectiveness of
very small municipalities (especially of the 547 local governments with less than 100
citizens) is very common. But the discussion goes mostly in the direction of categorization
of municipalities and increasing number of functions delivered by the larger ones.
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4. SIZE AND ALLOCATION  OF FUNCTIONS
4.1 More Functional Decentralization
in Countries with Bigger Municipalities?
In the introductory chapter, we referred both to theoretical arguments as well as to
empirical observations from Western European countries suggesting that larger size
local government units allow for more radical decentralization of functions. We may
ask whether this observation can be confirmed by data from Eastern and Central Europe.
A very simple indicator we may use is the role of municipal budgets in public
spending within countries with more (territorially) fragmented and consolidated systems.
The best measure would be the share of the municipality in total public spending.
However, this measure creates several methodological and data problems because of
the existence of various extra-budgetary public funds in several countries. Therefore,
we concentrate on the, less perfect but more clear, indicator—namely the share of
municipal spending in GDP.
As it is clear from Table 6.21  there is some relationship between the average size
(or between fragmentation measured by the proportion of municipalities below
1,000 population) and the overall size of municipal budgets. Still, it is not as strong
or clear as one might expect. There are countries which support our hypothesis—small
size corresponds to the low share of municipal spending in GDP (Slovakia) or big size
is connected to a relatively high share in GDP (Poland, Bulgaria). But as the Hungarian
case shows, there might also be small local governments spending a lot of money.
The correlation with the dominant trend in municipal spending over the last
decade is a little bit stronger. As Table 6.3 shows, municipalities in all of the countries
with fragmented territorial systems have been on a descending slope in the share of
municipal spending in GDP. However, in some of these countries (Hungary, Slovakia)
the trend is not very clear (and they have been marked by question marks in Table 6.3).
It is much less clear still, on the other extreme, with territorial organization. Among
countries with consolidated systems, Poland has been the only case with a clear
increase of municipal budgets. In Bulgaria or Lithuania, the share in GDP has been
decreasing—not very different from the fragmented systems.
In Central and Eastern Europe, it is quite clear that the level of territorial consolida-
tion has had some importance on a municipal level yet has not been a decisive factor
for functional decentralization. Several other factors, quite out of the scope of the
analysis of this book, such as political determination for the decentralization agenda,
have played much more important roles.
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Table 6.2
Relationship Between Average Size
and the Municipalities Expenditures’ Share in GDP
Share of local government spending in GDP
Low (<5%) Medium (5–8%) High (over 8%)
Average Small Slovakia (4) Czech Rep. (5.8) Latvia (8.6)
population size (below 5,000) Hungary (11)
of municipalities
Medium Romania (<4) Estonia (12)
(5–12,000) Slovenia (4.7)
Big (over 12,000) Lithuania (6.8) Poland (8.6)
Bulgaria (8)
% of municipali- High (over 50%) Slovakia (4) Czech Rep. (5.8) Hungary (11)
ties with less than
1,000 population Medium (10–50%) Latvia (8.6)
Low (below 10%) Slovenia (4.7) Lithuania (6.8) Estonia (12)
None Poland (8.6)
Bulgaria (8)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on  Horváth (1999) and Kandeva (2000).
Table 6.3
Relationship Between Average Size of Municipalities and Trend of Changes
(During the Last Decade) in Municipalities Expenditures’ Share in GDP
Trend of Changes in Municipalities Expenditures’
Share in GDP
Decreasing Stable Increasing
Average Small Czech Rep.
population size Latvia
of municipalities Hungary?
Slovakia?
Medium Romania Estonia
Slovenia
Large Bulgaria Poland
Lithuania
NOTE: Question marks indicate a trend which is unclear.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on  Horvath (1999) and Kandeva (2000).
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4.2 Illusion of the Same Function for Every Local Government
In all of the countries analyzed, the legal regulations stipulate that all basic tiers of local
governments (regardless their size) are equal and have the same powers. Obviously,
it is an illusion to expect small villages will be able to provide a similar number of
functions as bigger territorial units do. In fact, the real scope of activity depends
strongly on the size of municipality.
In Bulgaria, the national report states that the capital, Sofia, provides 48 various
functions. In smaller units, the number of activities gradually decreases and in case
of municipalities with a population below 10,000 the average number of provided
functions is a mere 13. Health care provides a good example of this process—the
number of functions related to the health care gradually decreases with the decreasing
size of local government.
In Poland, the law defines the 65 big cities which are responsible not only for
municipal but also for the county functions, such as secondary education, fire service,
consumer protection, etc. But there are differences in service provision among the
rest of municipal governments, although these differences can be hardly traced by
the law. Local public transportation is a good example—it is provided by about
200 (usually the biggest) municipalities, but not by the remaining 2,200+.
A Hungarian report mentions few thresholds related to population number
(2,000, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000) above which the number of obligatory functions
increases. Similarly, it is difficult to expect that almost 9% of Czech municipalities
with less than 100 citizens, or their equally small counterparts in Slovakia, are able to
take responsibility for most of the typical local functions, such as infrastructure services,
waste collection and disposal, etc. In some cases, these functions are delivered jointly
by some of the neighboring local governments. Sometimes, local government remains
responsible for them or contracts them out to private or public sector companies. In
several cases, especially in the Czech Republic, these functions are simply provided
by the neighboring town, without any formal agreement nor financial compensation
from the surrounding rural governments.
As it has been shown in the study on public perception of decentralization reforms
(Swianiewicz 2001), citizens of large municipalities also think local governments
should be responsible for a wider scope of functions. In the Czech Republic, citizens
of small villages (below 500) usually think that present duties of local governments are
sufficient, while respondents from the largest cities express their wishes for further progress
in decentralization. A similar relationship has been found in Poland as well.
The typical argument, heart-breaking and frequently raised, against territorial
consolidation within territorially fragmented countries is the case of an old lady who
needs to travel several kilometers to get something done at the municipal administra-
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tion office. Then there is the question (which is discussed in more detail later in
this chapter) whether it is really necessary for her to go to the central town/village
or whether a municipal administration might be available locally (as it is sometimes
in Bulgaria) even if the capital of the municipality is several miles away. More im-
portantly, we can re-formulate the dilemma: she may have a municipal office very
nearby but, it may only deal with a very narrow scope of issues (so, for more complicated
matters, she will need to travel anyhow), or the municipal office might be slightly
more distant but it may provide much more complex services.
Summing up, we failed to find convincing evidence that the territorial consolidation
versus fragmentation of the municipal government system is related to the extent of
financial decentralization of countries in the Central and Eastern Europe. Neverthe-
less, it is quite clear that the variation of functions allocation can be observed within
individual countries. Larger municipalities are responsible for a wider scope of functions,
while, in numerous cases, the autonomy of the smallest local governments is mostly symbolic,
since in practice they are unable to take responsibility for any significant public services.
Instead, these services are provided to the local population either by the state admi-
nistration or by another municipality.
5. COST OF SERVICE DELIVERY
—THE CASE FOR ECONOMY OF SCALE
In most of the countries analyzed, it has been discovered that the economy of scale
is important for several of the services local governments are responsible for. Straight
forward comparisons are very difficult because small and bigger municipalities often
perform different functions, even within the same sector. Moreover, some of national
chapters report that lower spending per unit is very often due to lower quality and
performance level, which in turn is due to insufficient financial capacity of the smaller
governments. For example, this has been noted in Bulgaria in case of waste collection,
kindergartens, and some other social services. Similar observations have been made also
in the Hungarian chapter concerning pre-school and school education. The specifi-
cally Bulgarian explanation of (sometimes) unexpectedly high relative spending per
unit in the biggest municipalities concentrate on a lack of arrears in payments in
big cities, whereas, such unpaid bills are quite common in smaller municipalities.
We can make note all of these explanations, but it is extremely difficult to measure
the impact of such differences and formulate convincing descriptive evidence, either
of the existence or the lack of effect of economy of scale. Still, we can make several
general observations based on cases discussed in the national reports presented in
this book.
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As it was noted above, in Bulgaria, the number of services provided is much lower
in small municipalities. Yet, the curve illustrating the relationship between per capita
spending on several services and the size of local government is U-shaped. We may
interpret this as indirect evidence of higher unit costs in the small local governments
group. However, we should remember that even the smallest Bulgarian local govern-
ments might be considered big in several other countries with more fragmented
territorial systems. They consist of several settlement units and have population well
over 1,000. It seems that their higher unit costs are mostly related to lower populations
density and spatial dilution of service users rather than the size factor itself. In
Bulgaria, changing the administrative division, towards the direction of further
amalgamation, would probably not change the general picture described above.
In Poland, the clear illustration of the economy of scale phenomenon is provided
by the costs per pupil in primary education which increases with the decreasing
size of local government. The relationship remains valid when we limit our analysis
to the group of rural local governments only, where the impact of population density
is not correlated with the size. This means that size itself is an important explanatory
variable of the unit cost. Similarly, it has been noted that the costs of solid waste collection
and disposal are significantly lower in those cases of inter-municipal co-operation.
Also, in Hungary, the education costs per pupil in rural areas provides an example
of economy of scale. The Hungarian report suggests that size of local government
makes a big difference to social services. It also suggests that in the case of public
utilities, it is not so important because they are provided by utility companies which
usually cover areas larger than one local government unit. We recognize this opinion,
however, this observation does not seem to be valid for the whole region. It is often
the case that catchment’s areas of public utility services are identical with the area
of municipality and that the fragmentation of local governments leads to the parallel
fragmentation of the service provision.
In the case of current expenditures per local administration, the analysis of the
impact of size on per unit spending is relatively simpler. The summary of findings
for four countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) is presented on Figures
6.1a and 6.1b2 . The evidence of economy of scale is most visible in the Polish and
Bulgarian instances. Per capita spending in the largest group is about two times
lower than amongst the smallest municipalities. In Bulgaria, per capita spending in
relatively small municipalities is much higher than in larger local governments, in
spite of their much narrower scope of functions. However, in the two remaining
countries, the descending slope for the administrative costs of bigger local governments
is also quite convincing. There are two complicating factors, however, which cause
the relationship to be not quite linear: (i) the extended functions of larger local
governments influence also raises spending on administration (that is why cities
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with a county status have been excluded from the Polish analysis, this same factor
probably explains the relatively good score for the smallest—below 200 citizens—
Hungarian villages), (ii) big cities pay higher salaries to their employees. These factors
have been reported directly within the Hungarian chapter. Figure 6.1b3  also illustrates
that small local government’s budgets are dominated much more by administrative
spending—in some extreme cases, not much is left over for any other purpose. This
is most visible in Hungary where the smallest local governments spend over 40% of
their budgets on administration. Further, in Slovakia, a very great burden of adminis-
trative spending within local budgets is very visible. In villages below 500, citizens
bureaucracy consumed almost 49% of total local budget during 2000, this is down
from 52% in 1999.
In addition to the evidence provided by Figure 6.1, we should mention that
Hungarian analysis reported an over 50% difference in administrative spending
between local governments that joined and did not join the notary office. It is quite
evident that, in the provision of administrative services, joint efforts with other
municipalities leads to considerable savings.
Figure 6.1a
Spending per Capita on Municipal Administration
as % of National Average
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Figure 6.1b
Spending on Administration
as % of Total Operating Expenditures
6. BIG IS STRONGER—SIZE AND CAPACITY
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In the countries analyzed, the direct influence of local governments on the local economy
is relatively limited. However, they can support local enterprises and attract investments
through planning instruments, implementation of promotional strategies, use of local
tax incentives, etc.  At least with some of these instruments, big local governments
have a greater chance to make an impact. They can mobilize (and concentrate) larger
amounts of resources and—for example—are capable to undertake wider promotion/
marketing activities.
Perhaps indirect influence on local economy is even more important and also more
dependent on the size factor. Local competitive advantage, to a large extent, depends
on the infrastructure facilities which municipal governments are responsible for in
most of the countries analyzed. There are several indicators suggesting that big local
governments may be more effective in infrastructure development policies:
1) they are less dependent on the transfer of state grants, which makes them
more flexible in making policy choices. This has been clearly reported in
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Bulgarian, Polish and Slovak reports. In Bulgaria, the relationship between
size of local government and investment spending is not very clear (it is the
highest in Sofia, on one hand, and also in the smallest municipalities, on
the other). Yet detail data clearly suggests that a relatively good “score” for
small municipalities is fully dependent on capital grants received from the
state budget.
2) They usually have a stronger economic base combined with lower per unit
operational costs, this results in a larger part of their revenue base which
may be allocated to financing developmental projects (either directly or
through re-payment of debt made in order to finance capital projects). Again,
data from Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia clearly support this claim.
3) Big municipalities can more easily concentrate resources on a small number
of big projects, which are crucial from the point of view of developmental
perspectives.
4) Their capacity to use credit resources in order to finance investment projects
is greater. This is due both to the fact that they are treated as “better clients”
by commercial banks and other investors (for example, those who are interesting
in buying municipal bonds) as well as due to the more advanced technical
skills of their administrative staff. As included in the Slovak chapter, informa-
tion on the high level of debt of the largest municipalities is, on the one
hand, sometimes scary. On the other hand, it confirms their high credibility
for banks. Polish data indicates both more frequent using of credit instruments
by bigger municipalities and their frequent long-term, coherent investment
strategies.
5) Their current level of technical infrastructure facilities grows alongside the growing
size of the local government unit (partially as a result of the factors enumerated
above). The most complete evidence of this thesis is included in the Hungarian
and Bulgarian chapters, but it is also true in the other analyzed countries.
As a result of better infrastructure facilities, the competitive advantage of larger
local governments is bigger.
The second very important indirect influence of local governments on economic
development is the spatial (land use) planning instruments. Because of their better
qualified staff and sometimes also because of larger financial resources, bigger govern-
ments are much better prepared to cope with this task effectively. This has been reported
in Poland where several small municipalities have had considerable difficulties
preparing new master plans before the national legislation’s set deadline. The Slovak
report informs that several small villages have been unable to modify the spatial
plans prepared long ago during the communist period.
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7. SMALL IS LIKED—THE CASE FOR LOCAL DEMOCRACY
There is no doubt that—as public choice or localism theories suggest—the smaller
size of local governments helps build of healthy and vital relationships between
citizens and local authorities. This has been already noted in the study of public
perception of local governments [Swianiewicz, 2001, pp.34–35]:
[citizens from small municipalities] feel better informed and they more often
know local councilors. In all the countries analyzed, the turn-out for local elections
is negatively correlated with the size (i.e. citizens of small towns and villages are
more interested and more involved in local public affairs). Also, in the larger cities,
there is higher mayoral turn-over after elections, which may be interpreted as
lower voters’ satisfaction with local governmental performance in big cities....
Although in most cases, overall positive opinion is clearly related to the small size
of the local constituency, the picture is not quite one-dimensional. The level of
declared satisfaction with local governments’ activity is usually negatively correlated
with size, but there are some exceptions to this rule.
In the Czech Republic, the opinions of citizens from villages below 500 inhabitants
are less positive than those from the 500–2000 population cohort.  Although the
difference is not statistically significant, at least the trend stops at around population
size 500. In Hungary, there was a visible (negative) correlation between size and
satisfaction in 1990–91, but data for 2000 is not as clear. In the smallest groups
(below 1,000) average opinion is negative, while the most positive feedback is
from administrative units between 2 and 5 thousand citizens...
For many services, the highest rate of satisfaction is found in the 2,000–10,000
cohort, while satisfaction in the smallest units is slightly lower. In the case of schools,
the level of satisfaction is very low in villages below 1,000 citizens. Regarding
culture, the relationship with size is positive (i.e. higher levels of satisfaction are
found in larger territorial units). In the Czech Republic, declared interest in
participation in local politics is the highest, not in the smallest group, but in
towns between 3 and 20 thousand.
It is hard to formulate very definite conclusions on the basis of data collected by
the “Public perception...” LGPP project, but it seems that citizens from smaller
administrative units, while enjoying many positive features of their local governments,
are at least partially aware that far reaching decentralization of functions would be
unrealistic and/or lead to inefficiency of service provision for much smaller authorities.
This is confirmed both by less support for decentralization of more functions in the
smallest local governments and by some level of disappointment with local services’
quality in the smallest municipalities (Hungary, Czech Republic).
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Reports included in this book mainly confirm observations made in the public
perception study. In Bulgaria (which was not included in the study quoted above),
the available data is rather limited. However, on the basis of a small sample of mu-
nicipalities under investigation, we may say that people in bigger local governments
are less interested in local public affairs but more satisfied with the provision of
services. However, we should remember Bulgarian smallest municipalities are still
quite big by the Slovak, Czech or Hungarian standards.
The relationship between size and local democracy is not entirely one-dimensional.
The reform theory expects greater pluralism in the local politics of bigger governments
as well as higher trust, due to a better developed civic society and their activities in
larger communities. This expectation has been partially confirmed in our reports.
In Poland, the number of candidates in local elections sharply increases in larger
municipalities. Both Polish and Hungarian chapters report more NGOs and local
newspapers in bigger local governments. Opposite to reform theory expectations,
neither greater pluralism nor wider scope of functions of big government leads to
greater citizens trust or interest in participation in local politics. As it is shown on
Figure 6.2, turn-out for local elections is negatively correlated with the size of muni-
cipality in three of four countries for which relevant data is available (Hungary,
Figure 6.2
Turn-out in Local Elections (1998)
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Poland, Slovakia4 ). Interestingly enough, in most countries, we also observe considerable
increase in voter turn-out in the largest local governments group (with slight
simplification we can dub this phenomenon the “capital city effect”). Still, it does
not change the general picture. The rule of higher turn-out in small municipalities does
not apply in the case of Bulgaria, a full explanation of this would require an additional
detailed investigation. One may speculate that the proportional electoral system in
Bulgaria, which does not support representation of small villages in municipal councils
may discourage voters from voting in these settlements. It must once again be noted
that there are no really small local governments in Bulgaria, so the factors of closeness
and openness of small communities are not really able to be examined.
8. VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
In situations in which individual local governments are too small to provide some
functions effectively, voluntary co-operation with neighboring municipalities might
be seen as the solution. This is quite often seen as an alternative to the creation of
large local government units through the amalgamation process. Indeed, examples
of co-operation have been described in all national chapters of this book. Interestingly
enough, it is seen as an important way to improve the performance of local administ-
ration, not only in countries with numerous tiny municipalities, but also in states
with large local governments. In Western Europe, such examples are drawn from
Britain, where joint authorities provide services such as fire protection, public transport
and waste disposal.  In Finland, local authorities form joint boards for health care,
social services and vocational training [Davey, 2002]. Similar examples may be found
in Central Europe, in countries in which basic tier authorities are generally larger—
i.e. in Bulgaria or Poland. In both Poland and Bulgaria, the one service the central
government has most encouraged inter-municipal co-operation for is solid waste
disposal.
According to some Polish studies, the economy of scale for this service is not
achieved if the market serves less than approximately 100 thousand residents. There-
fore, the waste disposal site’s optimal catchment area is closer to a Polish county than
a municipal government. In some services (waste disposal, water provision and waste
water treatment), it has been determined that inter-municipal commercial companies
are more flexible and enable easier management options than the “traditional” local
government associations. There are also several examples of co-operation in promotion
of local economic development and environment protection. At the end of 2000,
there were almost 200 municipal associations registered in Poland which focused
on delivery of services or joint promotion of local development.
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In other countries analyzed in this book, as recommended (by the central govern-
ment), co-operation concerns a broader scope of services with a special stress on
basic administrative services. The strongest suggestion for co-operation is found in
Hungary, where it is recommended that all local governments with populations
lower than 1,000 should form joint notary offices. These offices should then provide
basic administrative services for a group of villages. However, in practice only 2/3 of
small municipalities enter into these kinds of co-operations, moreover, the number of
notary offices has been stagnating and even decreasing in the last few years. In
1997, in order to strengthen joint offices and to provide additional incentive for
local governments, a special subsidy system was created. In 2000, this subsidy has
been offered on a normative basis. Consequently, the trend of the decreasing number
of joint offices (which had been noted in the first half of the last decade) has been
reversed. The typical joint office usually serves between 1,000 and 2,000 citizens,
not 5,000 as is recommended by official central government policies. In Hungary,
examples of the joint provision of services may be found also in other sectors, such
as kindergartens or primary schools. In 1999, as many as 7% of children and students
have been attending jointly managed kindergartens and schools. There is a total
number of over 1,400 associations, most of them focusing on one function, often
led by “compulsion”, i.e. the old, indivisible infrastructure which cannot be managed
by a single village. Another typical aim of the small local government association is
promotion of economic development (or some sectors of the local economy, such a
tourism) in the micro-region.
In Slovakia, typical areas of inter-municipal co-operation cover: solid waste
disposal, sewage treatment, environmental protection, economic development (including
tourism), joint development of infrastructure projects, education, as well as social
welfare projects. In the instance of technical infrastructure, as with Poland, organization
of inter-municipal commercial companies has recently become quite a popular option.
Similar to Hungary, the Slovak system provides an opportunity for joint administrative
offices, but this option has not been widely used. Very limited enthusiasm for the
co-operation is seen also in the results of surveys conducted in municipalities with
less than 5,000 citizens. Local mayors were asked about their plans regarding delivery
of education services after responsibility is transferred to local governments. Only
17% expressed willingness to establish inter-municipal co-operation. Even in villages
with less than 200 citizens, more than 1/3 wanted to manage schools and kinder-
gartens independently and in villages between 200 and 500 citizens, the proportion
rose to over 2/3.
In the Czech Republic, very often instead of co-operation between a few neighboring
local governments, the service is delivered by the local center (town) not only for its
citizens, but also for residents of the surrounding villages. Village governments do
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not contribute to financing these services. But such an arrangement also means that
the local rural population does not have an opportunity to influence (through democratic
mechanisms) the way service is managed either.
Why are examples of voluntary inter-municipal co-operation not amply frequent
and why don’t they always bring satisfactory results? One should remember that
there are several potential problems to overcome before co-operation becomes fruitful
and operational. It requires compromises on the particular interests of the individual
villages involved. Local leaders need to agree on co-operation which will sometimes
affect their personal political ambitions. The joint provision of functions, although
frequently bringing financial savings, requires transaction costs, which may be identified
with a complicated organizational-managerial setting. Therefore, it is difficult to
expect that the expected benefits will provide sufficient stimulation and that voluntary
co-operation may solve all problems related to the lack of economy of scale in small
local government units. The development of co-operation needs to be stimulated by incentives
provided by the central government. The Slovak authors, in their chapter of this book,
even recommend some forms of mandatory (imposed by the law) cooperation between
municipalities. In some of the countries analyzed, the only incentives have been of
a “moral” nature, which are definitely not sufficient. A specific illustration of an
insufficient central government interest in promoting inter-municipal co-operation
is provided by Hungary, where there is still no precise information available about
the intensity and structure of associations.
It is interesting that there seems to be no relationship between the average size
of local governments in the country and no central government policies that encourage
joint provision of services. It is hard to find examples of the financial incentives both
for Poland (in which local governments are usually relatively big) and for Slovakia
(which has one of the most territorially fragmented systems). Conversely, in another
country with big local governments—Bulgaria—the government has been offering
special grants for the joint development of waste landfills, grants that cover most of
capital investment costs. The most complex system of co-operation support has
been sited in Hungary. Villages of less than 500 citizens may get grants only if they
belong to the office notary and if they deliver some functions through associations.
Quite recently, there was a special grant scheme for the purchase of school buses.
This would enable the liquidation of small and costly schools in very small villages
and develop a decent transportation system to ship pupils daily to more distant schools.
There is also extra support available for municipal associations. However, the Hungarian
authors claim that the system is not really coherent. Support for associations competes
with special grants for the smallest local governments. Grants for school-buses have
not been followed by the support for every-day operation of a pupils’ transportation
system5 . It seems that the system of incentives for co-operation might easily be
built-up or developed in any of the countries analyzed.
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9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “MUNICIPAL CAPITAL”
AND “MUNICIPAL PERIPHERY”
In two of the countries analyzed (Bulgaria and Poland), there are several villages
that do not have their own local government but are part of a larger municipality
with the “capital” in another town or larger village. It is exactly this situation that
many local politicians in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are afraid of.
They argue that such an arrangement violates the right to local autonomy, destroying
village identity, and may lead to disregarding the needs of small local communities.
The Bulgarian and Polish examples give us an opportunity to consider whether
such fears are well grounded, under what circumstances, and how negative consequences
of multi-settlement unit local governments may be reduced.
First of all, we should stress that in none of the “consolidated systems” does the
village in question disappear as an entity with a certain amount of autonomy. In
Bulgaria, within municipal structures, there are almost 1,700 kmetstva, and in Poland
over 40 thousand solectwa, that enjoy the power to deliver limited functions and
have their own elected representatives. The existence of sub-municipal units depends
on the decision made by the municipal council, but there are no signs of attempts
at liquidating them. Village leaders are invited for municipal council meetings and
they may make the interests of their small motherlands known, but they have no
voting rights in the local government council. The position of sub-municipal
government is briefly summarized in Table 6.4.
However, it should be added that, in both countries, decentralization within
the municipality can go further. Moreover, the chapter on Bulgaria reports there has
been decreasing enthusiasm for the delegation of more functions in recent years.
Also in Poland, in a survey of village leaders, many respondents complained that
their relationship with municipal mayors has not been straightforward and delegation
of functions has often included only very limited powers. There is no doubt that
there is space for more radical decentralization and the passing of more discretionary
powers to individual villages. This claim is supported by the examples of Western
democracies with territorially consolidated systems [compare for ex. Hambleton,
Hogget, 1990]. Some extreme arguments are provided by Norwegian cities [Klausen,
2002] in which over half of the municipal budgets are administered by sub-municipal
units. In Poland, usually no more than 2–3% of the budget is transferred to the
villages or districts of the city. A similar figure is provided in the Bulgarian report.
The survey of village leaders in Poland still does not support those who suggest
small villages would feel oppressed by the “capital” in large local governments and
the struggle for resources between sections of the municipality might become a
dominant dimension of local conflicts. According to the survey, territorial conflicts
are among the least visible and the least important problems amongst Polish local
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governments. Part of the explanation for this statement may be the electoral system.
In many Polish rural governments, there is a majority system, with one (or more)
councilor elected for every village. In this way, every village has a feeling of being
represented and, even in those municipalities in which there are more villages than
councilors, the representation in the council is based on a geographical basis. In
mixed urban-rural municipalities (consisting of relatively small urban town and several
surrounding villages), it quite often will happen that councilors from the town may
be out-voted by the more numerous representatives of rural areas. Anyhow, domi-
nation over the largest settlement unit during the decision making and allocation of
resources is actually very unlikely.
Table 6.4
Position of Sub-municipal Governments in Bulgaria and Poland
Bulgaria Poland
Number of 1,696 kmetstvo Over 40,000 solectwo (exist in 99% of
sub-municipal rural and urban-rural and in 6% of
governments of urban municipalities)
Size of sub- At least 500 citizens (by law) Average 370 citizens
municipal units
How the unit Referendum initiated by 25% of Decision of the council, in practice
is created? population or by the council led by the tradition
Election of Popular (all citizens) Popular
village leader
Representation No guarantees, proportional Single-councilor wards guarantee
of individual representation tends to lead to the representation of most villages
villages in the to the domination of the largest town (but in 40% of rural governments,
local council and dramatic under-representation the number of villages is larger than
of villages number of councilors). But in 152
(7%) of municipalities within villages,
in which population exceeds 20,000
—proportional elections in few wards
with 5–10 councilors in each
Powers and Depends on the municipal council. Depends on the council.
services delivered Reported decline in support for Typical examples: part of the revenue
by villages decentralization from local taxes stays in the village,
management of village culture centers,
street lighting, transport of pupils
to school
Village leader Invited to municipal council meetings, Invited to municipal council meetings,
participation in but no voting rights but no voting rights
management of
municipality
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The situation in Bulgarian local governments is significantly different, due to a
different electoral system. Proportional representation, with all citizens voting for
the same lists, often leads to a situation in which over 90% of councilors come from
the largest town. Also, in the allocation of resources, the needs of small rural villages
are more likely to be overlooked.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Both empirical observations and theoretical considerations suggest there are several
options for arranging the territorial organization of local governments. These options
have been summarized in Table 6.5.
Each of these options has positive and negative aspects. In practice, the most
common model is a mixture of various approaches, but we may find examples which
are the closest to each of these solutions in their most ideal form. Until recently,
Slovakia had been a good example of the first solution (fragmentation, most of
functions kept by the state), but recent reforms have started to change this picture
and Slovakia is looking for an arrangement better tailored to wider decentralization.
One of the considered options is amalgamation of the smallest municipalities—the
Slovak chapter in this book suggests it should be mandatory for villages below 200
inhabitants. The present situation in the Ukraine (especially in rural areas) is also
not very different from option one. The Czech Republic is perhaps closest to the
second model, in which, despite formally even distribution of functions between all
municipalities, larger towns frequently serve citizens from smaller local governments.
Obviously, such situations happen in every country regardless of territorial organization
and local government system. Still, it seems unusually common and is generally
(although silently) accepted in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, the central government
tries to promote voluntary (and semi-voluntary) co-operation among small local
governments, although many observers of this policy say they are not always implemented
and, consequently, their successes are limited.  In the Hungarian report there is also
reflection on the discussion about wider implementation of the “buying in” option.
Poland has followed the model of territorial consolidation, although the opinion
has been voiced that further amalgamation, both on the municipal and on a county
level, are necessary. The road of amalgamation has been also chosen by several Western
democracies—including all the Nordic countries, United Kingdom, Netherlands and,
to some extent, Germany and Austria. But, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, Western
experiences are also not uniform—France provides an example of an extremely
fragmented municipal tier with a mixture of upper tier (department) responsibility
for several functions and very wide-spread co-operation among tiny communes. There
are over 19,000 inter-municipal associations in France. These take various organizational
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forms such as syndicates, districts, communities of cities, etc. [Poplewska, 2002]. With
some services (water provision), France is also an example that a private provider may
be the answer for a lack of economy of scale in small territorial units [Lorrain 1997].
Table 6.5
Territorial Organization on the Basic Level—Options Available
Size of How Are Most of the Important Risks/ Recommendations
Local Local Functions Delivered
Governments
(Basic Tier)
1 Small Narrow scope of functions for local Lack of decentralisation, central provi-
governments, most of services sion is often less efficient than provision
delivered by the state administration by democratic local governments
2 Small Narrow functions of villages and small Accountability problems in delivery of
towns, several services delivered by services for small local governments
larger towns for citizens of surrounding
settlement units (which are formally
separate local governments)
3 Small Wide scope of functions for local Wide “contracting out” especially
governments, several services delivered difficult in CEE countries where
through contractual arrangements— market of providers is not developed.
“contracting out” (buying services from Local governments are usually not
the private sector) or “buying in” willing to enter “buy in” agreements
(small local governments purchase
services from the bigger town nearby).
4 Small Narrow functions for basic tier Not applicable for small countries
governments, upper tier responsible in which county/regional tier is difficult
for majority of vital functions to justify.
Fear of municipalities’ domination
by upper tier of government
5 Small Wide scope of functions delivered Political and administrative costs of
through voluntary co-operation co-operation make most of local
of local governments governments reluctant. Accountability
and transparency problems of
associations. Co-operation requires
strong central incentives and clear rules
focused on transparency.
6 Big Wide scope of functions possible Recommendations: protect
to deliver by consolidated neighbourhood (village) governments’
(amalgamated) local governments identity; avoid proportional electoral
system which may lead to local council
biased towards over-representation
of the main town.
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 Empirical evidence, presented in this book, suggests that some amount of territorial
amalgamation would have a positive impact on the economic performance of local government.
Models presented in the Polish chapter suggest that, for local governments with
populations below 20,000, the increase in population size results in the marginal loss
in democratic efficiency which is lower than marginal gain in economic performance.
So, from the cost/benefit analysis point of view, there is a lot of space for amalgamation
in most of countries in the region. However, in several cases, amalgamation is a solution
which is not politically accepted. Small village autonomy is seen as a very important value,
even if, in practice, this autonomy is more symbolic than real. The fragmented system
definitely helps to build a local democracy. In Central and Eastern Europe, where
democratic values still need careful cultivation, this argument is difficult to reject. Therefore,
we are not able to say whether the fragmented or amalgamated system is always better for
every country. The decision toward territorial organization has to be made locally and needs
to take into account what is politically acceptable.
Does it mean that the evidence and analysis collected in this book does not allow
for any definite conclusions and recommendations? We are not able to give a “best”
answer which would be valid for each set of  local circumstances, but we are able to
discuss advantages and disadvantages of the most typical solutions and to indicate
the traps that should be avoided, as well as recommend steps which may help assist
within a chosen option.
Small Local Governments (Options 1–5)
One may decide that the local democracy arguments presented above are the most
important and forced amalgamation is out of the question. But local communities do
not only have a right to autonomy, they should also have a right to information. It is highly
recommended that complex information, on the implications of maintaining the
fragmented system, is provided to local population in an easily comprehensible form.
In such cases, we can assume that, if a local government refuses to merge with another
local government, it is the result of a conscious decision and not just lack of information.
But even if we decide in favor of a territorially fragmented system (a system which
may be characterized by a large number of municipalities), there are still a variety of
arrangements (described in Table 6.5, above, as options (1)–(5)) for local government
systems available.
Option (1) (many small elected governments, but most functions are in the hands of
the state administration) is hard to accept for those who believe that local democracy and
decentralization both bring important values to social and economic life. Apart from other
reasons; why bother with the function of several hundreds (if not thousands) of local
governments if they have very little, or nothing, to do with your everyday life? Function
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of local councils and even residual local administration is always costly. So, it only
makes sense when they have an essential role to play. Symbolic representation of villages
and practical lessons of local democracy are important, but not sufficient if they have
minimal influence on the crucial services delivered to local population.
Option (2) (citizens in a small local government are served by a nearby town) has one
fundamental disadvantage. If “by definition” the catchment area of several crucial
services is different from the geographical boundaries of the administrative unit responsible
for their delivery, democratic accountability is seriously damaged. Citizens from small
villages are proud of having their own local government, which they can influence but
their local authorities have a minimal impact on the most important services. At the
same time, they do not elect the representatives (councilors, mayor, etc.) of the nearby
town (which, in fact, provides them with many important services). So, they have
no democratic influence on the way crucial services are managed. There is also no direct
link between (local) taxes paid by dwellers of small villages and delivery of many services.
The town finances these services either from its own resources (under the assumption
that its local tax base is rich enough) or gets support directly from the central budget.
Such a situation also undermines the rules for a healthy local democracy.
Option (3) (contractual arrangements through the “contracting-out” or “buying in”
of services by small local governments) sounds attractive, but most likely it is unrealistic
in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Most typically, the market for local
services (especially in the peripheral, small, local governments) is not well developed
enough to expect contracting-out to the private sector as a realistic solution. Certainly,
these options would require complex legislative changes, potentially similar to Com-
pulsory Competitive Tendering in Britain [see, for example, Walsh, 1994]. It does
not mean that there are no positive examples of contracting-out in Central and
Eastern Europe. In Poland, for instance, several cities contracted-out waste collection
and disposal. The city of Gdan´sk had already contracted-out its water provision by
1992. Yet these examples are not very numerous, moreover, they are more likely to
be found in relatively big cities than in small, rural governments. Experience from
Central and Eastern Europe suggests that local governments are not very willing to
enter inter-municipal contractual arrangements to buy services from another municipa-
lity. Most often, negotiations fail and citizens end up using the services of neighboring
authorities as “free  riders”. This is quite frequent in the Ukraine, where—for example—
citizens of one local government use the hospital services of the larger neighboring
town while their own local authorities are unwilling to contribute to financing operation
of the hospital [Swianiewicz, Tymkovych, 2002]. Similarly in Poland, most of the
negotiations between core metropolitan cities and surrounding towns, on co-financing
metropolitan public transportation system, failed as well. Further examples are relatively
easily found in other countries in the region too. However, in the Hungarian report,
this solution has been mentioned as a possible recommendation.
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So, in fact, the only two acceptable versions for “small governments” decision
are (4) and (5). The typical trouble with option (4) (small governments with limited
functions and an upper tier of elected government providing more functions) is the unpleasant
memory of the relationship between the municipal and upper tiers of government
under the previous political system. During the communist period, the higher tier
of local government used to directly supervise local communities and had been seen
as one of the main barriers to local autonomy. It is not surprising that in several countries
contemporary suggestions for a strong, elected county self-government with no hierarchical
dependencies and a clear distinction of functions between tiers of government, is
often met with distrust. Otherwise, option (4) is worth considering—as it is certainly
easier to manage than relying on the voluntary co-operation of municipalities.
Voluntary co-operation of municipalities (option 5) seems to be the most commonly
accepted. We have already mentioned numerous examples of inter-municipal co-
operation in France. There are also thousands of voluntary agreements in metropolitan
areas in the U.S.. Joint purchasing agreements provide a very good example of an
attempt at utilizing economy of scale effect (Lindstrom 1998). Clark (2000) stresses
that, in such agreements, each local government can voluntarily withdraw from the
consortium at nearly any time. This forces the consortium to act responsibly and keeps
local power within the smallest local governments, rather than transferring major power
to a metro area unit that could generate deleterious effects for democracy. However, this
positive image is not always the reality. The co-operation is complicated, has organi-
zational and political costs, and the experiences of most of European countries suggest
it almost never happens automatically or spontaneously. Wherever we find good
and plentiful examples of co-operation, they have been supported (stimulated) by central
policies. It has been so in France and often times in Hungary. Some experts suggest
that, in many cases, co-operation should be compulsory rather than voluntary. In
such an instance, one may ask, what is the difference between the existence of small
municipalities, with compulsory co-operation in delivery of some services, and
creation of an upper tier of local government? But even if we do not leap so far ahead
in our conclusions and we are strict in keeping with the principle of locally made
decisions, there are some obvious recommendations to follow. First of all, there has to
be a favorable legal framework allowing for different forms of joint-ventures between
local governments. In some countries (not presented in this book however; in the
Ukraine for example), establishing single-purpose local governmental associations
is very difficult, or even illegal. Another serious problem related to voluntary co-operation
is an issue of transparency. Transparency and democratic accountability in the associations’
decision making process is more difficult to achieve than in singular local governmental
units. Therefore, legal regulations should be especially sensitive to these issues. Clear
rules on reporting and public access to information concerning local governmental
associations’ finance, structures, and other activities may help to reduce the problem.
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Last, but not least, in each of the national reports in this book (including the Hungarian
one) we identify either that there are no real incentives, or that the system of incentives
is not coherent neither consequent. The Western European experience has been
that if no specific, strong incentives are provided by the central level authorities,
small municipalities are usually not very willing to co-operate with their neighbors
on the up keep of basic services, regardless of the technical merits of such arrangement
[Davey, 2002]. Without violating the local autonomy, central government should
build a clear set of support for co-operating local governments, as well as disincentives for
small local governments who are not willing to enter joint agreements. Otherwise, it
would be naive to expect the majority of local governments to break down all their
organizational and psychological difficulties and enter into mass co-operation.
Territorial Amalgamation (Option 6)
As it was mentioned above, there are strong empirical arguments for the creation of
large local governmental units. But, if there is a political will of territorial consolidation
through amalgamation of small local governments, there are also some practical
recommendations also worthy of consideration:
• protecting the identity of amalgamated villages. Amalgamation reforms have
been introduced to strengthen local governments and enable them to deliver
a wide scope of functions efficiently. But citizens’ identification with smaller
territorial communities is also a value worthy of protection. In most countries
which have undergone the amalgamation reform, smaller villages’ governments
did not disappear completely, becoming subjects of territorial governments.
There is usually a symbolic political representation at the village level. Both
in Poland and Bulgaria, the legal system even keeps traditional names (solectwo
and kmetstvo) and village leaders are popularly elected and recognized as
important symbols of their local communities;
• responsibility for some functions in amalgamated municipalities can be decentralized
and handed down to villages. In the United Kingdom, parish councils, although
not very powerful, play important role in local life. In Scandinavian countries,
experiments with management of some functions by small communities
within larger local governments have well advanced. In some local governments
in Poland, individual villages keep a portion of local taxes and provide some
simple functions. Both Bulgarian and Polish chapters agree that, in practice,
there is still much more progress to be made in the passing of more functions
down to villages. One may claim that a difference between the amalgamated
system (with symbolic political representation on a village level and provision
of some limited functions of the lowest possible level) and two-tier system
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(with formally independent, small villages and more powerful upper tier of
elected self-government) is not very intense.
• electoral system that prevents domination of one town and secures balanced re-
presentation of geographical interests. The typical fear of amalgamation is related
to the potential domination of the largest settlement unit and disregard
towards the needs of small villages. Bulgarian examples suggest such a fear is
not merely theoretical. As the Polish case suggests, one may reduce such a
danger through the electoral system, in which the municipality is divided
into as many wards as the number of councilors elected. Such a system ensures
that no part of municipality will be without representation and that none of
the settlement units can dominate within the council or during local decision-
making. The issue may be even more controversial when the mayor is directly
elected by all the citizenry (as it is in Slovakia, Hungary or Ukraine and as it
will be in Poland after the 2002 local elections). In such an instance, the
local council (which has more or less a balanced geographical representation)
should play an important role in crucial budget allocation decisions.
• accessibility of local administration. As it was mentioned above, the frequent
argument against amalgamation stresses that it might be troublesome for
people to travel relatively far away in order to visit the local town-hall. There
are several solutions to reduce the effects of this problem. Municipal administ-
rations may have local branches in individual villages. They do not need to
be open on a daily basis but should be accessible enough to serve local citizens
needs. This solution is technically easier nowadays due to the wide-spread
availability of the Internet and other computer technologies. But it is still
possible, even in those peripheral regions of the Central and Eastern European
countries in which such advanced technological tools are still unavailable.
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NOTES
1 Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are based on 1998/1999 data. The situation may have changed
since then in some of the countries analysed, but for the sake of a clear comparative
base more recent data has not been considered
2 However, even in this relatively simple case, there have been considerable method-
ological problems which resulted in some approximations on the graph. Firstly,
individual national reports used various size-cohorts. In several cases, Figure 6.1
includes estimations based on interpolation of data for original size groups.
˛ ˛
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Secondly, the Hungarian report used the combination of size and administrative
status (village, town, town being a county capital) criteria. Sometimes a big village
is larger than small town. Also, the county capital designation does not imply any
particular size, however, the graphic illustration is based on the assumption that
most county capitals are bigger then the other towns, and that the majority of
them are larger than a population of 50,000.
3 In Slovakia, data from Figure 6.1b refers to the share of administrative expendi-
tures to total expenditures (current + capital).
4 In Slovakia, data on the size of local government in Figure 6.3 refers to the
number of eligible voters, not to total number of citizens in the local government
unit.
5 However, one might argue that if operation of the joint school is really cheaper,
no additional incentive is  necessary.  After the initial stimulus in forming support
for the capital purchase of the bus, the maintenance of the bus service could be
financed by savings made by lower school operational costs.
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Local Government
and Public Service Reform Initiative
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), as one of the programs
of the Open Society Institute (OSI), is an international development and grant-
giving organization dedicated to the support of good governance in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Newly Independent States (NIS). LGI
seeks to fulfill its mission through the initiation of research and support of
development and operational activities in the fields of decentralization, public policy
formation and the reform of public administration.
With projects running in countries covering the region between the Czech
Republic and Mongolia, LGI seeks to achieve its objectives through
• Development of sustainable regional networks of institutions and professionals
engaged in policy analysis, reform oriented training, and advocacy;
• Support and dissemination of in-depth comparative and regionally applicable
policy studies tackling local government issues;
• Support of country specific projects and delivery of technical assistance to
the implementation agencies;
• Assistance to Soros foundations with the development of local government, public
administration and/or public policy programs in their countries of the region;
• Publishing of books, studies and discussion papers dealing with the issues of
decentralization, public administration, good governance, public policy,
and lessons learnt from the process of transition in these areas;
• Development of curricula and organization of training programs dealing
with specific local government issues;
• Support of policy centers and think-tanks in the region.
Apart from its own projects, LGI works closely with a number of other
international organizations (Council of Europe, Department for International
Development, USAID, UNDP, and World Bank) and co-funds larger regional
initiatives aimed at the support of reforms on sub-national level. Local Government
Information Network (LOGIN) and Fiscal Decentralization Initiatives (FDI) are
two main examples of this cooperation.
For additional information or specific publications, please contact:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM INITIATIVE
P.O. Box 519, H–1397 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (36-1) 327-3104; Fax: (36-1) 327-3105
E-mail: lgprog@osi.hu; Web Site: http://lgi.osi.hu
